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

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

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THE "INTENSITY" PROBLEM AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY*

WILLMOORE KENDALL
University of Dallas

GEORGE W. CAREY
Georgetown University

Dinner is over. Mr. and Mrs. Jones and Mr. and Mrs. Smith are having coffee. The question arises: What shall we do this evening? Play bridge? Go to the movies? Listen to some chamber music from the local FM station? Sit and chat? Each, in due course, expresses a "preference" among these four alternatives but with this difference: Mr. and Mrs. Jones and Mrs. Smith, though each has a preference, "don't much care." Their preferences are "mild" or "marginal." Not so Mr. Smith. His preference is "strong." He is tired, couldn't possibly get his mind on bridge, or muster the energies for going out to a movie. He has listened to chamber music all afternoon while working on an architectural problem, and couldn't bear any more. If the group does anything other than sit and chat, he at least will do it grudgingly. He "cares enormously" which alternative is chosen.

Now: which is the "correct" choice among the four alternatives? Which, "distributive justice" to one side, is the choice most likely to preserve good relations among the members of the group? Some theorists, it would seem, find these two questions easy to answer. Mr. Smith *ought* to have his way, and good relations are likely to be endangered if he does not; and these answers are equally valid whether the other three all prefer the same thing or prefer different things. Since, for the latter, the choice is a matter of indifference, it is both "more fair" and "more expedient" (less likely to lead to a quarrel) for the group to do what Mr. Smith prefers to do.

To another but highly related point. At the Philadelphia Convention, some of the delegates drew a distinction between "temporary" or "snap" or "frivolous" majorities on the one hand, and what we may call "serious" or "deliberate" majorities on the other. The Convention in consequence, wrote into the new Constitution severe limitations upon temporary majorities, and left the path to the statute-book open only to serious, deliberate majorities—that is, majorities able to keep themselves in being long enough to gain control of both houses of Congress, of the Presidency, and of the Supreme Court. Why penalize the frivolous majorities? One possible answer seems to be this: Frivolous majorities will, in due course, prove to have been more or less indifferent on the policy-issue being decided because they will *not* remain in being long enough to gain mastery of the constitutional machinery. In other words, they will show, by their subsequent behavior, that they "didn't much care," in contrast to serious majorities which will, because their preferences are "strong," "stick to their guns."

The two situations sketched above, the one posing a problem in "moral" theory the other a problem in "political" theory, have not always been regarded as *in pari materia*. There is no evidence that the 55 at Philadelphia, though they certainly distinguished between frivolous and deliberate majorities, rested the distinction on the supposed relative strength of the preferences, or the opinions, of the individuals involved. They did not, on the record at least, go behind the distinction to ask, why does the frivolous majority turn out to be frivolous, while the serious or determined majority does not? But "we," in mid-Twentieth Century America, see at once the comparability, nay the identity, between the two situations. Because our "democratic theory" is more sophisticated than theirs, we readily bring the two situations together as illustrations of the "problem of intensity": Mr. Smith's "preference," being more "intense" than that of the others, should "weigh" more than theirs. Frivolous majorities, because they reflect "preferences" that are not "intense," must bide their time in favor of majorities that reflect "preferences" that are "intense."

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* EDITOR'S NOTE: After this article had been accepted for publication, Willmoore Kendall died in June, 1967. I am grateful to his co-author, Professor Carey, for having assumed the entire burden of preparing this final draft. As Professor Kendall's friend and sometime collaborator, I am proud that his last published scholarly article should appear in this REVIEW.

What we fashionably call the "problem of intensity" *is* a problem for democratic theory. We today are indeed more sophisticated about it, as a matter of explicit theory, than the Framers seem to have been. But that does not necessarily mean we have a more sophisticated solution of the problem than theirs. It may be we have greater sophistication. The Framers, however, may have had the better answers. One purpose of this article is to investigate that possibility.

It would be difficult to say when the phrase "the problem of intensity" first began to be heard in the land.[1] But we can say when, and in what book, it appears first to have been hauled out into the open and made the topic of a self-conscious venture in theoretization.[2] And we may safely add that it is a problem that had to arise, in due course, once people had begun to speak pejoratively of "apathetic" majorities, and to question the validity, or legitimacy, of the latter's claim to act for the entire electorate. For from the concept of the "apathetic" majority it is a brief step to the concept of the "non-apathetic," that is, "intense" majority, and the idea that "intensity" is the dimension in which to measure the difference between the apathetic majority and the majority that is not apathetic. Concretely, the "intensity" problem, as we know it, arises out of analysis of a "special case" under the theory of majority-rule, or "populistic" democracy. This theory assumes, as Professor Dahl put it, that decisions should be made according to "The Rule,"[3] or, as one of the present writers put it many years ago, the "majority principle," the principle that the majority should "have its way."[4]

Now: the Rule does not, in its pure form, make qualitative distinctions among members of the group. For purposes of constituting the majority that is to have its way, all are equal to every other one. Each in voting gives his consent to the proposed decision, which only he can give or withhold and which, for that reason and because consent is the only possible basis for right, for legitimacy, must be counted equally with everybody else's consent. Translated into the more sophisticated language of the recent literature, the Rule becomes: The decision-making group adopts the decision that is "preferred by most members," each member deciding for himself what he prefers, and each expression of preference being counted as of equal "weight" with every other. What is being weighed are preferences, and vote-taking is the scale on which they are weighed. So matters stood in majority-rule theory for a long while—until, we repeat, doubts began to arise in some minds about decisions backed up not by a majority *tout court* but by an "apathetic" majority. Again translating into the more sophisticated language of the recent literature, an apathetic majority is a majority made up to a greater or lesser extent of persons who indeed "prefer" the proposed decision, but do not prefer it "strongly." And the question arises: If what we are weighing is preferences, does it make sense to let a "weak" preference count equally with a strong one. Perhaps the Rule should speak not of the decision "preferred by most members," but of the decision "most preferred by members," which, clearly, is not necessarily the same thing. And, once that possibility is conceded, a number of further questions unavoidably arise: Is there a way of "telling," at the moment the vote is taken, which members have "strong" or "intense" preferences, and which "weak" or "apathetic" preferences? If there is, can we go further and somehow distinguish between "stronger" preferences and "less strong" preferences? Can we, that is to say, "weigh" preferences at all? And if the answer to both questions is "Yes," does it become incumbent upon us to devise the electoral machinery of the future populistic democracy, assuming we can do so, in such fashion as to make sure that the policy alternative shall prevail which is "most preferred?" What then happens to the "political equality" that is the point of departure of the theory of populistic democracy? Are citizens to be made "less than equal" just because the issue being voted on is one on which they do not happen to feel strongly? More, though here we venture perhaps into less familiar territory: If political equality is to be compromised to take into account differences in intensity, are there—might there be—other differences of which the *electoral machinery should take account?* Should differences in knowledge (a strong preference, after all, might be based on ignorance, while an equally strong preference may be based on sound knowledge) also be considered? What about differences in probity? An individual's strong preference for a given measure might—just might—be born of deeply-rooted anti-social tendencies on his part. Should it nevertheless be counted equally with the equally strong preference of the man motivated by thoughts of the general welfare? Is it true that a system that does not take intensity into account is probably headed for trouble? And, *per contra,* would a system that does take intensity into account generate problems peculiar to itself? All of these, clearly, are questions that are inescapable, and they are, demonstrably, questions that lead us to the very heart of political theory as it is generally understood in our democratic age. More: they point, in our opinion, to new and potentially fruitful areas of inquiry, the exploitation of which would broaden and deepen our understanding of democratic institutions and precedures.

---

[1] The senior author of this article first became aware of it in the course of a conversation with Charles Hyneman, in 1937 or 1938.

[2] Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), whose reasoning we have attempted to reproduce in our two "situations." See, in particular, Ch. 4.

[3] Dahl, *op. cit.* See, also, Ch. 2.

[4] Willmoore Kendall, *John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority Rule* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1941). See also: Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, *Democracy and the American Party System* (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1956), Chs. 1–4.

In the hope, first of all, of clarifying the problem on which these questions touch, we shall: (1) try to show that the "intensity" problem is all too easily and frequently confused with certain other problems to which it bears a superficial cousinly resemblance, but which are, in fact, unrelated to it and, simultaneously, endeavor to show what the problem, once correctly formulated, does and does not involve; (2) put forward and defend the thesis that differences in "intensity" do indeed pose certain problems, problems as to the relation between majority and minority in the self-governing political community, of which the political theory of such a community must take account and in so doing, attempt to evaluate the effort, on the part of previous theorists, to deal with those problems; (3) raise and attempt to answer, again with an eye to the democratic theory of the past, the question: Can we conceive of a political system that, while remaining faithful to the axioms of populistic democracy, would "measure" and take into account differences of intensity? Or to put it otherwise: What minimum requirements would such a system have to meet; and (4) with the foregoing in mind, venture to suggest certain standards or criteria, by which we can assess the "performance" of this or that political system over against the problem of intensity.

I. THE NATURE OF THE "INTENSITY" PROBLEM

The problem of intensity as we know it has, as noted above, arisen as a special problem in *the theory of populistic democracy. It is not,* however, peculiar to that theory. Any theoretical answer to the question "How is the self-governing community to govern itself?" must, soon or late, make a decision as to the extent to which policies are to reflect the individual preferences of members of the community, and as to whether, in order to be reflected accurately, those preferences are (as we have now learned to state it) to be merely counted, or *both* counted and weighed. Moreover, any answer to the question, "How is a *non*-democratic political system to be viable?" can ignore differences in the intensity of individual preferences at its peril. (A Stalin, and even more certainly a de Gaulle, well knows that the stability of his regime requires him, first, to see that not too many individuals out among the governed become too disaffected, and, second, to see that enough individuals out among the governed view his policies with a degree of approval well above the "average.") The intensity problem, then, emerges as a universal problem of politics.[5] To put the same point a little differently: Although we are accustomed to hear of the intensity problem from writers who speak out of a concern for "individual rights," "the rights of the minority," the "prerequisites" of democracy, etc., we must not conclude that the problem arises exclusively out of those concerns, or that it is exhausted once those concerns are taken care of. Put otherwise again: The question "Should there be limitations on the powers of the minority in a democratic political system?" is by no means congruent with the question, "Should a democratic political system take into account differences in the intensity of individual preferences?" The first of these questions does, to be sure, readily translate itself into the second in certain circumstances. For example, where existing limitations on the power of the majority themselves become, at a given moment, an "important" political issue; or where, again for example, the legitimacy or meaning of this or that claim to "individual rights" or "minority rights" is in dispute, and the attachment or non-attachment of individuals out in the community to those rights is put to the test. Clearly, however, there is a wide range of political issues, about which the self-governing community must make decisions, that have nothing to do either with rights or with limitations on the power of the majority and that, nevertheless, pose the dilemma: "Are we merely to count preferences, or weigh them?"

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[5] For the most part we will discuss the problem in the context of the populistic model of democracy. However, most of what we have to say is also applicable to other "models" of democracy.

Another point is this: it must be clearly understood that the intensity problem is not and cannot be exhausted by focusing attention, as theorists have shown a marked tendency to do, on the "extreme case," namely, the "apathetic majority" *versus* the "intense minority," and then proceeding to show that in such a case the minority must, whether for "ethical" or prudential reasons, be given its way. Far from exhausting the real problem, the "extreme case" merely exposes the Achilles heel of the theorists who have yielded to its fascination, which we may put as follows: Up to a certain point in the argument, everything is simple: One man, one equal vote; in the absence of unanimity, the majority decision is accepted as the decision of the community. Suddenly, however, the "extreme case" presents itself, at least as a theoretical possibility that the theorist must not ignore, and he finds himself unwilling to administer to the patient the medicine his prescription calls for. Suddenly, that is to say, merely counting preferences is not good enough, and they must be weighed as well as counted, and weighed in such a manner that the heavier ones tip the scale more than the lighter ones. "The Rule" then gives way to another rule—which, we are told, is called for by considerations alike of fairness and of expediency. Now: no theorist of the extreme case—such at least is our thesis—has ever faced up to the difficulties that, so to speak, cry up at one out of this sudden transition: How is it to be justified?[6] If it can be justified in the extreme case, why not in the case somewhat short of the extreme, and if in the latter why not in the case that is not extreme at all—that is, in *all* cases? The extreme case, to the extent that it is taken into account at all, can only drive home the following theoretical unavoidable truth: The choice between merely counting on the one hand, and weighing on the other hand, is an *exhaustive* choice, about which you simply can *not* have it both ways. Having once made his choice between "preferred by most" and "most preferred," the theorist is, so to speak, stuck with it, and must apply his rule to all cases that present themselves. Nor is it any answer here to say, "Ah! we shall devise a system that both counts and weighs preferences" and not merely, or primarily, because no theorist of populistic democracy has yet brought forward any suggestion as to how this might be done (though that is a not uninteresting fact), but rather because the two rules are mutually incompatible, so that to move from the first to second is to repudiate, not merely compromise, the first. In other words, if it *were* possible to devise a procedure that would simultaneously count preferences and weigh them, that procedure would be outlawed by each of the two rules—or, if you like, by each of the two principles that, respectively, underlie the two rules.

Nor is that all: The argument for the sudden switch from counting to weighing, or from counting to some combination of counting and weighing, owes much of its plausibility, we believe, to a tacit assumption on the part of some that intensity is a "discrete" not a "continuous" variable; that is, more precisely, an intensity curve may be neatly chopped up into sections, which may be labelled "low,"

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[6] See Henry Mayo, *Introduction to Democratic Theory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960). Mayo writes: "It is often objected . . . that to count each person . . . equally is absurd: some people feel more strongly about certain issues than others. Would it not fly in the face of common sense and elemental fair play to argue that 50% plus one of the lukewarm should overrule 50 percent minus one consisting of passionate dissenters? In such artificial terms the answer is yes" (p. 178). Mayo offers no justification for this stance except that such a condition would not arise save possibly in the case of "alienated or permanent" minorities.

Dahl writes: "Even an individual who finds the Rule reasonable in cases where he believes the intensity of desire is about the same among the individuals in the minority and majority might find it intolerable in the type of cases cited above, where x is only slightly preferred by a bare majority and y is very strongly preferred by a bare minority. Indeed, probably no one would advocate the Rule for every situation": *op. cit.*, p. 49. Dahl offers no justification for the switch on ethical grounds but does introduce the value of stability. See our comments below.

"medium," or "high." Perhaps this explains the emphasis in our literature on minorities whose preferences are of "high" intensity, together with the implication that you move from the first rule to the second at the point on the curve that divides "medium" intensity from "high" intensity.[7] But this assumption is clearly unwarranted, since there is no such point; for intensity, in the very nature of the case, is a continuous variable which affords no point in particular at which "things become different" in the manner assumed. The moment at which the political system is to shift gears from the first to the second rule cannot, if we start with the assumption that intensity is a continuous variable, be formulated in operationally significant language. (See text below.) Nor can this difficulty be circumvented by shifting attention from the absolute level of intensity of minority or majority preferences over to the ratio or proportion between the intensity of the one and the intensity of the other. In our view, that would make it more difficult to define, in operational terms at least, the point at which to make the transition, since the ratio in question is again a continuous variable, and, on the face of it, more complex in character than the curve that measures absolute intensity.

In speaking of the incompatibility of the two rules, and of the principles underlying them, we have of course been emphasizing the so-called "ethical" aspect of the problem. The conclusion we have reached is that any arguments used to justify weighing instead of counting in the "extreme case" would be equally applicable to any case short of the extreme. But we reach the same result if we forget about "fairness" and attempt to state the case for weighing, or counting and weighing, instead of merely counting, in terms of the "stability" of the political system, and content ourselves with the plea: Let us, in the extreme case, weigh instead of count, because otherwise the system will, like London Bridge, come tumbling down. Here we encounter, to begin with, two baffling "technical" difficulties: First, the "stability" that now becomes the "goal" of the political system must, if it is to do useful service as a goal, be given an operationally precise definition, which (a) probably cannot be done, and (b) would, if it were done, merely give rise to further problems. Is "stability" to be equated with the perpetuation of existing formal institutions, structures, and processes, governmental and social? Is it, rather, to be equated with compliance on the part of the governed with the laws and regulations the system produces—that is, with the absence of violent resistance on the part of individuals to policies to which they are opposed? If the former, are we to understand that the political system we seek is, *a priori*, to exclude "change" except by unanimous agreement? If not that, then we must ask "How much change can the system accommodate and yet be called 'stable'?" If the latter—if, that is, we equate "stability" with the absence of violent resistance—we run hard up against the difficulty that no system can reduce violent resistance to the zero point. So we must again, soon or late, define in operationally significant terms the point on the continuum at which the amount of anticipable violent resistance warrants the shift from counting to weighing.[8] And, since different persons in any community are certain to place different valuations upon "stability" (as opposed to change) no matter how defined, as also upon the elimination of violent resistance (as opposed to bringing to bear the coercive force necessary to prevent it) no matter how defined; since, moreover, the differing valuations will be projected on differing levels of intensity; we find once again that the answer we have before us raises more problems than, even ideally, it can be said to solve. To all of which we must add this: The "case" for weighing preferences in order to assure "stability," whatever its merits or demerits, is clearly incompatible with the case for weighing preferences in the name of "fairness," save as we are prepared to assume that fairness and stability always come down, in politics, to one and the same thing.

There are, let us notice, several readily discernible difficulties involved in any proposal, brought forward in the name of "stability," for identifying a point on the curve at which a populistic democracy must cease to merely count votes and begin to weigh them because they are intense:

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[7] Such a conception of intensity has been fostered by polls which measure *direction* of opinion (agree-disagree) and also attempt to measure *depth* by asking the respondent "how much" (i.e., to what extent) he agrees or disagrees—e.g., strongly, mildly, etc. For reasons we will note below it is highly doubtful that such polls measure intensity in terms that are meaningful for a political system designed to handle the intensity problem.

[8] This job remains for our present day "behaviorists." Though apparently determined to remain ethically neutral, they are still forced back upon stability or "system persistence" for justification of their enterprises.

a) Suppose, *arguendo*, that we have identified the "strategic" point on the curve, and have been able to formulate the necessary rule in operationally meaningful terms, so that we can now recognize, with confidence, the set of conditions in which the system must shift gears. Suppose, again *arguendo*, a series of decisions in which this set of conditions is approached but not quite reached. There would then seem to be no need for the system to shift from counting to weighing. But we are compelled to ask: Would such a system really work? Would stability, no matter how defined, be insured? We can easily imagine the following state of affairs: Individuals with intense preferences just slightly below the point or level at which we are supposed to make the transition from counting to weighing being frequently thwarted or denied by the system. This could well create a very special type of intensity, not related to any specific policy issue before the population, but rather with respect to the very system itself. At this point, of course, the intensity might be of such a degree as to warrant a shifting of gears. But we can also readily imagine at this stage of the process a second group consisting of the highly intense "victors" in the series of decisions that has produced this state of affairs, exhibiting a degree of intensity for the system that would also warrant a shift from counting to weighing. What now? It seems clear to us that by recognizing intensity as a factor to be taken into account, the system, through the cumulative effects of its own operation, might very well paint itself into such a corner. In the last analysis, it has no means to solve this kind of problem.

b) Because, first, the system as envisaged here is an open invitation to minorities to "fake" the symptoms that identify it as a threat to stability; because, second, a significant number of individuals caught up in the system may, in any case, get to feeling intensely on any side of any question; because, third, the system can, since it is by definition indifferent to all ethical considerations except the maintenance of stability, exclude no decision desired by a minority that meets the conditions for shifting gears; and because, fourth, we cannot imagine a population whose rank and file members are themselves so emancipated from ethical considerations as to be willing to elevate stability to the position of a *summum bonum* (which is what the system calls on them to do)—for all these reasons, we submit, the shift-gears-for-the-sake-of-stability system has a built-in potential for generating an instability all its own. It will, predictably, produce legislation that a (to be sure) greater or lesser number of voters will deem ethically outrageous, thus intolerable, and thus reason enough for upsetting the applecart. The stability-at-any-price system, on the face of it, emerges as an ingenious machine for the *manufacture* of the kind of intensity that produces instability. That perhaps helps explain the fact that no democratic theorist has ever actually assigned to stability as such the high "rank," amongst democracy's goods, here in question. (And, we may note in passing, the point we have just made would be equally applicable if the system's founders built in its arrangements for weighing votes not in the name of stability but in the name of fairness. It would still leave intense minorities free to force on it legislation that would produce a countervailing intense minority and, at the margin, a countervailing intense majority.)

Let us now confront the central difficulty in all this: Populistic democracy (or, if you like, the theorists of populistic democracy) cannot take intensity into account. Populistic democracy's bets, unlike those of the traditional political philosophy against which it is in open revolt, are on the notion that a political system can be adjudged good or bad according as authoritative decisions within it emanate from a certain "source" (to use Bertrand de Jouvenel's terminology)—from, concretely, the majority of a voting population made up of political equals, and not some minority. Its bets are on the notion, that is to say, that the majority must get its way. Its (and its theorists') only possible answer to the question, Suppose the majority doesn't much care, while the minority cares "intensely"? is: "So much the worse for the minority. If it feels so strongly about the matter, let it get out and win a majority over to its side." For a theorist of populistic democracy even to flirt with the idea of giving the minority its way is to appeal to "values" (e.g., justice or stability), and this he cannot do because the theory has cut itself off, once and forever, *ab initio*, from such considerations. The theorist can appeal to these or similar values only at the cost of admitting to himself that he has been wrong all along. In sum: If it is justice we are interested in, or stability, or justice and stability, and not merely equality, then we had best, as constructive founders of a democracy, build from the first moment with those goods in mind. The "intensity" problem, we repeat, merely exposes the Achilles-heel of the whole populistic democracy approach to the problem of how a people is to govern itself, that Achilles-heel being an exclusive concentration, for purposes of evaluating political systems, upon the "source" of decisions rather than the quality of their "content." It cannot, for the reasons we have been expounding in this section, meet the problem by switching to a new "source" (even if that new source could be justified on its principles, which the intense minority cannot be). It must go back to the beginning, and make a fresh start.

This is not to say that the "intensity problem" is not a real problem for democratic theory, or that any democracy could be viable that failed, in some manner, to take it into account. It *is* a real problem, but one that populistic democracy cannot solve. Put otherwise: it remains true, as a matter of history, that the intensity problem has arisen as a special problem in the theory of populistic democracy; but it has not, on our showing here, arisen there properly, because populistic democracy has no hooks for grappling with it.

II. THEORETICAL CONSEQUENCES OF DIFFERENCES IN "INTENSITY"

We are not, let us reiterate, denying that there is an "intensity problem" in politics, of which democratic theory, the theory of the self-governing society, certainly must take account. All we are saying, up to this point, is a) that the theory of populistic democracy cannot, on its own basic premise, properly recognize it as a problem; and b) that, even if it could, it cannot, on its own basic premise, conceivably "do" anything about it (i.e., the only "principled" answer it can give to an outvoted "intense" minority in political society is, as indicated above, "So much the worse for you"). To those two points we may now add this one: contemporary democratic theory, because of the parochialism that lies at its very heart, has uncritically committed itself to the assumption that democratic theory and the theory of populistic democracy are one and the same thing—that, if you like, any theory that refuses to accept the populistic-democracy model, at least as a paradigm that all self-governing societies must seek to approximate at the earliest possible moment, is *ipso facto* anti-democratic, or if not that, non-democratic.[9] One purpose of the present article, let us confess, is to combat that manifestation of parochialism.

With that in mind, let us approach our topic from another angle: The majority of the enfranchised in the self-governing society, we are told in a now vast corpus of political literature, might use its power to determine the result of an election as a means for writing rules into the statute-book (or even into the Constitution, if there be one), or for implementing policies, which violate the "rights" of "minorities" or of individuals; it might violate this or that allegedly indisputable principle of morality (or, what is equally reprehensible, perpetuate injustices); it might act foolishly, or out of ignorance, or out of momentary passion; and it might, all that entirely apart, ignore potential minority resistance to its legislation or policies and so produce defiance of the law, resistance to governmental action, and, at the margin, civil war. So the question gets itself asked: Is it possible, through the electoral process, to have it both ways, that is, somehow restrain the majority when, for any of the foregoing reasons, it "ought" to be restrained, and yet not challenge its "right" to "control" the government and, through the government, both legislation and policy-making? Much of the theory of the self-governing society handed down to us from the past (i.e., from the days before the advent of the theory of populistic democracy) insists, as is well known, that the correct answer to that question is "Yes, you can have it both ways." Calhoun's "concurrent majority" system, for example, says in effect, "Yes—by giving the minority the power to veto acts of the majority; that is, by letting the minority, any minority it would seem, decide when the majority 'ought' to be restrained."[10] Similarly, John Adams' theory of the balanced constitution says in effect: "Yes, by giving the 'natural aristocracy' the power to veto acts of the majority and thus to decide when the majority 'ought' to be restrained."[11] Clearly, however, neither succeeds in having it both ways, since neither is in the slightest concerned with the majority's "right" to control the government (though it is always amusing to remember that Calhoun appears to have had no quarrel with that right on the level of state government). Equally clearly, neither seems about to lose any sleep over the distinction between "intense" minorities and minorities that are something less than intense, or that between majorities that are "apathetic" and minorities that are something less than apathetic. Alike, Calhoun's veto and Adams' veto could be wielded by a minority only marginally concerned with the issue at stake. J. S. Mill, though he perhaps moves a trifle closer to the theory of populistic democracy, seeks a solution to the problem in an "artificial balance" between "classes," maintained through a system of "plural voting" which, again, reflects an indifference to the "right" of the merely numerical majority to control legislation and policy, and demands of the plural voters only that amount of "intensity" that will call them away from their normal pursuits, whether of foxes or of learning, long enough to cast their "extra" votes.[12] Aristotle's polity, looking as it does to a "natural" rather than "artificial" balance, that is, to a situation in which the middle-class is as large as, or larger than, the poor class and the rich class, does depend upon the majority, that is, the middle class, conceived as possessing qualities that will dispose it to restrain itself, and therefore "saves" majority control of the government—though at the expense of any minority veto, and without regard (save as the majority itself may take it into account) to the "intensity" of the minority. (In the absence of such a natural balance, Aristotle is fully prepared to subordinate majority-rule to "justice" and "stability." Here, also, "intensity" figures in his formulations at most by implication, and of course even then only as bearing upon "stability," not "justice".)[13]

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[9] We need hardly document the fact that one of the major preoccupations of many political scientists, since at least the turn of the century, has been advocacy of reforms calculated to bring our institutional fabric more in line with the seeming requirements of populistic principles. Proposals for the reform of Congress, of the party system, and of the electoral college, as also the current reapportionment movement, reflect this.

[10] *A Disquisition on Government.* R. K. Cralle (ed.), *The Works of John C. Calhoun*, Volume 1.

[11] *Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States.* Charles Francis Adams (ed.), *The Works of John Adams*, Volume IV.

Now: Let us hold all that aside, and do a little thinking of our own. If the majority is to be restrained when it ought to be restrained, the power to restrain it must vest either (a) in the majority itself; (b) in some minority; or, if that means anything (as we believe it does) (c) in the people as a whole, thought of as acting through what some of us like to call "consensus." Any proposal for lodging the power to restrain in some minority, on the face of it, ends you up with minority *dictation*. Instead of solving the problem of the self-governing society, it merely sweeps it aside. To paraphrase *The Federalist*, the self-governing society cannot vest the "last say" in a minority and must never forget that the basic principle of the self-governing society is *some* form of the majority-principle—which, as Publius well knew and as our contemporary parochials forget, can take many forms. It cannot vest the "last say" in any minority, moreover, as the adverse critics of Calhoun and Adams are quick to point out, because no minority can be counted on not to abuse its veto power, and use it to its own advantage at the expense of the common good. It cannot, again, vest the power to restrain the majority in the majority itself, because there is no more reason to expect the numerical majority to restrain itself when and only when it ought to be restrained, than to expect this or that minority to restrain it when and only when it ought to be restrained. What, then, about the third possibility we mention—that of the majority being restrained by the whole people? Is it nonsensical on the face of it, since it calls upon the whole people to perform an action that the majority of the whole people is opposed to? We shall return to this below. For the moment, we can only say that *if* the idea is nonsensical, then so is the whole idea of restraining the majority when it ought to be restrained without ending yourself up with minority dictation. The restrained majority becomes a will-o'-the-wisp.

Let us now hold all that also aside, and do a little further thinking of our own. Let us imagine a society, determined to be a self-governing society, with a total population of only two individuals, X and Y, with differing notions about legislation and public policy, and let us fix our attention for the moment on X. *To the extent* that X is to have his way (we are about to see why he will not have his way completely), he will get it only if, and to the extent that, he enlists Y's cooperation, alike in the short and long term. Now: Is it not clear, Y having by definition ideas (or "preferences") of his own, that one of the "prices" X is going to have to "pay" for Y's cooperation is that of not proposing, and certainly that of not doing, things that he knows Y will find absolutely unacceptable? And if that is clear, is it not also clear that Y's potential sense of outrage is merely the "extreme case," at one end of a continuum, the other end of which is X's proposing and doing things to which Y will respond with enthusiastic approval? Which is to say: another method by which X can enlist Y's cooperation is to propose and do things that will please Y. And in between the two extreme cases lie an infinite number of courses X can adopt, that will, in descending order, please Y less and less and, beyond a certain point, an infinite number of courses that, in ascending order, will displease Y more and more. Y the more pleased is the more likely to cooperate; Y the more displeased the less likely to.

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[12] *Considerations on Representative Government* (London, 1861), *passim*.

[13] *The Politics of Aristotle*, Ernest Baker (trans.) (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962).

Now, if these propositions be correct, the following corollaries and inferences seem to us to follow:

a) If X needs Y's cooperation in order to effectuate purposes of his upon which he places value, yet ends up so displeasing Y, or failing to please him, as not to get him to cooperate, X must recognize, retrospectively, that he has acted *irrationally*. The more *irrationally*, we hasten to add, to the extent that he had means of knowing, beforehand, that his behavior would lose him Y's cooperation. Similarly X will have acted rationally if, needing Y's cooperation, he behaves in such manner as to please Y, or not to displease him, to the extent needed in order to carry Y with him. It is by no means a matter of the stability of the system and, at the margin, of X avoiding a set-to with Y; it is a matter of X being able to use the system, through time, for the realization of the purposes he cherishes. And, of course, all that we have said of X with respect to Y goes for Y with respect to X. Each, to the extent that he has purposes he expects to realize through the political system, and recognizes a need for the other's cooperation, must give thought to pleasing and/or not displeasing the other enough to keep him from withholding his cooperation.

b) Both X and Y will, clearly, always be deciding for themselves whether to give or withhold their cooperation—and whether, insofar as that is the determining factor (it is not, of course, the only one; see below), and to what extent each is pleased or displeased by the other's legislative-and-policy-proposals. Each, moreover, knows this about the other. Either, therefore, might—just might—attempt to deceive the other, or even himself, as to the "price" the other must pay for his cooperation; that is, either might—just might—try to get out of the other a little more of what pleases him, or to shoo the other off a little further from that which will displease him, by exaggerating the likelihood of his withholding his cooperation unless *his* wishes are met, his "preferences" recognized and ministered to. One major component of the art of politics in the self-governing society is skill in raising and answering the question: "This *démarche* I am about to propose—whom it is going to please, whom displease, and how much?" And that question, clearly, leads to the further question: "How can I tell?"

c) The "intensity problem" in democratic theory is, then, by no means merely a matter of a people feeling strongly *against* legislation or policy; it includes, as an equally important dimension, people feeling strongly *for* legislation or policy. (This fact is implicitly, but only implicitly, recognized in those formulations of the problem that set the "apathetic" majority against the "intense" minority, which is always thought of as being against what the majority is about to do. We do not hear explicitly—such at least is our impression—of intensely pleased minorities, or of intensely displeased majorities.) And, what is more important, the "intensity problem" is by no means peculiarly a problem of majorities over against minorities. One is tempted to say, indeed, that the normal situation in democratic policies *is* the "apathetic" majority, the majority not sufficiently concerned with or informed about the issues at stake, over against *two* "intense" minorities. Put otherwise: the X and Y of our two-man self-governing society have as their normal counterpart, not a majority and a minority, but two minorities, neither of which can hope to effectuate its purposes without eliciting some degree of cooperation from the other, with the majority playing pretty much a spectator's role until the intense minorities (in the U.S. Senate, for example, the ADA'ers and the major Southern senators plus a Hruska or two) work out a frontier treaty. One is tempted to say, in other words, that the "apathetic" majority is the normal majority, not only out among the enfranchised but even in the legislative assembly of the self-governing society; but that it stands over against not *an* "intense" minority, but two or more intense minorities.[14]

d) One interesting and unavoidable complication that suggests itself, in the light of the foregoing, is that an "intense" X may transform an "apathetic" Y into an intense Y by seeking to exact too high a "price" for his cooperation—i.e., by overestimating Y's need for him. Another component of the art of politics, therefore, is skill in not making that kind of mistake. Both X and Y must continually put to themselves, and try to answer correctly, such questions as: "How badly does he, the other, need my cooperation? Am I demanding more, in the way of being pleased or not being displeased, than I can get?" Each X and Y—dropping now our supposition that there are only two individuals involved in the system—has his own hierarchy of purposes, and, we repeat, must arrive at his own judgment as to the price he is prepared to pay, perhaps in the form of giving up on some of his purposes, for the cooperation of other X's and Y's. Thus a "passionate minority" of X's might, for example, by seeking to exact too high a price for its cooperation, or failing to offer a sufficiently high price for the acquiescence of an "apathetic majority" of Y's, transform the latter into a "passionate majority" (a fact that certain leaders of the contemporary Civil Rights movement may now be pondering). In short, any group, minority or majority, in the self-governing society, must, to the extent that it is rational in the pursuit of its objectives, constantly ask itself: "Are we going too far—are we, so to speak, over-bidding our hand?" And since groups are made up of individuals, the same thing is true of each individual member of any group. To spell the point out completely in terms of our original model, with the addition of Z: X knows that there are issues about which he feels more (or less) strongly than Y and Z appear to feel about them, and knows that his own decision as to whether to give to or withhold from Y and Z or Y or Z the cooperation they wish from him, must be made in terms of a calculation that he must make for himself—erroneously, perhaps—with an eye to the intensity of his own feelings; and he will probably assume that Y and Z, who appear to belong to the same species of animal as himself and are, presumably, much like him, are making similar calculations. The problem, we may fairly say, is common to all political systems, whether the theorists of the system are aware of it or not. Nor is it by any means confined to the "politically active" (e.g., in a democracy, the "electorate"). The "non-voter," or even the slave, can, if only by resisting, rock the boat, and this brings him also within the confines of the "intensity problem." Only to the extent that the system "handles" the problem well is the cooperation it requires likely to be forthcoming.

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[14] Virtually all of the survey studies to date testify to the fact that the American people are "apathetic," at least in the sense that they do not know or care about the major issues of public policy. Our conception of the political process runs along these lines: The proponents of change and the resistors of change have to plead their cases before what may aptly be termed a "jury" of persons non-involved in or non-affected by the "issue" at stake.

e) Returning now to the "special case" of "the majority" over against "the minority" or "minorities," there emerge, in the context of the foregoing, a number of apparent paradoxes that are highly relevant to that general problem in any self-governing political society, and suggest certain minimum conditions that the latter must meet if it is to avoid tripping itself up over the "intensity problem" (a matter to which we shall return in Section III). Specifically, these apparent paradoxes are significant because they help us to understand not only why majority-rule systems (we do *not*, we repeat, equate "majority-rule system" and "populistic democracy") have not only shown a capacity to survive, but also to survive in a general atmosphere of willing cooperation and "good feeling."

First: the majority-principle and the unanimity-principle are not, though they appear to be and are generally thought to be, *ipso facto*, mutually exclusive. On the contrary. What makes a democracy workable, and hence viable, is precisely the apparently impossible combination of these two principles in a "system" whose characteristic feature is this: it gets its decisions made by the majority, but in such fashion that those decisions elicit what amounts to unanimous, or virtually unanimous, support or acquiescence. Just as the individuals X and Y, though disagreeing about this or that policy issue, may both, the one who does not get his way equally with the one who does, string along with the decision arrived at by the "system," so the minority may string along with the majority's decision—whether because of devotion to the majority-principle as such, or because it finds itself, overall, not too discontented with the results the system produces.

Second, "restraints" on the power of the majority need not be thought of exclusively (as some, at least, are in the habit of thinking of them) as either (1) of necessity imposed from some "outside" quarter (e.g., a Constitution, or a Supreme Court), or (2) as self-imposed out of devotion to the idea of "minority rights," or (3) as necessarily "anti-majoritarian," "anti-majority rule," in their bearing. The majority may very well impose such restraints upon itself, and subsequent majorities may respect and perpetuate them, because, quite simply, they deem them necessary for reasons falling within the "intensity problem" as we have defined it. It may, that is to say, restrain itself without in the slightest writing a question-mark beside the majority-principle, or in any sense abandoning its claim to a capacity to make whatever decisions it sees fit to make, but rather out of a determination to keep the majority-rule "show" on the road. In doing so, what it may be doing is to re-assert, rather than abandon, its claim to be the ultimate caller of the shots.[15] We too often forget that in all political systems—monarchies, aristocracies, democracies, dictatorships even—the power to govern is frequently exercised (if only for convenience's sake)—through the elaboration of "procedures," established ways of doing things or handling problems, that have, operationally, the effect of limiting necessarily only for the short term. Concretely, the decision-making authority (the king, the nobles, the majority in a democracy) may deem it prudent, may even find itself obliged, in order to achieve the maximum possible in the light of its "goals," to yield on this or that policy issue to one or more groupings out in society with a view to obtaining its, or their, willing cooperation in other areas of policy—that is, to "restrain" itself. And if its calculations in this regard are correct, which is to say based on a realistic appraisal of what it is up against, it does not, in restraining itself, undermine the "system" or compromise the principle upon which the system is based. On the contrary, what it does is to enhance the efficacy of the "system" and, at the same time, the chances of its perpetuating itself as that kind of "system."

Third, the decision-making authority, including again the majority in a majority-rule "system," may restrain itself (not always "prefer" its own "preferences") out of regard to a constitutional morality, or a morality *tout court*, or even a tradition or custom that it "values." This point will, to be sure, be lost on those who insist on reducing everything to preferences; especially those who are unable to distinguish between what "I" would give my right arm to feel free to do and that which I know, or believe, I ought to do.[16] But it is, we contend, a valid point, and an indispensable one for understanding the actual functioning of viable majority-rule systems. More: the decision-making authority, monarchy, aristocracy, or popular majority, may seek to bind its successors, may seek to stack the cards in such fashion as to limit their freedom of choice, without prejudice to the principle it appeals to in exercising its authority.

Fourth, philosopher kings are indeed (as we have lately been reminded by Professor Dahl) "hard to come by." But to concede that that is true is by no means to concede that every minority empowered to restrain "the majority," or every *parlement* empowered to restrain a king or an aristocracy, will as a matter of course end up acting in its own "selfish interest," or abusing its power, or "upsetting the apple-cart," or undermining the decision-making authority it restrains. The king, the aristocracy, the majority may, for reasons of prudence or morality, among others, itself establish arrangements calculated to cut itself off from the possibility of hasty or ill-considered decisions, and these may involve putting some minority in position to exert pressure upon it, and to keep it reminded of its obligations and responsibilities—so long, of course, as it retains the power to abolish the restraint when, in its considered judgment, it no longer serves the purpose for which it was intended. Just as it can, by creating machinery that will subject it to pressures on behalf of a constitutional morality, a morality *tout court*, a tradition or custom, or the need, arising out of the "problem of intensity," to carry others along with it, so also it can place a restraining minority in such a position that it too will be subject to such pressures and can be counted on to respond to them. Philosopher kings, we repeat, are indeed hard to come by; but we are by no means ignorant as to the steps we can take, in establishing a "restraining" minority, in order to force out of it "behavior" sufficiently like that of philosopher kings to be worth our while.

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[15] The point we are making both here and above is, we believe, similar to that made by Almond and Verba in accounting for the success of "civic culture." "In general," they write, "[the] management of cleavage is accomplished by subordinating conflicts on the political level to some higher, overarching attitudes of solidarity, whether these attitudes to be the norms associated with the 'rules of the democratic game' or the belief that there exists within the society a supraparty solidarity based on non-partisan criteria."

"This balance, furthermore, must be maintained on the elite as well as the citizen level. Though our data are not relevant here, it is quite likely that similar mechanisms operate on the elite level as well. The elaborate formal and informal rules of etiquette in the legislatures of Britain and the United States, for example, foster and indeed require friendly relations. . . . And this tempers the intensity of partisanship": Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965), pp. 359–360.

[16] See F. H. Bradley, "My Station and its Duties," in *Ethical Studies* (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1937). *A*, a paycheck in hand at the end of the month, may wish above everything to chuck it all, disappear, and start all over again, yet still go home to his tawdry and sullen wife and the five sons and daughters who drive him to despair—out of a sense of duty. Those whose idiom excludes such a distinction, and will have it that in going home to the wife and kids he "prefers" to do so, have, in our view, become so "scientific" as to cut themselves off from all possible communication with persons who "prefer" to preserve the traditional relationship between language and common sense.

With all this in mind, we can lay down certain conditions that, in particular, a majority-rule "system" must fulfill if it is to handle the "problem of intensity." We turn now to this matter.

III. MEANS FOR TAKING ACCOUNT OF DIFFERENCES IN INTENSITY

At least the following conditions, it seems to us, leap to the eye, on the above showing, as among those that a political system must meet if it is to handle the "intensity problem."

1) The system must have built-in facilities for *correct reciprocal anticipations*, on the part of groups and, ultimately, of individuals, of the intensity of each other's reactions, favorable or unfavorable, to the alternative courses of political behavior open to each. In our view, to the extent that the system fails to facilitate correct reciprocal anticipations, it is likely to encourage courses of action, on the part of groups and individuals, that will prove to be self-defeating, and that may easily lead to the breakdown of the system itself. And this applies equally to the "governors" and the "governed."

2) The condition just laid down does not mean, of course, that the system must never permit groups or individuals to take action that, because of the intensity of the reaction to it in this or that quarter or quarters, will deny them cooperation, or that it must never permit groups or individuals from attempting to exact, for their cooperation or compliance, a higher price than they can get. The important point is that groups and individuals shall not base their choice among various courses of action on *false* anticipations as to how others will respond; that, if you like, insofar as that is possible, they should not act in ignorance of foreseeable unfavorable reactions. The "governors" may well decide that they are *not* prepared to pay the price that this or that group will end up demanding for its cooperation or compliance. The "governed," on the other hand, may well decide to take, over against this or that legislative or policy *démarche*, retaliatory action that will bring down upon their heads disagreeable consequences. Our condition merely stipulates that such decisions must be taken, if the system is to work "rationally" from the standpoint of the participants, with the maximum possible knowledge of the consequences they will entail.[17]

3) The condition does *not* require that a democratic system weigh "preferences" instead of counting them. As far as elections are concerned it can, in the end, do nothing *but* count, though democratic systems of course differ enormously as to who is counted, and how, and with respect to what. What it requires is merely that the "counted" shall, as they cast their votes in elections, be so situated as to be able to reckon, beforehand, with the intensity of the reaction in various quarters to the use they make of their votes. In other words, a democratic system does not fail to meet our major "condition" merely by not itself weighing preferences, but does fail to meet it when it affords groups and individuals insufficient opportunities, before their votes are cast, to do their own "weighing." Above all, our condition does not require that people be given their way on this or that issue because they happen to feel intensely about it. The decision as to when, and about what, to give them their way, is one that the "governors" must make according to their lights; it does require that those lights, when issues are "up" about which some of the governed happen to feel strongly, be dimmed as little as possible by the system's machinery.

4) Correct reciprocal anticipation requires, clearly, a high degree of mutual knowledge and

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[17] While many have contended that the Civil War was the great failure of the American political system, there is, within the framework we suggest here, reason to dispute this. Calhoun's last speech to the Senate in 1850 certainly reflected an awareness of things to come.

"I have . . . believed from the first that the agitation of the subject of slavery would, if not prevented by some timely and effective measure, end in disunion. Entertaining this opinion, I have, on all proper occasions, endeavored to call the attention of both the two great parties which divide the country, to adopt some measure to prevent so great a disaster, but without success. The agitation has been permitted to proceed, with almost no attempt to resist it, until it has reached a period when it can no longer be disguised or denied that the Union is in danger. You have thus forced upon you the greatest and the gravest question that ever can come under your consideration: How can the Union be preserved?" We repeat: All that a well constructed political system can possibly do is to provide the means for correct reciprocal anticipations, and with respect to the Civil War the American system probably rates an A+ on this score.

understanding among the participants. The science and technology of politics, despite its great leaps forward in recent decades, has yet to invent a thermometer-like device that can be inserted in people's heads, much less into their hearts, to "measure" the intensity of their preferences. The only preferences we actually "experience," and can calibrate with great accuracy, are our own; and there is indeed "no conceivable way" to "directly observe and compare the sensate intensities of preference of different individuals [or groups]," or even to correlate them with observable "changes in facial expression, words, posture, or even the chemistry of the body."[18] Yet people do, and on our showing must if their political activity is to be other than counterproductive, attempt to make such correlations. The correlations they arrive at are often "proved out" by subsequent events, as, also, they are sometimes belied by them. All we are saying, for the moment, is that the critical variable here, the variable that results now in correct anticipations and now in incorrect ones, *must* be the knowledge-understanding the "anticipator" possesses as to what makes the other "tick." (The supreme example of the process at work, and the one most of us are likeliest to have experienced, or at least observed at first hand, is the smoothly-running family, in which each participant, husband or wife, brother or sister, parent or child, precisely because of the intimacy of their life together, can predict with a high degree of accuracy how the "others" will react to various alternative courses of action on his or her part). The successful politician, one might say, is, other things being equal, successful just to the extent that his anticipations in this regard approach the degree of accuracy achieved, day in day out, by the members of a smoothly-running family. And, from the standpoint of our overriding condition, a political system is to be judged "good" or "bad" according as it facilitates, or renders difficult, accurate anticipations of this kind.

5) A further corollary of the foregoing line of argument would be the following: The more "diverse" or "heterogeneous" the political society, the greater its need for elaborate and complex "machinery" to facilitate mutual knowledge and understanding of the kind here in question. Put otherwise: to the extent that a society is relatively homogeneous, so that people can safely assume that the "others" are pretty much like themselves, any given individual may fairly be expected to come up with fairly accurate forecasts as to the reactions of those others to any given political gambit he is contemplating. This for at least three basic reasons: First, the chances are greater, just to the extent that the society is homogeneous, that the legislative act or line of policy in question will affect the "others" pretty much as it will affect oneself—that, if you like, the individual will possess first-hand personal knowledge as to the extent to which the contemplated step will or will not elicit cooperation. Second, and allowing now for the fact that a society can be highly homogeneous (non-diverse, in the sense of *Federalist* 10) and still have in its bosom groupings that will be differently affected by a given policy decision, it remains true that the participants in a society have, to the extent that the latter is homogeneous, the greater opportunities to comprehend the composition and structure of the society, the "lay" of the potentially conflicting interests, goods, and "values." Third, just to the extent that the homogeneity of the homogeneous society is a matter of *shared* interests, goals, and values, we may fairly expect from the participants a higher degree of sympathetic "identification" with each other, thus a greater desire or willingness to understand beforehand the probable effects of the action contemplated, and thus, finally, a greater effort to feel the others out and seek some kind of accommodation with those who, predictably, will, if not accommodated, "cause trouble." The "extreme" case here, of course, is the "tightly-knit," "primitive" society which seeks, and obtains at whatever cost, unanimity, that is, does not submit issues to majority determination.[19]

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[18] Dahl, *op. cit.*, pp. 99–100.

[19] See on this point Bertrand de Jouvenel, *Sovereignty* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), Ch. 8. He makes a similar point when he writes: "The wider and more developed a society is, the less can the climate of trustfulness (such as should always prevail among its members if they are to confer on each other all the benefits possible) be the fruit of a spirit of community; the widening of the circle and the growing diversity of personalities tend to destroy that spirit. For that reason the climate of trustfulness comes more and more to rest on the guarantees provided by Law. I know nothing of Primus and am emotionally neutral in regard to him. No element of personal sympathy, no feeling of our belonging to each other will induce in him a certain course of conduct as regards me—only the abstract feeling of obligation as such" (p. 132).

That Madison was fully aware of this principle is beyond dispute. "Those who contend for a simple Democracy, or a pure republic, actuated by the sense of the majority, and operating within

6) Having mentioned *Federalist* 10, with its emphasis on "diversity" as one of the two pre-conditions for a democratic republic that will not lead to tyranny, we must (a) say a word about the second of Publius' two pre-conditions, and (b) face the question whether, and to what extent, our own emphasis on mutual self-knowledge places us (as at first blush it seems to) in opposition to Publius. As for (a), all that we have said about heterogeneity as an obstacle to successful handling of the "intensity problem" evidently applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to "extensiveness." An individual or group in, say, Florida, has scant opportunity, other things being equal, to make an accurate forecast concerning the reactions of an individual or group in, say, Washington (as we have largely been reminded by Watts, which seems to have surprised its neighbors in "extensive" Los Angeles hardly less rudely than it did its constructive neighbors in Portland, Maine). Distance, like diversity, is then a genuine obstacle to the kind of mutual knowledge and understanding that emerges as desirable in the light of our analysis of the "intensity problem." And this analysis certainly appears to point to the thesis—a truism in much of what we call "traditional" political theory—that self-government can thrive only in the "small" state. Such, certainly, was the teaching of Aristotle, who, as every careful reader knows, is echoed on this point by Rousseau, with his insistence that in a true democracy each of the citizens must be so situated that he can come to know and understand the "others" whom he will encounter in the assembly. (Rousseau, we feel sure, would have construed "know" and "understand" to be a matter not merely of the "head," but also of the "heart.") We do not suggest, of course, that the traditional argument for the non-extensive republic necessarily rested, even in part, on considerations akin to our overriding condition. Far from it; we suggest merely that the traditional argument would have been strengthened *had* it explicitly taken "intensity" into account, and that contemporary democratic theory would find itself less helpless, in the presence of the "intensity problem," had it given more weight to the considerations on which the traditional theorists did rest their argument. One might add (anticipating a little what we shall say in Section IV) that democratic *societies* have, in practice, departed notably less from the traditional teaching in this area than has democratic *theory*. As for (b), whether, on our showing here, we must end up taking issue with Publius in regard to his most celebrated doctrine, the answer is "No, indeed!" For our money, the case Publius makes out in *Federalist* 51 is, quite simply, unanswerable, and the conclusion at which he arrives beyond challenge:

> In [an] . . . extended republic, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of the majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good.[20]

At worst, our analysis merely exposes a weakness of the *Federalist* 10 model, which Publius and his adepts must do something about lest their system come a cropper over the "intensity problem." (Again to anticipate a little: Publius, regardless of whether he had anything like the "intensity problem" in mind, *did* do something about it). In brief: just to the extent that a system does not meet Publius' two conditions, it will require special machinery to meet our condition, since mutual knowledge

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narrow limits, assume or suppose a case which is altogether fictitious. They found their reasoning on the idea, that they have all precisely the same interests and the same feelings in every respect. Were this in reality the case, their reasoning would be conclusive. The interest of the majority would be that of that of the minority also; the decision could only turn on mere opinion concerning the good of the whole, of which the major voice would be the safest criterion; and within a small sphere, this voice could be most easily collected, and the public affairs most accurately managed. We know however, that no society ever did or can consist of so homogeneous a mass of Citizens. In the savage state indeed, an approach is made toward it; but in that state little or no Government is necessary": Madison's letter to Jefferson, Gaillard Hunt, *The Writings of James Madison*, Volume IV, pp. 222–224.

[20] *The Federalist*, Jacob E. Cooke (ed.) (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1961), *Federalist* 51, pp. 352–353. Incidentally, this view is not so much at odds with Rousseau's as one might imagine. Rousseau does indeed teach that there should be *no* subsidiary groups in the true democracy. But he hastens to add that where that condition does not obtain, i.e., everywhere, "they should be made numerous and prevented from being unequal in size. . . . [Only in this way can you make sure] that the general will shall always be enlightened and the people never misinformed": Jean-Jaques Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, translated with an introduction by Willmoore Kendall (Chicago: The Henry Regnery Company, 1954), p. 29.

and understanding on the part of the participants, comprehension of the general workings of the system, sympathetic reciprocal identification, etc., will to that extent be, as a matter of course, the more difficult to achieve. For Publius' system, as Professor Burns has brilliantly demonstrated in a recent book, does tend to generate intense competition among the "diverse" groups that it deploys over the "extensive" territory, thus increasing the danger that a group or combination of groups will, in the "heat of the battle" and with the righteous zeal that intense competition is likely to engender, try to ride rough-shod over intense preferences on the part of other groups.[21]

7) It is impossible to mention the participants' attempts to calibrate the intensity of the preferences of the "others" by observing their behavior (the expression on their faces, the noises they make, etc.) without running hard up against this difficulty: The participants have nothing *except* observable behavior to go on in arriving at their anticipations. Yet the observable behavior may tell us more about the histrionic talents of the agonizer than about the intensity of his feelings on the issue that is up. (One thinks, as a matter of course, of Senator Dirksen, whose tear-glands would seem to be equipped with spigots.) The "others," in a word, may be bluffing about their intention to rock the boat if they can't get their way; may, for example, be using an issue about which they do not in fact feel strongly in order to gain this or that strategic advantage. And such bluffing is the more likely to be successful just to the extent that the participants have had insufficient opportunity to come to know and understand each other well. In order to meet our overriding condition, therefore, the system will require rules and procedures, analogous to those of a poker game, that impose potentially heavy penalties on the player who would like to win the pot with the weaker hand. To the extent that the system permits the bluffer to win the pot, it is unnecessarily exposed to varying degrees of instability; partly because it will run the danger of overlooking tomorrow's real boat-rockers, and let itself in for trouble it might have avoided, and partly because it will run the danger of not mobilizing, behind the goals of the decision-makers, the maximum possible cooperation available to it given the "lay" of the "intensity problem" it faces. For the majority that can be bluffed will never be in position to make accurate forecasts as to the future reactions of the "others."

Can we conceive of rules and procedures that will minimize successful bluffing? Not easily, of course; but (a) the structure of the system can take into account the fact that X is likely to get by with his bluff just to the extent that Y and Z do not know and understand what kind of poker he plays, and (b) it can, through rules formal or informal, exact sacrifices from those who, in the course of playing out a political hand, demand that the intensity of their preferences be made a *ratio decidendi*—can, that is to say, put the costs of injecting such a demand so high that no one who does not have a genuinely intense preference will be willing to pay it. One possibility: give each member of the assembly *n* number of votes at the beginning of the session, and let him "spend" them as he sees fit—all of them if he likes, on a single issue, with the understanding that once they are gone he can cast no further votes. Another: encourage the "horse-trading" and "log-rolling" for which the Congress of the United States is so frequently denounced, thus maximizing the opportunity on the part of the participants to "trade" their votes on issues about which they do not feel intensely for votes of the others on issues about which they do. Viewed from the standpoint of our overriding condition, "log-rolling" may well play a beneficent role in the political system by helping to handle the "intensity problem."

We turn, in Section IV, to the implications of our analysis for scholarly inquiry, whether "normative" or "empirical," into the institutions and procedures of those contemporary democratic systems that appear to have demonstrated their viability.

IV. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING POLITICAL SYSTEMS

The questions that want asking in the light of the foregoing would appear to be these: First, to what extent do the "going" democratic systems meet the overriding condition we have laid down in Section III? And second, insofar as these systems fail to reflect accurately the "models" elaborated in democratic theory (i.e., insofar as they represent departures from those models), to what extent can we say that the models themselves meet that overriding condition? We can, we trust, pose those questions without seeming to suggest that democratic models and systems should be viewed, and judged, exclusively on the basis of their handling of the intensity problem. Our point, from first to last, has been merely that a democratic system which fails to provide facilities for accurate reciprocal anticipation among the participants does so at its peril.[22]

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[21] *The Deadlock of Democracy* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963).

Let us take up these questions in reverse order, speaking first of the models, and, following Professor Dahl, assuming that after you clear away the smoke, there remain only two: "populistic democracy" and "Madisonian democracy,"[23] the first of which underlines the bulk of contemporary empirical research by American political scientists, and may fairly be called the current orthodoxy, while the second is that embodied in *The Federalist*.[24]

First, then, the model of "populistic democracy." Its essential characteristics are: (a) it treats *elections* (in which *all* the citizens cast equal votes) as the be-all of democracy; (b) it conceives of elections as a means through which the voters express their "preferences" on matters of policy; and therefore (c) it understands elections as having no other function, properly speaking, than to eventuate in policy "mandates" that are, *sensu stricto*, governing, and, governing precisely because they express the *will* of a majority of the voters.

Now: reminding the reader that we are not concerned here with the model's "merits," either from the standpoint of ethics or from that of "workability,"[25] we ask only: What about it from the standpoint of the intensity problem? And our answer must be: The populistic model, just to the extent that it *is* workable and therefore capable of achieving its primary objective (a one-one correspondence between governmental action and the "preferences" of the majority), is, on the face of it, incapable of handling the intensity problem, and for the following crystal-clear reasons: (a) the constitutional morality implicit in the model encourages voters—nay, imposes upon them the obligation—to consult their *own* preferences about policy as they cast their votes, so that, just to the extent that they live up to that morality, they precisely do *not* take into account the preferences of the "others." Why should they, since the avowed purpose of the model is to translate, into legislation and policy, the preferences of the victorious majority? The role of the minority in the model—again on the face of it—is to say to itself, after the election, "so much the worse for us," and then obey the "mandate." (b) If we abstract from (a), and do impute to the majority a disposition (with a view to gaining its objectives) to take into account the preferences of the minority, and "weigh" them with an eye to their "intensity," the eristical clash between two idealogico-programmatic "alternatives" at election time, which the model's admirers deem necessary for a clear "mandate" that must at all costs be executed, is—still again on the face of it—the worst possible arena for working out the kind of accommodation needed for handling the intensity problem.[26]

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[22] By doing so, it both renders itself inherently unstable (an "empirical" judgment) and lays itself open to the charge (a "normative" or "ethical" judgment) that, by failing to elicit the maximum of cooperation available to it for the achievement of its objectives (which, *arguendo*, we assume to be "good"), it is self-defeating and therefore "bad." We hope to have dissociated ourselves sufficiently from the view that intense preferences should get the green light just because they are intense.

[23] Subject to correction by Professor Dahl, "polyarchy," on our reading of the *Preface*, is a variant of the model of "populistic democracy."

[24] Whose author was not, of course, Madison, but a creature with three heads who answered to the name "Publius."

[25] Professor Dahl is well aware of the difficulties involved in midwifing a "mandate" out of the electorate, as he indicates in the last chapter of his *Preface*.

[26] In this connection a comparison of the writings of Clinton Rossiter and James Burnham is instructive, as concretely illustrating how the differences in the two models manifest themselves with respect to American institutions.

Rossiter writes of the Presidency in the follow- terms: " . . . he is . . . the Voice of the People, the leading formulator and expounder of public opinion in the United States. While he acts as political leader of some, he serves as moral spokesman for all." Or: "Throughout our history there have been moments of triumph or dedication or frustration or even shame when the will of the people—the General Will, I suppose we could call it—demanded to be heard clearly and unmistakably. . . . No effective President has doubted his prerogative to speak the people's mind on the great issues of his time, to act, again in Wilson's words, as the spokesman for the sentiment and purpose of the century": *The American Presidency*, rev. ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1960), pp. 32–33.

Contrast this with Burnham's description of Congressional operations. "Many who complain about congressional slowness and inefficiency have not stopped to reflect that many of the ways in which Congressmen 'waste their time' are apt methods for accomplishing the tasks of a representative legislature in a democratic repub-

What such a clash is likely to produce is more or less angry determination on both sides to have one's way and, at the margin, a fanaticism that is only too willing for the chips to fall where they may. Nor is it possible to answer either that the "leaders" will make the needed accommodations in the act of drawing up the alternative programs (*their* job, as the model's explicators understand it, is to elaborate a program that will win a majority by appealing to the preferences of the larger number), or that the needed accommodations will be made, after the elections, in the assembly or by the executive (exactly the point about the model is that the real decisions about law and policy get themselves made at the polls, so that decision-making "history" is, so to speak, over when the polls close). (c) The "preferences" of the majority are, of course, in the last analysis the preferences of the individuals of which it is composed, which the model treats, if we may put it so, as "givens." But to say that is to expose the great weakness of the model from the standpoint of the intensity problem, the handling of which calls for, on the one hand, the wish for statesmanlike accommodations insofar as they are needed in order to prevent rocking of the boat, and the kind of knowledge and understanding, partly "intellectual," partly having to do with the (not-very-intellectual) capacity for empathy, needed for working out such accommodations. Now: the wish, or if you like the disposition to entertain such a wish regarding this intellectual know-how and empathy do require qualities with respect to which we should expect a log-normal distribution out among the population. Which is to say: the larger the number of people a party attracts into its projected majority, the further it must dip into strata of the population where these qualities are present in more and more modest quantities. To state this another way: the very fact that the majority is by definition made up of lots and lots of people, incapacitates it for "feeling out" the intensity of the minority's preferences.[27] (d) Decision-making history, we repeat, is over when the model's polls close, and this has the following further consequence: "Inter-election" policy decisions on issues included in the mandate (i.e., on the very issues that are most likely to produce unanticipated intense reactions that want placating) are out of the question. Concretely, the model hauls out into the open and emphasizes the kind of situation that cannot be handled consistently with its own basic principles of majority-rule: a majority preferring X, whether apathetically or intensely, standing over against a minority that intensely prefers Y, each committed, by the election, to a course of action irreconcilable with that preferred by the other; and in a context where nothing can be done about it short of the next election—a situation that is, of course, the more threatening the longer the interval between elections. The model first divides the voters into warring camps, then prevents their ranks from closing.

Does the *Federalist* model come off any better, from the standpoint of the intensity problem? Its characteristics, as we understand them, are: (a) It treats *deliberation*, that is, dialogue back and forth among members of the assembly and among the "branches" of the government, as the be-all-end-all of the democratic process, and claims for it that it will produce the "sense" (*not* the will) of the people as a whole. (b) It regards elections as means through which the voters express not their "preferences" on issues of policy or their "will" as to what the government is to do tomorrow, but their considered judgment, amongst the candidates who present themselves, as to which is the "best" man they can send forward to participate in the deliberative process contemplated in characteristic (a). (c) It postpones actual decisions concerning policy issues until a relatively tardy moment in the process of deliberations. (d) It places no premium upon an all-inclusive electorate, or upon an equal impact upon policy for each

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lic: by the chats and correspondence with constituents, the encounters with the press, the lunches with experts from the bureaucracy and even the cocktails with the lobbyists, the informal hours with each other and the staff professionals, the lecture trips to cities and universities, the travel junkets at home and abroad, the members are not merely helping to get themselves re-elected . . . but getting to know—or, better, to feel—the myriad problems and interests, the competing needs and desires, complaints and demands, that the legislature, if it performs its function, must try to weave into some sort of working resolution": *Congress and the American Tradition* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1959), pp. 264–65.

[27] Our voting and public opinion studies have shown, over and over again, that the rank-and-file voters are incapable of expressing, through an election, even their own "real" preferences. To impose upon them the further obligation to anticipate the impact of their mandates upon the cooperativeness of persons with different preferences is, clearly, to overburden them.

member of that electorate; it contemplates, rather, a citizenry divided into the two categories "voters" (i.e., persons able to meet whatever "qualifications" subordinate legislatures may have set for admission to the electorate) and "non-voters," and is not *ipso facto* unfriendly to "qualifications" that tend to make entry into the first of these categories more or less difficult. And (e) while it does not prohibit capture of its governmental machinery by a bare majority of the electorate, or legislative and policy decisions imposed by a bare majority of its bicameral assembly, it discourages both and, by clear implication, seeks decisions by "consensus."

Now: to return to our question. Just as the model of populistic democracy looks as if it had been devised to prevent handling of our intensity problem, because it renders grossly improbable correct reciprocal anticipations as to how the "others" will react to decisions by the "governors," so the *Federalist* model affords maximum facilities for such anticipations. And this for the following reasons: (a) Its implicit constitutional morality, which cannot be stated in the language of "preferences" or "will," is so to speak a summons to "statesmanship" understood as the eliciting of maximum cooperation—that is, as a matter of *not* ignoring the feelings of the losers in elections. (b) Since it does not encourage voters in elections to suppose, in casting their votes, that they are making actual policy decisions (i.e., since it tells them, in effect, that it is theirs only to choose the men who are to make those decisions at a later date), it is far less likely than the populistic model to divide the voters or, for that matter, their representatives, into warring camps committed, as we put it above, to irreconcilable positions. (c) By spreading actual policy-decisions out over a period of many months or even years (for so the inventors of the model conceived of it), it affords the participants in the decision-making process maximum opportunities to know and understand one another, to "feel each other out," and thus to arrive at correct reciprocal anticipations about future reactions to current policy alternatives. (d) Because it clearly takes a dim view of decisions by a bare majority, it puts the participants (whom it *expects* to arrive at a "consensus") under severe pressure to come to know and understand one another, to "feel each other out." (e) Decision-making history, far from being over in the *Federalist* model once the polls are closed (the word "mandate" does not appear in the model's dictionary), happens precisely in the intervals between elections, so that the model is at all times highly flexible as regards accommodations with potential boat-rockers. (f) To the extent that the qualifications for admission to the electorate make any sense whatever (=to the extent that the distinction between voters and non-voters is made meaningful, which, to be sure, cannot be guaranteed beforehand), the model may indulge the hope, impossible under the populistic model, of "creaming off" from the people, to become politically active, those whose scores would put them in the upper reaches of our log-normal curves (see above)—in the hope, in short, of not making demands on the participants that they are incapable of meeting.

But, the reader may object, have you not, insofar as you have proved anything, proved too much? Is there not every reason to believe that the British system of government (and its imitators in Australia and Canada) handles the intensity problem about as well as the American system? And is not the British system the very embodiment of the populistic model, as the American system is, traditionally at least, the embodiment of the *Federalist* model? Have you not, somewhere along the line, misled us, and proved to be impossible in theory that which every reader of the *New York Times* sees, under his very nose, in daily dispatches from London and Ottawa?

These are, evidently, questions that demand treatment on a scale far exceeding the limitations of a single article. But we can at least indicate the shape of the answers called for as follows: Let us concede, *arguendo* but reluctantly, that the British system handles the intensity problem about as well as the American system—that the former, like the latter, does bump along from decade to decade without creating pockets of irridentism that produce crises. But that is by no means to acquiesce in the main thrust of the objection, for two reasons: First, the governments in question do *not*, in our opinion, "embody" the model of "populistic democracy" to anything like the extent that some writers like to suppose. The British parties, at least as we see them in the dispatches from London, neither offer the voters at election-time the clear choice between alternative policies that the model calls for, nor make the unabashed appeal to "preferences," i.e., self-interest (as opposed to supposedly irrelevant considerations such as the "wisdom" and "virtue" of the competing candidates), which some textbook descriptions of the system would lead one to expect. The party that wins the election does, to be sure, win it on a "program," and does come to power with a "mandate" of sorts to carry out the program. The majority principle does, no doubt, command in Britain a kind of allegiance it has never enjoyed in America. Votes in Parliament do, *when they are finally taken*, no doubt reflect a very high degree of party "regularity." But the two major parties, each of which notoriously has its "left" and "right" wings, are by no means the national monoliths of the populistic model, which is to say: Electoral contests remain to a very considerable extent "local," with great differences of emphasis between candidates of one and the same party from constituency to constituency, and, in any case, are (from, e.g., the point of view of an American Conservative) more similar "ideologically" than dissimilar. Parliament, moreover, has by no means yet been reduced to the "rubber-stamp" role that the model would attribute to it. It remains essentially a *deliberative* body in the strict *Federalist* sense of the term, and its deliberations certainly turn, in very large part, on the majority's recognition that concessions must be made to the views of the minority. It gives M.P.'s on the two sides of the House all manner of opportunities to get to know and understand one another. The M.P.'s, if only because their constituencies are closer to hand, do, if anything, more constituency "nursing," more "feeling out" of the drift of voter opinion between elections than their American counterparts, and one who follows the dispatches gets the impression that the M.P. at home for the week-end by no means confines his attention to members of his own party, and is by no means without sources of information as to what measures will result in irridentism; and not a few writers on the British system have suggested that the "week-end" house-parties bring the leaders of the parties together in a kind of intimacy that, say some, has no equivalent in the American system. In sum, the British system involves a great deal of machinery that brings it, in point of fact, closer to the *Federalist* model than to that of populistic democracy. Viewed in the light of our analysis of the problem of intensity, this clearly facilitates accurate anticipations, back and forth among the M.P.'s, of one another's future reactions. Secondly, Britain remains, by contrast with America, a relatively homogeneous (i.e., non-"diverse") society that lives and has its being on a relatively tiny (i.e., non-"extensive") piece of real estate and therefore has, on our own showing, less need than the American system for *ad hoc* procedures to take care of the intensity problem. The fact it nevertheless takes the trouble to provide procedures that come off very well when referred to our overriding condition, rather fortifies than weakens the main argument of the present article.

One might argue, similarly, that if the American system is beginning, of late, to show signs of tripping up over the intensity problem, these are to be explained, in large part, in terms of a certain "slippage" in the direction of the populistic model. While we cannot fully explore this matter here, this much seems worth saying: Small wonder that—let's call it the Law of the Pinching Shoe—in any democratic system those institutions that enable it to handle the intensity problem are the ones most likely to become the target of "reform" proposals whose adherents press them with impassioned zeal, and the more certainly when those institutions are part of the very fabric of government and thus highly visible to participants in the political process (as they are in America, and are not in Britain). We have already expressed skepticism as to whether anybody ever gets to believing in the majority-principle in the sense of being ready, as a matter of course, to accept any and every majority determination, no matter how outrageous or disagreeable it may seem.[28] It nevertheless remains true that the idea "unanimity being impossible, the majority must decide" is likely, in an age when egalitarian notions pervade the intellectual climate, to commend itself to many people as axiomatic, self-evident, etc., and as, therefore, ultimately the essence of the democratic process; and from there, there is indeed nowhere to go, logically, except to automatic condemnation of institutions that "frustrate" the "will" of the majority as, *ipso facto*, "undemocratic." In other words, solutions calculated to prevent intense minorities from kicking up a future fuss are likely to displease the large number of persons who, because of them, end up politically with something less than the jackpot; and it is only natural that they should direct their fire not merely at the substance of the decisions in question, but also at the rules and procedures that produced them, and that they should make noises about "minority dictation." And, in absence of a certain understanding of, and commitment to, *Federalist* political philosophy,[29] efforts will be made to bring the system in line with the populistic model. We hope to have shown, however, that proper evaluation of such reform proposals is an extremely difficult and delicate undertaking, and that it must, at some point, face up to the question: What, if you clear a wide-open path for the majority, will happen to the cooperation the majority needs from the minority or minorities that will take exception to its policies? And let that man think twice who is tempted to say either that cooperation is not needed, or that it will be forthcoming as a matter of course. Those answers tempt him precisely because he has not done his homework. And the literature of political reform in America seems to us to rest, to a frightening degree, upon some such tacit premises.

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[28] An exception would perhaps have to be made here for situations, such as that in the bosom of the Supreme Court, where the participants really regard each other as pretty much equals. But we have yet to see a national democratic system in which *that condition* is fulfilled.

[29] Again, not necessarily in the heads of the participants. Such understanding and commitment can, in Lincoln Steffen's phrase, lodge itself

In our view, at least the following questions are highly relevant when dealing with the problem of reform. To what extent do existing deviations from the populistic model facilitate correct reciprocal anticipations? Given the social, economic, cultural, and political structure of the society, what means are available for the majority to impose its will after gaining full knowledge as to the possible reactions to its decisions? Is there reason to believe that certain identifiable minority groups are permanently advantaged or disadvantaged by the existing rules for making decisions, and in a way that does not facilitate handling of the intensity problem?

Finally, we submit: (a) The foregoing analysis of the intensity problem lays bare a whole series of heretofore neglected questions with respect to populistic democracy. (b) Contemporary studies of existing political systems, whether "empirical" or "normative," all too frequently overlook the complexities introduced by the intensity problem. And (c) we can hope to understand existing democracies only to the degree that we are prepared to take into account the dimensions of the intensity problem and the complexities it introduces.

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in the "hips"—and not merely the hips of isolated individuals, but those of the generality of men in a democratic society. The American people, who up to now have turned a cold shoulder to most reform proposals of the kind here in question, despite the pleadings of the most knowledgeable writers on such topics, certainly do not do so out of an intellectual understanding of Publius; but they do so, all the same.

A THEORY OF THE CALCULUS OF VOTING*

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Much recent theorizing about the utility of voting concludes that voting is an irrational act in that it usually costs more to vote than one can expect to get in return.[1] This conclusion is doubtless disconcerting ideologically to democrats; but ideological embarrassment is not our interest here. Rather we are concerned with an apparent paradox in the theory. The writers who constructed these analyses were engaged in an endeavor to explain political behavior with a calculus of rational choice; yet they were led by their argument to the conclusion that voting, the fundamental political act, is typically irrational. We find this conflict between purpose and conclusion bizarre but not nearly so bizarre as a non-explanatory theory: The function of theory is to explain behavior and it is certainly no explanation to assign a sizeable part of politics to the mysterious and inexplicable world of the irrational.[2] This essay is, therefore, an effort to reinterpret the voting calculus so that it can fit comfortably into a rationalistic theory of political behavior. We describe a calculus of voting from which one infers that it is reasonable for those who vote to do so and also that it is equally reasonable for those who do not vote not to do so. Furthermore we present empirical evidence that citizens actually behave as if they employed this calculus.[3]

I. THE BASIC VOCABULARY

We start with the variables customarily used in the analysis of the calculus of voting:[4]

N: set of eligible voters for a particular election
n: number of members of N
V: set of actual voters in a particular election
v: number of members of V
R: the reward, in utiles, that an individual voter receives from his act of voting
B: the differential benefit, in utiles, that an individual voter receives from the success of his more preferred candidate over his less preferred one
P: the probability that the citizen will, by voting, bring about the benefit, B; of course, $0 \leq P \leq 1$
C: the cost to the individual of the act of voting.

The expected utility hypothesis expresses the calculus of voting thus:

$$R = (BP) - C \tag{1}$$

so that, if $R > 0$, it is reasonable to vote; while, if $R \leq 0$, it is not reasonable. Since in any election where n and v are as large as they typically are in national elections in the United States P is a very small number (e.g. 10^{-8}) and since it is usually thought that $C > 0$, it follows that B

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[1] The two most interesting presentations of this analysis are Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper, 1957), pp. 36–50, 260–276 and Gordon Tullock, *Toward a Mathematics of Politics* (University of Michigan Press, 1968), Chapter 7.

[2] In Downs' theory, which he characterizes as "positive, but not descriptive," there is no reason to expect descriptive accuracy, although in science one would expect to discard positive theories that are inadequate as descriptions. Tullock's theory is, however, intended to be descriptive.

[3] There is continuing interest in political science in the question of whether or not the substantive decisions in voting are rational: e.g., B. R. Berelson, P.F. Lazarsfeld, and W. N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago, 1954); and V. O. Key, *The Responsible Electorate* (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), the former of which takes the position that substantive decisions are irrational while the latter argues that they are rational. See also W. H. Riker, *Democracy in the United States* (2nd ed., New York, 1965), pp. 47–49. This essay may be taken as supporting the position of Riker and Key on the procedural level, i.e., that voters are rational in deciding whether or not to cast a substantive ballot.

[4] When we say "customarily," we are referring not only to the work of Downs and Tullock, but also to the numerous unpublished analyses we have read or heard from political scientists and economists over the past twenty years.

must be a very large number (as compared to C) when R is positive. The size of B when R is positive does indeed stagger the imagination. Hence it is concluded that R is typically negative, even when the citizen votes, which is of course irrational.

Accepting (1) as a reasonable initial expression of the calculus, the problem for those (like ourselves) who wish to render the inferences from it also reasonable in the explanation of behavior is to examine each element of (1) in order to determine an appropriate method for estimating its parameters. So we shall examine R, C, P, and B successively in order to understand and interpret (1).

Since, in (1), R is a consequence of three other variables, it cannot be examined directly. But it can be examined in relation to the real world, for the actions of real people in the real world set constraints on R, if we wish R to be descriptive. The problem for the theory is to explain the fact that in the real world some people vote and others, who are eligible, do not. Hence if R is to be descriptive, it must be the case that, for an individual voter, i,

(2) if $i \in N$ and $i \in V$, then $R_i > 0$ and if $i \in N$ and $i \notin V$, then $R_i \leq 0$.

We know from empirical investigation that there are classes of eligible voters who vote in very high proportions (e.g. about 92 percent of the white prosperous males aged 46–64 in the midwest voted in 1964) and there are other classes of eligible voters who vote in very low proportions (e.g. about 20 percent of the Negro, poor, females aged 21–24 in the South voted in 1964).[5] Surely any theory of the utility of voting must reflect and explain this difference. And this is what statement (2) demands by insisting that, for each individual, R be calculated in such a way that it is positive for voters and zero or negative for non-voters.

Empirical investigation has revealed numerous other facts about R. Not all of these appear to be relevant here; but at least one certainly is, so we point it out as an additional constraint on R. In a descriptive theory, R must be consonant with facts we already know. Hence this prior knowledge is a kind of constraint on the way R is calculated.

The constraint arises from the following fact: In election districts in which one party is completely dominant (e.g., the solid South as it existed from ca. 1880 to 1952), it is typically the case that many more people vote in the primary of the dominant party then in the general election. Signifying the primary with the subscript "1" and the general election with the subscript "2", this fact can be expressed

$$(3) \qquad v_1 > v_2.$$

For at least those voters included in V_1 but not in V_2, it must be the case that

$$(4) \qquad R_1 > R_2.$$

It is probably true that (4) holds for those who vote in both elections as well; but we have no way of knowing for sure. And of course about those who do not vote in either election we know only that $R_1 \leq 0$ and $R_2 \leq 0$. But we can be sure that (4) holds for some voters.

The constraints on R, (2) and (4), are obvious; but they are not trivial for they permit some methods of calculating R and prohibit others.

II. A REINTERPRETATION OF B AND C

It has usually been assumed that B, representing the gain from the success of one's favored candidate, is always positive and C, representing the cost of voting, is always a subtraction in equation (1). These assumptions, $B > 0$ and $(-C) < 0$, seem needlessly restrictive and perhaps unrealistic and so we reopen the discussion of them.

In Downs' analysis B is calculated for an individual, i, thus:

$$(5) \qquad B_i = E(U^1{}_{t+1})_i - E(U^2{}_{t+1})_i$$

where

U^x is the utility for the individual of the election of candidate x,

$$x = 1, 2$$
$$(U^1)_i > (U^2)_i$$

t is a time period
$E(U)$ is expected value of U

so that B is simply the difference in expected utility for the individual of the election of his favored candidate over the election of his disfavored one. As such, of course, it is always positive or zero.[6] Similarly C is the collection of time spent on the voting decision, the act of voting itself, etc. Since time itself is always costly, C is always to be subtracted in equation (1). Unfortunately, this incomplete analysis of the act of voting has been followed by most other analysts.[7]

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[5] U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports* Series P-20 #143, "Voter Participation in the National Election: November 1964," (Washington, 1965).

[6] Downs refines (5) considerably and we refer the reader to his work cited, pp. 38–47, for the full presentation.

[7] Downs, of course, recognizes that his is an incomplete analysis of the act of voting. Because

TABLE 1. CATEGORIZATION OF EFFECTS ON THE EXPECTED UTILITY OF VOTING

(6)	Effects on the Expected Utility of Voting	Effects for which the magnitude is dependent on the individual contribution to the outcome	negative (a)—absent from (1)
			positive (b)—B in (1)
		Effects for which the magnitude is independent of the individual's contribution to the outcome	negative (c)—C in (1)
			positive (d)—absent from (1)

If, however, we consider voting as a self-contained act with a set of associated effects on expected utility, some of which are positive and some negative, then we can approach the matter more realistically, for we have put the act of voting in a fuller context. In (1), we apparently distinguish between those parameters of the *utility function* for which the magnitude is dependent on the individual's contribution to the occurrence of a favorable outcome and those parameters of the utility function for which the magnitude is independent of his contribution. That is, B is multiplied by P, while C is not. This suggests a categorization of the effects on expected utility into those which are dependent on the outcome and those which are not. And each of these categories can be further subdivided into positive and negative effects. Hence we get Table 1.

Since category (6 (b)) is what has hitherto been called "B" and category (6(c)) what has hitherto been called "C", we need not concern ourselves further with them and can concentrate on interpreting (6(a)) and (6(d)). Let $(6(a)) = A$ and $(6(d)) = D$.

Both A and C are kinds of costs, which have not previously been distinguished, probably because only the costs in C are universal. Nevertheless costs in A can exist. Consider an election without a secret ballot (as still occurs in one state) in which a Negro farm laborer votes for a candidate opposed by his white employer. The amount of reprisal the laborer can expect is presumably related to the amount of rancor the employer feels. And this will doubtless be greatest if the employer's favored candidate loses by a narrow margin. Hence it will probably not much hurt the laborer to vote for a candidate who loses or who wins by a wide margin; but it may hurt him considerably to vote for a candidate who just barely wins. Such circumstances of course exist even under the secret ballot if the employee reveals his preference to his employer or the part of the laborer is played by one spouse and of the employer by the other.

The variable A appears to be a rather com-

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of the particular theory of rationality he adopted, however, he was unable to include other considerations. Rationality may be interpreted broadly as the ability to order preferences and to choose the more preferred action over the less preferred. In this sense, almost all behavior is rational and the assumption of rationality is close to tautological. Because he thinks the tautology is sterile, Downs rejects this definition of rationality, which is the one customarily used by economists, for a narrower interpretation in which rational behavior is only that behavior directed toward the goals that the theorist postulates as appropriate for a particular realm of action. As a result Downs cannot include "non-political" benefits (i.e. those calculated in (7) but not in (1)) in his analysis, although many of the benefits he cannot include are clearly political. It seems to us that he is unduly bothered by the tautology, which after all does affirm something, namely that people calculate about their actions and that their calculations can be understood by others. It seems to us also that in a descriptive theory it is unwise for the theorist to impose his own interpretation of goals on the observed behavior. By so doing, he falls into the trap (that all the natural law theorists fall into) of saying that one goal is rational and another is not. Because it is not possible to judge the "rationality" of goals—unless one adopts some sort of natural law theory—we will adopt here the broader interpretation of rationality, recognizing its tautological character, in order to develop a theory that may more adequately describe behavior.

plex function of the election returns and P. Since the magnitude of A is, in the foregoing example and probably generally, dependent on the margin of victory of the employer's less preferred candidate, the expected utility loss to the employee can be written as $Pf(M)$, $A = f(M)$ and M = margin of victory. Because A is probably both non-universal and complexly related to R, we think it likely that formal incorporation of A in the analysis will yield little payoff. We therefore neglect it from this point on.

Although the costs in A are probably rare in the real world, the benefits in D are substantial and their omission from (1) seriously impairs its adequacy. Among these elements in D are the following positive satisfactions:

1. the satisfaction from compliance with the ethic of voting, which if the citizen is at all socialized into the democratic tradition is positive when he votes and negative (from guilt) when he does not.
2. the satisfaction from affirming allegiance to the political system: For many people, this is probably the main rationale for voting. It is also a highly political motive and to leave it out of the calculus would be absurd.
3. the satisfaction from affirming a partisan preference: Voting gives the citizen the chance to stand up and be counted for the candidate he supports. For many voters this must be the most important and politically significant feature of voting. Why else vote so determinedly for a candidate whom the voter knows is almost certainly going to lose or, for that matter, going to win? In the United States, millions of Stevenson supporters did that in 1956 and millions of others in 1964 for Goldwater, two sets for which there was probably very little overlap. Some of these millions must surely have been clear-headed enough to see how poor were their hero's chances. And for this clear-headed group at least, the major satisfaction in voting must certainly have been this one. Of course, it is relevant for those who support a winning candidate also.
4. the satisfaction of deciding, going to the polls, etc.: These items are usually regarded as costs, but for those who enjoy the act of informing themselves for the decision, who get social satisfactions out of going to the polling booth, etc., these supposed costs are actually benefits.
5. the satisfaction of affirming one's efficacy in the political system: The theory of democracy asserts that individuals and voting are meaningful and for most people the only chance to fulfill this role is in the voting booth.

Doubtless there are other satisfactions that do not occur to us at the moment; but this list is sufficient to indicate the nature of D. It should be noted that most of the items, and the most significant items, are political satisfactions or benefits and therefore must be included in any consideration of the political rewards of voting.

Equation (1) can now be rewritten:

$$R = PB - C + D \tag{7}$$

III. CONSTRAINTS ON P

For many voters, the weightiest parameters of R are C and D. It may be tempting, therefore, to disregard P and B. But this is unreasonable, as the following illustration suggests: Consider a primary election in which the only candidates are those for a non-partisan judicial office. (Some states actually conduct such trivial elections.) Naturally the participation is very low, but still as much as ten percent of those registered vote. The usual incentives summarized by D are far less influential, so that for most citizens $C > D \geq 0$. For those who do not vote, it must be that $C > (D + PB)$. For those who do vote, however, it is probably also true that D is very small or zero, since voters are subject to the same influences rendering D small as are non-voters. So, for at least some voters it must be the case that $C > D$. Yet they can become voters, given the constraint of (2) only if $PB > (C\text{-}D)$. We can be sure in such an election that P is vastly larger than usual in elections in the same jurisdiction. Hence, even if B is smaller than usual, PB may be relatively large. It is not unreasonable to suppose, therefore, that what impels the (admittedly small number of) voters in such elections to be voters is the size of PB. And if we can see the force of PB in elections like this one, it can be supposed to operate for some voters in other elections.

Even if we can have some confidence that voters exist for whom the size of (PB) is an incentive to vote, we are still faced with a difficult problem of calculating P and (PB). Although Downs' number, $E(U)$, in (5), may result from the method of calculating P that we shall subsequently propose, he does not discuss the operator E and we cannot be sure just what he intended. Tullock uses P, but does not explain his calculation so that we can only infer his method of calculation from his examples. Most of the unpublished analyses we have seen or heard, however, assume either:

$$P = v^{-1} \tag{8}$$

which is attractive because it is the Shapley value when voters are weighted equally,[8] or

$$P = \left(\frac{v+1}{2}\right)^{-1} \tag{9}$$

Statement (8) is the chance that a voter casts the last necessary vote for the winning candidate. Statement (9) is the chance that a voter on the winning side casts the deciding vote. Tullock apparently uses (9). Both (8) and (9) are unreasonable, however, as the following argument shows: Given, for a one-party state, a primary, 1, and a general election, 2, in which the same man wins both. We assume $v_1 > v_2$, for reasons indicated in our argument leading to (4). Since the same candidate is involved in both elections, for those who favor that candidate, either $B_1 = B_2$ or (since B is a differential benefit and thus likely to be larger in the general election) $B_1 < B_2$. (While it might be argued that in special cases $B_1 > B_2$, as when, for a conservative voter, a conservative defeats a liberal in a primary and faces another conservative in the general election, we can nevertheless assume that in most one-party states $B_1 \leq B_2$ if only because the party attachment is itself so strong—as in the solid South in the 1920's and 1930's.) We can easily assume that $C_1 = C_2$.[9] And similarly we can also assume D constant so that $D_1 = D_2$. We then have the pair of equations

$$\begin{aligned} R_1 &= P_1B_1 - C + D \\ R_2 &= P_2B_2 - C + D \end{aligned} \tag{10}$$

in which the C and D terms can be combined as a constant, k. Substituting (8) into (10) we get

$$\begin{aligned} R_1 &= v_1^{-1}B_1 + k \\ R_2 &= v_2^{-1}B_2 + k \end{aligned} \tag{11}$$

Since $v_1 > v_2$, it follows that $v_1^{-1} < v_2^{-1}$. We have two cases:

1. $B_1 = B_2$. In this case, $R_i = v_i^{-1}B_i + k$, so that $R_2 > R_1$.

2. $B_1 < B_2$. In this case, $R_i = v_i^{-1}B_i + k$. Because R_2 is the product of the larger number of the pair (v_1^{-1}, v_2^{-1}) and the larger number from the pair (B_1, B_2), again $R_2 > R_1$. But to say $R_2 > R_1$ is a direct violation of condition (4), which is $R_1 > R_2$. Indeed any form of P in which the major component is $1/v$, as in (8) or (9), necessarily violates (4). Hence we may reject such methods of calculation of P as (8) and (9) as unrealistic.

Approaching the task of calculating P in a way that seems to us to accord with the thought processes of a citizen who is trying to decide whether or not to vote, we ignore D initially because it in part involves considerations arising outside of the context of the election at hand. The citizen has two alternatives, to vote and not to vote; and the state of the world can be that his preferred candidate either wins or loses. If a citizen votes and his candidate wins, he receives the utility to him of the victory of his candidate, U^1_{t+1}, to use Downs' terminology, less, of course, the cost of voting, C. So we can write, for a particular voter, U^1_{t+1}-C, which is the reward to that voter when he votes and his preferred candidate wins. When his preferred candidate loses, the voter's reward is U^2_{t+1}-C. But, of course, his candidate has only the subjectively estimated chance, q say, of winning, where $0 \leq q \leq 1$. Therefore the expected utility of voting is:

$$q(U^1_{t+1} - C) + (1 - q)(U^2_{t+1} - C)$$

As for the citizen who does not vote, he receives (U^1_{t+1}) with the probability q' and (U^2_{t+1}) with the probability (1-q'); of course, he has no cost of voting. This information is summarized in Table 2, where the entries in the cells are the utility outcomes for the citizen times their probability of occurring, given his choice of alternatives and the state of the world.

TABLE 2. EXPECTED UTILITY FOR VOTING AND NON-VOTING

	Possible Results of Election	
	1 wins	2 wins
Citizen votes	$q(U^1_{t+1} - C)$	$(1-q)\ (U^2_{t+1} - C)$
Citizen does not vote	$q'(U^1_{t+1})$	$(1-q')\ (U^2_{t+1})$

The marginal reward the citizen, i, gets from voting is then the sum of the outcomes in row 1 less the sum of the outcomes in row 2.

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[8] L. S. Shapley, "A Value for n-Person Games," *Annals of Mathematics Study* #28 (Princeton, 1953), pp. 307–317. See also L. S. Shapley and M. Shubik, "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," this REVIEW, 48 (1954), 787–792.

[9] It might be argued that $C_1 > C_2$ owing to the fact that in an area of strong partisanship, the party label reduces the cost of decision in the general election to zero. If this is true then the argument in the text is even more persuasive because B_1 must then be even greater than B_2 for v_1 to be greater than v_2.

$$\begin{aligned}(12)\quad R_i &= [q(U^1{}_{t+1} - C) + (1-q)(U^2{}_{t+1} - C)] \\ &\quad - [q'(U^1{}_{t+1}) + (1-q')(U^2{}_{t+1})] \\ &= qU^1{}_{t+1} - qC + U^2{}_{t+1} - C - qU^2{}_{t+1} \\ &\quad + qC - q'U^1{}_{t+1} - U^2{}_{t+1} + q'U^2{}_{t+1}\end{aligned}$$

$$(13)\quad R_i = (q-q')(U^1{}_{t+1} - U^2{}_{t+1}) - C$$

Setting $P=(q\text{-}q')$ and $B=(U^1{}_{t+1}\text{-}U^2{}_{t+1})$, equation (13) is another form of equation (1). With the addition of D to the right side, it becomes (7).

Despite the similarity of (13) to (1) and (7), however, we have learned something new from the analysis, specifically,

$$(14)\qquad P = q - q'$$

and from (14) we have some notion of how P might be calculated.

But in order to calculate it exactly we need to know more about q and q' which are probability numbers, specifically probabilities that 1 will win when i does (or does not) vote. In order to define q and q' precisely, we offer the following definitions:

(15) "pr $[1;\, x]$" means "the probability that candidate 1 will receive exactly x votes;" (while pr $[1;\, x]$ is a subjective probability, we assume that it behaves like an objective probability so that

$$\sum_{x=1}^{v} \mathrm{pr}[1;x] = 1);^{10}$$

where there are v voters, $0<v\leq n$, the decision rule for winning is that the winner must receive at least m votes, where, if v is even, $m=(v/2)+1$, and, if v is odd, $m=(v+1)/2$;

We now define q and q', when there are v voters in addition to voter i: if v is odd

$$\begin{aligned}(16)\quad q &= \mathrm{pr}\left[1;\frac{v+1}{2}+1\right] + \mathrm{pr}\left[1;\frac{v+1}{2}+2\right] \\ &\quad + \cdots + \mathrm{pr}[1;v+1]; \\ q' &= \mathrm{pr}\left[1;\frac{v+1}{2}\right] + \mathrm{pr}\left[1;\frac{v+1}{2}+1\right] \\ &\quad + \cdots + \mathrm{pr}[1;v];\end{aligned}$$

and if v is even

$$\begin{aligned}(17)\quad q &= \mathrm{pr}\left[1;\frac{v}{2}+1\right] + \mathrm{pr}\left[1;\frac{v}{2}+2\right] \\ &\quad + \cdots + \mathrm{pr}[1;v+1]; \\ q' &= \mathrm{pr}\left[1;\frac{v}{2}+1\right] + \mathrm{pr}\left[1;\frac{v}{2}+2\right] \\ &\quad + \cdots + \mathrm{pr}[1;v];\end{aligned}$$

or more concisely

$$\begin{aligned}(16\text{a})\qquad q &= \sum_{x=(v+1)/2+1}^{v+1} \mathrm{pr}[1;x]; \\ & \qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad (\text{odd}) \\ q' &= \sum_{x=(v+1)/2}^{v} \mathrm{pr}[1;x]; \\ (17\text{a})\qquad q &= \sum_{x=v/2+1}^{v+1} \mathrm{pr}[1;x]; \\ & \qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad (\text{even}) \\ q' &= \sum_{x=v/2+1}^{v} \mathrm{pr}[1;x].\end{aligned}$$

Note that, if v is odd, then q and q' both contain $(v+1)/2$ terms, while, if v is even, q' contains $v/2$ terms and q contains $(v/2)+1$ terms. This curious fact can be readily explained: When v is odd, the addition of the citizen who decides to vote increases both the number of voters and the number required to win by one, so that q and q' contain the same number of terms. But when v is even, the addition of the citizen who decides to vote increases the number of voters by one but does not change the number required to win, so that q has one more term than q'.

We now need to prove a modest lemma about the terms in the definition of q and q' and for this purpose we need the additional notation that "pr_v $[1;x]$" means "the probability, when there are v votes cast, that 1 receives x votes" and an axiom:

(18) The preference for a member of V between candidates 1 and 2 remains unchanged when the set of voters is expanded by voter i to $(V\cup[i])$.

This axiom is probably realistic when there are hundreds or millions of voters but it may not be totally realistic when, e.g., $v=5$, since it is possible that a voter, j, change sides from 2 to 1 or 1 to 2 just and only because a voter, i, who prefers 1 is added to the system. Such bandwagon and repulsion effects are probably limited to small committees, however; and so we assume (18).

We now prove:

(19) If voter i intends to vote for candidate 1, and $p_1=\mathrm{pr}_v$ $[1;x]$, and $p_2=\mathrm{pr}_{v+1}$ $[1;x+1]$, then $p_1=p_2$

Assume citizen i believes p_1 exists when he does not vote and then adds his own vote to the system to produce p_2. He knows, of course, that his vote will be cast for 1 for certain, while by (18) the probability distribution remains unchanged for other voters. Hence the probability, p_2, that 1 receives $x+1$ votes in the expanded system is at least as great as the probability, p_1, that 1 receive x votes in the smaller

[10] In the general case, since we are dealing with subjective probabilities, we may write $\sum_{x=1}^{v}$ pr $[1;\, x]=A$, where A is any positive number.



FIG. 1(a): v odd

system. That is, (18) forbids $p_1 > p_2$; hence at most, $p_1 = p_2$.

Assume $p_1 < p_2$; Then it follows that

$$\sum_{x=0}^{v} \mathrm{pr}_v[1;x] < \sum_{x=0}^{v} \mathrm{pr}_{v+1}[1;x+1]\cdot \tag{20}$$

But this is impossible because by the definition of probability numbers (15) both sides of (20) must equal one. The assumption, $p_1 < p_2$, thus leads to a contradiction. So it must be that $p_1 = p_2$ as stated in (19).

It is now possible to prove an identity about P:

$$P = q - q' = \frac{1}{2}\,\mathrm{pr}_v\left[1;\frac{v}{2}\right] \tag{21}$$

There are two cases:

1. v is odd. In this case, $q\text{-}q' = 0$. Consider a typical term in q', e.g. $a' = \mathrm{pr}_v$ [1; k], where $(v+1)/2 \leq k \leq v$. By reason of (19) there must be in q a term, $a = \mathrm{pr}_{v+1}$ [1; $k+1$], such that $a = a'$. Since by (16) q and q' have the same number of terms, the expression, $q\text{-}q'$, must consist of a series of subtractions, $a\text{-}a' = 0$, so that $q\text{-}q' = 0$.

2. v is even. In this case, $q\text{-}q' = \mathrm{pr}_v$ [1; $v/2$]. For all terms a' in q', there is, by (19), a matching term a in q such that $a\text{-}a' = 0$. But q contains one more term than q'. This additional term must be $b = \mathrm{pr}_{v+1}$ [1; $v/2+1$] because the term matched with it by (19) is $b' = \mathrm{pr}_v$ [1;$v/2$], which is not in q'. Hence it must be that $q\text{-}q' = b = b' = \mathrm{pr}_v$ [1; $v/2$].

Since case 1 may be expected to occur with a probability of $\frac{1}{2}$, we get, when we sum the outcomes in the two cases,

$$P = \tfrac{1}{2}[q - q' = 0] + \tfrac{1}{2}[q - q' = \mathrm{pr}_v[1;v/2]] = \tfrac{1}{2}\,\mathrm{pr}_v[1;v/2]. \quad \text{Q.E.D.}$$

Statement (21) lends itself readily to a verbal interpretation: the probability that i will by voting influence the outcome is exactly one-half his subjective estimate of the chance that, if i does not vote, a tie will occur. His influence is thus a function of his chance to break a tie. This result can perhaps be conveyed more effectively from a geometric interpretation. In Figure 1(a), we have depicted the case where v is odd. On the horizontal axis is recorded the number of votes 1 can receive, x, where (0 or 1) $\leq x \leq$ (v or $v+1$). On the vertical axis is recorded the probability that 1 receive x votes. As is apparent from (21) and Figure 1(a), $a' = a$ and hence

$$\sum_{x=(v+1)/2}^{v} (a')_x = \sum_{x=(v+1)/2+1}^{v+1} (a)_x$$

and hence $q\text{-}q' = 0$.

Figure 1(b) depicts the case where v is even. In Figure 1(b), $a_1' = \mathrm{pr}_v[1;\, v/2+1] = a_1 = \mathrm{pr}_{v+1}$ [1; $v/2+2$] and so on to $a_n' = \mathrm{pr}_v[1;v] = a_v = \mathrm{pr}_{v+1}$ [1;$v+1$], just as in Figure 1(a). But in Figure (1b) there is an unmatched probability in q, namely $b = \mathrm{pr}_{v+1}$ [1; $v/2+1$] $= b' = \mathrm{pr}_v$ [1; $v/2$]. Clearly b' is not in q', while b is in q. Hence in the case where v is even, the addition of i makes a difference.

Statement (21) that $P = \frac{1}{2}\mathrm{pr}_v$ [1; $v/2$] permits us to make an additional statement about an important property of P. Let x_0 be the value of x for which pr_v [1; x] is at its maximum. Then, assuming the variance is constant, as x_0 approaches $v/2$, P increases. That is, the higher the probability of a tie without the voter and as subjectively estimated by the voter, the higher is P. In more conventional terms, the closer



FIG. 1(b): *v* even

the anticipated outcome the higher is P. P is thus a function of the estimated closeness of the vote. This fact can be visualized as in Figure 2. There are two distributions in this figure, j and j', with approximately equivalent variances and with two maximum $\text{pr}_v\,[1; x]$ at x_0 and x'_0. Clearly P is greater in j than in j' because $r > r'$, where r and r' are the points of intersection between j and j' and a perpendicular line at point $v/2$. Note that this property of P, where $P = q - q'$, avoids the contradiction with (4) that occurred when P was calculated as in (8) and (9). In those equations, P was a function of the number of voters, regardless of the location of x_0, and this is what led to the contradiction. In (21), however, P is a function of the location of x_0 and the number of voters, thereby avoiding the contradiction. For those voters who vote in the primary but not the general election, it may be the case that P_1 (in the primary) is substantially larger than P_2 (in the general election).

In the foregoing argument, we have assumed that the variance is constant. This need not be so. Indeed the probability density function for a particular voter is a function of certainty. Thus a voter who honestly says he doesn't know how the election will turn out has a density function as depicted in Figure 3(a), while a voter who says he is quite sure might have a density function like Figure 3(b). Therefore, for a voter, i, who believes the outcome less certain than does a voter j, i's P may be greater than j's, even though x_0^i may be closer



FIG. 2



(a) (b)

FIG. 3

to $v/2$ than x_0^i. This situation is depicted in Figure 4. Clearly P is a very complicated number since it is a function of both x_0 and the subjective variance around x_0.[11]

In the proof of statement (21) we supposed the probabilities were discrete, while in the argument of the foregoing paragraph we have implied they are continuous, a confusion we must now clear up. In small electorates, a discrete probability density function is probably descriptively accurate, whereas in large societies like ours it may not be, for it is hard to imagine a voter estimating, e.g., pr [1; 37,492, 203]. (We are supposedly describing a rational voter and the reasonableness of such a calculation escapes us.) But if the voter assumes a continuous density function, then pr $[1; x] = 0$, even when $x = v/2$, because in general for continuous densities $\Pr[x] = f(x) = 0$. Hence statement (21) is rendered trivial in that $P = 0$. (Doubtless it was this fact about large electorates that led to the use of $P = v^{-1}$, as in statements (8) and (9).) There is, however, a way out of this contretemps. In probability theory it is assumed that, although $\Pr[x] = f(x) = 0$, still $0 \leq \int_\delta f(x) \leq 1$. That is, for some interval, δ, in the domain of $f(x)$, there will be a $\Pr[x] > 0$. Hence, for the continuous density shown in Figure 5, P would be calculated as approximately r rather than zero. This method of calculation is not behaviorally unrealistic. It assumes, however, that the citizen knows what



FIG. 4

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[11] The variance is a function of certainty and certainty is in turn a highly complicated function of information such that increases in information may either increase or decrease certainty. For example, information about opinion surveys taken closer and closer to the election and showing a large and sustained majority for one candidate might increase certainty while information about opinion surveys showing an increase in undecided voters as the election approached might decrease certainty.



Fig. 5

the turnout will be, which of course he does not. Behaviorally, it is probably more accurate to assume that his perceptions of electoral outcomes are not based on absolute vote totals but on percentages. Hence he probably evaluates P by estimating pr $[1; v_1/v=.5]$, where v_1 is the number of votes received by candidate 1. And when the horizontal axis is in terms of percentages rather than absolute numbers, it is reasonable to suppose that the points are thought of as discrete. Like Schelling's "tacit coordination points," certain points (e.g. .50, .505, .51, .55, .60, etc.) stand out as foci for citizens' perceptions. Hence we can return once more to our analysis which employed discrete density functions without loss of generality so that equation (21) becomes

$$(21') \quad P = \tfrac{1}{2}\,\mathrm{pr}_v[1; v/2] \cong \tfrac{1}{2}\,\mathrm{pr}[1; (v_1/v) = .5].$$

IV. A TEST OF THE THEORY—INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS

We now have a theory about the individual calculus of voting which is at least consistent with some known facts about the decision to vote and mildly compelling because it has been constructed out of a careful analysis of the voting calculus under the assumption of individual rationality. But it is still not intuitively convincing, for our only major difference in (7), i.e., $R=PB-C+D$, from (1), i.e., $R=PB-C$, is the addition of D in the former equation. Thus we have provided an excuse to render R positive for all voters. But we have said nothing to alter the intuitively persuasive supposition that $PB-C<0$. And if this intuitive supposition is correct, then we have simply made voting rational by saying that the decision to vote by those who have been socialized to vote is a rational decision. So it appears that the rational calculation is based on habit and not on judgments about the candidates and the electoral situation.

By reason of our detailed analysis of P and B, however, we are in a stronger position than is suggested in the previous paragraph. Our theory makes it possible to infer statements about how voters behave in particular situations and these inferences can, of course, be subjected to an empirical test. In particular, our theory allows us to say something about the way voters calculate P and B so that we can discover whether or not P and B are ever large enough to determine a positive R. Our previous analysis shows that voters might reasonably: (1) Assume the probability density function is continuous and that $P=0$, in which case the only components of the voting decision would be the magnitudes of D and C. (2) Assume that the function is continuous and evaluate P with a δ approximation or assume that it is discrete, defined over a domain of percentages, and evaluate $P = \sim\frac{1}{2}$ Pr $[1; (v_1/v)=.5]$. Whether or not voters follow the second procedure is a testable proposition, where the hypothesis tested is: In the United States in some recent elections some voters employ a calculation of P and B to decide whether or not to vote. In the remaining sections, therefore, we set forth the result of a test of this hypothesis, which indicates that P and B are significant components of the calculus of voting. To the degree that this evidence is persuasive, the whole equation is a useful description of behavior, while eliminating the implication of irrationality mentioned at the end of Section I.

The data we use in our test are questions asked by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan in surveys conducted in connection with the 1952, 1956, and 1960 Presidential elections.[12] We infer from our theory the kind of responses that should be expected to some of these questions. If the responses are in fact substantially those dictated by the inferences, as they indeed are, then we can regard the theory as verified. Incidentally we note that, historically, the development of the theory preceded by several months the test we are about to report. The relation of theory to experiment is, therefore, exactly that demanded in the notion of a deductive explanation of behavior.

Consider an individual citizen for whom we can assume D and C constant over several elections. Assuming P and B to vary, we then have three cases

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[12] The data utilized in this study were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research and were originally collected by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan.



FIG. 6

(a) $D > C$. Since $PB \geq 0$, R is positive and the individual always votes.

(b) $D \leq C$. For those elections in which $PB > C - D$, R is positive and the individual votes.

(c) $D \leq C$. For those elections in which $PB \leq C - D$, then $R \leq 0$ and the individual does not vote.

Unfortunately it is probably impossible to obtain empirical evidence about the calculus of voting for one individual, if only because D and C probably do not remain constant over time. So we attempt instead to make analogous predictions about groups of individuals. Consider a set of citizens who can be assigned to subsets such that, for those in each subset, D stands at about the same height on their preference scales. Suppose we have also some way of estimating the variables P and B for those in each subset. Then, we predict that, for those in a particular subset, those with a high (PB) would be more likely to vote than those with a low (PB). This prediction can be stated systematically thus: Let "pr $[a_i]$" signify "the probability that a citizen in cell a_i votes" so that from Figure 6 we obtain the following predictions as indicated by the arrows which can be read as signs of the inequality "greater than": pr $[a_1] >$ pr $[a_2]$; pr $[a_1] >$ pr $[a_3]$; pr $[a_1] >$ pr $[a_4]$; pr $[a_2] >$ pr $[a_4]$; pr $[a_3] >$ pr $[a_4]$.

In every cell we would expect the occurrence of some individuals covered by case (c), i.e. $D < C$, so that we would expect typically that pr $[a_i] < 1$. And we would expect some individuals covered by case (a) to appear in all cells so that typically Pr $[a_i] > 0$. But we would expect a greater probability of finding a case (b) individual in cell a_1 than in cells a_2, a_3, and a_4 and a lesser probability of finding a case (b) individual in cell a_4 than in cells a_2 and a_3. Note that we make no prediction about the relation of pr $[a_2]$ to pr $[a_3]$. Given equation (7) we should be able to make such a prediction; but our method of testing is far too gross to verify any prediction about this relation, so we attempt none here. Nevertheless, if our predictions are verified with respect to the relations stated in Figure 6, we believe that we have shown that for persons in categories (b) and (c) the calculus in equation (7) is actually carried out.

V. THE OPERATIONAL ESTIMATORS OF P, B, C, D, AND pr $[a_i]$

For the operationalization of P, we have the pre-election interview responses to a question asked in each quadrennial survey from 1952 to 1960 about how close the respondent believed the outcome of the Presidential election would be. Since, as we have already shown, when $P = q\text{-}q' = \text{pr}_v\ [1;\ v/2]/2$ and the variance remains constant, P increases as x_0 approaches $v/2$, it follows that the closer the respondent believes the outcome will be the higher his subjective estimate of P. We assume that the variance is constant.[13] Since the SRC offered the respondents several degrees of closeness, we simplified the data by dichotomizing: All those who were in the two lowest categories of closeness, we said had a low P, while those in the other categories we said had a high P.[14]

For the operationalization of B, we have the pre-election interview responses to a question asked in the same surveys as to how much the respondent "cares" about the outcome of the

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[13] An operationally equivalent assumption is that the variance of the probability density function is randomly distributed, independently of x_0. Hence those citizens with a subjective x_0 "close" to $v/2$ are expected to have a higher P than those whose x_0 is "far" from $v/2$.

[14] It is conceivable that some people who have a high P by this operationalization actually view the probability density as continuous so that for them $P = 0$ rather than $P = \frac{1}{2}$ pr $[1;\ v/2]$. If some "low" P persons are by this error of operationalization included in the "high" P category, our predictions are of course rendered more difficult to verify.

Presidential election. Since we have already assumed $B = U^1_{i+1} - U^2_{i+1}$, the greater the differential benefit from the election of his favored candidate, the more the voter can be expected to "care" about the outcome. The answers of this question are, therefore, estimates of B. Again, since the SRC offered the respondents several degrees of "caring", we simplified the data by dichotomizing: All those in the two highest categories of caring had, we said, a high B, while those in the remaining categories had a low B.

For the operationalization of pr $[a_i]$ we have the post-election interview responses to the question of whether or not the respondent recalled having voted. To estimate pr $[a_i]$ we can construct a ratio, v/n, where v is the number in cell a_i who said they recalled having voted and n is the number of persons in cell a_i as determined by their estimates of P and B. This ratio, v/n, is the percentage of voters in the cell and we can, grossly, interpret it as the probability that any individual in the cell is in fact a voter. So for purposes of estimating, we say pr $[a_i] = v/n$.

There is some ambiguity in the operationalization of P, B, and pr $[a_i]$; but we think it does not materially disturb the outcome. When respondents are asked whether or not they care about the outcome and whether or not they think it will be close, the question specifically refers to the Presidential election only. When citizens vote, however, they actually vote in several elections simultaneously. Each voter can be expected to have a vector $\vec{P}$ of P's and a vector $\vec{B}$ of B's, where each pair of elements in $\vec{P}$ and $\vec{B}$ relate to one office, e.g. President, governor, register of deeds, etc. In the voter's calculation of R, therefore, all the PB terms are summed. Since $P \geq 0$ and $B \geq 0$, the new marginal utility of voting, R', say, is greater than R. But $R' \geq R$ for voters in all cells, a_i. Hence, if we hold D constant as we intend to do, the inflation of R' should not materially affect the outcome of the test.

In the operationalization of P, B, and pr $[a_i]$, we have had a gross but intuitively unobjectionable procedure. Turning to the operationalization of D and C, however, we have a more difficult task with a more dubious result. For the operational estimate of D we have a so-called sense of citizen duty scale which the SRC constructed out of responses to four questions about the duty to vote asked in the pre-election interviews.[15] According to Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, the scale of the sense of citizen duty has a high degree of internal consistency (i.e., an index of reproducibility of .96). Given this consistency, to the degree that the sense of citizen duty scale captures the essence of the notion of D, we can regard this scale as an operationalization of D.

The index of citizen duty yields five scale scores. The bulk of the respondents scored I or II, while the lower three scores each occur with considerably less frequency. In order to avoid practically empty cells, therefore, we collapsed the last three categories into one so that we had:

I. high sense of citizen duty (score I on the scale)—high D
II. medium sense of citizen duty (score II on the scale)—medium D
III. low sense of citizen duty (scores III-V on the scale)—low D

We regarded the persons in each category of D as having approximately the same level of D on their scales of preference. This interpretation may seem to involve some interpersonal comparison of utility, which, of course, we wish to avoid. We think it does not, however, because we have simply categorized respondents into those for whom D is high, medium, or low on their own individual scales and thus we believe we avoid interpersonal comparison. In any event, we propose by this means to hold D constant in one of three categories.[16]

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[15] Unfortunately the SRC did not ask the appropriate questions in 1964 so that we cannot use other data from that year in our analysis. The sense of citizen duty scale is fully described in A. Campbell, G. Gurin and W. E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, 1954), pp. 194–199.

[16] The constancy of D is open to some technical question. The SRC ceased in 1964 to collect the necessary information, first, because the scale of citizen duty turned out to be very similar to the scale of the sense of political efficacy, which was more useful for SRC purposes, and, second, because it seemed possible that the four questions on the sense of citizen duty scale might be contaminated by a positive response set. Their first reason for the rejection of the scale is not immediately relevant to our concerns. Their second reason, if true, does, however, bias the data in favor of our predictions. Suppose some persons with an actually low D are included (by reason of response set) in our categories I and II of high and medium D. They will then lower the percentage of voters in these categories. And if low D is associated with not caring about the outcome of the election so that these low D's add disproportionately to the non-carers, their presence among the non-carers in category I or II will

The operationalization of C is somewhat arbitrary. We assume that C and D are not positively correlated and that C is constant in each category of D. In fact, it seems likely that C and D are negatively correlated. That is, if the halo effects of voting (D) are high, then the costs of voting (C) are low simply because the citizen who believes it is terribly important to vote is likely to minimize costs of voting while the citizen who thinks voting is unimportant is likely to maximize costs of voting.

VI. A TEST OF THE THEORY

Concerning the answers to questions in the three surveys, we offer the following predictions:

1. For each election in the set K, $k_1=1952$, $k_2=1956$, $k_3=1960$, and for each category of D, i.e., (I, II, III), it is the case that

$$\text{pr}[a_{i,I}]_{k_j} > \text{pr}[a_{i,II}]_{k_j} > \text{pr}[a_{i,III}]_{k_j}$$
$$j = 1, 2, 3]$$

   This prediction is essentially a test of our operationalization of D. If it were the case that the predicted relation did not hold, we would not be able to affirm that D had been held constant.

2. For each category of D, $d_1=I$, $d_2=II$, $d_3=III$ and for each election, k_j, $j=1,2,3$, it is the case that

$$\text{pr } [a_1]_{d_ik_j} > \text{pr } [a_2]_{d_ik_j}$$
$$\text{pr } [a_1]_{d_ik_j} > \text{pr } [a_3]_{d_ikj}$$
$$\text{pr } [a_1]_{d_ik_j} > \text{pr } [a_4]_{d_ik_j}$$
$$\text{pr } [a_2]_{d_ik_j} > \text{pr } [a_4]_{d_ik_j}$$
$$\text{pr } [a_3]_{d_ik_j} > \text{pr } [a_4]_{d_ik_j} \quad \text{for } i = 1, 2, 3$$

The data for testing these predictions is set forth in Table 3 where each cell contains $v/n = \text{pr } [a_i]$.

As is indicated in Table 4, prediction 1 is true (T) in 23 out of 24 cases.[17] The one case in which it is false (F) involves a cell in which $n=4$, by far the smallest n in any cell. We believe this one falsehood is well within the chance of sampling error and so we regard prediction 1 as well verified and we regard the operationalization of D as adequate. The test of prediction 2 is set forth in Table 5. As indicated in this table, the predicted differences occur in 42 out of 45 cases.

This high score for accuracy is, however, somewhat spurious, for the predictions are not independent. If pr $[a_1] >$ pr $[a_2]$ and if pr $[a_2] >$ pr $[a_4]$, then certainly pr $[a_1] >$ pr $[a_4]$. Similarly, if pr $[a_1] >$ pr $[a_3]$ and if pr $[a_3] >$ pr $[a_4]$, then certainly pr $[a_1] >$ pr $[a_4]$. So the prediction that pr $[a_1] >$ pr $[a_4]$ is not independent of the other predictions. We can allow for this fact by eliminating it, although this is probably unduly harsh. The situation is: Let α_1 stand for the pair of predictions pr $[a_1] >$ pr $[a_2]$ and pr $[a_2] >$ pr $[a_4]$. Let α_2 stand for the pair of predictions pr $[a_1] >$ pr $[a_3]$ and pr $[a_3] >$ pr $[a_4]$. Let α_3 stand for the prediction pr $[a_1] >$ pr $[a_4]$. Then

if α_1	and α_2,	then α_3
T	T	T
T	F	T
F	T	T
F	F	T or F

so that in 3 cases (i.e. if either α_1 or α_2 are true) the truth value of α_3 is determined. But when α_1 and α_2 are both false, the truth value of α_3 is not determined. Therefore, the total elimination of α_3 sets an unreasonably high standard for our prediction to meet. Nevertheless, if we do eliminate it, we still have 33 accurate predictions out of 36.

It is possible to calculate a statistical significance level for the results set forth in Table 5. Since our 45 predictions involve some interdependence, we will interpret each row of Table 5 as an observation. Then we can calculate the significance of obtaining seven out of nine observations which support the hypothesis. It is possible for an observation to have one of 18 forms. (For example, rows 1952-I, 1952-III, and 1956-II represent three of these forms.) If both P and B had no effect on a voter's calculus, we would expect on each observation any one of the 18 forms to occur with equal likelihood. Hence, for our null hypothesis, each form would occur with a probability of 1/18. Only one form (i.e., that of row 1952-I, for example) agrees with our theory, however, so the chance of a validating observation would be 1/18 and the chance of an invalidating observation 17/18. Assuming equiprobability of the occurrence of forms, the significance level of only 2 invalidating observations is the sum of the probabilities of obtaining exactly

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make it easier to verify our hypothesis that those who care about the outcome are more likely to vote than those who do not care. If, however, this bias, for our purposes, was significant it would tend to wipe out differences among like a_i's between categories. Since, as will be shown later, this does not occur, we may suppose that the response-set contamination of the scale of citizen duty is minimal.

[17] This is the necessary confirmation of assumption, mentioned earlier, that the effect of response set is minimal. (See footnote 16.)

TABLE 3. DATA FOR TEST OF PREDICTIONS

		I		II		III	
		High *D*		Medium *D*		Low *D*	
		B		*B*		*B*	
1952		High	Low	High	Low	High	Low
	P High	$\frac{323}{362}=.89$	$\frac{104}{124}=.84$	$\frac{259}{310}=.84$	$\frac{95}{141}=.67$	$\frac{86}{150}=.57$	$\frac{73}{159}=.46$
	P Low	$\frac{85}{99}=.86$	$\frac{21}{27}=.78$	$\frac{58}{75}=.77$	$\frac{17}{26}=.65$	$\frac{33}{54}=.61$	$\frac{16}{32}=.50$
1956	*P* High	$\frac{376}{421}=.89$	$\frac{160}{198}=.81$	$\frac{220}{274}=.80$	$\frac{89}{137}=.65$	$\frac{56}{98}=.57$	$\frac{64}{156}=.40$
	P Low	$\frac{104}{129}=.81$	$\frac{49}{63}=.77$	$\frac{64}{87}=.74$	$\frac{22}{30}=.73$	$\frac{24}{46}=.52$	$\frac{10}{38}=.26$
1960	*P* High	$\frac{315}{335}=.94$	$\frac{128}{154}=.83$	$\frac{178}{198}=.90$	$\frac{79}{96}=.82$	$\frac{52}{70}=.74$	$\frac{42}{92}=.46$
	P Low	$\frac{37}{41}=.90$	$\frac{8}{12}=.67$	$\frac{26}{33}=.79$	$\frac{3}{4}=.75$	$\frac{8}{11}=.73$	$\frac{5}{12}=.42$

2, 1, and 0 invalidating observations. These probabilities and the significance level may be calculated using binomial probability thus:

$$\text{significance level} = \sum_{x=0}^{2} \binom{9}{x} \left(\frac{1}{18}\right)^{9-x} \left(\frac{17}{18}\right)^{x}$$

Using this method, the level of significance of our result is approximately .00000005, so that there is about one chance in twenty million that we have falsely asserted our hypothesis to be true. Hence we regard prediction 2, our main theory, as validated.[18]

VII. CONCLUSION

We started out with an intuitively persuasive theory, equation (1), which many people believe to be false because it leads to counter-intuitive conclusions. We refined this theory, equations (7) and (21), so that we could draw from it a non-obvious inference, i.e., that P increases as x_0 approaches $v/2$. We then presented evidence that, given the non-obvious inference, people actually behaved as the theory predicts; so we conclude that the theory is nevertheless true. We have therefore described the rational calculus that does in fact occur in the act of deciding whether or not to vote. And we are able to affirm that the behavior of most people can be described by a theory of rational decision-making. This is what we set out to do.

Nevertheless, those who find the conclusions from the theory counter-intuitive are bound to be dissatisfied, for they will wonder how their intuition went wrong. For their sake we offer the following observations:

1. It is likely that, for many people, the subjective estimate of P is higher than is reasonable, given the objective circumstances. Subjected as we are to constant reminders that a few hundred carefully selected votes by non-voters could reverse the results of very close

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[18] If we drop from our calculations in Table 3 all those persons whom the SRC coded "not appropriate," "don't know," or "no answer" to the question about the closeness of the outcome (whom we have actually included in Table 3 in the "high" P category), then the results are somewhat improved. Two of the three bad predictions in Table 5 are eliminated and the level of significance increases.

TABLE 4. TEST OF PREDICTION 1

	pr $[a_1]_{I} >$ pr $[a_1]_{II} >$ pr $[a_1]_{III}$		pt $[a_2]_{I} >$ pr $[a_2]_{II} >$ pr $[a_2]_{III}$	
1952	T	T	T	T
1956	T	T	T	T
1960	T	T	T	T
	pr $[a_3]_{I} >$ pr $[a_3]_{II} >$ pr $[a_3]_{III}$		pr $[a_4]_{I} >$ pr $[a_4]_{II} >$ pr $[a_4]_{III}$	
1952	T	T	T	T
1956	T	T	T	T
1960	T	T	F	T

elections, such as the Presidential election of 1960, the subjectively estimated chance of a tie (i.e., *P*) may be as high as the propaganda urges it to be, even though in objective calculations the chance of a tie may be low.

2. It is likely that *B* is much higher for many people than anyone has heretofore supposed.

3. We have not, of course, completely eliminated instances of possible irrationality from the system. One wonders, for example, why, out of the 4294 respondents, the 104 who cared deeply, believed the outcome close, had a high sense of citizen duty, nevertheless did not vote (i.e., the non-voters of a_1, Category I, assuming—what may be false—that they were eligible to vote); and why the 31 who cared little, believed the outcome not close, had a low sense of citizen duty, nevertheless did note (i.e., the voters of a_4, Category III).

By the foregoing comments we believe we have explained most of the difficulties that led previous thinkers to decide that the intuitively satisfying equation (1) led to counter-intuitive results. Therefore, we reaffirm the validity of the intuitively satisfying equation (7).

The development of any science is characterized, in the beginning, by some conceptualization and a great deal of operationalization of notions relevant to the subject matter. This is followed by the formulation, inductively, of empirical generalizations and these become the hypotheses tested in elementary scientific research. We might call this stage 1 in the development. In further stages, the verified hypotheses from stage 1 are used to generate additional empirical generalizations but more importantly to generate a systematic theory—often stated in axiomatic form—which theory, when used to derive inferences that are subsequently verified, is then the corpus of the science itself. This we might call stage 2.

Political science is, in our opinion, now well into stage 1, proliferating hypotheses and beginning to learn how to test them. The leaders in this enterprise have mostly been those who are classified as "behavioralists," for example, the students of American voting

TABLE 5 TEST OF PREDICTION 2

	pr $[a_1] >$ pr $[a_2]$	pr $[a_1] >$ pr $[a_3]$	pr $[a_1] >$ pr $[a_4]$	pr $[a_2] >$ pr $[a_4]$	pr $[a_3] >$ pr $[a_4]$	Form of Observation
1952						
I	T	T	T	T	T	R_1
II	T	T	T	T	T	R_1
III	T	F	T	F	T	R_2
1956						
I	T	T	T	T	T	R_1
II	T	T	T	F	T	R_3
III	T	T	T	T	T	R_1
1960						
I	T	T	T	T	T	R_1
II	T	T	T	T	T	R_1
III	T	T	T	T	T	R_1

behavior. What we have attempted in this essay, however, is to go somewhat beyond stage 1 and into stage 2 for one tiny aspect of politics. We have taken a few notions about voting, incorporated them into the larger theoretical system of rational decision-making, derived testable inferences from the theory, and tested them with the result that we now have confidence in the accuracy both of the inferences and of the theory.

APPENDIX

Many readers of an earlier version of this paper have suggested that an implicit assumption of our analysis misrepresents the voter's calculus. This criticism arises from the introspective belief that many voters vote either for causes which they know are lost or for candidates who are certain to win. In such a case, the utility of a vote is reflected not only by D but also by the effect on the outcome (defined not only by who wins but also by how much). Many citizens voted in the 1964 Presidential election, for example, knowing with almost certainty the inevitable outcome, since they desired Johnson to win by a landslide or they wanted the conservative voice of America to be counted.

We emphasize again that these benefits are not necessarily to be accounted for by D but are reflected in our PB term. The question then becomes: how do these additional considerations affect our analysis? Some additional notation must be introduced to answer this question.

Assume: (1) There is a utility function, $u(x)$, defined over the range of all possible electoral outcomes. (2) There are v voters in the system. (3) The equation, $u(v)=1$, is the citizen's utility if his most preferred candidate receives all the votes. (4) The equation, $u(0)=0$, is his utility if his most preferred candidate receives none of the votes. (5) There is a probability density function, $g(x-x_0)$, defined over the range of all possible electoral outcomes, where x_0 is the citizen's subjectivity estimated most probable outcome when he does not vote.

In terms of our previous analysis it was assumed:

$$\begin{aligned} u(x) &= B \qquad x \geq m \\ u(x) &= 0 \qquad x < m \\ m &= v/2,\ v \text{ even} \\ m &= \frac{v+1}{2} + 1,\ v \text{ odd.}^{19} \end{aligned}$$

In other words, $u(x)$ was assumed to be a step function. For purposes of the present analysis we can normalize $u(x)$, but we would like to analyze PB when $u(x)$ is continuous throughout its range.

Given these definitions the expected value of the election, before the citizen votes, can be represented as,

$$EV = \int_0^v u(x)g(x - x_0)dx \tag{1A}$$

Since we are applying the continuous calculus to variables that might best be described as discrete, the limitations of the assumption of continuity must be kept in mind. It is possible to represent $u(x)$ and $g(x-x_0)$ graphically as follows,



FIG. 1A

Hence equation (1A) is simply a means of representing the product of the value of an event and its subjectively estimated probability of occurrence, summed over all possible events. Furthermore, if we assume that $g(x-x_0)$ goes to zero sufficiently rapidly, we can write the change in EV with respect to an increase in x_0 (which would represent the citizen's decision to vote),[20]

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[19] If the vote for the citizen's preferred party is $v/2$, v even, before he votes, then this outcome is worth B utiles since his vote gives his party $v/2+1$ votes, or enough to win. If, however, v is odd, then, assuming the voter does not value a tie, only until an outcome of $(v+1)/2+1$ votes is assured can the voter realize the desired outcome of his preferred candidate winning when he votes.

[20] It is assumed that $g(x\text{-}x_0)$ goes to zero sufficiently rapidly so that small changes in x_0 do not violate

$$\int_0^v g(x - x_0) = 1.$$

Also it is assumed that $u(x)$ does not change when one more voter is added to the electorate.

$$\frac{\partial EV}{\partial x_0} = -\int_0^v u(x)g'(x - x_0)dx, \tag{2A}$$

where $g'(x-x_0)=\partial g(x-x_0)/\partial x$.

A special class of utility functions is that for which utility is a simple linear function of the number of votes the citizen's preferred candidate receives. In this case $u(x)=x/v$ and (2A) becomes,

$$\frac{\partial EV}{\partial x_0} = -\frac{1}{v}\int_0^v xg'(x - x_0)dx. \tag{3A}$$

Integrating by parts (3A) becomes,[21]

$$\frac{\partial EV}{\partial x_0} = -\frac{1}{v}\,[vg(v - x_0) - 1]. \tag{4A}$$

But by our earlier assumption—that $g(x-x_0)$ goes to zero sufficiently rapidly—$g(v-x_0)=0$. Hence:

$$\frac{\partial EV}{\partial x_0} = \frac{1}{v} \tag{5A}$$

This is the Shapley value which we rejected earlier as a means for calculating P. We may conclude, therefore, that voters probably do not, in general, have linear monotonic utility functions for electoral outcomes.

Our original analysis, although recognizing the importance of taking into account the size of the electorate, indicates the importance of two additional factors of the voter's calculus, namely, x_0 and the variance of $g(x-x_0)$. Clearly, $\partial EV/\partial x_0=1/v$ is independent of these two factors. For nonlinear $u(x)$, however, it can be shown that $\partial EV/\partial x_0$ depends on these two factors. To prove this, take (2A) and integrate by parts.

$$\frac{\partial EV}{\partial x_0} = \int_0^v u'(x)g(x - x_0)dx \tag{6A}$$

where $u'(x)=du(x)/dx$. Now assume that $u(x)$ can be described or approximated by a polynomial.[22] For polynomials of order n, the derivative of the polynomial will be of order $n-1$. For the simple linear case the derivative will contain no factors in x and (6A) will reduce to (5A). For higher order polynomials, however, the first, second, etc. moments of $g(x-x_0)$ will determine $\partial EV/\partial x_0$. The first moment is simply x_0. The second moment, with some simple manipulation, is the variance of $g(x-x_0)$. Hence, only for the special case of linear utility functions is $\partial EV/\partial x_0$ independent of how close the citizen feels the election will be or how certain he is of his prediction (the variance of $g(x-x_0)$ will not be a factor for quadratic utility functions, however).

A closer scrutiny of (6A) yields another important observation. The number $\partial EV/\partial x_0$ will be maximized if $u'(x)$ is greatest when $x=x_0$. The maximum amount $u(x)$ can change is 1 when it is a step function. Hence the maximum of $\partial EV/\partial x_0$ is $g(0)=\text{pr}_v[1;\ x_0]$.[23] Hence the following constraints on P exist;

$$0 \leq P \leq \text{pr}_v\,[1; x_0] \tag{7A}$$[24]

which is *identical to the constraints on P in our* original analysis.

This leads to the following important observations: Although x_0 and $g(x-x_0)$ may be subjectively estimated by the citizen so that $\text{pr}_v[1;\ v/2]=0$, it is not necessarily the case that $\partial EV/\partial v_0=0$. This accounts for the vote for lost causes and inevitable winners. Both $\partial EV/\partial x_0$ and $\text{pr}_v\,[1; v/2]$ are, however, bounded by the same limits. Hence, we cannot escape the conclusion that a voter's subjective P can appear and probably usually does appear greatly to exceed our objective calculation of it.

A utility function which decreases after some point (reflecting a desire on the part of the voter not to give a particular candidate a mandate), of course, complicates this analysis. For such utility functions and a given x_0 it may be the case that $\partial EV/\partial x_0 \leq 0$. In such circumstances the citizen obviously shouldn't vote. It might, moreover, be in his interest to dissuade others from voting. A more complete analysis of utility functions which have a

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[21] Integration by parts is defined as follows:

$$\int udv = uv - \int vdu$$

In this particular case we let $x=u$ and $g'(x-x_0)dx=dv$.

[22] An n-order polynomial is any function of the following form:

$$f(x) = a_0 + a_1x + a_2x^2 + a_3x^3 + \cdots + a_nx^n$$

[23] This result differs by a factor of $\frac{1}{2}$ from our original formulation in equation (21) because we have implicitly assumed v even. Our original analysis showed however that when v is odd the voter cannot affect the outcome so as to bring about the victory of his preferred candidate. The gain associated with increasing his favored candidate's chance of winning is offset by increasing the chance of a tie (from 0 to $\text{pr}_v\,[1; v+1/2]$). Given an equal likelihood for even and odd v we would once again let $P=\frac{1}{2}\text{pr}_v\,[1;\ v/2]$. If we assumed the voter equally valued creating a tie to having his preferred candidate win then we would drop the $\frac{1}{2}$ once again.

[24] Or if one wishes $\frac{1}{2}\text{pr}_v\,[1; v/2]$.

negative slope in some range is not intended here. All we wish to suggest is that an analysis of them can be incorporated into the present framework.

Finally, if we assume that S-shaped utility functions are the most general case we can make an important observation concerning the relationship of $\partial EV/\partial x_0$ and x_0. We can show graphically that the closer x_0 is to $v/2$ (assuming the inflection point of the utility function occurs at $v/2$) the greater is $\partial EV/\partial x_0$ (the step function is a special limiting case of the S-shaped function). Hence, our conclusion—the closer the citizen believes the election will be the larger will be P—receives additional justification.

ON THE FLUIDITY OF JUDICIAL CHOICE*

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Within the past decade, a significant change has occurred in political science literature about the judiciary. The central questions have shifted from public law concerns—what is the law and its value?—to a primary focus on decision-making and process—how and why courts decide what they do, and with what political effects? The Supreme Court still dominates professional attention, but a host of new research techniques (jurimetrics and socialization studies, content and capability analysis, small group theory, etc.) vie for the allegiance of researchers.[1] The variety of methods in vogue is formidable, and a testament to the borrowing power of the profession. So has been the sound and fury accompanying the change.[2] The new approaches are perhaps too young to attempt a synthesis with traditional methods of analysis or even among themselves. Yet it is never too early to locate unities of inquiry, including common problems. The object of this essay is to air one difficulty facing virtually every student of the judicial process—the fluidity of judicial choice—and to examine some of its implications for research in and normative evaluation of judicial behavior.

The general argument should be stated at the outset. My purpose is to present empirical findings as a basis to critique some current research techniques in hopes of contributing to the analytical synthesis which must come if the discipline is to make a concerted advance in understanding judicial behavior. From a research standpoint, an unfortunate by-product of the debate between the "quantifiers" and the "qualifiers," as Joseph Tanenhaus has distinguished them, is that extremes of advocacy have obscured the much more important things that students of the judiciary share in common than the methodological differences which agitate them.[3] In the first place, most analysts assume that judging is a value-laden rather than a value-free art. Moreover, researchers who attempt to answer how or why questions are all engaged in the very humbling enterprise of making inferences from manifest behavior about the unknown, the judicial mind. If that enterprise were not enough to mellow the most messianic methodologue, it is also the case that some behavioral approaches have more in common with traditional approaches than with each other. Admittedly, one treads on dynamite in suggesting such kinship, but those who infer attitudes and motivation from opinions and those who infer attitudes and ideology from aggregate votes are basically in the same camp. That is, both infer individual attitude from a form of group behavior, and with insufficient attention to the group interaction which intervenes between attitude and action and qualifies both.[4]

Under both quantitative and qualitative

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[1] For bibliography see Glendon Schubert, "Behavioral Research in Public Law" this Review, 57 (June, 1963), 433–445. Some outstanding later examples are Walter F. Murphy, *Elements of Judicial Strategy* (Chicago, 1964); Martin Shapiro, *Law and Politics in the Supreme Court* (New York, 1964); Schubert, *Judicial Behavior; A Reader in Theory and Research* (Chicago, 1964); Schubert, *The Judicial Mind* (Evanston, 1965); and S. Sidney Ulmer, "Toward a Theory of Sub-Group Formation in the United States Supreme Court," *Journal of Politics*, 27 (February, 1965), 133–152. Also, see symposia, "Jurimetrics," *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 28 (Winter, 1963), 1–270; and "Social Science Approaches to the Judicial Process" *Harvard Law Review*, 79 (June, 1966), 1551–1628.

[2] See, *e.g.*, Walter Berns, "Law and Behavioral Science," *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 28 (Winter, 1963), 185–212; Wallace Mendelson, "The Neo-Behavioral Approach to the Judicial Process: A Critique," this Review, 57 (September, 1963), 593–603, and communications, 948–953; Theodore L. Becker, *Political Behavioralism and Modern Jurisprudence* (Chicago, 1964); and Lon L. Fuller, "An Afterword: Science and the Judicial Process," *Harvard Law Review*, 79 (June, 1966), 1604–1628.

[3] Joseph Tanenhaus, "Supreme Court Attitudes Toward Federal Administrative Agencies," *Vanderbilt Law Review*, 14 (March, 1961), 481.

[4] Cf. Glendon Schubert, "Ideologies and Attitudes, Academic and Judicial," *Journal of Politics*, 29 (February, 1967), 3–40; "Academic Ideology and the Study of Adjudication," this Review, 61 (March, 1967), 106–129.

research procedures, inferences about individual belief systems are derived from the "hard" data of group outcome. Once attitudes and ideologies have been inferred, they are then offered as explanations of outcome. Both procedures inspire reservations for the precise reason that intervening variables operating in a collegial court mediate significantly between individual attitude and behavior. The evidence for this mediation is a phenomenon I have chosen to call the fluidity of judicial choice. My contention is that fluidity of choice is so extensive in empirical reality as to pose very serious problems of classification and inference, whether one's categories and inferences are behavioral or jurisprudential in character. To put the matter simply, if a vote or an opinion has changed in response to a multiplicity of intra-court influences before its public exposure, how reliable is that vote or opinion as an indicator of attitude, ideology, or, if one pleases, predilection? If a vote, opinion, or speech has been ghosted by someone else, how reliable is that datum in establishing the modal categories which everyone from *Shepard's* to Schubert perforce must use in making classifications?

In the official theory of judging as a process of discovery, to be sure, this problem is irrelevant; a judge may freely change his mind up to the point of revealing his discovery without straining the analytical system. Once the analyst seeks to pierce the mystery, however, the issue of flux is inescapable. Quantifiers, though dependent upon the same objective data of votes and opinions, cannot duck the problem, for they purport to measure the most subjective of quantities, psychological attitudes, including latent ones. Qualitative methods of doctrinal analysis and biographical study, though they may raise illuminating examples of changing options, seldom do so systematically or with contemporary data.[5] Obvious difficulties of observation under conditions of secrecy prevailing in American courts explain the scant attention to the issue. Difficulty of analysis cannot explain away the problem of reliability, however, nor its implications for development of theory about judicial behavior.

I. THE EVIDENCE OF FLUIDITY

It has long been known, of course, that judges change their votes and permit their opinions to be conduits for the ideas of others. *Causes célèbres* such as the Legal Tender and Flag Salute Cases, or the *Carolene* footnote, come quickly to mind. So does Chief Justice Hughes' pungent expression of willingness to alter language in the interest of harmony: "Justice Holmes used to say, when we asked him to excise portions of his opinions which he thought pretty good, that he was willing to be 'reasonably raped.' I feel the same way."[6]

Walter F. Murphy's excellent *Elements of Judicial Strategy* is replete with examples of how Justices work such changes via internal bargaining.[7] Yet it may come as some surprise to political scientists how commonplace, rather than aberrational, judicial flux actually is. The recently opened papers of Justice Murphy, which contain fairly extensive conference notes for the years 1940–49, as well as docket books for the 1947 term, give a much more plastic impression of judicial choice in the making than the rigidly stratified bloc warfare by which most of us have characterized the Roosevelt and Vinson Courts.[8] Indeed, when meshed with the Stone and Burton papers, which overlap the same period, the Murphy papers tempt one to say that hardly any major decision in this decade was free from significant alteration of vote and language before announcement to the public. Neither was the phenomenon confined to Justices whose overt allegiances were to professional ideologies of law as reason or to philosophies of self-restraint. One of the most striking aspects of the decade is that the most important instances of judicial flux, from the doctrinal standpoint, occurred precisely among those Justices most suspected of ideological automation and in cases that stand as highpoints of their libertarian commitment. From the very human tendency to change one's mind under pressure, no one, and certainly no "libertarian activist," was immune.

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[5] See Schubert, *The Judicial Mind*, pp. 76–77, 185–186; and "Jackson's Judicial Philosophy: An Exploration in Value Analysis," this REVIEW, 59 (December, 1965), 944–945. Alpheus T. Mason, *Harlan Fiske Stone*: *Pillar of the Law* (New York, 1956), p. 641; and Alexander Bickel, *The Unpublished Opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis* (Cambridge, 1957).

[6] *Knox* v. *Lee*, 12 Wall. 457 (1870); *Juilliard* v. *Greenman*, 110 U.S. 421 (1884); *Minersville School District* v. *Gobitis*, 310 U.S. 586 (1940); *West Virginia State Board of Education* v. *Barnette*, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); *United States* v. *Carolene Products Co.*, 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). Charles E. Hughes to Felix Frankfurter, November 1, 1939: Box 18, Frankfurter Correspondence, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

[7] *Op. cit.*, note 1 *supra*.

[8] The Murphy papers are located at the Michigan Historical Collections of the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Unless otherwise cited, manuscript material comes from this source. Additional details about cases discussed in the text may be found in the author's *Mr. Justice Murphy*: *A Political Biography* (forthcoming, Princeton University Press).

Examples of fluctuating options are legion; but for convenience of illustration, certain types of flux may be distinguished from among well-known civil liberties decisions of the day. Without pretending to offer the following categories as a unified theoretical construct, we may classify fluid choices according to certain intervening variables which appear to have been at work. First is the "freshman effect"—i.e., unstable attitudes that seem to have resulted from the process of assimilation to the Court. It is not uncommon for a new Justice to undergo a period of adjustment, often about three years in duration, before his voting behavior stabilizes into observable, not to mention predictable, patterns. Biographical materials suggest the generality of this experience, irrespective of prior background and ranging from Justices as dissimilar as Cardozo and Murphy. Justice Cardozo, according to one clerk's recollection of the docket books, registered surprisingly unstable options as a newcomer. Frequently voting alone in conference before ultimately submerging himself in a group opinion, Cardozo himself confessed discomfort in adjusting from the common law world of the New York Court of Appeals to the public law orientation of the federal Supreme Court.[9] Elsewhere I have documented a similar instability on the part of Justice Murphy. During his freshman years on the high bench, Murphy swung from the wing of Justice Frankfurter, whom he had assumed would be his intellectual mainstay and ally, to substantial agreement with Justice Black, whose views regarding the First Amendment and state criminal procedure, it should be remembered, were also shifting ground at the time. In the process of adjustment, however, Murphy had problems of craftsmanship in the picketing cases and, along with other members of the Court, groped for a coherent position regarding free speech. He drowned a dissent in *Gobitis;* he cast a decisive turnabout vote at the last minute in *Bridges* v. *California;* and he also switched sides in *Hines* v. *Davidowitz.* However contrary to preconceptions, it was the libertarian Justice Murphy who had to be talked out of publishing a concurrence in *Cantwell* v. *Connecticut* (in return for different language) which criticized Justice Roberts' Court opinion for inadequately protecting state power to preserve the peace from clashing religious sects.[10]

Eloise Synder's pioneering study of the Court as a small group supports the hypothesis that the "freshman effect" has been a continuing phenomenon.[11] Parallels in other decision-making groups, e.g., the socialization of freshman Senators, also indicate that the Court is not alone in creating assimilation problems for new members. What occurs is a sort of hiatus between the norms of the individual's belief system and new institutional norms which must be internalized as role expectations unfold. Still, the aggregate effects of such freshman transitions are probably more difficult to trace in the judiciary. Using the concept of cliques, Synder hypothesized that the high court assimilates its new members through a "pivotal clique" in the ideological center, with the implication that uncommitted newcomers on stratified courts are likely to maximize influence at the outset of their judicial careers, before attitudes and bloc alignments jell. The experience of Justices Cardozo and Murphy suggests the need of refining this concept, however, especially the suggestion that fledging judges with unstable or inchoate attitudes are more influential than senior, committed members. While a pivotal Justice may have a controlling vote in a given five-four situation, the very reasons for the "freshman effect"—inexperience, feelings of inadequacy, hesitation about premature bloc identification, low seniority in assignments, strategies of playing safe, etc.—all point to the opposite direction of freshmen Justices following rather than leading.[12] Further, to the extent that "freshmanness" does cause newcomers to restrain personal preferences and gravitate toward the center, it may retard the absorption of current ideas into the Court's output, which Robert A. Dahl once argued is a prime effect of the appointive system and a means of harmonizing the institution with the outlook of dominant lawmaking majorities.[13] The problem, in brief, is whether the newcomer's influence should be measured in terms of votes or in terms of formulating doctrine and persuading peers. Only a mechanistic view of the judicial process, in my view, would measure influence exclusively in terms of either.

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[9] Paul A. Freund, "The Supreme Court: A Tale of Two Terms," *Ohio State Law Journal*, 26 (Spring, 1965), 227; Robert H. Jackson, "Full Faith and Credit—The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution," *Columbia Law Review*, 45 (January, 1945), 1–2.

[10] J. Woodford Howard, Jr., "Justice Murphy: The Freshman Years," *Vanderbilt Law Review*, 18 (March, 1965), 473–505. *Thornhill* v. *Alabama*, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); *N.L.R.B.* v. *Virginia Electric and Power Co.*, 314 U.S. 469 (1941); *Bridges* v. *California*, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); *Hines* v. *Davidowitz*, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); and *Cantwell* v. *Connecticut*, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). In *Cantwell*, Justice Stone also withheld a concurrence after Justice Roberts deleted a passage which had questioned state regulation of solicitation as a prior restraint. Copy, Harlan F. Stone to Owen J. Roberts, May 2, 1940: No. 632, Box 129.

[11] Eloise Synder, "The Supreme Court as a Small Group," *Social Forces*, 36 (March, 1958), 236–238.

A second cluster of fluctuating choices may be grouped around the familiar strategic variables of massing the Court and of institutional loyalties. Justices frequently compromise personal opinion in order to maximize their collective force and to safeguard the power and legitimacy of the Court among its reference groups. That personal ideology may be qualified or even defined by organizational perspectives is by no means unique to the judiciary. Neither must a judge genuflect at the mere mention of the tribunal, as a friendly wag once said of the agnostic Justice Frankfurter, to be affected by such considerations in the system of expectations within which modern judges operate. The evidence of the 1940's suggests that all of the Justices, at one time or another, were constrained by group and institutional interests. Not only was it common for them to offer helpful suggestions and advice to adversaries, according to the official theory of collective responsibility, but they also sacrificed deeply felt views. For example, Justice Murphy stifled a powerful lone dissent in the first Japanese Relocation Case under the badgering and patriotic appeals of Justice Frankfurter; and Justice Douglas did the same in the second.[14] After finding himself alone, and probably under advice from Justice Rutledge, Murphy also withheld an elaborate dissent in the case of runaway spy Gerhard Eisler, with the result that he left stillborn the first known assault by a Justice upon the House Un-American Activities Committee for violating the First Amendment.[15] Similarly, Justice Rutledge swallowed personal opinion in order to avoid stalemate in *Screws* v. *United States*, an important civil rights decision which held off an attack on expansive concepts of state action at the price of enfeebling federal statutory power to punish police bruality in the states.[16] And in familiar marshalling tactics, Murphy and Rutledge stifled their prepared dissents in the *Resweber* double execution case by joining forces with Douglas (who had switched votes) in Justice Burton's libertarian protest.[17] Massing support behind an unexpected ally is not an unfamiliar judicial stratagem, and it may well explain Justice Murphy's assignments in both *United States* v. *White*, which denied Fifth Amendment privileges to trade union officers in their official capacity, and *Hickman* v. *Taylor*, a pathfinding decision regarding pre-trial discovery.[18]

More difficult to analyze is a third class of fluctuating options, those which appear to have resulted from the changing factual perceptions of a particular judge. In some cases, the reasons for such a shift may be indistinguishable from pressures to coalesce. Thus, Justice Douglas' acquiescence in *Korematsu* v. *United States* probably was made easier by Chief Justice Stone's continuing reminders that opportunity to challenge relocation orders still remained open to petitioners so long as orders to report to control centers and actual detention were separable. Lack of opportunity for individuals to prove their loyalty was what had troubled Douglas all along.[19] In other cases, shifting perspectives appear to have been a function of additional thought and homework, by a clerk or a Justice, into issues that were only partially perceived at first because of inadequate argument, briefs, or time. The Supreme Court does not follow the practice in some state supreme courts of assigning cases by lot and of infrequent dissent.[20] But it is not uncommon for a Justice assigned to express one consensus to reverse field after further analysis, and then persuade his colleagues to follow suit. Justice Murphy did so with unanimous approval in the complex Chickasaw-Choctaw land claim controversy.[21] An even neater example occurred in *Lawson* v. *Suwannee Fruit & Steamship Co.*, in 1949. There, after independent research by a clerk in a poor record showed that a workmen's compensation award for the particular petitioner might jeopardize statutory rights of longshoremen as a class, Murphy turned tail, reworked the opinion without asking the Court's leave, and won quick, eight-to-one approval at conference. Justice Frankfurter, at that point, could not resist the "dig":

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[12] For an incisive critique of clique and power-game concepts as applied to the Supreme Court, see Ulmer, *op. cit.*, note 1 *supra*.

[13] Robert A. Dahl, "Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker," *Journal of Public Law*, 6 (Fall, 1957), 284–286.

[14] *Hirabayashi* v. *United States*, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). See Sidney Fine, "Mr. Justice Murphy and the Hirabayashi Case," *Pacific Historical Review*, 33 (May, 1964), 195–209. *Korematsu* v. *United States*, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Douglas, J., draft dissent, circulated December 1, 1944: No. 20, Box 133.

[15] *Eisler* v. *United States*, 338 U.S. 189 (1949). Murphy, J., draft opinion, circulated June 3, 1949: No. 255, Box 139. This attack, incidentally, anticipated by almost twenty years Judge Howard F. Corcoran's celebrated injunction against H.U.A.C. in 1966, which was based upon a theory of community rights and the chilling effect on free speech developed by way of Murphy's opinion in *Thornhill* v. *Alabama* as revived by the Warren Court in *Dombrowski* v. *Pfister*, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). Since Murphy was ill during much of the preparation of his *Eisler* opinion, however, the draft dissent must be viewed as a clerk's trial balloon which the Justice agreed to sponsor in hopes of restraining committee abuse. See *New York Times*, August 17, 1966, p. 24:5–8.

[16] 325 U.S. 91 (1945). Rutledge, J., Memorandum to Conference, February 24, 1945: No. 42, Box 133.

[17] *Louisiana ex rel. Francis* v. *Resweber*, 329 U.S. 459 (1947). Cf. draft dissents of Murphy and Rutledge, JJ: No. 142, Box 137.

[18] 322 U.S. 694 (1944); 329 U.S. 495 (1947).

> It seemed to me a compelled conclusion if due respect is to be given to legislation—if, that is, we let Congress make laws and not re-make them.
>
> This opinion (and change of Conference vote) ought to be a lesson that merely because a particular case is to be decided for a particular employee the result *on a fair and long view* may be a great disservice to labor and to Law. I could 'document' this truth.[22]

The difficulty is that the reasons for changing perceptions are not usually so obvious. One may argue that flux of this sort is inevitable in the cross-pressures of a collegial court of last resort whose main business lies at the frontier of legal development. One may speculate further about the competing values, the strategies of avoidance, the problems of obtaining linguistic consensus, the rush of business, and the just plain difficulties of substance which induce perceptual change. Occasionally, one may even suspect Justices of doing the unexpected just to confound bloc identification. Justice Murphy had one clerk who suggested that ploy in close cases after the Black-Douglas-Murphy trio began to form. S. Sidney Ulmer, after publishing an attitudinal study of the Michigan Supreme Court, was later challenged by one of the judges to explain an aberrant vote![23]

But no outsider really knows why judges change their minds. Seldom do they admit, as Jackson hinted in *Everson* v. *Board of Education*, to having switched their votes.[24] Even when overruling themselves later, seldom do they write with the candor of the Canadian jurist who blandly confessed: "the matter does not appear to me now as it appears to have appeared to me then."[25] Nor, it must be stressed, should judges be faulted either for changing their minds or for lack of complete candor. A major objective of the adversary system, after all, is prevention of premature classification and judgment.[26] That judges may shift position between conference and final voting is not only well understood among themselves, but a testament to the limitations of conference and the effectiveness of the argumentation system. And it is hardly "robism" to suggest that a cloak of secrecy may be just as necessary for judges as for diplomats in making such accommodations possible.

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[19] 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Stone, C.J., undated Memorandum to Conference; Black, J., Memorandum to Conference, December 8, 1944: No. 20, Box 133.

[20] Robert J. Sickels, "The Illusion of Judicial Consensus: Zoning Decisions in the Maryland Court of Appeals," this REVIEW, 59 (March, 1965), 100–104. On the effects of limited time, see Robert H. Jackson, *The Supreme Court in the American System of Government* (Cambridge, 1955), pp. 15–16.

[21] *Choctaw Nation* v. *United States and Chickasaw Nation*, 318 U.S. 423 (1943). Cf. draft opinions of February 5, 1943, and March 1, 1943: No. 80, Box 131.

[22] 336 U.S. 198 (1949). Clerk to Murphy, J., February 1, 1949; Frankfurter, J., comment on slip opinion, February 8, 1949: No. 56, Box 139. The conference vote was 5-4 in favor of reversal, with Vinson, Black, Douglas, Rutledge, and Murphy in the majority, but the last three Justices apparently had misgivings because the clerk noted question marks by their votes. The final outcome was an affirmance, Douglas, J., dissenting without opinion.

[23] Clerk to Murphy, J., January 31, 1942. Box 101. Ulmer to author, December 16, 1966.

[24] 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1949).

[25] Bramwell, J., in *Andrew* v. *Styrap*, 26 *Law Times Reports* (N.S.) 704, 706 (1872), referring to his judgment in *Ellis* v. *Kelly*, 3 *Law Times Reports* (N.S.) 331 (1860).

[26] See Lon L. Fuller, "The Adversary System," in Harold J. Berman (ed.), *Talks on American Law* (New York, 1961), pp. 39–41.

Whatever their causes, however, shifting individual perceptions can significantly affect public policy and the ideological complexion of courts. Consider, for example, the changing positions of Justices Black and Douglas in three of the most ideology-charged decisions of the decade: *Martin* v. *Struthers*, *Colegrove* v. *Green*, and *Terminiello* v. *Chicago*.[27]

In *Struthers*, the Court faced the question whether an anti-doorbell ringing ordinance designed to protect sleeping night-shift workers in an industrial town violated the First Amendment rights of proselyting Jehovah's Witnesses. Although he too expressed sympathy in conference for the Sunday sleepers of Struthers, Chief Justice Stone at first was unable to attract a majority in support of "preferred freedoms." Justice Black, who saw the scales tipping toward privacy of the home and local control, expressed prophetic fears in conference that the next case might be Jehovah's Witnesses invading Roman Catholic services if no restraints were approved. That view was accepted by a five-four vote; and, after assigning himself the majority opinion, Black circulated a hard-hitting memorandum to the effect that such a community reasonably could forbid doorbell ringing altogether in order to protect privacy. Then, after answering objections in a second circulation, Justice Black suddenly reversed himself. The ordinance was overturned by a five-four vote, and the Chief Justice graciously permitted Black to write a new majority opinion which in effect invited the town to try again with a more carefully drafted ordinance that accommodated privacy and free speech. After all, as Stone argued behind the scenes, some room for accommodation remained before community action, at least until homeowners had an opportunity to listen or object.[28]

Justice Black's about-face in *Struthers* goes far toward explaining some of the puzzles in the opinions. For one thing, it accounted for Justice Murphy's emotional concurrence which replowed the same terrain but had originated as a Murphy-Douglas-Rutledge dissent against their colleague's failure to balance interests. It also made more sense of the Frankfurter-Jackson complaints that the Court was "wanting in explicitness" and attempting to resolve tough practical issues by a "vague but fervent transcendentalism."[29] What the Court had decided was a narrow question of judgment—whether it was possible for a community to accommodate colliding interests by more carefully framed time, place, and manner regulations. What the public read, on the other hand, were heavily rhetorical outpourings from both sides which obscured the precise rights involved and exaggerated the doctrinal split over "preferred freedoms." No one could have guessed until twenty-five years later that privacy of the home and local control loomed so high in Justice Black's scale of values. No one could have guessed that the attitudes he expressed in the sit-in and racial picketing cases of the 1960's represented, not a switch attributable to advancing age, but constancy to prime values which, for two decades, the course of litigation had left unexposed.[30]

Likewise, from reading the opinions in *Colegrove* v. *Green*, no one could have fathomed that Justice Black, author of the three-man opinion which viewed congressional reapportionment as a justiciable issue, had initially expressed contrary conclusions in conference, along with every other Justice but one.[31] Who could have guessed that Justice Black had not only echoed the general fears about entering the apportionment thicket, but himself had attempted to express those sentiments for the Court before he once again changed his mind and wrote the powerful minority opinion which structured a fateful enlargement of judicial power as a supervisor of the electoral process?[32] The answer, of course, is that no one could have inferred such flux from votes or opinions. Having resolved his own misgivings, Justice Black simply advanced his conclusions unencumbered by his previous doubts.

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[27] 319 U.S. 141 (1942); 328 U.S. 549 (1946); 337 U.S. 1 (1949).

[28] Conference notes, No. 238, Box 132; No. 966, Box 131. Cf. draft opinions circulated by Black, J.: No. 238, Box 132.

[29] 319 U.S. 141, 153; 319 U.S. 157, 179.

[30] See *Bell* v. *Maryland*, 378 U.S. 226, 344 (1964); *Cox* v. *Louisiana*, 379 U.S. 536, 580 (1965); *Brown* v. *Louisiana*, 383, U.S. 131, 151 (1966); *Adderley* v. *Florida*, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). Cf. Schubert, *Judicial Policy-Making* (Chicago, 1965), p. 127; *Wall Street Journal*, November 2, 1965, p. 18; and *New York Times*, February 27, 1966, IV, p. 7.

[31] On first impression, only Justice Douglas voted to intervene. Justice Murphy passed, and Justice Rutledge echoed general doubts about the political implications of the case. Rutledge later changed his mind on the justiciability issue, but cast the decisive vote against intervention because of difficulties perceived in equitable remedies. Conference notes, No. 804, Box 136. 328 U.S. 549, 564 (1946).

The majority opinion in *Terminiello* v. *Chicago* also provided no clue that its author, Justice Douglas, had followed a parallel course.[33] Nevertheless, both the Murphy and Burton papers indicate that Justice Douglas had initially perceived Terminiello's speech at a volatile political rally of Gerald L. K. Smith forces in Chicago as throwing a lighted match into an explosive situation and had cast his vote accordingly. Then, after reversing position and thus the result, Justice Douglas was assigned the majority opinion and defended the choice by arguments that many contemporaries regarded as the apogee of libertarian dogma.[34]

These examples may be extreme because the opinions acknowledged none of the doubts which had been resolved. Yet they serve to make the point. Votes can be a crude measure of attitude. So can opinions, and even the lack of them.[35] The ideological commitments seemingly manifest in both may be lower and the basis of choice far more pragmatic than either imply on their face. Certainly that was true of the 1940's. The disparity between the rigid ideological appearances of opinions and the fluid choices behind them was sufficiently widespread as to pose genuine problems for anyone making ideological inferences, whether by analyzing opinions or by aggregating votes. After all, if it is true that even the most libertarian of Justices sweated so hard over their options, what are we to make of interpretations, advanced by both quantitative analysts and their critics, which explain libertarian judicial behavior as simply attitudinal automatism? Plainly, the data point to a deflation of the ideological component in the decision-making of this period.[36]

II. THE GAP BETWEEN IDEOLOGY AND CHOICE

To deflate ideology is not to explain the disparity between choice and opinion on a Court otherwise known for its ideological cleavages. The tough nut is still knowing when individual attitude and action have been proximate. In grouping the evidence of flux around intervening variables of socialization, strategy, and personal perception, the implication is that group variables moderate personal ideologies. Yet the mediation works both ways. Ideology may be inflated as well as deflated. To generalize whether moderation or exaggeration will result from group interaction, it is plain, would tax the middle range theory the discipline so desperately lacks. My hunch is that systematic application of role theory to the appellate process offers the richest potential aid to the problem. Pending that development, however, a number of discrete variables can be identified from the 1940's which may help to account for disparities of both types.

Besides bargaining and the intervening variables already mentioned, moderation may have resulted from: *equivocation*, in which personal ideologies were victim of novel situations and newness on the bench (Flag Salute Cases); *pragmatism*, in which ideological values were tempered by strategic judgments about what professional and lay traffics would bear (Murphy, J., in *Hirabayashi*); *cross-pressure*, in which conflicting values neutralized individual response (Rutledge, J., in *Colegrove*). Limitations of law cannot be dismissed from that equation. As Justice Rutledge once put the problem to his confrere Murphy in a tax case: "I am constrained to concur, though I wish, as I know you do, that there was some tenable way to reach the opposite result."[37] Ideological inflation, in turn, appears to have resulted from several factors: *conversion*, in which judges who changed tack after further analysis wrote with a conviction that acknowledged none of the misgivings they had resolved (Black, J., in *Colegrove*); *workload*, in which busy decision-makers reached into pigeon holes and lawyers' briefs for standing arguments to support conclusions more discriminatingly reached (Murphy, J., in *Prince* v. *Massachusetts*);[38] *evangelism*, in which desires to persuade lay publics reinforced tendencies to black-and-white argument (*id.*); *a milieu of advocacy*, in which the demands of persuading colleagues and countrymen in trailblazing cases coalesced with professional habits and personal antagonisms to transform opinion-writing into argumentation and overstatement (*S.E.C.* v. *Chenery Corp.*).[39]

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[32] *Ibid.* Docket Book, 1945 Term, Box 92. Harold H. Burton Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

[33] 337 U.S. 1 (1949).

[34] Conference notes, No. 272, Box 140, Murphy Papers. Docket Book, 1948 Term, Box 182; and conference notes, Box 184, Burton Papers. Cf. *Washington Post*, July 20, 1949, p. 12:3.

[35] For instance, Justice Frankfurter's dissent in *United States* v. *Kahriger*, 345 U.S. 22, 38 (1953), was predicated in part upon an assumption that Justice Brandeis, by joining the majority in the Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922), considered the tax unconstitutional. Bickel, *op. cit.*, pp. 16–19, indicates that Frankfurter's inference was erroneous inasmuch as Brandeis had acquiesced in the Child Labor Tax Case for largely tactical reasons.

[36] In this connection, see Walter F. Murphy, "Deeds Under A Doctrine: Civil Liberties in the 1963 Term," this REVIEW, 59 (March, 1965), 64–79.

[37] Wiley Rutledge to Frank Murphy, December 1, 1943: No. 53, Box 132. *Commissioner of Internal Revenue* v. *Gooch Milling & Elevator Co.*, 320 U.S. 418 (1943).

Admittedly, these variables resist quantification and are seldom constant; but it is not unlikely that we have underestimated their effect upon judicial choice, styles of argument, and hence ideological appearances. Especially is this so of institutionalized advocacy. Among the myriad influences at work on the Roosevelt and Vinson Courts, surely advocacy by judges flowered with unaccustomed brilliance. And what advocate would willingly concede an advantage to his adversary by parading his doubts in public? Judges, all of them lawyers and many ex-politicians, commonly refer to opinion writing in terms of advocacy; "you have stated your side of the case as well as it can be put," is a routine compliment to an opponent. Neither are they impervious to Huey Long's reported tactical suggestion on the margin of a Senate speech: "Weak Point, Holler Louder!" Vigorous language, as Judge Walter V. Schaefer of Illinois once remarked, may even be psychologically necessary to cover interior doubt. Aggravating the effects of advocacy, moreover, are heavy workload and scarce time. The Justices, whatever their inclinations, simply lack the time to indulge in all the subtle philosophic calculations attributed to them by commentators. As active problem-solvers, they are sometimes, in Murphy's words, "rushed beyond belief."[40] Pressures are especially intense at the end of term. Under the circumstances, it is understandable why busy judges may throw the book at their tasks of persuasion. And the tendency to overstate is reinforced by the prevalent professional norm that it is nobody's business how the Court's decisions are reached, that official explanations are all that count.

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[38] 321 U.S. 158, 171 (1944), which sustained application of a child labor law against religious solicitation at night by a Jehovah's Witnesses child accompanied by her guardian. Cf. the absolutist quality of Murphy's lone dissent and this preliminary observation to his clerk, who had done much to agitate the Court into review: "After carefully examining the records and briefs and with no little reflection and the benefit of the Rutledge draft, it is not difficult to come out on the same side of the question that he does although all my instincts are against it and I want very much to be on the other side in dissent if I can stand on firm ground. . . . Rutledge has made something of an impressive case. I want you to see his side of it and clearly what we have to meet. He stands on the grounds of enlightened conception of control and responsibility for child welfare. As he sees it it is modern social legislation under the police power to which religious as well as secular organizations ought to be required to conform,—and to which the 'rights' of the parent or custodian must be subordinated for reasons outlined by Rutledge. But I do not want to conform—I want to save all that can be saved for the individual in freedom of conscience and I want to save all that can be saved for the parent as against the state in the right to teach the religion to the child. This might sound a little Catholic but I assure you I have nothing in mind but liberty of religion in a country that was conceived as a sanctuary for oppressed people. . . . What motives are behind the prosecutions in this case? What is there in the record to support my suspicions? Very little. But I am confident I am right about it. We are up against a tough problem I know when we attempt to say that the public streets are a no-man's-land where social legislation cannot operate and parents or religious bodies are free to do as they like. . . . But . . . I don't see a genuine or substantial evil in what the child did in this case. She was evangelizing her religion as she understands it (as well as her guardian). Their literature *on religion* must be offered to the public. . . . Is the matter in issue the rights of the custodian, not the child? It is to be observed that the custodian herself thought the child should be left home, and took her along only because she cried. But out on the street she went to the defense of the child's legal right." Memorandum to clerk, January 22, 1944: No. 98, Box 133.

[39] Justices Jackson and Murphy, who had collided within the Justice Department before joining the Court, seldom joined each other's dissenting opinions and, when spokesmen for opposing positions, often wrote in pejorative style. See, *e.g.*, *Jewell Ridge Coal Corp.* v. *Local No. 6167*, 325 U.S. 161 (1945); *Western Union Co.* v. *Lenroot*, 323 U.S. 490 (1945); *S.E.C.* v. *Chenery Corp.*, 332 U.S. 194 (1947).

[40] Auerbach *et al*, *The Legal Process* (San Francisco, 1961), pp. 358–359. Frank Murphy to G. A. Richards, December 16, 1940. Box 93.

Whatever the reasons for the disparity between plastic deeds and hard argument in the 1940's, however, one untoward effect was exaggeration of doctrinal conflict to the point, it is tempting to say, that outside ideologues preferred. For ideology is also in the mind of the beholder, and scholarship did not escape entrapment in its own polar opposites. However useful pedagogically it may have been to depict judicial struggles of the decade as an epic clash between dichotomous ideologies, the fact is that few major issues took so simple a form. Rather, the fluidity of choice on the Roosevelt and Vinson Courts serves as a reminder that judging, like most American decision-making, is situational and that causation is apt to be more complex than the simple mirroring of precedent or principle or personal belief systems.

This observation has particular bearing on the controversy between "quantifiers" and "qualifiers" regarding the accuracy of attitude measurement. All doubtless would agree that attitudes affect action. All probably would agree with Justice Frankfurter's aphorism that general propositions do decide concrete cases if a judge's convictions are strong enough.[41] The main issue is how to determine attitudes and to chart their effects, and that touches again upon the question whether influence should be measured by doctrines or by votes. This question, of course, has close parallels to an older conflict between aggregationists and survey researchers in the study of voting behavior. An inherent problem of voting analysis generally is that votes, of themselves, do not distinguish underlying variations of intensity, issue perception, and certainty of response among voters. Opinion sampling and scaling techniques were designed to unravel these variables in mass electoral behavior, and today few scholars would seriously dispute their efficacy or rich potential.[42] Guttman scaling, content analysis, and other quantitative techniques were adapted to judicial behavior as surrogates for opinion sampling. But while sampling poses problems enough in mass populations, there is little doubt that the surrogate methods of attitude analysis face rougher sledding in the Supreme Court. The principal reason is that the universe is a collegial elite whose members not only make decisions in a highly structured and secret process but also must offer persuasive collective reasons to the public. While scaling of judicial votes in split decisions has the virtue of stressing relationships among the decision-makers, the method excludes unanimous decisions and the power considerations which help produce them. Further, the unit of analysis itself is under collegial influences. The very reliance on votes to infer attitudes points to the essential problem of identifying the intervening variables which affect those votes.

These difficulties are reflected especially in the conflict over measurement of attitude intensities. Qualifiers such as Martin Shapiro resist suggestions in jurimetrics literature that Supreme Court decisions can be explained or predicted in terms of the attitudes of median men on cumulative scales of split decisions; and many scholars balk at some of the headier conclusions reached in the salad days of quantification, e.g., the Schubert–Spaeth assertions that Justice Clark was the most influential Justice in determining the Court's position in the late 1950's. Quantifiers, in turn, object to rebuttals that median men are, by definition, least affected by the values at play; and Schubert has gone so far as to suggest that they may be involved the most.[43] The truth seems to be that neither side is wholly right or wrong. For one thing, no general proposition yet framed squares with all that we can reconstruct from the real world of the past. For another, quantifiers do not always agree whether median Justices on attitude scales are most or least structured in attitude or are most or least influential.[44] Ambiguity also lurks in the debate because of a tendency to imply that median Justices on scalograms are the swing-men of particular cases. Clearly, there is no necessary connection, just as there is no reason to assume *a priori* that the most intense Justice is the most influential or that either Justice is the swing-man, the tailman, the group spokesman, or anyone else. Relative attitude intensities and influence are separate questions.

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[41] Frankfurter, J., Memorandum to Conference, April 25, 1947: No. 84, Box 136. *Harris* v. *United States*, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).

[42] See Walter Dean Burnham, "The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe," this REVIEW, 59 (March, 1965), 7–28; Warren E. Miller, "Party Identification and Partisan Attitudes," in Raymond E. Wolfinger (ed.), *Readings in American Political Behavior* (Englewood Cliffs, 1966), pp. 252–253.

[43] Cf. Shapiro, *op. cit.*, 37–38, and Glendon Schubert's reply in "Ideologies and Attitudes, Academic and Judicial," *op. cit.*, 30–38, note 4 *supra*.

[44] Cf. Schubert in *ibid.*, with his earlier work in "The Study of Judicial Decision-Making As An Aspect of Political Behavior," this REVIEW, 52 (December, 1958), 1010–1011, and with Harold J. Spaeth, "Warren Court Attitudes Toward Business: The 'B' Scale," in Schubert (ed.), *Judicial Decision-Making* (New York, 1963), pp. 89–90; and with S. Sidney Ulmer, "Supreme Court Behavior and Civil Rights," *Western*

The variations, in reality, may be broad. It is quite conceivable that the most intense or most influential Justice may go unexposed. For example, the driving force in the *Gobitis* case may not have been the Court spokesman, Justice Frankfurter, any more than Chief Justice Hughes, whose forceful analysis of the issue in conference was followed exactly, and with little apparent debate, in the final opinion of the Court.[45] While the similarity of Hughes' conference presentation and Frankfurter's opinion may have been coincidental, given the speedy conference deliberations in those days, the similarity is enough to make us pause before assuming that Justice Frankfurter, before the *Barnette* reversal, was most influential or intense. Justice Black's swings in *Struthers* and *Colegrove*, to take another illustration, indicate that he felt quite intensely and had critical influence. But in neither case was he the classically disengaged or moderate swing-man, who is sometimes postulated as the most likely recipient of assignments in close cases. By the same token, it is hard to believe that he felt less intensely or had less influence than swing-man Murphy in *Bridges* v. *California* or swing-man Reed in the *Jewell Ridge* portal pay case, which touched off the so-called Black-Jackson feud.[46] Despite the differences in all these cases, Justice Black nonetheless would be ranked as an anchor man for reasons that opinions do not disclose. Variances between single cases and cumulative scales, it is true, are not conclusive. As a result of his positions in the Doorbell Ringing, Search and Seizure, and Birth Control Cases, Justice Black probably would occupy a median position on a right-to-privacy scale. But that may suggest no more than that the "chameleon" concept of privacy itself is too inclusive and should be broken down into separable problems—search and seizure, marital privacy, privacy vs. picketing, privacy vs. commercial publication, etc.—about which he appears to entertain strong and separate views. Some commentators have suggested such differentiation as a more fruitful approach to the policy problems of privacy. It would be interesting to scale judicial attitudes accordingly.[47]

Schubert, as I understand his recent writing, would not necessarily disagree. Coming from a different route, he also insists that intensities are relative and depend on the situation.[48] We part company mainly on definition of the situation. Here one must readily concede that simplification of empirical reality is an essential step in scientific advance. But the intervening variables of strategy and style, in my judgment, are so critical in judicial decision-making that they cannot be excluded from any stimulus-response model without distorting results and reducing the reliability of the most carefully constructed attitudinal inferences. Consider, for example, Justice Frankfurter's posture toward federal searches and seizures. Either scaling techniques or doctrinal analysis, I daresay, would result in a relatively high rank order for Frankfurter in libertarian responses against searches and seizures by federal police. To assert that he felt more intensely about the matter than even Murphy or Rutledge, on the other hand, would invite dispute. Yet Frankfurter appears to have done just that in the *Harris* and *Trupiano* cases, a fact which was obscured because he chose to work *through* Justice Murphy in order to maximize his protest.[49] Confessing himself to be "nuts about" the *Harris* problem, and even apologizing to his colleagues for excess heat in conference, Justice Frankfurter himself wrote a brilliant dissent challenging the Court's conclusion that discovery of contraband during lawful arrest legalized unauthorized searches and seizures in the premises. But Frankfurter had difficulty rousing his fellow dissenters to

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Political Quarterly, 13 (June, 1960), 296. For a critique of scaling techniques, see Joseph Tanenhaus, "The Cumulative Scaling of Judicial Decisions," *Harvard Law Review*, 79 (June, 1966), 1590–1594.

[45] "Observations of Chief Justice Hughes," April 25, 1940: No. 690, Box 129. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).

[46] For citations, see notes 27, 10, and 39 *supra*.

[47] See *Time, Inc.* v. *Hill*, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); *Berger* v. *New York*, 18 L. ed. 2d 1040, 1059 (1967); and William L. Prosser, "Privacy," *California Law Review*, 48 (1960), 383. Cf. Schubert, *The Judicial Mind*, pp. 171–174.

[48] See *op. cit.*, note 43 *supra; The Judicial Mind*, pp. 286–287; and *Judicial Policy-Making*, p. 113.

[49] *Harris* v. *United States*, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); *Trupiano* v. *United States*, 334 U.S. 699 (1948).

the same level of intensity. Justice Jackson, who had expressed doubts in conference, declined to enter a joint statement. Justice Rutledge, who differentiated searches of automobiles and homes as well as seizures of open and hidden contraband, refused to join Frankfurter's attempt to undermine the close *Zap* and *Davis* decisions of the year before. Justice Murphy's draft dissent was routinely restrained.[50] Once before in the Detectaphone Case, Justice Frankfurter had encouraged Murphy to add "a little pastry," as Murphy described his rhetoric, to strengthen his dissent.[51] Because he regarded it as "terribly important" that their *Harris* protest reach the police and lower courts as well as their brethren, Frankfurter again prodded Murphy to stoke his fires, which was done in an opinion that Frankfurter regarded as "none too strong." By way of reward, Frankfurter then assigned Murphy the majority opinion in *Trupiano* the following year, when Justice Douglas' swing gave them a temporary five-four majority.[52]

Stylistic variations may color the problem of intensity no less than the tactical. Felix Frankfurter, both as teacher and judge, was a scrappy and excitable intellectual with intense convictions. But Frankfurter also valued "Doric austerity" in opinions, a trait he lionized in Brandeis and juxtaposed to "the Blue Danube side of me."[53] Frankfurter's notions of style and strategy coalesced in racial discrimination cases. The former NAACP counsel consistently cautioned his colleagues to play down anti-racist rhetoric on the ground that "this Court should avoid exacerbating the very feelings which we seek to allay." "And if I myself at times betray this wisdom," he added, "so much the worse for me." Frank Murphy also was a passionate character and a pushover for appeals to evangelical preachment, his most congenial style. But perceiving different responses to judicial crusading, former NAACP board-member Murphy insisted that the Court should invoke "constitutional condemnation" at every opportunity as a symbolic stroke against racism.[54] These variations, of course, were situational as well as personal. Yet that is the point; in assessing attitudinal intensities, can we safely subsume such strategic and stylistic variables, hot or cool?

Similar reservations hold for variations of issue perception and certitude among Justices. If anything, these aspects of choice are even harder to infer than intensity. The problem for traditional analysis is that opinions seldom reveal the issue perceptions of all the Justices, and those perceptions which are revealed may reflect collegial influences more than individual cognition. In any event, we are dependent upon what the judges say their perceptions are. The problem for behavioral analysis is that quantification can reach a point of diminishing returns when multiple variables are involved. There are forces at work in the appellate process, to be sure, which are designed to narrow the issues; we also may expect that increasing sophistication in regression techniques may make the multiplicity problem more manageable. Still, the collisions of value which fracture customary blocs—*Screws* and the privacy cases, for example—also tax ideological analysis. When cases turn on clashes *among* multiple libertarian values, problems of classification and quantification increase. Furthermore, when past opinions have greater predictive force than current bloc configurations, as was true of Justice Black's *Adamson* opinion for his position in *Griswold* v. *Connecticut*, the lesson may be that, at this point, no one method of prediction is intrinsically superior.[55]

There are occasions of flux in narrowly pivided courts, finally, which bloc and swingman notions fail to fit because of pervasive uncertainty. A case may be considered so close that one conference vote cannot be considered more stable than another. The Justices, to put the matter differently, may be proceeding on probabilities of 51–49 percent. That situation

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[50] Conference notes; Frankfurter, J., Memorandum to Conference, April 25, 1947; note, Wiley Rutledge to Frank Murphy, April 12, 1947, and comment on slip opinion, April 7, 1947: No. 34, Box 136. *Zap* v. *United States*, 328 U.S. 624, 630 (1946); *Davis* v. *United States*, 328 U.S. 582, 594 (1946).

[51] *Goldman* v. *United States*, 316 U.S. 129, 136 (1942); Felix Frankfurter to Frank Murphy, April 3, 1942; Murphy, J., to clerk, undated: No. 962, Box 130.

[52] Felix Frankfurter to Frank Murphy, February 15, 1947; comment on slip opinion, April 3, 1947: No. 34, Box 136. Murphy to Frankfurter, April 10, 1948: No. 427, Box 139.

[53] Comment on slip opinion, *American Power & Light Co.* v. *S.E.C.*, 329 U.S. 90 (1946): Nos. 4–5, Box 136.

[54] Felix Frankfurter to Wiley Rutledge, January 2, 1948: Box 34, Frankfurter Correspondence, *loc. cit.* Cf. Murphy, J., in *Steele* v. *L.&N.R. Co.*, 323 U.S. 192, 208 (1944).

[55] *Adamson* v. *California*, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947). *Griswold* v. *Connecticut*, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

probably obtained for several Justices in the tough treaty abrogation case, *Clark* v. *Allen*, in which Justice Rutledge's description of his mental state—"in fog"—aptly caught a wider mood.[56] Uncertainty also characterized a substantial segment of the Court in the early establishment clause case, *Everson* v. *Board of Education*.[57] Although all the Justices readily accepted the principle of a high wall of separation between church and state, application of that principle to a parochial school bus rebate set off prolonged soul-searching and flux. Only two Justices, Frankfurter and Rutledge, would have nullified the subsidy in preliminary voting, and Frankfurter expressed his conclusion "with difficulty." Justice Jackson criticized the child benefit theory so vigorously that his vote for affirmance was doubtful. Justice Murphy, devout Catholic and "ardent Jeffersonian," passed. After Justices Jackson and Burton switched votes, Murphy's signature gave Justice Black's opinion the decisive fifth vote. Murphy thereby came closest to a classic, cross-pressured swing-man; but it stretches reality to suggest that he, more than Jackson, Burton, or any other doubtful voter, "controlled" the decision. Attitude analysis becomes hazy in *Everson* because the judges were still in process of determining them. Principle did not decide the concrete case.

In conference, only Justice Rutledge appears to have articulated absolutist arguments; even those reflected a pragmatic judgment that there was no other way to draw a comprehensible and consistent line. "First it has been books, now buses, next churches and teachers," Murphy recorded him as saying bluntly and presciently in conference. "Every religious institution in [the] country will be reaching into [the] hopper for help if you sustain this. We ought to stop this thing at [the] threshold of [the] public school." Rutledge's medicine—on the face, invalidation of aid to *any* private school—was too strong for the others. But as they tried to sharpen alternatives by projecting the principle into implications ahead, Chief Justice Vinson seems to have expressed a common discomfort—and lack of ideological compulsion—when he declared: "I try to think of [the] case before me." *Everson*, in short, may have been one of Justice Brandeis' "go-aheads" when the certainties are no more than 51 percent.[58] Ideological hardening came later.

The Court's evolution in the religion field suggests that different methods of analysis may be better suited to different subjects as well as to different questions. Quantitative methods, in my opinion, have proven utility as negative tests of affirmative hypotheses; it is illuminating, for example, that the legal categories of *stare decisis* and self-restraint are difficult to scale. It also should be remembered that quantitative techniques were designed primarily for research situations in which votes and opinions are the only data available. Yet even then quantitative methods may be safer after judicial attitudes have time to set than when belief systems and doctrinal categories are still emergent. Early quantitative researchers indeed made a "lucky hit," for instance, by choosing right-to-counsel cases for scalogram analysis.[59] The doctrinal watershed in that field and in state criminal procedure generally was reached relatively early in *Betts* v. *Brady*.[60] Successive decisions after *Betts* seem to have been a matter of pumping factual situations into standing doctrinal categories rather than attempts at differentiation. Nothing really new was added after 1942 except Justice Black's historicism in *Adamson*, and even the language used in the great Black-Frankfurter debate over due process in that case was a projection of the internal dialogue in *Betts*.[61] Religion cases, by contrast, would have been far more difficult to quantify dynamically, because in both freedom to worship and establishment cases, doctrinal motifs themselves were emergent and the threshold conclusions of judges were erratic. One has only to contemplate scaling of the Flag Salute Cases or *Everson*, *McCollum*, and *Zorach* to grasp the point.[62] Time and litigation may be necessary for implications to be perceived and attitudes to harden in a case-law system. Methods that make no explicit provision for such change are essentially static. The subject of religion, in this sense, probably could be studied more fruitfully as a form of "incrementalism," however difficult that concept may be to operationalize.[63] For the attitudinal referents themselves evolved as the

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[56] Conference note, No. 626, Box 138. 331 U.S. 503 (1947).

[57] 330 U.S. 1 (1947).

[58] Docket notes and conference notes, No. 52, Box 138.

[59] Schubert, *The Judicial Mind*, p. 99.

[60] 316 U.S. 455 (1942).

[61] Conference notes, No. 837, Box 132.

[62] *McCollum* v. *Board of Education*, 333 U.S. 203 (1948); *Zorach* v. *Clauson*, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).

[63] Martin Shapiro, "Stability and Change in Judicial Decision-Making: Incrementalism or Stare Decisis?", *Law in Transition Quarterly*, 2 (Summer, 1965), 134–157.

Court was forced to shift emphasis from free exercise to establishment and as successive cases exposed tension between the two which at first was only dimly perceived.[64] Consequently, for all the rhetoric released as litigation progressed, the judgments of erstwhile libertarian absolutists remained interest-balancing and close to the vest. Whatever the merits of decisions in either field, it is no accident that the Court ventured into new pastures in state criminal procedure while in religion it still is fashioning attitudes in the old.[65]

III. CONCLUSION

If the foregoing argument is persuasive that greater fluidity of choice prevailed in the Supreme Court of the 1940's than is commonly assumed, the evidence presented has several implications for the empirical and normative concerns of the discipline. First, assuming that the experience of this decade can be projected, the data point to a potential disparity between a highly complex and fluid "input" stage and a relatively simplistic official "output" in the judicial process. This disparity between choice and explanation aggravates a general analytical problem of reliably classifying hard data, votes and opinions, whether classification proceeds by a single observer or risks are cut by panel techniques. The disparity also points to the complexity of conversion processes, since presumably they too are affected by group interaction.[66] The disparity likewise suggests the need of refining popular concepts about blocs, cliques, and attitudinal automatism which sometimes pass for causal explanations in both quantitative analyses and normative critiques of Supreme Court behavior. By no means do I conclude that the above examples of fluctuating options *refute* the findings of socio-psychological measurement, particularly the more sophisticated and careful versions as exemplified by Schubert's *The Judicial Mind*, or by Ulmer's suggestive work on the theory of sub-groups. Indeed, a surfacing latent attitude may be the very reason for the flux described; and aggregate analysis may be the most effective safeguard against the hazards of classification, particularly in the nonreplicable and highly impressionistic form in which findings such as mine are usually presented. The point is, however, *not necessarily*. Quantifiers must classify no less than qualifiers, and both should face squarely the probability and effect of fluid choices on their modal categories and attitudinal inferences. Because group theory focuses upon such variables while drawing from both behavioral and traditional resources, that approach offers a rich potential source of synthesis for analysis of judicial behavior.[67]

Second, the evidence of the 1940's lends greater support to the lawyer's ideal of the judicial process as a system of reasoning than many legal realists would accept. Clearly, judges of all ideological persuasions pondered, bargained, and argued in the course of reaching their decisions, and they compromised their ideologies, too. No one can plow through the papers of a Stone or a Murphy without coming out with renewed respect for the give-and-take or without appreciation for the multiplicity of variables and constraints, including that old whipping-post, Law, that went into the decision-making of the era. On the other hand, several major decisions were neither so collective nor so ideologically opinionated as the Hart-Arnold debate of a few years back would have it.[68] At present levels of knowledge the central issue of that debate, what constitutes *the* judicial process, defies inclusive description and, because it fails to differentiate institutional layers and responsibilities, perhaps asks a meaningless question.

Third, and for the same reasons, the evidence suggests the need of caution before generalizing about the so-called "role" of ideology on the high court. Especially is this so of the ever-popular dichotomy between "libertarian activism" and "judicial self-restraint." The fact that the Justices commonly identified as libertarian activists actually changed their minds so readily in the 1940's, the fact that Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge arrived at libertarian conclusions only after tortuous processes of reflection and interchange in some of the most ideologically-loaded decisions of the day, should cool the attraction of these worn antinomies as meaningful labels (though I doubt that any evidence will). On the other hand, the fact that the opinions lend themselves so easily to simplistic ideological explanation adds substance to continuing professional criticism of the Court for indulging in overstatement.[69] The issue here is more than one of taste. Apart from styles of advocacy of interest mainly to lawyers, overstatement touches upon problems of credibility, of clarity of choice and inflation of doctrine, and thus of effective judicial leadership in an intricate legal system in which the Court's ultimate power is persuasion. Libertarian Justices, whatever their reasons for ideological modes of address, can be faulted for presenting their conclusions as if they never had any doubts. Oversimplification from the Court, after all, feeds its often-decried public counterpart.

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[64] Philip B. Kurland, *Religion and the Law* (Chicago, 1962).

[65] Cf. *Miranda* v. *Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), with *Zorach* v. *Clauson*, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); *Two Guys* v. *McGinley*, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); *Gallagher* v. *Crown Kosher Market*, 366 U.S. 617 (1961); and denial of certiorari in church tax exemption cases, *Cree* v. *Goldstein* and *Murray* v. *Goldstein*, 385 U.S. 816 (1966), and in *Horace Mann League* v. *Maryland Board of Public Works*, 385 U.S. 97 (1966).

[66] See Joel B. Grossman, "Social Backgrounds and Judicial Decisions: Notes for a Theory," *Journal of Politics*, 29 (May, 1967), 334–351.

[67] *Op. cit.*, note 1 *supra*. Also, see Joel B. Grossman, "Role-Playing and the Analysis of Judicial Behavior: The Case of Mr. Justice Frankfurter," *Journal of Public Law*," 11 (1962), 285–309.

[68] Cf. Henry M. Hart, Jr., "Foreward: The Time Chart of the Justices, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term," *Harvard Law Review*, 73 (November, 1959), 84–125; and Thurman Arnold, "Professor Hart's Theology," *ibid.* (May, 1960), 1298–1317.

Finally, the evidence presented here points to the essential unity of research techniques, in particular as traditional methods of biographical exploration may contribute fresh data and suggest conceptual refinements for newer methods that were designed for more usual research situations in which votes and opinions *are* the only hard data available. This point is worth stressing because at the present stage of inquiry the critical need is for attempts to combine the findings of aggregate analysis and microanalysis in a theoretical synthesis. Thus, if the above conclusions appear unduly negative or destructive of what passes for conventional wisdom in substantial parts of the discipline, my defense is that they are offered for the peacemaking rather than the warlike purpose of helping to sharpen the theoretical tools that will enable us collectively to cut through the judicial process' fierce complexity.

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[69] Cf. Harlan, J., in *Miranda* v. *Arizona,* 384 U.S. 436, 509–510 (1966).

A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF DEFENSE DEPARTMENT DECISION-MAKING IN THE McNAMARA ADMINISTRATION

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In 1961 the Defense Department, under a new Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, began a major management revolution, based on a set of methods and techniques which came to be called a programming, planning, and budgeting system (PPBS). Few, if any, of the techniques were new. Their revolutionary impact depended upon (1) the high degree of development or sophistication to which some of them (e.g., cost and program analysis) had been driven, and (2) the relatively high degree of integration achieved in the new "system," so that, for example, decisions about current operations can be taken in the light of their effect on programs four or five years in the future, and decisions about future goals can be taken with their implications for present operations specified.

In August, 1965, President Johnson announced his plans to develop comparable management systems in other executive departments. The progress of this effort has been uneven. But it is clear that PPBS is going to be with us for a while.[1] This article is an attempt to assess its effect on the bureaucratic politics of the Defense Department.

The principal method used is functional analysis.[2] A more common method in the literature of public administration is a less theoretical and more detailed analysis of political relationships. Such attention to political detail is warranted by the importance of the subject. But the case studies that result often concentrate on the shape and flow of political transactions without dealing explicitly and systematically with the raison d'être of the agency under consideration. Even the more formally structured studies of administrative organizations that use the methods of social psychology commonly do not examine the agency's overall purposes.

The literature on administration has long grappled with the problem of giving appropriate weight to the formal structure and purpose of the organization. Obviously, to take either formal structure or purpose on its face is to be insufficiently empirical. To ignore them, on the other hand, is also to neglect relevant data, particularly since bureaucrats use formal structure and purpose frequently as tools. A distinguishing feature of bureaucratic politics, that is to say, is the prominent role which structural arrangements and authoritative goal prescriptions play in the process. Functional analysis has been used here in an attempt to strike a balance between process descriptions and means-ends analyses.

Briefly, my thesis is that the traditional military requirements process has fulfilled certain political or institutional needs, that these needs still exist, explaining its survival in certain areas, particularly in NATO, but that the new policymaking processes have been able to perform these functions remarkably well. In effect, the political functions which the administrative process must perform for military policymaking explain in part both the survival of old and the success of new processes.

I. THE FUNCTIONS OF TRADITIONAL REQUIREMENTS GENERATION PROCESSES

The political functions that the administrative process must perform for military policy-making can be divided, somewhat arbitrarily, into three main ones: (1) bureaucratic rationalization in the military establishment, (2) risk and role distribution in the making and implementing of military policy, and (3) self-legitimization within the military establishment and in relationship to other elements of the government and the political system. Suppose we look first at the way the traditional requirements process has performed these functions.

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* Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of The RAND Corporation or the official opinion or policy of any of its governmental or private research sponsors.

This paper was prepared for delivery on the American Government panel at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 9, 1966. It was revised and updated before the announcement of Robert McNamara's resignation as Secretary of Defense had been announced. Only minor editorial changes have been made since then. The author thinks the definite ending of McNamara's career in the Pentagon does not affect substantially what he had to say here.

[1] The President's press release and related documents are now compiled in Senate Government Operations Committee, *Planning-Programming-Budgeting: Official Documents,* Committee Print, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).

[2] For an evaluation of structural-functional analysis as a method in social anthropology see John Beattie, *Other Cultures: Aims, Methods and Achievements in Social Anthropology* (London: Cohen & West, 1964), ch. 4. A thoughtful but rambling evaluation somewhat closer to home is Theodore L. Becker, "Judicial Structure and Its Political Functioning in Society: New Approaches to Teaching and Research in Public Law," *Journal of Politics,* 29 (May, 1967), 302–333.

1. *The Rationalizing Function.* To be rational, one must overcome two obstacles. One's propositions must be logically consistent with each other and each must correspond with the real world. For bureaucracies, three standards of rationality cope with these obstacles in different ways. They are radical rationality, procedural rationality, and liberal or transactional rationality.

Radical rationality attacks the cognitive obstacles directly, postulating criteria and applying them to the substance of policies. It persuades and legitimizes on the basis of shared values. In any given context, however, the radically rational position begs the questions about how to establish criteria scientifically. Radical empiricism is a variant of radical rationality. It postulates the validity of empirical (not necessarily organizational) methods by which to acquire and analyze data. One might refer to it as scientific due process.

Procedural rationality appeals to some self-evident or widely accepted standards of organizational or administrative due process, such as deliberation and clearance, information gathering and processing, authority, subordination, and responsibility. Administrative due process can rely upon agreement about more tangible things having to do with how things ought to be done.

The third form, liberal or transactional rationality, is a special case of the second: due process for extreme skeptics in a pluralistic and liberal culture. Skeptical of prevailing standards of administrative due process, it falls back upon the generic political processes of the classical liberal market place. It is more individualistic than administrative due process. Of the three forms of rationality, it may beg the fewest questions, although it assumes rationality in individual behavior.[3]

The rationalizing function is a reciprocal process with several phases. In one it articulates and clarifies objectives and methods (in the course, presumably, of generating the rationale which will explain and win support for them). In another phase it tests the validity of articulated ends and modifies them accordingly. In still another, it adapts, in turn, methods and means to ends or objectives. Rationalizing is concerned with the propriety and probity of ends and the appropriateness of means. A bureaucracy performs the rationalizing function in several ways. It seeks consistency by requiring agreement among various offices on the nature of problems and how to deal with them: the internal clearance process. It may, in addition, expose policies to less structured examination. It seeks factual accuracy, or correspondence, through similar procedures. Viewed in this light, a rationale is an attempt to explain ends and means with reference to each other. The rationalizing function can be described in terms of the policy-makers who perform it, the procedures they follow, the content, scope, political weight, factual accuracy and logical rigor of the rationale they produce, and the changes they make in adapting practice to rationale.

Since World War II the traditional military requirements determination process[4] has helped bolster central authority in all the services and the Defense Department and prevent Congress from taking significant initiatives. It may seem sensible to assign the central office responsible for military operations the authority to determine the kinds of military forces that it needs. In the United States, however, this arrangement has not existed until recently. Before World War II the supporting bureaus in both the Army and Navy had been inclined to take it upon themselves to decide what kinds of weapons and forces to make available for operations, quite apart from what the operations wanted. One therefore cannot consider the authoritative, centralized determination of requirements a "traditional" process. The propensity to concentrate efforts on means-oriented objectives is doubtless found in other complex organizations, but it is probably peculiarly acute in military ones which spend most of their time preparing for but not performing their pay-off function.

In this pluralistic setting, what I have called the traditional requirements generation process had a rationalizing effect in two respects. First, it gave a prominent voice in specifying what the overall capabilities of the whole military establishment should be to those military officers most directly concerned with the pay-off function.[5] By doing so, it raised the chances that the definition and choice of military tasks or objectives would be valid.

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[3] Aaron B. Wildavsky deals with a comparable distinction in his "Political Implications of Budgetary Reform," *Public Administration Review,* 21 (Autumn, 1961), 183–190. Wildavsky's *The Politics of the Budgetary Process* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964), is a clearly delineated example of a process description.

[4] For an excellent normative statement about the traditional military requirements determination process see House Armed Services Committee, *Hearings on Military Posture,* 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), 361.

Second, since the wartime role of the military chiefs dictated that at all times they be at or near the center of the military organization, giving them the main voice in determining military requirements had the effect of centralizing authority in the military service departments and throwing more weight onto ends-oriented interests over means-oriented interests.

It should be noted that the criterion of rationality here amounts to what we might call administrative due process: the distribution of authority so as to give sufficient weight to the views of the people who are most closely identified with the pay-off function. One does not attempt to test the wisdom or validity of their collective findings by scrutinizing the deductive and inductive methods by which they have arrived at their conclusions. Avoiding that task may be only for economic reasons. It can also be in order to accommodate an essentially romantic view about judgment that intuition can come closer to the truth than can formal—and hence explicit, articulate, and communicable—analytical procedures.

The traditional military requirements notion may be regarded as the supporting doctrine for an authoritative due process arrangement. It replaces, for example, the idea that shipbuilders know best what kinds of ships to build for the fleet, or supply corpsmen what kind of war materiel to provide the combat forces. It does not, however, concern itself with the criteria for deciding *what kinds* of ships to build or material to procure. It is concerned with procedures, roles, and authority, with who should decide, not with substance. Issues of substance were raised only within this procedural framework.

Before unification, each service chief was the principal determiner for his service of short-term force posture requirements. The Joint Chiefs of Staff accommodated military interests with each other. In the fifties, with the establishment of unified commands, and the conferring of command responsibility on the JCS, a second channel for generating military requirements came into effect. Both originate among the operating forces. But one goes up the chain of command, reaching the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the headquarters of a unified command. The other shifts to the supporting service, reaching the JCS through the service chief.

Specifications for weapons capabilities to guide research and development do not always reach the joint arena. Unless they involve weapons for joint use, requirements are usually stipulated by the service chief. The decision to take a developed weapon into production, which could be regarded as a "qualitative" requirement decision, is in fact handled as a quantitative requirement, since it must be linked to particular force postures. In this form it concerns the JCS.

The rationalizing function includes both the generation of ideas and their explication—enough to link perceptions of objectives and purposes to force capabilities and postures. Explication and elaboration may also expose these ideas and linkages to critical examination.[6] The military requirements generation processes have not been very successful in performing this function. Even the special deference accorded the JCS has not made it conspicuously successful in performing the function by developing and adapting strategic objectives, strategic concepts, and force postures to each other. The Secretary of Defense stepped into a vacuum of unexplicated strategic concepts and obsolete strategic doctrine when he assumed an important formal role in performing the rationalizing function.

Concepts which could define policy issues and derive alternative resource needs and programs have not been the conspicuous output of the JCS. Rather than encouraging the JCS to rationalize in this manner, the traditional generation process may suppress the explanation of concepts and their systematic use by confirming the military as an authority whose decisions, though unexplained, should be deferred to. Deference to military requirements decisions has served at least to protect the military establishment from external probings about the reasonableness of military programs, but without assuring effective internal handling of problems.

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[5] The balance all too often went too far in that other direction in wartime, when administrative doctrine dictated giving the military commander *anything* he asked for without challenge. Since it was, of course, impossible to do that, the field commander could be his own enemy. Pershing, for example, though anxious to get American aircraft onto the Western Front in World War I, was, by his frequent changes in major specifications, a principal cause of delays in getting production under way: see I. B. Holley, Jr., *Ideas and Weapons* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953). pp. 67–79.

[6] One would expect that the more the rationalizing process is unified, the more it normally will produce mutually consistent explanations based on agreed suppositions about the real situation, while the more pluralistic the process the more it would reflect disagreement about which data depict the real world.

2. *The Distribution of Risks and Roles.* The processes used to determine military requirements distribute political risks and establish administrative and political roles. The ranking military authorities cannot guarantee national security against external threats. The effort to get them to do so helps distribute political responsibility for national security. If at any time since World War II the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been willing to specify without qualification a politically acceptable level of military effort as sufficient to insure the national security, the administration would have shared to the maximum the internal political burdens of the national security effort. In fact, however, never have the Chiefs gone that far. Usually, they have shifted the burden back or avoided it by setting military requirements above politically acceptable levels, by failing to agree upon a common military posture, or upon the nature and extent of the threat, and by qualifying their guarantees. Despite the protective capabilities thus manifest, or perhaps because of them, until the 1960s the JCS have usually been under continuous heavy pressure to bear the political burdens of military force requirements.

Roles are at stake here as well as risks. The incentive to unload responsibility onto the military, which any incumbent administration experiences, depends upon their prestige, nonpartisan status, professionalism, and limited identity with the incubent administration—factors which make the military capable of bearing them. The political commitments involved in the military program—the demands it makes on resources and manpower, the overseas entanglements that are a part of it, and the involvement of national prestige—all may be considered political burdens in the form of costs and risks. Risks, of course, involve opportunities. The military may run political risks (or assume other political burdens) in order to acquire wanted resources.

Yet, it may be prudent to limit political risks. Not all wanted resources will be granted anyway, and, if necessary, risks can always be assumed later, when the gains as well as the risks are more certain. Whether or not they have carried the political burden in peacetime, the military can be expected to reap the benefits of political risk-bearing in times of high national security threat anyway. To the extent that they understand this, military authorities are discouraged by their understanding from assuming political burdens in peacetime. In a similar way the prospect of later payoffs to the military at their expense may discourage political authorities from reducing their political burdens by loading them onto military authorities.

The government must decide upon a military program and win support for it. The more that elective officials can make the military do these things, the less burdensome the program is to them. Yet, the military can carry the political burden only to the extent that they do not appear to be either aggressive interest claimants or captives of political authority. They are not captives in the degree that they can limit their commitments and state their differences with civil authorities.

The traditional procedures both pinpoint and obscure responsibility. When an administration tries to push more political burdens onto the military, and they actively resist, much confusion can result. When, as is more often the case, both military and civil authority groups are divided into factions with alliances that include each other, the distribution of risks is a chaotic process, to say the least.[7] The jostling that has occurred in using the traditional requirements generation process since World War II indicates that it has performed this function very imperfectly.

3. *Legitimization.* When military requirements are generated according to the traditional rules, or appear to be, they carry a presumption of legitimacy with them, winning deference for the incumbent administration's military policies and programs from Congress and from other outside groups. Probably the requirements process has performed the legitimizing function the most satisfactorily, although there have been difficulties with it, also. They seem to fall into three areas. The first involves budget-program-planning discrepancies within the military establishment.

Before McNamara, strategic military planning, military programming, and the annual military budget-making all took place quite independently of each other. The problems of this disjunction among the core policymaking activities of the military establishment could have been isolated and clarified if each process occurred without reference to the other, or had each consistently taken the others into account. But neither has been the case. Each was performed with an eye on the other, but an eye which produced unexplained and varying accommodations.

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[7] Glenn Snyder has described with illuminating detail how misleading the claims of unanimous JCS endorsement were for the "New Look" elements of the fiscal 1955 budget: see W. R. Schilling, P. Y. Hammond, and G. H. Snyder, *Strategy Politics and Defense Budgets* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962) esp. pp. 418–440, 486–491.

This was the consequence for quantitative requirements. For qualitative requirements, the ramifications went much further. Knowing that many feasible and valuable weapons projects would have to be dropped eventually, the Defense Department during the fifties adopted cumbersome procedures to see that the dropping occurred as early as possible. This was done both to save resources and to assure that a new weapons system was eliminated before it had acquired a political base for itself.[8]

The second area of difficulty concerns authority and consent problems within the Defense Department. Legitimization is valuable to an organization because it reduces the cost of compliance. In the Defense Department consent and support depend heavily upon the political feasibility of alternatives. Whenever it has been easy to persuade powerful Congressmen to support one's minority position in the Defense Department, it has been relatively easy to obstruct central Defense Department authority. Legitimized policies bolster central authority by increasing the cost of risks of advocating alternatives.

The third area of difficulty is the greater prestige and perceived value which military activities and needs have enjoyed over nonmilitary ones in foreign relations. Military legitimization has often provided an umbrella for many nonmilitary parts of foreign policy. The result may be that military instruments in foreign policy get too much attention in comparison with nonmilitary instruments. Certainly during the time when the military umbrella worked the most effectively, in the early 1950s, much criticism was leveled at the administration in these terms.

II. THE MCNAMARA ADMINISTRATION: FROM AUTHORITATIVE ROLE-PLAYING TO PROGRAM ANALYSIS

The McNamara administration both replaced and modified the traditional ways of military decision-making. Without describing changes in detail, it should be helpful now to compare the way the program-generation process McNamara installed performs the three functions which the military requirements setting processes used to perform.

1. *The rationalizing function.* One of the most impressive achievements of the McNamara reforms is the tight linkage which has been achieved between the five year program and the current annual budget.

The five year program introduced the use of systems analysis, upon which, in turn, cost-effectiveness analysis and program budgeting have heavily depended. They are the backbone of an impressive system for relating means and ends.

The management techniques of the McNamara administration work best when they can address problems some distance in the future. Systems analysis, in the experience of some hardware engineers, works much better in designing new systems than in adapting old ones. Perhaps management problems are comparable. To be effective in the general designing of alternatives, the analytical methods which have been built into the budgetary system need to be able to address problems up to five years or more in advance.[9]

Similarly, systems analysis, used as a management technique, works best when it can design resources and postures for "set-piece" operations. As one might expect, then, the emphasis in military management has come to be on these techniques to the neglect of improvisation, institutional learning and marginal or incremental adaptation.

Systems analysis has held the initiative in defense management for six years. In the research and development sector, the Directorate of Defense Research and Engineering had become a powerful agency by 1961. Since then it has lost its predominance to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis, the primary agent in OSD for exploiting these techniques. The "opportunity approach" to research and development used normally in DDR&E may be more flexible, but it is less thorough in the exploration of tradeoffs in a technological environment of rapidly increasing possibilities than are the decision analysis techniques which are exploited by OSD(SA). It is a fair estimate that the latter persuades the Secretary of Defense more often than does DDR&E on major research and development questions.

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[8] House Appropriations Committee, *Supplemental Appropriation Bill*, 1957, H.R. Report No. 2638, 8th Cong., 2nd Sess. (July 7, 1956), 11–12.

[9] Of course, the major reason why one pushes the program budget out five years into the future is not to accommodate the convenience of systems analysis but to achieve the economies of long range programming.

For a brief period after the Comptroller's office was split into two parts it looked as though OSD(SA) would be faced with a new competitor. When Robert N. Anthony, a former Harvard Business School Professor, took charge of the older elements of the Comptroller's office, as Defense Comptroller, there was some hope that the fiscal management function could draw from (and to some extent pioneer) modern business comptrolling practices to produce adaptive capabilities within the Office of the Secretary of Defense which could exploit the flexibilities of incremental decisionmaking. The promise of such a development is that it would be a supplement to existing programming methods, an alternative to the analytical constructs of systems analysis.[10] In fact, however, Anthony's office has become almost wholly absorbed with a formidable and necessary task with less profound implications. It amounts to turning the cost estimates which have served as the basis for the programming, planning and budgeting system into cost accounts—developing, that is to say, a budget and an accounting system for operations which corresponds to the programming and planning categories now used.

From the beginning of Anthony's effort, the difference in perspective between his office and OASD(SA) has been apparent. There may yet be some rivalry ahead for the two offices in OSD. If that rivalry, or something else, can raise the capacity of the Defense Department to improvise and learn in the process of operating, it will have expanded the rationalizing capabilities of contemporary management methods.[11]

Explication can expose ends and means to critical scrutiny and clarify their relationship to each other. The heavy emphasis on the explication of major program decisions provides a body of data and doctrines by which to orient and indoctrinate audiences within the Defense Department to the military program, to explain and defend it before external audiences, like the Congress, and hence to evaluate it. The heavy emphasis of the McNamara reforms on the articulation of reasons and criteria is more than an effective defense mechanism. It is also a procedural inducement to be rational in the same way that written judicial opinions, because they are carefully prepared statements of the reasons why, encourage judges to deliberate carefully. Theoretically, the defense program budget, linked to systems analysis methods for the exposition of major defense policy issues, establishes common frames of reference for discussion throughout the military establishment and establishes what kinds of data to extract and collect. This is in effect a "scientific" commitment to a rational organization discourse.

According to the market place or transactional approach, critical discussion must be entirely open. There must be no appeal to authority.

Of course, other procedural standards have been applied to defense policy-making. The main alternative is a closed authoritative system. It is similar to the traditional process. It asserts that military judgment is esoteric and deserves a privileged position in the market place of ideas as well as in the policy clearance process for specified authorities who possess it. In some degree every professional group claims that its professional talents involve esoteric knowledge. It cannot claim special status without doing so. The scientific norm of open inquiry without appeal to authority is in fact applicable only *within* privileged groups. Pursued to its ultimate conclusion it argues for a wholly unstructured arena.

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[10] Robert N. Anthony has stated the case for what he calls management control, which he distinguishes from operational control, in his *Planning and Control Systems: A Framework for Analysis* (Boston: Harvard Business School, 1965), esp. ch. 3. The book cannot be taken as analogous to C. J. Hitch and R. N. McKean, *The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), in relationship to Charles J. Hitch's appointment as Defense Comptroller in 1961, although the comparison with Anthony's appointment may be revealing. The Hitch-McKean volume is a set of essays representing an already existing capability. Anthony's book is an effort to formulate and clarify the tasks for developing a capability. Hitch's task was to apply a set of analytical capabilities which had already reached impressive proportions; Anthony's task, if the analogy holds, is to develop the general capabilities as well as apply them.

[11] Congress must approve changes in the budget and accounting system. For OSD's efforts to win this approval, see House Appropriations Committee, H.R. Report No. 349, *Defense Appropriations for Fiscal 1968*, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), 6–7; Senate Appropriations Committee, S. Report No. 494, *Appropriations for Fiscal 1968*, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), p. 22; the Secretary of Defense's letter to Rep. George H. Mahon, Chairman, House Committee on Appropriations, August 7, 1967; the Secretary of Defense's Memorandum to Secretaries of the Military Departments, Subject: "Tests of Budgeting and Accounting Systems," August 9, 1967; Department of Defense Position on Amendment Adding Sec. 641 to H.R. 10738, Approval of Accounting and Budgeting Systems, August 19, 1967; *Congressional Record*, 113 (August 18, 1967), S. 11842-4, and (August 21, 1967), S. 11923-5; and House Appropriations Committee, H.R. Report No. 595, *Conference Report on H.R. 10738*, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (August 23, 1967).

The Defense Department under Secretary McNamara hardly went that far. While the changes he instigated have widened the participation of department officials in the development of military policies by denying to certain professional military groups the privilege of deciding without explaining, the decision-making process remains highly structured. The Secretary of Defense not only decides major policy issues, but decides as well which issues, in what form, will be addressed. He holds the initiative in the establishment of the frames of reference for data selection and analysis, chooses many of the issues at controversy, and specifies the criteria by which they will be decided. More people may participate in Defense Department policymaking than before. Yet the modifications of the McNamara administration brought the major decisions into fewer hands.

Fewer participants, or centralization, does not necessarily mean greater procedural rationality, even in a military establishment where assumptions about rationality tend to favor authoritarian models. These changes have also been costly to Congressional participation in defense policymaking, a change which may be, but is also not necessarily, more rational. I have suggested elsewhere that Congressional politics tends to give advantage to correspondence rationality, defined as accurate perceptions of the real world, while the more unitary an administrative structure is, the more administrative politics depends upon consistency as its standard of rationality.[12]

It follows that the more pluralistic administrative politics are, the more resources they will devote to achieving accurate perceptions of the real world, even at the expense of internal consistency. OSD is heavily committed to standards of internal consistency, insofar as they can be given practical meaning. That, in any case, is the premise on which military requirements generation procedures mainly rest. The management reforms of the incumbent administration, then, have established strong controls over the internal policy dialogue. According to this line of reasoning, the Defense Department is strong on internal consistency, but quite possibly at the expense of that untrammeled dialogue and debate which tend to promote accurate depictions of and adaptations to external conditions.

2. *The Distribution of Risks and Roles.* Across the range of major policy issue areas, the secretary of Defense assumed a larger role and commensurately greater political burdens. If something goes wrong with the F-111, if the Russians deploy an effective anti-ballistic missile defense before the United States does, if there are materiel shortages in Vietnam, if we lose our strategic superiority, McNamara (and his successors) could be blamed.[13]

Undeniably, the distribution of roles and powers, of risks and political burdens, is clearer now than it has ever been in the past. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are no longer the major determiners of defense programs. It is now the Secretary of Defense who takes responsibility, as he should, for a program which must necessarily be a balancing of risks and costs. He can shift responsibility on the margins. But the main political risks, and the main political defenses within the Defense Department, remain his. Role and risk distribution have been clarified by concentration.[14]

The value of this clarification is demonstrated by the relationship of the Secretary of defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the present administration. The Secretary of Defense has taken over some important functions from the Joint Chiefs with surprisingly little opposition. First reactions were somewhat militant, but the militancy of the JCS has much subsided. One could conclude that the Chiefs have lost gracefully, but considering the persistence and skill with which they had previously protected their prerogatives, a further explanation may be needed. Probably more than one might have expected, they are content in their reduced role because it involves commensurately reduced responsibilities. There is, at any rate, a certain unprecedented equitableness in the changed status of the JCS which they may recognize.

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[12] "Foreign Policy Making and Administrative Politics," *World Politics,* 17 (July, 1965), 660.

[13] I do not mean either that blaming them would take care of the matter or that no one else would be blamed. Here I am only concerned with their assumption of political responsibilities and risks.

[14] It is not entirely obvious, however, how much the clarification of role and risk distributions represents an asset. If the Secretary of Defense can be held responsible for everything, that may be clear, but it is not very practical. For discussion of this problem in broad democratic representational context, see Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), ch. 2.

The assumption by the Secretary of Defense of political risks and responsibilities is not the only factor which produced JCS assent to reduced political status. Another major factor has been what Warner R. Schilling has termed the "shower of dollars"—the increase in Defense Department expenditures under McNamara, as indicated by Table 1.

TABLE 1. TOTAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES 1959–1967[a]

1959	41,223
1960	41,215
1961	43,227
1962	46,815
1963	48,252
1964	49,760
1965	46,173
1966	54,409
1967	66,950[b]
1968	72,300[b]

[a] Excluding military assistance, nuclear weapons and materials, and defense support expenditures. Figures, in millions of dollars, taken from *Budget of the United States Government for Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1968* (G.P.O., 1967), p. 456.

[b] Estimated.

As these figures indicate, during the period when most of the McNamara revolution was being carried out—in the first two years, say, of the Kennedy Administration—the services had increasing resources to distribute. The management techniques—including the economizing ones, were instigated in an expansive environment. Where the management policies of McNamara really pinched, as with the forced marriage of several aircraft system requirements into the TFX, or with the negative responses to the advanced manned bomber, or the delayed procurement of anti-ballistic missiles, the contentment of the services with the prominence of OSD has been less impressive.

These money matters explain a great deal. But we should not lose sight of the fact that the McNamara administration did change things in the Defense Department to an unprecedented degree. No one previously has come close to changing major functions and processes so much. There have been "showers of dollars" before, in 1950–51, and, of course, in the early 1940s, to take the major instances. But either of these showers was used to consolidate civilian power in the military establishment. Unquestionably it was easier, politically, to win control in a period of expansion. The opposition had less to rally around. But technically it was much harder. McNamara's consolidation of power was an impressive managerial achievement in taking advantage of political opportunities.

At least four improvements seem to be related to the clarification of roles and risks that was a part of the McNamara reforms. (1) The Defense Department has become more responsive—compared with the State Department, strikingly more responsive—to needs perceived in the White House.[15] (2) The new delineation of authority and responsibility is more protective of the military professionals. (3) OSD has held the initiative more in dealing with changes in the military policy environment than it did previously. (4) The new distribution of risks and roles, implemented in part by the integrated planning, programming, and budgeting procedures, has focused defense policies more on issues and less on roles and personalities than it used to.

3. *The Legitimizing Function.* The defense policy and management innovations of 1961–1967 performed remarkably well the legitimizing functions for policy, perhaps because of the particular combination of authoratativeness and open rationality which seem to have been associated with them. Within the Defense Department, as outside it, the McNamara administration won early respect for its competence. As one might expect of an administration which modifies the status and rewards of powerful interests, the McNamara administration was not spared criticism, or avoided deserving it; but rarely did it come close to being discredited on any particular issue.[16] Moreover, holding control of the services to the extent that it did while carrying out major modifications of their forces and methods demonstrates that it could cope with external as well as internal pressures.

The McNamara administration did not en-

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[15] The case against the State Department has been givenwide publicity by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1965), pp. 406, 410–413, 446–447, 513, 681, 1016.

[16] Still the closest, probably, is its source selection for the development and manufacturing of the F-111.

courage its external critics to think that they could ally with dissatisfied segments of the Defense Department in order to criticize its central authority. At the same time, the vigor with which it defended itself in Congress enhanced its authority within the Defense Department by giving confidence to subordinates that they would be supported if they were loyal, and by indicating that the challenges from outside could only have a limited effect. Effective legitimizing inside and outside the military establishment thus reinforced each other.

The last seven years have seen less appeal than before to military authority to legitimize established policies both inside and outside of the Defense Department. Internally, the change of tone reflects the greater capacity of OSD to compel compliance with general policies through the integrated program-planning-budgeting procedures.

III. THE MCNAMARA ADMINISTRATION: PAST AND PROSPECTIVE TRENDS

So far I have looked at the changes wrought by the McNamara management revolution for their effect on the political functions performed by military policymaking procedures. My purpose has been to establish a basis for evaluating the claims about rationality in behalf of the major changes in relationship to their political environment and functions. In an effort to carry the analysis of political factors further in that direction I will look at two hypothetical developments and then take a final look at the rationality problem.

1. *Limited Military Engagement with Increasing Political Burdens.* Let us suppose that over the next five to ten years the United States will continue to make increasing commitments of military power and political prestige in Southeast Asia. Maybe the war in Vietnam will be settled in our favor: Then suppose other military challenges arise in the area.

The mounting military effort would impose mounting political burdens on the U. S. Government to go along with mounting expenditures. More and more questions would be raised both inside and outside the government about means and ends. Official Defense Department presentations would carry less weight in legitimizing military policies.

What effect would such a prolonged but limited military effort have on the policy and management reforms achieved in the past few years? On the one hand, one might expect it to weaken the newer analytical methods and strengthen the role of traditional military judgment in defense policymaking. The growing military effort would enhance the prestige of traditional military command channels and the role of traditional requirements generation. One should expect greater reliance on professional military judgments about how to fight the war and less reliance on analytical methods under the direction of civil authorities. In part the shift could be the result of greater pressures from Congress and the public which would force the shift in roles and political risk distribution, and modify the way the administration would seek legitimization. Congressional probes of military establishment activities in wartime rarely concern themselves with the discrediting of military operational command authority. More often they look for failures in support efforts. During the Korean War, and recently with respect to Vietnam, Congress showed much interest in the possibility of an ammunition shortage.[17] The internal environment, showing the effects of the conflict, would enhance the role of the military authorities (the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the major operating commands in the field) at the expense of the civilians in OSD who have gained so much prominence in recent years.

In part, this shift would reflect changes in the tasks performed in the military establishment. Growing military commitments would increase the importance of managerial and operational adaptiveness at the expense of middle range planning. Five-year programs would be less important than how given capabilities would be adapted to cope with immediate and continuing problems. Rationality in the military establishment would come to be defined less in terms of internal consistency and more in terms of the accurate depiction of and accommodation to the real world of the combat situation.

In this environment, not only might more systems analysis be employed under military command channel sponsorship, but analytical and mangerial capabilities under the control of OSD might be enhanced, particularly if these capabilities could compete successfully with the military in making operations and programs more adaptable. If OSD could respond by developing in the Comptroller's office the management control techniques which would do that, OSD might continue to hold the initiative.

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[17] E.g., Senate Armed Services Committee, *Ammunition Shortages in the Armed Services*, Hearings; *Investigation of Ammunition Shortages in the Armed Services*, Interim Report; and *Investigation of Ammunition Shortages in the Armed Services*, 2nd Report, all in 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1953); and *Status of Ammunition and Air Munitions*, Hearings, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1966.

In effect, the growing burdens of war could become an opportunity for further modifications in Defense Department management controls, providing policy implementation techniques which could be made equal to the burdens that would have to be imposed on them. They would, it seems fair to say, have to undergo considerable development to do that. But if they did so successfully, the pay-off could be high: enhanced Defense Department capabilities to learn and adapt military efforts in the course of implementing policies generated through the new analytical techniques now used.

The argument in favor of continued civilian initiative in reshaping the Defense Department turns in part on propositions suggested by the experience in Vietnam that internal war imposes heavy demands for innovation on military capabilities, that the efforts to meet these demands requires reinforcement or support from outside the operational command channels, and—what may be the most important proposition—that the largest apparent need for innovations involves military *and* civil capabilities for dealing with an environment described better by the behavioral sciences than the physical or biological sciences. If this is the case, then civilian-generated innovations would be in much demand in the hypothetical case under consideration, whether they came from outside or within the military establishment. If OSD should respond to the opportunity, its role would grow in developing more adaptive military capabilities and generating parallel nonmilitary capabilities for use where the military ones are not applicable, or to compete with military capabilities where their predominance is in question.

It may be too much to expect problems of this nature as they appear in Vietnam to be solved by improved management analysis and implementation techniques. Probably no amount of further sophistication in systems analysis or "management control" techniques can overcome the effects of the White House's granting priority to military instruments there. On the other hand, Vietnam may now be demonstrating the profound need for a learning and "steering" capability which PPBS in the Defense Department has not provided.

2. *The Cold War Extended.* The second hypothetical case is a continued period lasting one or more decades in which the United States would experience no direct military engagements, yet would continue to perceive sufficient military threats to require the maintenance of a substantial military capability.[18] As a result, on the general strategic level present military policies would be maintained, their success measured in deterrent value, not in the achievement of disarmament.

One of the effects claimed for the cold war has been that it enhances the dominance of the Presidency over the Congress in making and implementing military policy. This hypothetical extension of the cold war might not further Presidential dominance because it might offer the White House, through OSD, few new opportunities to maintain the initiative. The major gains in economizing may now be behind us and further gains are too hypothetical to be taken seriously. If the Secretary of Defense should be willing to assume political burdens as much as he could, he might be able to maintain a working relationship with Congress in which his political risk assumption and role-playing were the basis for continued Congressional support. Yet if his opportunities for taking initiatives proved to be low, it may well be that he could not continue effectively to assume risks and win legitimization for his initiatives.

In the hypothetical case of a continuing cold war, one should anticipate continued centralization, with an emphasis on internal consistency at the expense of three things: efforts to reexamine the relevant premises about the real world, the development of more adaptive capabilities in the implementation of policy, and the propensity of the organization to explore and generate new options. In all three ways, options would be lost or buried in the administrative processes of the Defense Department.

3. *Actual and Potential Trends.* These sharp contrasts in the hypothetical future draw attention to at least three important indicators of trends in the new defense management arrangements. The first and most important is the policy-making and management initiative of OSD.

If, as I have suggested, the character of the management revolution in the Defense Department has depended upon OSD's taking and maintaining the initiative in the definition of policy issues, the distribution of risks, the legitimization of policy, and in the further rationalization of structures and processes, then it follows that the loss of initiative could mean changes in all of these phenomena. The character of existing structures and processes, the sources of political leadership for military affiairs, the basis for public support of defense policy, and the direction of management efforts in the Defense Department could all change if executive initiative is lost. That is why OSD initiative is such an important indicator.

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[18] I am not concerned with the likelihood of these two conditions existing together—the continued perception of major, low probability threats and the continued lack of much military engagement.

The initiative which would have to be sustained seems to be composed of the high risk-assumption propensities of OSD, combined with very considerable adaptive and innovative capabilities. Two possible component indicators of the latter have been a demonstrated capacity to extract new kinds of information from sectors of the defense establishment, and evidence of innovative momentum, such as new attacks on cost/effective or strategic program analysis problems.

In general, the maintenance of initiative after seven years is impressive. OSD continues to assume risks and to generate new questions and analytical answers. Innovation has been institutionalized in internal OSD capabilities and through a variety of contractual relations with private industry. Large cost analysis tasks remain unfinished which hold much promise. Still, it would not be hard to imagine a lagging of OSD initiative great enough to have a significant effect on the functioning of the Defense Department. In the end, the maintenance of initiatives may depend, as it has so much in the past, on OSD's setting and pursuing major, concrete objectives.

The most promising next set of objectives might be to reach out beyond the new policy-making arrangements and develop new policy implementation techniques. Systems analysis has not provided the way to adapt military capabilities while they operate in close relationship to an uncertain but rich environment.[19] These new techniques should try to do so.

A second indicator—or rather, set of indicators—would be the components of a political support-winning strategy for any Secretary of Defense, for they would indicate the extent that he has adopted or found his way to one. Secretary McNamara played a role of unprecedented prominence in national policy debates for someone in his position. His administration was a striking combination of executive initiative-taking, energetic defensiveness in Congressional relations, and political dependence upon the White house. His administration required the defense establishment to assume large political risks and a comparatively prominent political role. The performance may have been impressively successful; but in relationship to the political burdens assumed, the political support was not abundant. Much depended upon its finite limits.

The war in Vietnam shows all the signs of becoming an increasingly prominent national political issue. If it is comparable to the fall of China as a foreign policy issue, with the incumbent administration held responsible and the Congressional parties taking care to disassociate themselves from the administration, this relationship between McNamara's assumption of political risks and the limited political consent and support upon which he depended may come to have an increasingly important bearing on the development of military programs. From the viewpoint of the incumbent administration, it might then appear that changes had been pushed too fast or too far, and that more external support should be generated and existing support demonstrated. In that event, some retrenchment in the recent management revolution would be likely. These may be extreme and unlikely outcomes, yet something less would be a trend worth noticing. Any change in the efforts of OSD to win approval for the administration's military policies would be an important indicator of that trend.

The third indicator to watch is centralization. It is also an important trend in its own right. We can infer from the foregoing depiction of political functions that the side effects from centralizing decision-making in the Office of the Secretary of Defense will vary, depending upon the way political risks are handled and how much executive initiative is maintained. In particular, the more one exploits a given political base, the more he increases the potential costs of centralization in two ways, by pushing the organization into defending the status quo and by encouraging it to suppress options, hedges, and innovations.

These observations can be explained with reference to transactional rationality by looking at the incentives of OSD to conform with prevailing standards of procedural and radical rationality—standards which include the exploration and explanation of unexamined premises, the openness of communications, the opportunity for competitive analysis, the clear distribution of risks and responsibility. Three statements summarize the arrangement of relevant incentives:

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[19] Systems analysis can design flexibility beforehand for a hypothetical future, given sufficient lead time. For a price, it can build in different capacities beforehand. But it cannot tell someone how to evaluate unfolding events in order to establish new criteria by which to use the capacities it designs.

1. Where the payoffs for OSD-instigated program changes based on cost/effectiveness and systems analysis are high, the quality of the analysis will be high and the propensity of OSD to assume risks and accept responsibility will also be high.
2. Where the payoffs are high, but the political risks associated with them increase, OSD will be encouraged to obscure responsibility and degrade the integrity of the analysis.
3. Where payoffs are low, and political costs high, but decisions must be made, analysis will lose its integrity and become a tool of management interests.

The point of this survey is that the first situation may have existed and continue to exist in the Defense Department, but the trend has been toward the second and third combinations—the increase in political risks and the reduction of payoffs achievable by the techniques of rational analysis. I have suggested that the first statement will remain applicable, to the extent that OSD maintains the initiative, so that payoffs in programs will stay high and the political costs of risk and responsibility bearing will be held down. I have also indicated that rising costs could handicap the maintenance of initiative and increase the political costs and risks to OSD—a phenomenon which already can be observed to some degree.

What might happen if the U. S. military program were to be reduced—in conformity with disarmament arrangements or in unilateral response to changed perceptions of threat, for example—might be equally discouraging. The services would become more restive, their political supporters more critical of particular OSD economy measures, though still committed to reductions in general. OSD could not score well with a general economy program and would cause outright hostility in many particular cases. These are circumstances in which the pressures and temptations to degrade the policy debate would be brought to bear from all sides. The level of debate might not sink as low as it did in 1949 or 1954–55, but any degradation would have serious consequences. The utility of present management methods is particularly sensitive to quality.

IV. CONCLUSION

In 1960 I wrote:

> In all the major fields of defense organization it is evident that the shortcomings of the business approach have been perceived. In some, it has led to a search for program—for some way to formulate general policies—which will provide more adequate guidance to management efforts. Whenever a solution has been considered, however, it has been rejected because it challenged the prerogatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the determiners of the military ends for which the military establishment exists.[20]

Sooner than I thought possible the Defense Department had a "program." What made the difference was a new administration which assumed the task of generating programs and objectives by imposing radically rationalistic programming, allocation, and operational techniques.

I have laid stress on the prospects that the initiative which OSD held under McNamara will be sustained. Holding the initiative depends upon both internal and external conditions. I have taken an optimistic view of the internal ones here, referring to some prospects for further innovation. But we ought to consider some less attractive eventualities. If initiative is sustained, we can expect some additional achievements in defense management and policymaking. We can also expect that the rate of innovation will be sustained, in turn sustaining the capacity to adapt to a changing political and technological environment. But against these prospects, we must measure the very considerable propensities of any large and highly centralized organization to kill its own capacity to innovate or change. By now, the issue may well be whether the Defense Department can survive its own success.

The relations of the Defense Department with external conditions I approached through two alternative views of the future, the cold war continuing peacefully, and the expansion of limited war somewhere, such as Southeast Asia. The first threatened to produce executive stagnation, which could be particularly harmful to the validity of military programs. The second could make Defense Department programs increasingly vulnerable to political attack, and that could produce stagnation and its consequences, too. That may be an important danger posed by the domestic political effects of the war in Vietnam; they would not, so far as I can tell, be the effects anticipated in Hanoi.

We have come to depend heavily for the quality of the defense program upon the quality of executive leadership and management in OSD. In order to get the quality of programs that we want, there may be no other choice. The McNamara reforms were carried out and worked effectively because OSD was able to take and keep the initiative and thus expand its dominating position in military policy-making outside of the Defense Department as well as inside it. Reduced OSD dominance over external policy-making competitors would mean, conversely, reducing effectiveness within the military establishment, including reduced ability to generate options and innovations. In fact, the first quality OSD would lose by retrenching on the exercise of its authority would probably be its adaptability.

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[20] *Organizing for Defense* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 315.

Put in these terms, it should be evident that we are back where we started, with a military program generation process which must defend its actions not "on the merits" but over issues of institutional integrity. That is why, in the end, the case for the new policies and methods of defense policy-making cannot be made on the grounds that they rest on more satisfactory concepts of rational decision-making. Rather, a more inclusive standard must be applied. I have specified three political functions which a military program decision process must perform, and argued that it performs them at least as well as it predecessor did. Functional analysis can be altogether too general and too detached to be much use in evaluating organization behavior and output. But it can bridge the gap between transaction-oriented political analysis and end-means oriented systems analysis, as this study is intended to show.

THE STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL CONFLICT IN THE NEW STATES OF TROPICAL AFRICA

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I. INTRODUCTION[1]

Having assumed the burden of understanding political life in two-and-a-half dozen unruly countries, political scientists who study the new states of tropical Africa must leap with assurance where angels fear to tread. We have borrowed, adapted, or invented an array of frameworks designed to guide perceptions of disparate events, and Africa is now uniformly viewed through the best lenses of contemporary comparative politics with a focus on political modernization, development and integration. Unfortunately, it appears that when we rely exclusively on these tools in order to accomplish our task, the aspects of political life which we, as well as non-specialists, see most clearly with the naked eye of informed common sense, remain beyond the range of our scientific vision. In our pursuit of scientific progress, we have learned to discern such forms as regular patterns of behavior which constitute structures and institutions; but the most salient characteristic of political life in Africa is that it constitutes an almost institutionless arena with conflict and disorder as its most prominent features.

In recent years, almost every new African state has experienced more or less successful military or civilian coups, insurrections, mutinies, severe riots, and significant political assassinations. Some of them appear to be permanently on the brink of disintegration into several new political units. With little regard for the comfort of social scientists, the incidence of conflict and disorder appears unrelated to such variables as type of colonial experience, size, number of parties, absolute level or rate of economic and social development, as well as to the overall characteristics of regimes. The downfall of what was widely regarded as the continent's most promising democracy in January, 1966, was followed in February by the demise of what many thought to be the continent's harshest authoritarian regime. Furthermore, recent events in Nigeria, Ghana, and elsewhere indicate that military regimes are as fragile as their civilian predecessors. Given the presence of almost every "gap" ever imagined by scholars concerned with development and modernization, and in the absence of the requisites most commonly posited for the maintenance of a political system, there is little place for countries such as these in the conceptual universe of political science. Yet, more often than not, these countries do persist. Hence, we have little choice but either to play an academic ostrich game or come to grips with their reality.

In order to deal in an orderly manner with such disorderly countries, we must alter our vision. Our normal focus on institutions and their concomitant processes resembles the focus of the untrained eye on the enclosed surface, or figure, of an image. The naive observer sees interstices as "shapeless parts of the underlying ground. He pays no attention to them, and finds it difficult and unnatural to do so."[2] Like trained painters, however, we must force ourselves to reverse the spontaneous figure-ground effect in order to perceive "interstices," shapes which initially do not appear worthy of our attention, but are in fact fundamental to our perception of the surface under observation. To understand political life in Africa, instead of viewing political disturbances as the shapeless ground surrounding institutions and processes which define the regimes of the new states, we must try to view them as characteristic processes which themselves constitute an important aspect of the regime in certain types of political systems.[3]

II. AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT

On the whole, African countries are distinguished from other Third World clusters by extremely weak national centers, a periphery which consists of societies until recently self-contained, and levels of economic and social development approaching the lowest limits of international statistical distributions.[4] They continue to reflect the fact that their origins stem from a recent European scramble for portions of an international system or subsystem constituted by interacting tribal societies. Although the French, British, Belgian, Portuguese or German nets were sometimes cast over an area dominated by a single society or by a group of societies with similar characteristics, this was usually not the case at all. Within the administrative nets which later became states there were only a few decades ago a varying number of more or less disparate societies, each with a distinct political system, and with widely different intersocietal relationships.

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[1] Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the September 1966, meeting of the American Political Science Association (New York City) and at the Seventh World Congress of the International Political Science Association (Brussels, September, 1967). The category "new states of Tropical Africa" excludes Liberia and Ethiopia.

[2] Rudolf Arnheim, *Art and Visual Perception: A Psychology of the Creative Eye* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965), p. 230.

[3] Notions concerning the political system apparent in this paper are inspired by the works of David Easton, but clearly lack the intellectual rigor of *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965).

Although the new political units provided a territorial mold within which social, economic, political, and cultural changes that accompanied colonization occurred, we are becoming increasingly aware that these processes, although related, did not necessarily vary "rhythmically," i.e., at the same rate;[5] and that the rates of change varied not only between countries but also between regions of the same country. If we conceive the original African societies as sets of values, norms, and structures, it is evident that they survived to a significant extent everywhere, even where their existence was not legally recognized as in the most extreme cases of direct rule. Furthermore, the new set of values, norms, and structure, which constituted an incipient national center did not necessarily grow at the expense of the older ones, as if it were a constant-sum game in which the more a country becomes "modern" the less it remains "traditional." Although many individuals left the country for the new towns, they did not necessarily leave one society to enter a new one; instead, the behavior of a given individual tended to be governed by norms from both sets which defined his multiple roles and even mixed to define a particular role. Because the new center had nowhere expanded sufficiently at the time of independence, we cannot characterize what is contained within these countries today as a single society in the normally accepted sociological sense of the word, with its connotation of a relatively integrated system of values, norms, and structures. But since the new African states in reality do provide territorial containers for two sets of values, norms, and structures, the "new" and the "residual," with the latter itself usually subdivided into distinct sub-sets, it is useful to think of these sets as forming a particular type of *unintegrated* society which can be called "syncretic."[6]

The syncretic character of contemporary African societies tends to be reflected in every sphere of social activity, including the political. If we seek to identify their political systems by asking how values are authoritatively allocated within these societies, it is evident that in every case the most visible structures and institutions with which political scientists normally deal, such as executive and legislative bodies, political parties and groups, the apparatus of territorial administration, the judiciary, and even the institutions of local government provided by law, deal with only a portion of the total allocative activity, and that the remainder must therefore be allocated by other means, by other structures. This is fairly obvious where some functional division of labor between "modern" and "traditional" institutions was provided for initially as part of the constitutional settlement at the time of independence, but it is equally the case where traditional political structures have no recognized legal or political standing, or even where they have been formally abolished, as in Guinea or Mali.[7]

Without denying important variations in the degree of institutionalization of national centers in different countries, it is suggested that from the present vantage point, even the most prominent variations in political arrangements at the time of independence must be viewed as superficial features of the political system since they were never firmly institutionalized. An examination of political parties, the best studied feature of the African scene, reveals such a wide gap between the organizational model from which the leaders derived their inspiration and their capacity to implement such schemes, that the very use by observers of the word "party" to characterize such structures involves a dangerous reification.

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[4] For the concepts used see Edward Shils, "Centre and Periphery," in *The Logic of Personal Knowledge—Essays in Honor of Michael Polanyi* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), pp. 117–130. See also note 42, below.

[5] See the discussion in C. S. Whitaker, Jr., "A Dysrhythmic Process of Political Change," *World Politics*, 19 (January, 1967), 190–217.

[6] The problem with which I am dealing here is akin to that of the "plural society" conceptualized by M. G. Smith in *The Pleural Society in the British West Indies* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965). The word "syncretic" distinguishes the present societies from the "plural," which is a particular type involving super-ordination between components. I prefer it to the more passive "heterogeneous," because "syncretic" connotes that a process of amalgamation and integration is being attempted.

[7] For a further development of this point, see my book *Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), Chapter V. My reasoning here is deductive; but empirical evidence from micro-political studies of Ghana by David Brokensha and Ernst Benjamin, of Mali by Nicholas Hopkins and of Tanzania by Henry Bienen, confirm the validity of the assumption.

These comments may be extended to include constitutional arrangements, which in the absence of anchorage in supporting norms and institutions had little reality beyond their physical existence as a set of written symbols deposited in a government archive; about the civil service, in which the usual bureaucratic norms are so rare that it is perhaps better to speak of "government employees" as a categoric group; of "trade unions," which are more by way of congeries of urban employed and unemployed intermittently mobilized for a temporary purpose, such as a street demonstration; and even of "the Army," which far from being a model of hierarchical organization, tends to be an assemblage of armed men who may or may not obey their officers. It is generally evident that the operations of even the most "modern" institutions in Africa are governed by values and norms that stem from both the "new" and the "residual" sets.

The societal environment shared by all the new African states thus imposes severe limits upon the range within which significant variations of regimes can take place. Whether we define political integration in terms of the existence of a political formula which bridges the gap between the elite and the masses, or in terms of linkages between the values, norms, and structures that constitute the political system, it is clear that the level of political integration was, at the time of the founding, very low throughout Africa. Hence, although we can refer to the existence of "states" and "regimes" in Africa, we must be careful not to infer from these labels that their governments necessarily have authority over the entire country, any more than we can safely infer from the persistence of these countries as sovereign entities proof of the operations of endogenous factors such as a sense of community and the ability of authorities to enforce cohesion against people's will. Persistence may only reflect the initial inertia which keeps instruments of government inherited from the colonial period going, as well as the inertia of claimants which assures in most cases that all the problems will not reach the center simultaneously; it may reflect also the absence of effective external challenges and even to a certain extent the protection provided by the contemporary international system which more often than not guarantees the existence of even the weakest of sovereign states born out of the decolonization of tropical Africa.

Under these generally shared circumstances, it is not surprising that the founding fathers of most African states behaved very much in the same way in order to achieve the dual goal of modernizing as rapidly as possible while maintaining themselves in office. Like any other government, they had to cope with the problem of managing the flow of demands while at the same time eliciting sufficient support. They could obtain support in exchange for the satisfaction of demands (distribution); they could enhance support on the basis of the internalization by a sufficiently large proportion of the population of a belief in their right to rule (socialization, legitimacy); they could suppress demands by negative reinforcement, while at the same time punishing non-support (coercion and force). In the face of overwhelming problems stemming from the syncretic character of the society they relied increasingly on the latter techniques, thus contributing substantially to the escalation of political conflict.

Initially, the founding fathers of African states benefited from the sudden creation of a multitude of new political offices, from the departure of a number of colonial officials, from the expansion of administrative and state-directed economic activity which had begun during the latter years of welfare-state colonialism, as well as from a prevalent sense that they had earned the right to rule through their leadership of protest movements and that they were the legitimate successors of colonial officials. On these foundations, many were able to construct adequate political machines based primarily on the distribution of benefits to individual and group claimants, in the form of shifting coalitions appearing either as a "multi-party system," or more commonly, as a "unified" party. In the light of the politicians' inability to maintain themselves in office for very long (except in a very few cases) and of the lurid revelations of their corruption and ineptitude which made headlines after their downfall, it is easy to forget that many of them were initially quite successful in developing symbols and organizations which could be used to channel support and to establish the legitimacy of their claim to rule in the eyes of their countrymen. Beyond this, they also benefited from the sort of inertia already referred to, whereby those individuals who were aware of the existence of country-wide political institutions simply accepted them as a continuation of what they were already used to, the colonial order, but with a welcome populist flavor. The inheritance of instruments of force (police, gendarmerie, small armies), usually among the more professionalized bodies and often under the continued supervision of European officers, provided a certain backing in case the political process failed.

III. THE SHIFT FROM POWER TO FORCE

The shift to a new phase of political activity is related to two sets of mutually reinforcing factors, stemming from the interaction of the rulers with the syncretic society in which they operated. First, there was a growing gap between the leaders' ideological aspirations and their capacity to implement the policies these aspirations entailed. Whether or not it is appropriate to speak of a "revolution of rising expectations" throughout the continent, there is little doubt that such a revolution has occurred among those responsible for government, in the form of a commitment to rapid modernization. The most obvious examples here are the "mobilizing" states, such as Ghana (until 1966), Mali, or Guinea, in which this commitment was defined in a very specific manner to include the transformation of the syncretic society into a homogeneous society by eliminating the "residual" set of values, norms, and structures and institutionalizing the new set according to ideological directives; the creation of an all-pervasive state apparatus, including both an all-encompassing mass party which could function as a controlling organization in the Leninist sense and as an aggregative organization, and an effective Africanized bureaucracy; and a planned economy geared to the achievement of very high increase in the rate of total output, as well as economic self-sufficiency in which the State plays the dominant role. Whether or not they espoused "socialism" in this form, most other African leaders shared these aspirations, albeit in some modified form. Since African countries are farther behind with respect to most of these goals than any other set of countries in the world, however, the result is that governments with the lowest load capability have assumed the heaviest burdens. But in the process of trying to raise the capability of their governments to achieve these goals, African rulers frittered away their small initial political capital of legitimacy, distributive capacity, inertia and coercion by investing it in non-essential undertakings, much as many of them did in the economic sector. A major source of the vulnerability of African regimes thus stems from adherence to self-imposed ideological directives.

Secondly, even if properly allocated this capital was seldom adequate to deal with political difficulties stemming from the very character of the syncretic society, the circumstances of decolonization, and the characteristics of the new institutions themselves. This was most obvious in the case of the Congo, where challenges stemming from every direction occurred simultaneously and most dramatically within a few weeks after independence. Although elsewhere the challenges have been less extreme and have usually been spaced over a few years, while the countervailing power and force at the disposal of the government was somewhat greater, their cumulative impact has not necessarily been much less severe. Everywhere, African governments have been faced with some or all of the consequences of the politicization of residual cleavages which occurred in the course of the rapid extension of political participation prior to independence; and of an inflationary spiral of demands stemming from the very groups whose support is most crucial for the operations of government. Since these processes are often discussed in the literature, only their major features will be noted here.

1. *The Politicization of Primordial Ties:*[8] Pre-existing distinctions between groups in Africa were usually supplemented by others stemming from the uneven impact of European-generated change. Often, by the time of independence, one tribe or group of tribes had become more urban, more educated, more Christian and richer than others in the country. Hence, at the mass level, old and new cleavages tend to be consistent rather than cross-cutting; camps are clear-cut and individuals can engage wholeheartedly in the disputes that occur;

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[8] For a general treatment of this topic, see Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution," in Clifford Geertz (ed.), *Old Societies and New States* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963) pp. 105-157. Although every serious monograph on African politics has also dealt with the subject, it is unfortunate that no effort has been made to refine for Africa the comparative analysis of the phenomenon along the lines suggested by Geertz.

almost any issue can precipitate a severe conflict; the history of conflict itself tends to make the next occurrence more severe; with few intervening layers of community organization, even localized conflicts rapidly reach the center. They tend to be particularly severe where there is an asymmetry between the old and the new stratification system within a single society or between complementary societies, as when for some reason serfs become more educated than their masters or when their greater number becomes a source of political power at the time universal suffrage is introduced.

At the level of the modernizing leadership, recruitment is usually uneven, but nevertheless open to a certain extent to the various groups in the country; common life-experiences insure a certain degree of solidarity which provides offsetting cross-cutting affiliations; and ethnic ties make an important contribution to national integration by preventing the formation of the sharp elite-mass gap that is common in peasant societies. But there is always a very great strain on the solidarity of the modernizing leadership because, regardless of their ideological orientation, political entrepreneurs who seek to establish or maintain a following must necessarily rely on primordial ties to distinguish between "us" and "them." When it appeared that the shape of the polity was being settled rapidly, perhaps once and for all, a multitude of groups began to press their legitimate claims for the protection of their way of life, for a redefinition of the relationship between their own peripheral society and the center, and for a more satisfactory distribution of benefits. Many latent disputes were revived and flowed into the new arena provided by central institutions. Hence it is not surprising that even in countries where one party seemed to be solidly established the leadership felt that their country was less integrated than ever before. Where several ethnic-regional movements vied for power, and especially where participation was extended very suddenly, the consequences of these cleavages and ensuing conflicts upon the center were even more disturbing.[9]

In general, almost any difference between two groups can become politically significant, even if from the point of view of the ethnographer the two groups belong to the same cultural classification. Although each of the oppositions tends to involve but a small proportion of the total population, because of the very nature of the groups involved, many permutations are possible and contagion can set in. Suitable institutional arrangements, such as various forms of territorial federalism, proportional or communal representation, and institutional quotas, are not easily designed in situations where primordial identities are as numerous and fluid as they are in most of the countries under consideration.

2. *The Inflation of Demands:* The second major source of challenge involves three crucial categories of individuals: civilian employees of government, men in uniform, and youths. Government employees, who include not only professional civil servants but also a large number of low-level, unskilled clerical personnel and manual workers employed in the operation of the governmental infrastructure (railways, harbors, road maintenance, and public works generally) usually constitute a very large proportion of those gainfully employed outside of agriculture. Promotions were initially rapid because of Africanization and the vast expansion of government agencies; many programs of economic development have had as their major consequence a reallocation of national revenue to the benefit of the managers, including both government employees and politicians; and government employees often constitute in terms of income and prestige the most privileged group in the society, after the politicians themselves. Yet, these same factors have contributed to a process of acute relative deprivation. Because of their very occupation and training, government employees have internalized to a greater extent than most others the style of life of their European predecessors; they feel that on the grounds of native ability and training they are qualified to rule rather than merely to execute policies; rapid promotions only lead to higher aspirations among those who have already been promoted and among those left behind, while the rate of governmental expansion tapers off soon after independence. During the colonial period, government employees who vented their grievances against their employer were "good nationalists"; as they continue to do so after independence, they are a "selfish privileged class." The deterioration in the relationship between government employees and the politicians is relatively independent of the ideological orientation of the regime itself: in most of French-speaking Africa, government employees are "leftists" in relation to whatever the government's orientation happens to be at a given time; but in Ghana, under Nkrumah, civil servants constituted a sort of

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[9] I have attempted to deal with this question in *One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 47, 77, 128–134.

"rightist" opposition to the regime. Since personnel expenditures constitute as much as two-thirds or more of the government's annual expenditures, any demands that require translation into resource allocation tend to create a major financial crisis.

The grievance orientation toward government extends also to those employed in the private sector, since even in countries that are not nominally "socialist," *étatisme* prevails; the private industrial or commercial sector is closely regulated since major firms usually operate on the basis of government guarantees concerning manpower costs. So much of the workers' real income takes the form of benefits rather than money wages (family allocations, housing, etc.) that any sort of collective bargaining usually involves a modification of rules governing labor and leads to a showdown between the government and the unions. Finally, a similar process prevails among cash-crop farmers, for example, since marketing operations are managed or at least closely regulated by government. Demands in this sector are therefore necessarily and automatically "political," and governments are even viewed as responsible for controlling the fluctuations of world markets for tropical commodities, over which most of them have but a very limited leverage.

Men in uniform tend to act very much like other government employees. In the absence of institutionalized values and norms which transform men in uniform into a military establishment and a police force, officers and men are ruled by the norms that prevail among other groups; hence what has been said above applies to them as well. Furthermore, they rapidly find out that by virtue of their organizational characteristics and their control of certain instruments of force, they are indeed the best organized trade union in the country. As I shall point out below, this is not the only factor which has led the military to intervene in African politics; but it has helped set the mood for certain types of interventions and for the general relationship between the military and civilian politicians.[10]

As Lucian Pye has noted, "The non-Western political process is characterized by sharp differences in the political orientation of the generations," primarily because of a "lack of continuity in the circumstances under which people are recruited to politics."[11] In most African countries, it was easy for a particular age-cohort to move from relatively modest positions in the occupational structure to the highest positions in both the polity and the economy. Within a single decade, clerks and elementary school teachers became Presidents, cabinet ministers, members of party executives, directors of large trading establishments, etc. But for the next generations, whose expectations are based on the experience of their predecessors, conditions have fundamentally changed. First of all, the uppermost positions have already been filled by relatively young men who see no precise time limit to their tenure. Secondly, men with some education and occupational qualifications have rapidly became much less scarce because of the huge growth of secondary and higher education during the post-World War II decade. Thus, there has been a manifold increase in supply while the demand has abruptly decreased. The result is that newer generations face an insurmountable glut which frustrates their aspirations, with very few opportunities for movement into alternative spheres of activity.[12] Hence, the intergenerational gap within the political sphere can be noticed in almost every other institutional sphere, including especially the civil service and the military. It is exacerbated by the fact that the newer generations are usually in fact better trained and more highly qualified than their predecessors and hence have a very legitimate claim to take their place. To these discrepancies in recruitment must be added gaps in political socialization. In syncretic societies, the regime has very little control over the major mechanisms of socialization, the family and the primary group, and only partially over the educational structure. There is little likelihood that new generations will have a set of attitudes compatible with the requirements of the new order. This is particularly important given two factors: The rapid growth of a large body of slightly educated, unemployed young urbanites; and the general shape of the demographic pyramid in which adolescents and young adults constitute a very large proportion of the total population. Intergenerational conflict is exacerbated by the fact that youthful discontent tends to be manifested not only by individual deviance from established norms, but also in the appearance of age-homogeneous movements and organizations, functional equivalents of the familiar youth gangs of industrialized societies, which tend to maintain a distinctive sub-culture and to act autonomously in the political sphere.[13] "Youth" is thus transformed from a mere categoric group into a movement.

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[10] The most useful recent surveys of African military establishments are presented in the publications of the Institute of Strategic Studies, London. See in particular, M. J. V. Bell, "Army and Nation in Sub-Saharan Africa," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 21 (August, 1965); and David Wood, "The Armed Forces of African States," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 27 (April, 1966). For an earlier essay, see James S. Coleman and Belmont Bryce, Jr., "The Role of the Military in Sub-Saharan Africa," in John J. Johnson (ed.), *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 359–405.

[11] Lucian Pye, "The Non-Western Political Process," in H. Eckstein and D. Apter (eds.), *Comparative Politics* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 660.

[12] On patterns of recruitment of new elites and their consequences see Rémi Clignet and Philip Foster, *The Fortunate Few* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966).

In concluding this brief review of the consequences of the politicization of residual cleavages and of the inflationary spiral of demands voiced by crucial groups in the society it is important to note that the two processes are seldom insulated from each other. Government employees, soldiers, or young men in the towns are *also* members of ethnic groups; yet, these several affiliations do not constitute the sort of web of group affiliation characteristic of "pluralist" societies. Hence, the two processes reinforce each other to produce recurrent, serious, and complex conflicts, which easily penetrate into the political arena because of the weakness of aggregative structures. But even if they do not immediately result in an increase in demands or in a withdrawal of support, they constitute serious disturbances from the point of view of governments engaged in building a nation since by their very existence they provide evidence that this goal has not been achieved.

The added weight contributed by these processes to the burdens of government is relatively independent of the wisdom or devotion of particular political leaders, factors which will not be considered here. The difficulties of government in syncretic societies are so great, however, that the marginal consequences of human error, of weakness, and of sheer roguery—whose incidence among African politicians may be assumed to be about the same as among equivalent men elsewhere—are vastly magnified. For example, corruption among government officials, which probably did not interfere with the industrial take-off of European countries or the United States (and perhaps even facilitated it), can have very damaging consequences where it diverts a large proportion of very scarce, non-expanding resources, away from the public domain into the pockets of a non-productive bureaucratic bourgeoisie. Impatience and arbitrary actions, which elsewhere may only lead to the discrediting of a public figure and to personal tragedy, can become sparks which ignite a major conflict.

Within a few years the two types of challenges discussed above strained the restricted distributive potential of the new governments and rapidly undermined the limited legitimacy of the founders. The center's weakness, hitherto hidden from sight, was unmercifully exposed, as when the value of the currency issued by a national banking system is drastically reduced when the credit pyramid, itself based on the productivity of the economy, collapses.[14] In the new situation, demands are expressed more vociferously; depositors knock down the gatekeepers and seek to invade the vault. Parsons has suggested that the system's response can be twofold: "First, an increasingly stringent scale of priorities of what can and cannot be done will be set up; second, increasingly severe negative sanctions for non-compliance with collective decisions will be imposed."[15] Political power, normally based on the overall social structure, gives way to force.

Although no African rulers ever abandoned completely their reliance on the techniques of machine politics to maintain themselves in office, illustrations of a trend toward the use of force abound and constitute by now a monotonous recitation of unpleasant but familiar facts of African political life: intimidation, exile, detention, or assassination of political opponents; modification of the electoral system to make competition either impossible or at least very costly to those who attempt to engage in it; reduction of the independence of the judiciary or creation side-by-side with it of dependable political courts; redefinition of loyalty into unquestioning obedience and sycophancy; use of the military, of the police, and of political thugs to bulldoze dissidents into passivity, and passives into demonstrative supporters; creation of additional quasi-military or quasi-police bodies to offset the questionable loyalty of the existing ones. Although coups which result in changes of government have attracted the most attention, the most frequent coups in Africa have probably been those initiated by an incumbent government against threatening individuals or groups (real or alleged), and those launched by rulers or dominant factions against their associates.

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[13] Conditions under which the phenomenon occurs are specified by S. N. Eisenstadt, *From Generation to Generation* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956).

[14] The analogy is drawn from Talcott Parsons, "Some Reflections on the Place of Force in Social Process," in Harry Eckstein (ed.), *Internal War* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 59–64. A similar analysis is provided by Martin Kilson in *Political Change in a West African State: A Study of the Modernization Process in Sierra Leone* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), with emphasis on the initial growth of "reciprocity" and the eventual inadequacy of this political technique.

[15] Parsons *op. cit.*, p. 64.

Beyond its immediate unfortunate consequences for the individuals affected, the shift from power to force as a technique of government has serious long-term consequences for political life more generally in that it serves as the prelude to anti-government coups and revolutions, in the following manner:

a. In the process of shifting from power to force, governments tend to become over-confident in their ability to reduce the disturbing flow of demands by dealing harshly with their source. They become afraid that any concession might be interpreted as weakness and open up a Pandora's box of claims. Hence, less change occurs altogether. Governments become less adept at discriminating among danger signals and tend to deal with even the smallest disturbances by expending a great deal of force.[16] But since the capital of force is small it becomes rapidly used up in relatively unnecessary undertakings, thus increasing the government's vulnerability to more serious threats.

b. When a shift from power to force occurs, it is accompanied by a change in the relative market value of existing structures. In the case of the new African states, the relative value of political parties and of civilian administrative agencies has undergone a sort of deflation, while the value of the police, of the military, and of *any* organization capable of exercising force, even by the sheer manipulation of large numbers of people in demonstrations and civil disobedience actions, has been vastly increased.

c. Although the shift to force represents an attempt to overcome deteriorating legitimacy and inadequate power, paradoxically it enhances the problem of the legitimacy of the rulers in the eyes of those to whom the implementation of force must necessarily be entrusted. As Parsons has indicated: "Most important, whatever the physical technology involved, a critical factor in socially effective force is always the social organization through which it is implemented. There is always some degree of dependance on the loyalties of the relevant personnel to the elements of the social structure ostensibly controlling them."[17] Attempts to balance one instrument of force which is thought to be unreliable by creating another merely modifies the problem of control of force by political means, but does not eliminate it. In fact, resort to this technique may exacerbate the very problem it seeks to overcome by antagonizing individuals identified with the relevant institution.

d. When individuals and groups are deprived of the right and opportunity of exercising power to express their demands, they have no choice but to submit to force or use it themselves to express their demands. But when the government's capital of force is discovered to be limited, the latter alternative tends to be frequently chosen. Furthermore, since authority is personalized and the government is committed to a rigid course, specific demands tend to be translated into demands for a general change of rulers.

It is within the context of this inter-relationship between governments who rely on force and the remainder of the society that the growing frequency of military and civilian coups, successful or unsuccessful; of mutinies, large-scale and prolonged urban strikes or rural disturbances; of near-civil wars, insurrections, and revolutionary-minded movements, must be understood.

IV. THE COUP AS A POLITICAL INSTITUTION[18]

The coup can be viewed as an institutionalized pattern of African politics on statistical grounds since in recent years it has become the modal form of governmental and regime change. More significantly, however, the coup is a normal consequence of the showdown between a government and its opponents who use force against each other in a situation where the force at the disposal of the government is very limited. This condition, which is met in most African countries, is most important because it distinguishes the conflict situation that tends to lead to a coup from others which tend to develop into some form of internal war as the result of extensive mobilization of support by both sides. In Africa, the government usually falls too soon for this to occur; there is some evidence that governments even prefer dissolving themselves to fighting. Coups determine who will rule, at least temporarily, but do not in themselves affect the fundamental character of the society or of its political system. The scope of the conflict is limited in relation to the society as a whole. Coups may be accompanied by some brutality but seldom entail more strategic forms of violence.

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[16] This proposition is related to Apter's suggestion that there is "an inverse relationship between information and coercion in a system." (David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965], p. 40.)

[17] Parsons, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

[18] It is difficult to analyze the patterns of coups because it is impossible to identify the components of the universe with which one must deal. If incumbent rulers are to be believed, attempted coups against the government are extremely frequent in almost every African country; but what appear to be anti-government plots may in fact be only government-initiated purges. The present analysis is based exclusively on secondary sources. Unless otherwise specified, data are drawn from reports in *West Africa*

As of mid-1967, the set of new states of tropical Africa could be divided into two sub-sets of almost equal numbers: those which had experienced at least one change of central government personnel as the result of a coup, and those which had not. But almost all the units in the second sub-set had experienced some serious challenge; some had withstood it only through external intervention on behalf of the incumbents; and it appeared probable that the next coup, or the one after that, would be successful. As I suggested in the introduction, the incidence of coups appears to be independent of the quantitative or qualitative variables normally used to differentiate among African states. Attempted or successful coups are always justified by the initiators, and often explained by observers, with reference to the corruption, ineffectiveness, and arbitrariness of the incumbents; but it is impossible to distinguish any significant threshold beyond which these faults and weaknesses become intolerable and it would probably be impossible to demonstrate that the regimes of countries in which successful coups have occurred were, as a group, more vulnerable to these criticisms than others. Whether or not a coup occurs in a given African country at a particular time is related to specific and circumstantial features of that country's current political and economic situation, rather than to any fundamental and lasting characteristics which differentiate that country from others on the continent. The most significant variable may well be the passing of time, a factor often neglected in studies of regime stability in the developing countries.[19] Except in the most extreme situations, coups are more likely to occur after a few years of independence than initially because it takes some time for a government to use up its initial political capital and for opponents to test the government's strength.

If the *incidence* of coups appears random, this is not true of the manner in which they develop. The atmosphere within which a coup is likely to occur can be created by almost any type of conflict situation, originating almost anywhere in the social structure, within the ruling elite or outside of it. But not every kind of showdown between the government and its opponents is equally likely to lead to the government's downfall. The government has to be physically threatened, which means that the initiators of the coup must be able to deploy force in the capital. Hence, successful coups usually involve two bodies of manpower: trade unions and the formal bearers of force, the Army and the police (including of course such bodies as the gendarmerie, where one exists). But these two bodies are related in an asymmetrical fashion: the unions cannot bring about the downfall of the government without the support of the Army (active or passive), while the Army can carry out a successful coup without securing any alliances. In the final analysis, then, the role of the Army is determinative. As one African journalist has put it, "the Army has established itself as a no man's land between the elite and the masses."[20]

Given the small size and organizational weakness of the military establishments inherited by most countries from the colonial era, few students of African politics devoted much attention to its potential political role until it became manifest. Yet, James Coleman and Belmont Bryce, Jr. indicated in one of the first essays on the subject that the Congo crisis

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(London), *Afrique Nouvelle* (Dakar), *Le Monde*, *Sélection Hebdomadaire* (Paris), *The Times* (London), *The New York Times*, *Jeune Afrique* (Tunis), *Africa Report* (Washington), and *Africa Digest* (London). A more detailed analysis of military interventions will appear in my contribution to Henry Bienen (ed.), *The Military Intervenes* (New York: Russell Sage, 1968).

[19] As for example in the hypothesis discussed by Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, 17 (April, 1965), p. 427. His data are based on Fred R. von der Mehden, *Politics of the Developing Nations* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.; Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 65.

[20] Justin Vieyra in *Jeune Afrique*, December 12, 1965.

of 1960, in which an Army which had recently shown every sign of disaggregation was able to act as the arbiter between the President and the Prime Minister, demonstrated "the determinative influence which a small military force could exercise in a situation in which countervailing institutions of power groups are absent."[21] How small "small" can be is now clear in the light of the successful interventions by the Togolese Army of 250 men in 1963 and by the Central African Republic's Army of 600 men in 1966, each of which was the smallest military establishment on the continent at the time of its coup. Perhaps the only reason for the slight delay in the army's prominence was the fact that in some countries the uppermost levels of the army were not Africanized until several years after independence, while in others the presence of European garrisons or bilateral defense agreements provided some protection against the African government's own military.[22] Even under these conditions, however, the determinative role of the military in political conflict should have been apparent to us much earlier: for example, the breakup of the Federation of Mali in 1960 involved initially a dispute between Senegal and Soudan over the appointment of the chief of the general staff, while the eventual showdown involved a clash between the pro-Senegalese gendarmerie (with the help of French Community officers) and troops under the command of the Soudanese Chief of Staff; the gendarmerie's action turned the tide in favor of Senegal.[23] In Senegal two and a half years later, President Senghor's control over a single batallion of airborne troops insured his victory over Prime Minister Mamadou Dia, who had initially deployed the gendarmerie (with some Army support) against the President's partisans.[24]

Relationships between civilian governments and the military have steadily deteriorated, in keeping with the processes discussed in the preceding section. In addition, the government's very reliance on the military as an instrument of force brought about a transformation of the military outlook as officers became intimately acquainted with the seamy side of political life and were able to form an accurate estimate of the government's authority. Initially, the military tended to intervene against obviously weak governments such as the Congo-Kinshasa, Togo, the Congo-Brazzaville, or Dahomey; but later, even the strongest governments appeared to be much less formidable. Hence, there has been a steady escalation of the character of military interventions. Initially they took the form of strike-mutinies (to secure better pay, the removal of unpopular officers, better pensions for veterans, or an expansion of the army) and referee actions (in the face of prolonged stalemate between contending politicians, or urban disorder resulting from strikes and demonstration). These early interventions usually led to the establishment of a compromise civilian government satisfactory to the military and to a return of the military to its barracks.[25] More recently, however, the military has tended to engage in comprehensive takeovers. Several of these have occurred after earlier referee actions failed to bring about the desired changes; in others, a coup which appeared to be initially intended as a referee action was gradually transformed into a full-scale takeover when attempts to bring about a reconciliation among civilian politicians failed; in the light of these experiences, military leaders have become even less hesitant to establish military rule from the very beginning.

The institutionalization of the coup as an important means of government change in Africa stems not only from the internal characteristics of each country but also from the phenomenon of contagion. When African states first became independent, they were still isolated from one another, except when they formed colonial groupings, such as British East or French West Africa; international physical, social, and political communications were almost non-existent. Hence, during an initial period, disturbances in one country (Sudan, 1958; Congo-Kinshasa, 1960; Ethiopia, 1960) do not seem to have had any significant consequences for others, except when they occurred within one of the colonial groups (as in former French-speaking Africa from mid-1962 to early 1964, and in former British East Africa in January, 1964). More recently, however, the countries of the continent have become much more of an interacting international sub-system as denoted not only by the formation of the Organization of African Unity and other formal groupings that cut across former colonial boundaries, but also by the growth of informal political ties among leaders and of intervention by one country in another country's politics. Within this new context, waves of coups are more likely to occur. Although it is very difficult to show direct connections between events in Algeria (June, 1965), the Congo-Kinshasa (October), and the other countries in which military interventions occurred during the four months that followed, the first two did set the precedent for an escalation from referee actions to takeovers. For West Africa as a region, the links are much more specific. The military leaders of the Central African Republic, of Upper Volta, and of Dahomey have known one another since they served their apprenticeship together in Indochina; and although there is no evidence of concerted action, it is likely that for each of them the promotion of the group as a whole created new political aspirations. Beyond this, General Soglo has explained that his takeover in Dahomey was prompted by the fear that the elections scheduled for early 1966 might crystallize the North-South cleavage and result in disorder similar to that which prevailed among the Yoruba of neighboring Western Nigeria during recent elections, and about which Dahomeyans, many of whom are also Yoruba, were well informed.[26] Conversely, Soglo's success probably affirmed the resolution of Nigerian officers next door; their success in turn may have inspired their Ghanaian counterparts, with whom they share not only British professional traditions but also exposure to the disastrous consequences of political disorder gained while serving in the Congo with ONUC.

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[21] Coleman and Bryce, *op. cit.*, p. 399.

[22] The Congo crisis of 1960 reminds us, however, that African troops can launch mutinies against their European officers.

[23] William J. Foltz, *From French West Africa to the Mali Federation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 176–183.

[24] Victor Du Bois, "The Trial of Mamadou Dia," *American Universities Field Staff Report Service*, West Africa Series, VI, No. 6 (June, 1963), pp. 4–8.

[25] See, for example, the analysis of Dahomey and the Congo-Brazzaville in Emmanuel Terray, "Les révolutions congolaise et dahoméene de 1963: essai d'interprétation," *Revue Française de Science Politique*, 14 (October, 1964), 917–942. A more detailed account of the process of escalation is presented in my paper cited in note 18

Within one country also coups engender other coups. The success of one set of claimants encourages others to try. Even the establishment of military regimes does not lessen the probability of future civilian or military coups, since the very characteristics of African armies insure that the solidarity of their leadership, the control they have over their own organization, and their authority over the society at large, are not likely to be much greater than what they were in the government they replaced.[27]

V. FORCE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF MAJOR POLITICAL CHANGE

Both the ins and the outs in Africa have also attempted to use force in order to achieve more fundamental changes including the modification of political communities, the alteration of important aspects of the stratification system, and the transformation of regimes (in Easton's sense of "regularized method for ordering political relationships"). These attempts may be initiated by the original founders, by new governments resulting from successful coups, or by alternative elites who seek to construct a competing spstem of authority while the government they oppose is still in place. Since these attempts usually involve the mobilization of extensive support, they tend to lead to an enlargement of the scope of conflict and may entail more strategic forms of violence. Except in a few specific situations discussed below, however, force fails to bring about major political change in Africa. In particular, political revolutions are unlikely to succeed because they entail prerequisites which are absent from the syncretic societies of contemporary Africa.

1. *The Modification of Political Communities:* Force is often invoked in Africa to bring about a redefinition of the territorial extent of the political community or of the internal relationship between some of its major components. Many countries contain regions that wish to secede, either to constitute an autonomous state or to join a neighbor. Such situations usually arise when one or more of the following features are precent: an ethnic group which straddles two countries, one segment of which comes to believe that it is in the wrong country; territorially contiguous societies with asymmetrical status cultures, particularly in countries which straddle the borderline between Arabized Muslim and "Black" Africa; rich areas (with income based on mineral deposits or on an important export crop) which resent having their revenue reallocated on a national basis and are geographically in an eccentric position from the point of view of the larger unit.

The most prominent case is of course that of Katanga, where secession did occur and was accompanied by a clash of organized military bodies in the form of a small-scale war, because of the availability of non-Congolese instruments of force on both sides. By contrast, the breakup of the Federation of Mali did not involve strategic violence, but only a show of limited force by the two sides. Many other countries have experienced small-scale versions of this phenomenon: border tensions, involving armed incursions or attempted subversion, are common. Because of the nature of African armies and of the terrain (especially the absence of land communications suitable to military movement between countries with different colonial experiences), however, it is unlikely that these conflicts will lead to international wars; attempts to alter the territorial definition of political communities will either succeed without much violence, or will result in recurrent but minor irritations.[28]

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[26] Reported by Philippe Decraene in *Le Monde, Sélection Hebdomadaire,* June 30-July 6, 1966.

[27] For a further discussion, see my paper, "Military Rule and Political Development in Tropical Africa," presented at the Conference on Armed Forces and Society sponsored by the World Association of Sociologists (London, September, 1967).

Conflict over the relationship of one or more relatively integrated and distinct parts of the political community to the remainder stems most commonly from the sequels of indirect rule, as in Nigeria and in Uganda. The constitutional settlement achieved under British leadership and supervision as a condition of the grant of independence, which provided for a loose form of federation approaching confederacy for all Nigerian regions, and between Buganda and the rest of Uganda, represented merely a truce in a protracted conflict because it could not be anchored in congruent political norms and structures. Although there are many other unsettled issues in both countries, conflict over the role of the North in Nigeria and of Buganda in Uganda have dominated political life since independence, with power rapidly giving way to force as a means of settlement. In Nigeria, the North attempted to preserve its identity by controlling policy-making at the federal level as the indispensable major partner in successive coalitions. Force came to be used by all sides to insure favorable results in critical elections. The new situation led to a first military coup in January, 1966. When the new military government announced its intention of transforming the country into a unitary state—a decision which was interpreted in the Nigerian context as a fundamental change in the character of the political community—the North resorted to force (attacks upon southern residents of northern towns) to obtain concessions. In August, 1966, a new military coup put an end to unitary government before it had even begun to function. The sequels have involved an extension of inter-regional conflict, including the breakup of the Army into regional factions, and the secession of the Eastern region in May, 1967, and subsequently a protracted civil war.

In Uganda, Buganda long resisted all attempts by the national government to obtain control of the police on Buganda territory, organized a para-military body of veterans to occupy contested territory (in the "Lost Counties" dispute), and used force to intimidate Baganda whose political loyalty was not assured. Whatever the reasons which led to the strange government-initiated coup of February, 1966, in the course of which Prime Minister Obote assumed full exceutive powers, his decision to eliminate the offices of President and Vice-President (held by the traditional rulers of Buganda and Busoga respectively), the purge of pro-Baganda elements from the national army, and the eventual proclamation of an entirely new constitution without consulting the federal units, clearly constituted the prelude to an attempt to alter the most important features of the political community by force. Force gave way to the strategic use of violence in the next phase of conflict; and although the Obote government successfully repressed the Buganda uprising of May 1966, it is unlikely that this constitutes the end of the affair.[29]

Although such clear-cut cases are relatively rare, there are numerous instances which involve similar sequels of quasi-indirect rule, as with the Mossi of Upper Volta or the Agni of the Ivory Coast. Related situations occur in countries that contain pastoral and/or nomadic societies which the colonial powers had been satisfied to contain rather than to rule, and for which the end of European presence represents an opportunity to return to a traditional way of life that includes internal feuding and raiding upon neighbors. These patterns of behavior not only involve violence in and of themselves, but often lead to violent clashes with the military and the police.[30] The conflict may be exacerbated by specific factors, as in Mali where the nomads are "white" while the new African government is "black," or by the nationalist ideology of the rulers of new states from whose vantage point successful containment alone is not a satisfactory solution.

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[28] Intra-national and international conflicts involving Ethiopia and the Sudan are major exceptions; they are not considered here because these two countries are peripheral to the universe of post-colonial tropical Africa with which I am particularly concerned.

[29] This account is based on the excellent analysis by M. Crawford Young, "The Obote Revolution," *Africa Report*, June 1966, 8–14.

[30] Manifestations of this process in Uganda are discussed by Colin Leys, "Violence in Africa," *Transition*, 5 (Fourth Quarter, 1965), 17–20.

2. *Stratification Change:* A few African countries deviate from the general pattern discussed in section (1) in that the territorial boundaries established by European colonizers coincided with the domain of a single unit whose stratification system included a clear-cut hierarchical organization of ethnic strata defined in relation to each other with a socially, economically, and politically dominant minority and a subordinate majority approaching the "plural society" discussed by M. G. Smith.[31] The introduction of the principle of legitimacy based on popular sovereignty and of opportunities to implement this principle by means of elections based on universal suffrage in such societies can have genuinely revolutionary consequences, as was the case in Rwanda and in Zanzibar.

In Rwanda, the pastoral Tutsi, who constituted approximately 15 percent of the population, ruled for four centuries over the agricultural Hutu linked to them by an inheritable client-patron "contract" through a highly centralized administration headed by their Mwami, backed by their specialized warrior caste, and based on a monopoly of all cattle and land.[32] Although both the Germans and the Belgians ruled indirectly, reserving educational opportunities and administrative posts almost exclusively for the Tutsi elite, changes began to occur after World War II when the Hutu engaged in the cultivation of a new major cash crop (Arabica coffee) and were encouraged to attend Catholic mission schools. Although political participation was slowly extended by means of indirect elections in 1953 and 1956, its effects were initially mediated by fears of Tutsi retaliation; nevertheless, Hutu-led political organizations began to emerge by the end of the period. In 1959, following the death of the ruling Mwami, Hutu leaders organized a popular uprising against the coming to power of an extremist Tutsi faction which advocated immediate independence in order to forestall further political and social reforms. Many Tutsi fled the country at this time, and again in the midst of the serious violence that accompanied the 1960 and 1961 elections in which the Hutu party won a decisive victory. The new government went beyond earlier reforms and destroyed the basis of the stratification system by abolishing the old contract relationship and redistributing cattle. A large number of Tutsi still in the country were slain when Tutsi exiles forcibly attempted to reenter Rwanda in 1963; there have been repeated cycles of violence since then.

As a political unit, Zanzibar is composed of the island of that name and of Pemba. On the island of Zanzibar, the stratification system involved consistent cleavages between an Arab minority, who owned most of the land and the revenue-bearing trees on it, and the Shirazi majority, island Africans who lived on the land on a squatter basis; there were also some mainland Africans with ties to Kenya and Tanganyika. Cleavages were less consistent on Pemba, where the Shirazi were economically less differentiated from the Arabs. The British governed the island indirectly through the traditional Arab rulers but extended participation in the usual manner toward the end of the colonial period. The growth of political organizations entailed a mobilization of the various communities accompanied by the expected exacerbation of cleavages and ensuing disturbances. In the elections preparatory to independence of June, 1963, the Afro-Shirazi party (with support among Zanzibar Shirazi and mainland Africans on both islands) won 63 percent of the votes on Zanzibar alone, and a 54 percent majority on both islands together; because of the system of single-member constituencies, however, it failed to obtain a majority of seats, and the government was organized by the ZNP (with support among the Pemba Shirazi and Arabs on both islands), together with the smaller ZPP. One month after independence, on January 21, 1964, insurgents broke into the police arsenal and armed themselves; the police offered minimal resistance, and the insurgents rapidly gained control of the island of Zanzibar. In the course of this coup and after a new Shirazi-dominant government was installed, large numbers of Arabs were slain, fled, or left under duress. Permanent change in the stratification system was thus brought about.[33]

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[31] See Note 6, above.

[32] For background on Rwanda, see in particular Jacques Maquet and Marcel d'Hertefelt, "Elections en Société Feodale," *Académie royale des Sciences coloniales, Classe des Sciences Morales et Politiques*, XXI, Fasc. 2 (1959); and Jacques Maquet, *The Premise of Inequality in Ruanda* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961). For more recent events, I have relied on Aaron Segal, "Rwanda: The Underlying Causes," *Africa Report*, 9 (April, 1964), 3–8; and on an unpublished paper by Donald Attwood, graduate student in anthropology at the University of Chicago.

[33] This account is based on Keith Kyle, "Coup in Zanzibar," *Africa Report*, 9 (February 1964), 18–20. See also Michael F. Lofchie, *Zanzibar:*

In Zanzibar and in Rwanda, genuine revolutions were possible, with or without a coup, because the stratification system was defined by some central features which could be modified by force. But this is a rare situation in the new African states, found at the national level only in Burundi and sometimes in a particular ethnic group within a country (as in Nigeria and others that contain Fulani societies with serf-like clients or captives). The potential for drastic modifications of the stratification systems involving violence is thus present, but is unlikely to have the spectacular effects it had in Zanzibar or in Rwanda.[34]

3. *The Second Revolution:* Aside from the cases just discussed, there have been few attempts in tropical Africa to bring about rapid and profound changes in established political arrangements and in the underlying social structure by drastic means. The few radical-minded regimes established at independence have tended to choose survival over revolutionary purity and have bowed to necessity by curtailing their goals. Most coups have resulted in military rule, and the main concerns of general-presidents are rule of law, honesty, efficiency, and financial responsibility. Their institutional models resemble those of dedicated European officials during the last phase of colonialism. Yet, many members of newer political generations and older radicals who were by-passed by machine politicians during the first go-around have begun to view the original founding and more recent changes as abortive beginnings. Like the thinkers who launched a wave of political messianism in mid-nineteenth century Europe, they believe that the true revolution is yet to come. The shape it might take has been analyzed by Frantz Fanon, who believed that it would be based upon the total mobilization of the youthful sub-proletariat of the growing cities and of the neglected rural masses.[35] Two situations so far seem to approximate what African revolutions might entail, the aftermath of the Congo-Brazzaville coup of 1963 and the Congo-Kinshasa (ex-Leopoldville) rebellions that began in 1964.

With 65 percent of the school-age population in schools at the time of independence and with one-fifth of its population in three cities, but without much economic development, the Congo-Brazzaville experienced very early and in an unusually acute form the consequences of growing cities peopled by semi-permanently unemployed youths. Opportunities for employment probably even declined absolutely when Brazzaville ceased to be the administrative capital of French Equatorial Africa. Political life had long reflected a sharp antagonism between the Mbochi of the North and several related Bakongo groups, including the Lari (Balali), who had been a focal point for the activities of numerous religio-political protest movements such as Matswanism during the colonial era and provided basic support for the rise to power of a Catholic priest, Fulbert Youlou.[36] Having emerged as a strong man around 1960 after a period of coalition government, Youlou stepped up the construction of a one-party state in mid-1963 in the face of growing unrest stemming from unemployment, open corruption, ruthless elimination of opposition leaders, and his unabashed espousal of causes usually defined as "neo-colonialist". In the course of a confrontation between the government and trade unions in August, the Army, which only a few months earlier had been involved in a near-mutiny put down by the gendarmerie with the aid of French troops, shifted from support of the government to neutrality and eventually demanded Youlou's resignation. This time, French troops did not intervene and the government fell. A moderate provisional government, without direct Army or trade union participation, was immediately installed.

Except for the provision of a dual executive (President and Prime Minister), the other steps in constitutional reform and policy reorientation in the economic and international fields since 1963 have merely brought the country in line with African "radicals" such as Guinea or Mali; on the ethnic side, the Balali (Lari) have been replaced as the leading political group by other Bakongo tribes. The more significant feature of political change is the apparent accountability of the new authorities to the "street," represented by the *Jeunesse*. The lowering of the voting age from 21 to 18 immediately after the coup sug-

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Background to Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

[34] The political emancipation of Fulani "captives" probably contributed to the rise of the nationalist movements of Mali and Guinea in 1956–58.

[35] See *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1965). For a more general discussion of Fanon's thought in the context of his life, see my article "Frantz Fanon: A Gospel for the Damned," *Encounter*, November, 1966.

[36] For background on Brazzaville, see the several works of Georges Balandier and also Jean-Michel Wagret, *Histoire et Sociologie Politiques de la République du Congo (Brazzaville)* (Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1963). For an analysis of the 1963 coup, see Terray (note 25 above).

gests that it was among young adults, who probably constitute the bulk of the urban population, that the new leaders hoped to find much of their support or, alternatively, that they were already dependent upon them. Although the youth was formed into an ancillary wing of the *Mouvement National pour la Révolution*, it appears that it is the youth branch which is the most powerful part of the organization. The major manifestation of its political role are the activities of the "revolutionary militia" whose major weapon seems to be terror, including a political protection racket backed by the threat of violence and occasional assassinations. The *Jeunesse* as a whole was characterized in 1965 as a "curious mixture of revolutionary idealism and juvenile delinquency," which the government could barely control.[37] Although in the absence of additional information it is impossible to analyze the sociology of this movement, it seems that much of the ire of the *Jeunesse* and of the new regime more generally has been directed at Catholic trade union leaders (including those who had participated in the initial coup), youth leaders, schools, and at the Church more generally. This would suggest that a rejection mood, akin to that which activated earlier messianic movements, underlies contemporary political life. The regime's future remains uncertain. Discontent among the Balali followers of Youlou, the inability of the regime to solve fundamental problems of development and unemployment, factionalism among trade union leaders, have been reflected in sporadic antigovernment riots, plots, and changes of leadership at the top. In June, 1966, the Army reacted to the growing importance of quasi-military political organizations by staging a coup; although this one failed, the next one might well succeed.

The loosely connected movements usually referred to as the Congolese rebellion which originated in Kwilu (near Leopoldville) and in Maniema (Eastern Congo) in 1964 can all be attributed to general factors which are not unique to the Congo, but are exacerbated by the special Congolese situation.[38] They must be distinguished from dissidence elsewhere in Africa, however, not only by their scope and the massive violence engendered, or by their international implications and long-term consequences for the areas involved, but also by their clearly rural rather than urban character. The case of Kwilu is particularly interesting in the present context because of the special ideological meaning it was given by its leaders and the basis on which it was organized. As one study puts it, the Kwilu rebellion emerges as "a revolutionary attempt to correct some of the abuses and injustices by which large segments of the population of the region felt oppressed four years after official Independence and an effort to try once again to express and to concretely realize the goals and dreams promised by the 'First Independence of 1960'."[39]

Kwilu, a densely populated area inhabited by several different ethnic groups whose traditional political organization does not extend much beyond the village level, and whose adult males work mostly as palm cutters on European-owned plantations, had a history of rebellion against the *Force Publique* (1931) and of religio-political protest movements throughout the colonial period. When political participation was extended in 1959, A. Gizenga, P. Mulele, and C. Kamitatu, representing different tribes, organized the *Parti Socialiste Africain* (PSA) whose socialism took the form of a "village paradise-on-earth." It was allied at the national level with the Lumumba coalition. After the Congo crisis of 1960, the *PSA* itself splintered; Gizenga, connected with the Stanleyville government of 1960–61, became the "imprisoned martyr"; Mulele left the country and spent some time in Communist China; while the more "moderate" Kamitatu faction obtained control of the regional government when Kwilu became a province in 1962.

The growing discontent throughout the region in 1962–63, manifested by palm-cutter strikes and a resurgence of messianic cults, was channeled into an organized movement by Mulele upon his return in mid-1963. He established forest camps in which *équipes*, led by a President and a *Commissaire Politique*, and accompanied by a *soigneur* (healer—usually a practitioner of traditional magic and medicine), were trained in guerilla warfare. The *équipes* formed the *maquis;* above them were the *directions* ultimately responsible to the *centrale.* Mulele also provided the movement with a rudimentary ideology which defined what was wrong, diagnosed causes, and indicated remedies. Within this framework, the culprits are the "Congolese colonialists" or *retardataires* who presently man government at all levels. The remainder of the society is divided into *avancés* (Mulele partisans) and *réactionnaires* (moderates, fence-sitters). The goal is to achieve a new society "conceived as a gigantic village made up of thousands of small villages in which the people find their own authenticity; all that they need materially; justice, creativity, and happiness in working the soil together."[40] In order to achieve it, the *avancés* must destroy the *retardataires* and persuade the *réactionnaires.* They are bound to triumph if they obey their leaders and adhere to prescribed norms, including certain taboos, such as the prohibition against speaking French, which guarantee their invulnerability.

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[37] *Jeune Afrique*, August 8, 1965. There is some evidence that similar youth groups helped bring Youlou to prominence in 1956 (Wagret, *op. cit.*, p. 65).

[38] Succinct and well-balanced analyses of the Congolese Rebellion can be found in Marvin D. Markowitz and Herbert F. Weiss, "Rebellion in the Congo," *Current History*, April 1965, 213–218; and M. Crawford Young, "The Congo Rebellion," *Africa Report*, 9 (April 1965), 6–11. The present discussion of the Kwilu case is based on Renée C. Fox, Will de Craemer, and Jean-Marie Ribeaucourt, "'The Second Independence'; a Case Study of the Kwilu Rebellion in the Congo," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 8 (October 1965), 78–105. The most comprehensive source of information on these rebellions is Benoit Verhaegen, *Rébellions au Congo*, Vol. I ("Les Etudes du C.R.I.S.P." Leopoldville and Brussels, 1966). This work, as well as Herbert Weiss, *Political Protest in the Congo* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), became available too late to be fully consulted.

[39] Fox *et al*, p. 78.

Support for the movement was generally drawn from Mulele's and Gizenga's own ethnic groups, the BaMbunda and the BaPende; it attracted much of the *jeunesse,* especially teachers and clerks who hoped to be rapidly promoted in the bureaucracy of the new state; ex-policemen dismissed because of a pay mutiny; and a variety of chiefs and lineage and age segments involved in local conflicts. The initial attacks of January, 1964, were planned, systematic, and well-controlled; they were aimed at religious, industrial, governmental, and educational establishments, but spared those considered friendly to the rebels (such as the mission schools which the leaders had attended). In the absence of outside communications, Mulele was able to persuade much of the local population that the revolution had already been victorious elsewhere; hence, in much of the area, after the initial uprising life tended to go back to normal within the framework of the "new society." Only later, after Europeans had been evacuated and the undisciplined Congolese Army advanced into the region did full-scale, indiscriminate *terre brûlée* violence occur. Although the Congolese Army was able to contain the Kwilu area as early as April, 1964, they still clashed with rebels at the beginning of 1966, and their present control over the area remains tenuous.

It is likely that growing tensions and the availability of dissident leaders will contribute to the emergence of similar movements elsewhere, that the activities of these movements will generate large-scale violence, and that participation in them will genuinely lift the spirits of those involved. But even if we combine Brazzaville and Kwilu, it is unlikely that movements such as these will be able to translate their revolutionary aspirations into the institutionalization of a new regime and of new social structures. African society does not have a center; its syncretic character insures that it cannot be turned upside down, or that if an attempt is made to do so, some groups will shift their relative positions but the society as a whole will remain very much as it was before. If the revolutionaries succeed in obtaining control of the government, they will resemble at best the radical-minded regimes created in the course of the "first revolution." If they do not succeed, however, they might give rise to a "vendetta morality" or become full-scale withdrawal movements which consume themselves in senseless violence.[41] In the final analysis, it is unlikely that even the most glorious dedication to force can broaden the limits of the range of variation imposed on political arrangements by contemporary African society.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

Seeking to overcome the parochialism of area studies and the intellectual irrelevance of raw empiricism, many scholars dealing with the politics of new states have hit upon the device of bringing the foreground of the contemporary scene into sharp focus, extracting it from context, and blowing up the recorded image for leisurely contemplation. The background tends to be reduced to an indistinct blur called "tradition," which is discarded because it yields little interesting information, But vastly blown-up stills of political development, modernization, or integration obtained in this manner tend to make these processes appear similar regardless of what is being developed, modernized, or integrated. One wonders, however, whether the similarities genuinely stem from the phenomena observed or whether they are artifacts arising from the manipulation of the recorded images; whether the information on which many current generalizations are based pertains to the reality the image sought to capture, or whether it pertains mainly to the characteristics of the lens and of the film used to record it.

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[40] *Ibid.*, p. 97.

[41] For similar outcomes elsewhere see, for example, E. J. Hobsbawn, *Primitive Rebels* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1965).

Surely, as we begin to explore an unknown world, we must master the techniques of *cinéma-vérité*, using hand-held cameras that are a more direct extension of the observer's eye, suitable for obtaining intimate moving pictures of the varying patterns subsumed under the terms political development, modernization or integration. Understanding of these processes will be achieved, not by reducing them prematurely to a common denominator, but by seeking to preserve their singularity and then comparing their manifestations in different settings. The characteristics of political life in all the new states can easily be subsumed under relatively few general headings. However useful such efforts may be in clearing the ground, however, we must remember that the same headings will refer to very different things where, for example, national communities are being carved out of a more universal one and the stratification system is defined by an opposition between urban elites that control land and peasant masses, as against situations where many small societies devoid of this sharp differentiation are being amalgamated into arbitrarily defined larger wholes under the aegis of an open stratum of recently educated men drawn more or less evenly from the component societies that constitute the country.

The situation in most of tropical Africa is so extreme that studies focused primarily on incipient central institutions almost necessarily exaggerate their importance in relation to the society as a whole.[42] Hence, I have tried in this essay to provide some balance by considering politics in the more general context of African societies and by focusing on conflict as a major element of political life. This is not to say that no institutionalization is taking place, but rather that until such processes reach a certain level—as yet unspecified—force and violence are likely to remain salient features of political action.[43] Since various factors insure the persistence of most of the new territorial units even if political institutionalization does not occur at a very high rate, we must make a place for conflict in our conceptual apparatus. Although the incidence of certain manifestations of conflict may be relatively random, political conflict is not a random process but derives a discernible structure from the characteristics of the society itself, as do other patterns of political life. Much more precision can be achieved than in this essay by operationalizing independent and dependent variables in a manner to obtain elements from which a comparative typology can be constructed.

From this point of view, it is clear that a small number of countries, e.g., the Ivory Coast and Ghana, stand out from the rest of the pack and are on the verge of reaching a threshold of societal development which may be labeled "incipient modernity." These are exceptional in the contemporary African scene, and are likely to become even more exceptional in the predictable future as the spillover effects of incipient modernization become infused into every sphere of social life, including the political. At the other extreme, there is a fairly large group of countries, such as the Central African Republic or Upper Volta, which are among the least developed countries in the entire world. Unfortunately, they are likely to remain at the bottom for a long time, since it has become increasingly evident that the die was cast several decades ago in the sense that wherever there was *some* potential for relatively rapid modernization, it was brought out during the colonial period. In between are countries with some potential but with a complex of problems which has so far prevented it from emerging. Some of these will join the first group, while the others will, unfortunately, join the second. It is not necessary to view politics as merely epiphenomenal to suggest that the general characteristics of the social structure, and especially the nature of primordial solidarities combined with gross differences in degree of modernization, impose limits within which variations of regime can occur.

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[42] For example, the most recently compiled *Selected Economic Data for the Less Developed Countries*, published by the Agency for International Development in June, 1967 (data for 1965 and 1966), shows that Africa (not including the United Arab Republic and the Union of South Africa) is the lowest ranking of four areas (Africa, East Asia, Latin America, Near East/South Asia) on total GNP, Annual Growth of GNP, electric power per capita, life expectancy, people per physician, literacy, pupils as percent of population. It was tied with one other area for bottom place on several other indicators, and ranked relatively high only on acres of agricultural land available per capita.

[43] An approach to the study of institutionalization and integration is suggested in my paper, "Patterns of Integration," in *The Journal of Modern African Studies* (forthcoming, 1968).

Although the relationship between political conflict and political development has not been explicitly examined in this essay, this does not imply that I view the functions of conflict in a society as wholly negative. Integration into a free society does not entail the total elimination of conflict from political life, but rather its containment within acceptable limits as indicated by a shift from force to power and authority.[44] How that is achieved remains a central problem of the social sciences which far transcends the parochial concerns of particular disciplines or of sub-fields within each. One thing is clear, however: Progress in this direction requires an acceptance of the premise itself—the institutionalization at the cultural level of a belief that conflict is a potentially manageable aspect of society, rather than the persistence of wishful thinking about its permanent disappearance expressed in the form of ideologies or scientific theories.

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[44] This view is inspired by Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), especially p. 318. See also my general argument in *Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).

MAJORITY VS. OPPOSITION IN THE FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, 1956–1965: A GUTTMAN SCALE ANALYSIS*

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I. INTRODUCTION

A series of significant developments in French politics has recently touched off speculation about the possibility that a major transformation of the structure and behavioral patterns of the system of political parties is taking place.[1] The most salient developments from 1958 until 1967 can be briefly listed: (1) the unprecedented longevity of governmental coalitions throughout the entire span of life of the Fifth Republic (only one Government overthrown in eight years); (2) the near single-party majority attained by the Gaullist UNR in the November, 1962 elections; (3) the ability of five major non-Gaullist parties to coalesce their forces behind only two candidates opposing General de Gaulle in the December, 1965 presidential election, with the resulting necessity for a second ballot; (4) the subsequent merging of forces on the moderate left and the moderate right into combinations[2] bent upon coordinated efforts in the March, 1967 legislative elections; (5) the successful construction of a Gaullist electoral alliance limiting the number of official Gaullist first-ballot candidates in each constituency to one; (6) the electoral agreements between the Communists and the moderate left *Fédération* permitting only one candidate of the left to remain in the race in any constituency on the second ballot; and (7) the tendency of voters to reward the united fronts of the outgoing Gaullist majority and the consistent leftist opposition and to penalize the relatively small and ambiguous center force, the *Centre Démocrate*.[3]

These developments seem to add up to two fundamental changes in the nature of the French party system between 1958 and 1967: (1) The number of effective major parties has been reduced from at least six to no more than five.[4] (2) All but one of the major parties can now be identified as a loyal majority partner or a consistent opponent,[5] whereas

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[1] The debate among French observers has centered around the possibility of a two-party system emerging. See *Le bipartisme est-il possible en France?* (Paris: Association Française de Science Politique, 1965). Opinion in this colloquium was weighted toward caution. However, momentarily in the wake of the March, 1967 legislative elections, writers foreseeing a two-party system were having their inning: Alfred Fabre-Luce, "Giscard ou Mendès," *Le Monde* (March 17, 1967), p. 7; Maurice Duverger, "Vers le Dualisme," *Le Monde* (March 19–20, 1967), p. 9. It is an assumption of the present article that considerable *simplification* of the party system can take place without a two-party system necessarily resulting.

[2] *The Fédération des Gauches Démocrates et Socialistes* (left-center) and the *Centre Démocrate* (right-center).

[3] For an incisive account of the 1967 legislative elections see François Goguel, "Les élections législatives de mars 1967, "*Revue française de Science politique*, 17 (June, 1967), 429–467.

[4] The figure "six" for the number of effective major parties in 1958 is rather arbitrary. The following are considered to rate that characterization: the Communists, the Socialists, the Radicals, the MRP, the Gaullist UNR, and the Independents. What is striking, however, is that there has been a clear reduction in the number of splinter parties that have to be taken into account. In 1958 there were an additional four or five parties that had to be reckoned with, locally at least. By 1967 only two could by any stretch of the imagination be considered significant: the *Parti Socialist Unifié* on the left and the *Alliance Républicaine* on the right. For 1958 see Philip M. Williams and Martin Harrison, "La Campagne pour la referendum et les élections legislatives," in Association Française de Science Politique, *L' Etablissement de la Cinquième République: Le Referendum de septembre et les élections de novembre 1958* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1960), pp. 21–59.

[5] In the election campaign the five major parties were grouped as follows: majority—UNR and *Républicains Indépendants;* opposition—Communists and *Fédération des Gauches;* ambiguous—*Centre Démocrate.*

only two, the Gaullist UNR and the Communists, could be so identified with confidence in the wake of the November, 1958 legislative elections.[6] It has really been only since the 1965 Presidential election that these developments have taken place at a level visible to all but the closest students of the French political scene. Yet before then there already existed one salient fact which distinguished political party behavior under the Fifth Republic from that under the Fourth: government stability. Even during the First Legislature[7] of the Fifth Republic (1958–1962), when no single party was close to having a majority of the seats in the National Assembly, no Government was toppled by the Assembly until nearly four years had elapsed, a record for longevity until then unsurpassed in the history of republican France. Majority cohesiveness was already apparently a reality more than five years before a coherent majority coalition faced the electorate in 1967. Could it be said that a fairly simple majority-opposition division already existed in the Assembly early in the Fifth Republic? Were the voting patterns at that stage appreciably less complex and more predictable than those of the Fourth Republic? Did the legislative election of 1962 effect an abrupt change in the alignment of parties in the Assembly by giving one party a near majority, or did that election merely accentuate trends already in existence? It is the purpose of this article to shed light on these matters by analyzing voting patterns and trends in the French National Assembly during the period 1956 to 1965, a period which spans the last years of the Fourth Republic and most of the Fifth Republic years up to the present writing. Guttman scale analysis[8] is used as a means of establishing the essential voting patterns that existed during these years and of enabling comparison between the three legislatures elected during that time span, those of 1956, 1958 and 1962.

The use of Guttman scaling in this article may be differentiated from its uses by other students of legislative roll calls whose studies have come to the author's attention.[9] According to the authors of a handbook for legislative roll call analysis, Guttman scaling has been utilized for three purposes: "the characterization of roll calls; the characterization of the voting behavior of individual legislators; and the characterization of the voting behavior of groups of legislators."[10] All three are subsidiary purposes of the present study; but a more fundamental purpose is to characterize three whole legislative bodies and compare them with one another.[11] In order to do this the samples of roll call votes taken for each Legislature have been subjected to the empirical method of scale-searching outlined recently by Duncan MacRae, Jr.[12] In this method no a priori classification of items (roll calls) is made aside from that applied originally in the selection of the sample. The items in the sample are compared with one another in pairwise fashion to ascertain whether or not they satisfy some measurement criterion of pairwise fit. The matrix of pairwise coefficients is examined to determine what is the largest possible sub-set of items that can be found wherein each pair of items satisfies the fit criterion employed. This sub-set is then extracted from the sample and the remaining items (if any) are subjected to the identical procedure to determine what is the second largest sub-set; and the procedure is repeated as many times as are necessary to characterize every one of the items in the sample as belonging to some sub-set of one item or more.

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[6] Although most of the seven parties identified as "major" for 1958 voiced their support for the policies of General de Gaulle, there was no identifiable majority coalition as there was in 1967.

[7] The term "Legislature" refers to the span of service of a given set of National Assembly deputies from one election to the next, as the term "Congress" refers to a given two-year term of office of members of the U. S. House of Representatives.

[8] In addition to the standard fountainhead essay, Louis Guttman, "The Basis for Scalogram Analysis," in Samuel A. Stouffer et al., *Measurement and Prediction*, Vol. IV of *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966), pp. 60–90, see Duncan MacRae, Jr., *Dimensions of Congressional Voting* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958); and H. Douglas Price, "Are Southern Democrats Different? An Application of Scale Analysis to Senate Voting Patterns," in Nelson W. Polsby, Robert A. Dentler and Paul A. Smith (eds.), *Politics and Social Life* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963), pp. 740–756.

[9] A useful listing of such studies may be found in Lee F. Anderson, Meredith W. Watts, Jr., and Allen R. Wilcox, *Legislative Roll Call Analysis* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 120–121, footnote 14.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 90.

[11] At this level of generality we move away from the initial objectives for which Guttman scaling was devised and first applied to legislative bodies: attitude measurement. The scale has been viewed in earlier studies as a kind of yardstick measuring various degrees to which roll calls express certain underlying attitudes: e.g., George M. Belknap, "A Method for Analyzing Legislative Behavior," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 2 (November, 1958), 377–402; and David M. Wood, "Issue Dimensions in a Multi-Party System: The French National Assembly and European Unification," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 8 (August, 1964), 255–276. Most students have recognized that the legislative vote is likely to involve a more complex choice situation than the response to a survey question (e.g., Lee F. Anderson, "Variability in the Unidimensionality of Legislative Voting," *Journal of Politics*, 26 (August, 1964), 568–585), and they have therefore paid considerable attention to the relationships that can be found between the positions of legislators on the scales and (1) the various groups, organized and categorical, to which legislators belong or (2)

Studies which have employed this procedure for roll call analysis have frequently found that the largest scale to emerge is heterogeneous in terms of the substance of the issues before the legislators and is considerably larger than the next largest to emerge. Often the smaller scales are more homogeneous in content.[13] This suggests the existence of a dominant alignment of legislators ranging from strong supporters to strong opponents of the existing Government. Only under the stimulus of issues about which the executive leadership is indifferent or which evoke strong loyalties of (for example) a sectional or religious nature that transcend positions vis-à-vis the Government, is there likely to be a different alignment emerging, one that will be characteristic only of certain types of issues and not of others. This is particularly likely to be the pattern in a parliamentary system, since many of the votes on substantive issues are treated by the Government as matters of confidence and legislators must take into account the consequence of their votes for the life or death of the Government. It can be argued, therefore, that during the life of a single coalition in a multiparty parliamentary system we should expect to find a single dominant heterogeneous scale encompassing the bulk of at least the more important votes taken, especially those regarded as votes of confidence.

An exception to the above would be a case in which a Government, in order to persist, must hover between two alternative majorities, consisting of a common element of reliable supporters and two mutually exclusive supplementary elements. In such a case one would find two major scales emerging, neither one of them dominant, less heterogeneous than in the normal case but more so than is usually true of the smaller exceptional scales. Whatever the number of dominant scales, however, the legislative body could be divided into three types of legislators according to their positions on the dominant scale or scales: a sub-set of consistent supporters, a sub-set of consistent opponents, and a sub-set of intermediate legislators, now supporting the Government, now opposing it. For any given scale it would be possible to establish lines of demarcation between the types at the points along the scale cut by the confidence vote most positive for the Government and the confidence vote giving it the least support. If more than one scale emerges with confidence votes the ranks of the consistent supporters and opponents are likely to shrink to the advantage of the intermediate type, since the consistent deputies

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certain properties of the constituencies they represent: e.g., Duncan MacRae, Jr., "Roll Call Votes and Leadership," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 20 (Fall, 1956), 543–558; Leroy N. Rieselbach, "The Demography of the Congressional Vote on Foreign Aid, 1938–1958," this REVIEW, 58 (September, 1964), 577–588; Samuel C. Patterson, "Dimensions of Voting Behavior in a One-Party Legislature," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 26 (Summer, 1962), 185–200; Lee F. Anderson, "Individuality in Voting in Congress: A Research Note," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 8 (November, 1964), 425–429. In attempting to characterize an entire legislative body in Guttman scaling terms, I hope, among other things, to make evident the possible applications of the tool in *comparative* study, whether cross-national or cross-state.

[12] Duncan MacRae, Jr. "A Method for Identifying Issues and Factions from Legislative Votes," this REVIEW, 59 (1965), 909–926.

[13] MacRae's findings fit this pattern for the Democrats in the House of Representatives, but the results for the Republicans are mixed: *ibid.*, 922–923. See also William O. Aydelotte, "Voting Patterns in the British House of Commons in the 1840's," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 5 (January, 1963), 134–163; Duncan MacRae, Jr., "Intraparty Divisions and Cabinet Coalitions in the Fourth French Republic," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 5 (January, 1963), 164–211; and Loren K. Waldman, "Liberalism of Congressmen and the Presidential Vote in Their Districts," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 11 (February, 1967), 73–85.

will have to be consistent on all scales or else be counted among the intermediates. As a final ground rule, should a single scale be found encompassing more than one Government, as might happen in a legislature such as the National Assembly of the Fourth Republic which was unable to sustain any single Government during the entire period between elections, it is regarded as the alignment pattern of a single coalition which, though stable in structure itself, could not sustain a stable Government. This might happen if a group of intermediaries held the balance of power between a frozen group of consistent supporters and a frozen opposition, maintaining its support for a given Government only up to a point, but then withdrawing it, only to serve once again as the key "swing" group for the succeeding Government.

Employing the above assumptions and technique, study has been undertaken of the three legislatures between 1956 and 1965 in order to answer two questions: (1) Has there been a trend during this time toward a less complex, more unidimensional voting structure in the Assembly?[14] (2) Have the consistent supporters and opponents increased as a proportion of the Assembly at the expense of the intermediate element? If there was indeed a trend toward a simplified majority-vs.-opposition voting structure in the Assembly before 1965, the answers to both questions should be positive. In the Scandinavian multi-party parliamentary systems majority and opposition coalitions are fixed at the outset of the Legislature and generally remain in force throughout its life.[15] All members of the legislative

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[14] Two votes can be considered to share the property of unimensionality if they divide up the legislative body into only three of the four possible sub-sets shown in the following four-fold table:

		Vote 2	
		+	–
Vote 1	+	*a*	*b*
	–	*c*	*d*

So long as one of the four cells is unoccupied, unidimensionality prevails, although, if the unoccupied cell is either *a* or *d*, it will be necessary to reverse the signs of one of the items to make the items fit the conventional scale model: Anderson, Watts and Wilcox, *op. cit.*, p. 92:



Here cell *b* is unoccupied and the deputies are divided by votes 1 and 2 into three sub-sets, with those in the center (*c*) having voted negatively on vote 1 and positively on vote 2. By extension, more than two votes would be perfectly scalable if each of the possible pairs among them exhibited pairwise perfection.

Clearly such perfection in human behavior is unattainable. Some measure of scalability must be used allowing a certain minimum of non-scalar behavior (i.e., a few deputies in the *c* cell in the above example). Before the pairwise method of scale-finding was introduced an overall measure of scalability, called the coefficient of reproducibility (*cr*), was used, permitting a certain % of "errors of reproducibility" (non-scale votes) scattered throughout the scale: see Guttman, *op. cit.*, p. 77. With the pairwise method MacRae recommends the use of Yule's *Q*, a correlation coefficient designed for four-fold tables: "A Method for Identifying Issues and Factions from Legislative Votes," *op. cit.* I am impressed by the necessity to measure correlation as well as reproducibility, but prefer a measure which combines the two standards, as ϕ/ϕ max rather neatly does. See Edward E. Cureton, "Note on ϕ/ϕ max," *Psychometrika*, 24 (March, 1959), 89–91. This measure provides for a comparison between cells *b* and *c*, which *Q* does not. The author is indebted to Mr. Joel S. Rose for demonstrating to him the applicability of the ϕ/ϕ max coefficient. By pegging ϕ/ϕ max at the .7 level it was found that no pair of items was admitted to a scale at less than the .94 level of *cr* for any of the scales of the three legislatures studied. The overall *cr*'s for the five scales analyzed are presented in footnote 36, *infra*.

[15] See Stein Rokkan, "Norway: Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism," and Nils Stjernquist, "Sweden: Stability or Deadlock," in Robert A. Dahl (ed.), *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 70–146. When compared to the British two-party model, the Scandinavian multi-party systems fall short of a thoroughgoing majority-opposition confrontation. Stjernquist characterizes the Swedish opposition parties' tactics thus: "in election campaigns, the English approach; in parliament and elsewhere, collaboration with the government in order to influence the political decision-making as much as possible": *ibid.*, p. 137. But the dualism is still present, at least in elections, whereas, until 1967, it was non-existent in France. Maurice Duverger has recently stated the thesis that present-day "centrism" in France (i.e., the joining of the centers against the extremes) is nearly unique to

body may be counted either as consistent supporters or consistent opponents. Since groups of legislators seldom exchange roles with one another during the Legislature, unidimensionality (albeit a rather uninteresting variety) prevails. While France has not yet reached this limit, the question at hand is whether or not, prior to the Presidential election of 1965 which constrained the parties to assume more overt positions as majority or opposition elements,[16] trends were in existence which moved the National Assembly closer to a pure majority-opposition confrontation than had been the case during the waning years of the Fourth Republic.

II. THE 1956–1958 LEGISLATURE

The data utilized in this article are most of the roll calls (*scrutins*) mentioned in *L'Année politique*, the French political yearbook, for the years 1956 to 1965, inclusive.[17] These total 83 for 1956–58, 65 for 1959–62, and 47 for 1962–65. The three legislatures will be analyzed in chronological order, with general comparisons between the three appearing in the concluding section.

The 83 votes for the Third (1956) Legislature of the Fourth Republic are taken from a total universe of 972 taken up to and including the investiture of Pierre Pflimlin as Premier on May 13, 1958.[18] The votes have been classified in terms of the substance of issues involved. These are rather rough categories whose purpose is primarily to make it more evident at a glance whether the various scales obtained are relatively homogeneous or heterogeneous in content:

Category	Symbol	Number of Votes
North Africa	N	20
Budget	B	11
Government (general)	G	9
Social welfare	S	8
Europe	Eu	6
Church-state	Ch	4
Economic policy	Ec	4
Political	Po	4
Constitutional revision	Co	3
Military	M	3
Education	Ed	2
Veterans	V	2
Agriculture	Ag	1
Energy	En	1
Foreign policy	F	1
Housing	H	1
Labor	L	1
Overseas possessions	O	1
Procedural questions	Pr	1

North African votes for the most part concerned the Algerian War, a dominant issue in the Legislature. One vote concerning the Suez crisis of 1956 and two relating primarily to Franco-Tunisian relations in 1958 are also included in the category. Government questions involve debates on general policy surrounding motions of confidence or interpellations. However, confidence motions and

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France among present-day European countries: *La Démocratie sans le Peuple* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1967), pp. 129–132.

[16] Unlike a legislative election, a presidential election forces the parties to choose between a small *finite* number of individual candidates rather than an indefinite number of potential coalitions. With de Gaulle as one of the candidates, parties in the center of the spectrum either had to fall in behind him or support an active, critical opponent. For accounts of the pre-election soul-searching experienced by the parties see William G. Andrews and Stanley Hoffmann, "France: the Search for Presidentialism," in William G. Andrews (ed.), *European Politics I: The Restless Search* (Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1966), pp. 104–138; and Georges Suffert, *De Defferre à Mitterrand: La Campagne présidentielle* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1966).

[17] *L'Année politique, économique, sociale et diplomatique en France*, 1956–1965 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1957–1966). MacRae used roughly the same criterion for identifying important votes in his study of the National Assembly in the Fourth Republic. For his persuasive justification, see *Parliament, Parties and Society in France* (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1967), pp. 339–341. Only the votes for which *pour* and *contre* totals were given in the "Politique intérieur" section of the yearbook were used in the present study. Several votes with excessive numbers of absences and abstentions were omitted, as were all votes in which more than 90 percent of the deputies voting positively or negatively voted the same way. Deputies' votes were tabulated from Journal officiel de la République française, *Débats parlementaires, Assemblée Nationale*, 1956–1965.

[18] Seven votes were mentioned in *L'Année politique* for the weeks immediately following the Pflimlin investiture (#974, #977, #986, #989, #990, #993, and #1000). These votes were omitted from the study by my oversight. They include the investiture of General de Gaulle and the granting to him of "pleins pouvoirs."

interpellation resolutions that are specific to a particular issue are included in the appropriate substantive category. Political votes concern electoral system reform and questions of the eligibility of newly elected deputies after the January, 1956 legislative elections.

Party identification of the 615 individuals who were members of the National Assembly for all or part of the 1956 Legislature is best accomplished by adhering to the *groupes parlementaires* formed within the Assembly for purposes of internal organization. Fragmentary groups not appreciably different from others belonging essentially to the same political "family" are combined with the latter in the following analysis for purposes of simplification. Eleven such groups are identified below roughly as they sat from left to right in the Assembly chamber:

Official Designation	Name Employed in This Study
Groupe communiste	Communists
Groupe socialiste	Socialists
Union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance	UDSR
Républicains radicals et radicals socialistes	Valois Radicals
Groupe radical-socialiste	Morice Radicals
Rassemblement des Gauches républicaines	Faure Radicals
Républicains Sociaux	Gaullists
Mouvement républicain populaire	MRP
Indépendants et Paysans d'Action sociale	Independents
Groupe paysan	Peasants
Union et Fraternité française	Poujadists

The Morice Radicals are included only in the analysis of the latter part of the Legislature. Their defection from the main body of Radicals (the Valois Radicals) occurred in October, 1956.

Essentially two dimensions emerge from scale analysis of the 1956 Legislature. Use of the scale-finding procedure outlined above produced five separate sub-sets of the 83 items, grouping 51, 28, two, one, and one items respectively.[19] The two largest sub-sets were then subjected to scale analysis.[20] The items in the 51-item scale (Scale A) are analyzed on page 94 in terms of the categories of votes represented. The votes are listed in the order in which they appear on the scale, beginning with the smallest percentage voting for the position supported by the Government.[21]

The second-largest scale (Scale B) contained (see page 94) 28 items:

The most striking feature of these scales is the clear-cut difference between them in the times when the votes were taken. Whereas the median votes for Scale B (#104 and #105) were taken on May 2, 1956, that for Scale A (#691) was taken on September 25, 1957. Aside from two rather untypical Scale B votes taken in September and October, 1957 (#682 and #692),[22] the overlap between the two scales encompasses only twelve votes, taken between July 11 (#210) and November 19 (#303), 1956. With the exception of this interim period, therefore, it can be said that there were two time-spans during the 1956 Legislature, one from January to June, 1956, and the other from November, 1956 to April, 1958, in each of which there was a single dominant dimension

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[19] A special computer program was written in Fortran by Mr. Joel S. Rose to find scalable sub-sets in the prescribed fashion. This overcame the almost insurmountable complexities involved in trying to find the largest scalable sub-set from an 83×82/2 matrix.

[20] The four non-scalar votes for the Legislature (with substantive categories in parentheses) were #211 (Eu), #840 (Po), #841 (Po), and #972 (G). Only #972 was a confidence vote; it was the investiture vote for the Pflimlin Government. The brace of "Political" votes comes the closest to a small homogeneous scale of any of the sub-sets. Both votes relate to electoral reform.

[21] Roll calls were originally coded according to the criterion that the side on which members of the Government voted should be considered "positive" and the other side "negative." For the two Fifth Republic legislatures, with members of the Government no longer doubling as deputies, the side of the motion supported by the majority of the Gaullist UNR was taken as the positive side. The computer program included a feature whereby pairs of items were flagged if they would scale with the reversal of signs of one of them, thus making it possible to catch items for which the sign criterion was inappropriate. One item (#692) was actually added to Scale B (1956) in this fashion. All of the various types of absences and abstentions by which the *Journal Officiel* classified deputies were combined into a single residual code category.

[22] Both were motions which tended to rally the left and center of the Assembly against the right, an untypical occurrence after late 1956, since the left was usually divided in the period covered by Scale A.

Scale A (1956)

Scrutin	Type	Date	Scrutin	Type	Date
880	Co	Mar. 12, 1958	387	F	Dec. 20, 1956
693*	G	Oct. 28, 1957	420	Eu	Jan. 22, 1957
971	N	Apr. 15, 1958	212	Eu	July 11, 1956
571*	G	May 21, 1957	823	N	Feb. 11, 1958
690*	N	Sept. 26, 1957	655*	N	July 19, 1957
772*	V	Jan. 16, 1958	701	N	Nov. 12, 1957
365*	V	Dec. 10, 1956	846*	M	Mar. 7, 1958
366*	B	Dec. 10, 1956	522	Ag	Mar. 6, 1957
714*	Ec	Dec. 5, 1957	687	N	Sept. 26, 1957
807	N	Jan. 31, 1958	227*	M	July 28, 1956
777*	N	Jan. 22, 1958	873	Ec	Mar. 10, 1957
813	M	Feb. 4, 1958	401	B	Dec. 27, 1956
582*	Ec	June 24, 1957	694*	G	Nov. 5, 1957
942	Co	Mar. 21, 1958	265	N	Oct. 31, 1956
396	B	Dec. 26, 1956	745	B	Dec. 16, 1957
704*	Ec	Nov. 19, 1957	304	B	Nov. 20, 1956
963	N	Mar. 27, 1958	307	B	Nov. 21, 1956
710*	N	Nov. 29, 1957	210	Eu	July 11, 1956
709*	N	Nov. 29, 1957	254*	G	Oct. 25, 1956
367*	B	Dec. 10, 1956	609	Eu	July 4, 1957
364*	B	Dec. 10, 1956	850	Ed	Mar. 8, 1958
884*	Co	Mar. 18, 1958	317	Ed	Nov. 27, 1956
778	N	Jan. 22, 1958	681	N	Sept. 25, 1957
623	Eu	July 9, 1957	608	En	July 2, 1957
748*	B	Dec. 19, 1957	242	G	Oct. 5, 1956
574*	G	June 12, 1957			

Asterisks denote motions of confidence or investiture votes.

characterizing all or most of the votes taken during the period. In the first of these time-spans all 21 votes taken were found to fit on the same scale (Scale B). In the second period, 45 of the 50 votes included in the study for the period were encompassed by the dominant scale (Scale A). For approximately 23 of the 28 months covered in the study virtual unidimensionality prevailed.

Two additional differences between the

Scale B (1956)

Scrutin	Type	Date	Scrutin	Type	Date
105	S	May 2, 1956	11	N	Feb. 7, 1956
692*	G	Oct. 18, 1957	119*	S	May 5, 1956
34	Ch	Feb. 24, 1956	239	B	Aug. 2, 1956
19	Ch	Feb. 17, 1956	37*	L	Feb. 28, 1956
272	Ch	Nov. 8, 1956	103*	S	May 2, 1956
255	Ch	Oct. 26, 1956	120*	S	May 5, 1956
52	N	Mar. 9, 1956	152*	S	June 8, 1956
10	Po	Feb. 7, 1956	6*	G	Jan. 31, 1956
9	Po	Feb. 7, 1956	157	O	June 19, 1956
104*	S	May 2, 1956	682	N	Sept. 25, 1957
151*	S	June 8, 1956	54*	N	Mar. 12, 1956
220*	B	July 25, 1956	56*	N	Mar. 12, 1956
2	Pr	Jan. 25, 1956	53*	N	Mar. 12, 1956
163*	S	June 21, 1956	303	H	Nov. 19, 1956

scales should be noted: (1) The heavier concentration of confidence votes toward the negative end of Scale A than is the case for Scale B indicates that governments found their majorities more precarious during the time period covered by the former. In the median confidence vote[23] in Scale A (#709) 200 deputies voted against the Gaillard Government; only 108 deputies voted against the Mollet Government in the median confidence vote of Scale B (#103). (2) The two scales differ somewhat also with respect to the nature of the issues involved in the confidence votes. One-half of the Scale B confidence votes involved the Mollet Government's Old Age Fund proposal. This issue, in fact, provided that Government with most of its more difficult confidence motion situations in the early months of its existence. North African confidence votes are prominent in both scales, but it is noteworthy that they were among the least critical of those in Scale B and provided some of the most troublesome, and even disastrous, situations among those in Scale A. Veterans' votes are found only in Scale A, and they were clearly among the most dangerous for governments to face.

The explanation for the scalar pattern outlined above becomes quite evident when the alignment of parliamentary groups on the two scales is examined. Of the 52 possible classes (0 through 51) which individuals could occupy in a 51-item scale, deputies were found in 29 in Scale A. Since many of these classes were occupied by one or a very few members, neighboring classes were combined in such a way that no remaining class, original or combined, would contain less than two percent of the 615 deputies.[24] As a result of the combining 11 classes remain for Scale A. The group distribution among the classes is listed in Table 1.

Scale A reveals a solid combination of Socialist and MRP deputies supporting the three governments whose lives spanned the period covered by the votes in the scale. UDSR support was near-perfect, and the governments could count upon over 60 percent of the Valois Radicals. Opposition, on the other hand, came from the Communists, the Poujadists, most of the Peasants, and some of the Independents, Gaullists and Valois Radi-

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[23] This refers to the median confidence vote in the order in which confidence votes are arrayed in the above table listing Scale A votes.

[24] The procedure for collapsing scale categories departs from that suggested by MacRae in "A Method for Identifying Issues and Factions from Legislative Votes," *op. cit.* The method used here proceeds from the assumption that, in a parliamentary legislative body, the vote on a given scale which most clearly characterizes a sub-set of legislators is the one at which it first votes against the position advanced by the Government. Thus, as we move from the positive to the negative side of a deputy's voting pattern on the scale, he will be scored according to the point at which the first negative vote that can be deemed scalar appears. This follows the conventional pattern if there are no errors or abstentions on the margin. Thus:

(1) − − − − − + + + + +

is scored as 5, as is

(2) − − − − − + + + − +

Errors on the margin pose problems for any scoring convention. The way to mentally "sweep an error under the rug" is to pretend that the vote is what it should have been to conform to the pattern. But what of the following kind of pattern?

(3) − − − − + − + + + +

Here the problem is whether to treat the marginal + as a − or the marginal − as a +. Under the assumption prevailing in this study we attach greater significance to the negative vote. Thus the + is converted to a − and the deputy scores 4. (Incidentally, deputies are given no score if they have more than 10 percent errors or more than 40 percent absences and abstentions.) Absences and abstentions on the margin are treated as if they were positive votes, since the vote against the Government is deemed the "harder" alternative. Thus,

(4) − − − − − 0 + + + +

is scored as 5.

Given the importance attached to the first negative vote, we can identify each class on the scale by the vote which separates it from the next most positive class. If a class contains less than two percent of the deputies we must choose whether to combine it with the class to its positive side or with that to its negative side. To resolve this problem the "identifying vote" for the small class is compared with each of its neighbors to see which pair yields the higher ϕ/ϕ max coefficient. Pairs of items with the higher coefficients are combined as are the classes of deputies identified with them. I do not recommend the use of these conventions for other kinds of studies. The particular purpose of the present study—measurement of majority and opposition voting—seemed to warrant it.

TABLE 1. SCALE A (1956)

Class	Group Composition	Cutting Point
10	96 Socialists 21 Valois Radicals 8 UDSR 1 Morice Radical 3 Faure Radicals 1 Gaullist 72 MRP 2 Others — 204 Total	
		#880 (March 12, 1958), Triboulet amendment to Constitutional revision report tending to limit number of occasions where confidence and censure motions can apply: 281–211
9	1 Valois Radical 3 Morice Radicals 2 Faure Radicals 16 Independents — 22 Total	
		#971 (April 15, 1958), Government motion to postpone debate onFranco-Tunisian relations (unofficial confidence motion: Gaillard Government falls): 255–321
8	4 Morice Radicals 2 Faure Radicals 10 Independents 1 Peasant — 17 Total	
		#571 (May 21, 1957), Motion of confidence regarding Government fiscal project (Mollet Government falls): 213–250
7	13 Independents 3 Peasants — 16 Total	
		#690 (September 30, 1957), Motion of confidence regarding Government project on Algerian institutions (Bourgès-Maunoury Government falls): 253–279
6	3 Morice Radicals 3 Faure Radicals 4 Gaullists 10 Independents — 20 Total	
		#772 (January 16, 1958), Confidence motion posed against agenda propositions of Conference of Presidents, especially relating to veterans' allowances: 253–233
5	3 Gaullists 10 Independents — 13 Total	
		#366 (December 10, 1956), Confidence motion regarding budget for Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones: 228–204
4	1 Gaullist 12 Independents — 13 Total	
		#813 (February 4, 1958), Postponement of debate on organization of Army: 322–248
3	1 Valois Radical 2 Faure Radicals 6 Independents 3 Peasants 1 Other — 13 Total	
		#884 (March 18, 1958), Confidence motion regarding adoption of dispositions revising Constitution of 1946: 282–196
2	9 Valois Radicals 1 UDSR 3 Gaullists 4 Independents 1 Peasant 2 Others — 20 Total	
		#304 (November 20, 1956), Opposition to previous question in debate on Financial project for 1957: 187–382
1	6 Peasants 30 Poujadists — 36 Total	
		#210 (July 11, 1956), Priority of Government *ordre du jour* in Euratom interpellation debate: 389–181
0	149 Communists 1 Peasant — 150 Total	

TABLE 2. SCALE B (1956)

Class	Group Composition	Cutting Point
9	148 Communists 92 Socialists 1 UDSR 8 Valois Radicals 1 Other — 250 Total	
		#105 (May 2, 1956), Boisdé amendment to Old Age Fund bill: 263–290
8	1 Communist 1 UDSR 18 Valois Radicals — 20 Total	
		#692 (October 18, 1957), Pinay investiture (unsuccessful): 198–248
7	2 Socialists 10 UDSR 15 Valois Radicals 1 Gaullist 1 Other — 29 Total	
		#52 (March 12, 1956), Arrighi amendment to bill authorizing special powers in Algeria: 278–305
6	2 UDSR 2 Valois Radicals 2 Gaullists 62 MRP 5 Others — 73 Total	
		#104 (May 2, 1956), Paquet counter-project to Old Age Fund bill: 178–369
5	5 Valois Radicals 2 Faure Radicals 5 Gaullists 7 MRP 1 Independent — 20 Total	
		#163 (June 21, 1956), Confidence motion on National Solidarity bond bill: 314–123
4	1 Valois Radical 9 Faure Radicals 4 Gaullists 5 Independents — 19 Total	
		#239 (August 2, 1956), Supplementary budget for 1956: 286–130
3	2 Faure Radicals 26 Independents — 28 Total	
		#6 (January 31, 1956), Mollet investiture (successful): 420–71
2	25 Independents 7 Peasants — 32 Total	
		#54 (March 12, 1956), Confidence motion on project authorizing Algerian economic expansion project: 451–72
1	19 Independents 2 Peasants 1 Poujadist — 22 Total	
		#303 (November 19, 1956), *Loi-cadre* on construction: 490–59
0	1 Gaullist 4 Independents 2 Peasants 40 Poujadists 1 Other — 48 Total	

cals (those who supported the position of Pierre Mendès-France). In between were ranged the Morice and Faure Radicals and the remainder of the Gaullists, Independents and Peasants. Since the reliable supporters of the Government did not constitute a number sufficient to assure a majority, this intermediate element held the balance of power in the Assembly throughout the entire period from late 1956 to the Spring of 1958.

The alignment of deputies on Scale B bears some resemblance to that of Scale A, but there are also important differences, as Table 2 reveals. In the early months of the Legislature the majority elements included the Communists as well as the Socialists, the UDSR and part of the Valois Radicals (this time including the supporters of Mendès-France, who was still a member of the Government throughout most of this period). But the MRP deputies were at best sometime supporters, although their support was generally forthcoming on confidence motions. The Poujadists were in opposition, as were a somewhat larger number of Independents and Peasants than were in opposition in the Scale A period. Valois and Faure Radicals, Gaullists, and many of the Independents are ranged in between, although because of the support of the sizeable Communist bloc, the Government did not, strictly speaking, need the intermediate votes to retain its majority. The Communists were not regarded as part of the Government's official majority, however. In fact the Mollet Government at this time regarded itself as a "minority Government" which charted its own course and relied upon the good sense of the centrist groups to prevent a situation wherein the Government must rely upon the Communists' votes to survive.[25]

As events in the Algerian War pushed the Mollet Government more and more toward a policy which the center-right of the Assembly could support, the Communists and the Mendèsist Radicals began to cool toward Mollet and the Socialist leadership. This incipient left opposition became more selective in voting during the summer and early fall of 1956 (the period when votes are found falling on either scale). Finally, in the wake of the Suez crisis and the Hungarian revolt, the Communists turned to systematic opposition. Soon the Mendèsists were voting fairly consistently against the Government and Mollet was talking as if a "new contract" existed (implicitly with the MRP, the dissident Radicals, and perhaps even some of the Gaullists and Independents).[26]

A comparison of the positions of deputies on scales A and B, presented in Table 3, will facilitate the identification of types of deputies according to the threefold classification advanced at the outset of the article (consistent supporters, intermediates, and consistent opponents). Note that deputies who are unclassifiable for one of the scales because of excessive absences or non-scalar votes cannot be included in the table. On each scale there are two cutting points which define the outer limits of tolerance of members of the Assembly. They are the cutting points which fall closest to the confidence votes in each scale wherein the largest and smallest number of deputies respectively supported the Government. For Scale A the cutting point between classes 8 and 9 is vote #971. Though not officially a confidence motion, it was regarded as such by the Gaillard Government, which fell as a consequence of the adverse vote. It can be considered the most negative confidence vote on the scale for any of the three governments whose lives Scale A votes spanned.[27] The least negative confidence vote on the scale is #254, the closest cutting point to which is that between classes 1 and 0. However, Class 1 is populated by Poujadist and ex-Poujadist deputies who actually abstained on vote #254 and who consistently refused their support to any Government on any confidence motion. Hence it is preferable to move up the scale to the cutting point between classes 1 and 2, which falls closest to the second most positive confidence vote on the scale, #694, the vote on which the Gaillard Government was invested. Below this line of demarcation are the deputies who were consistent opponents to all governments throughout the period covered by Scale A. Above the line between classes 8 and 9 are the consistent supporters of all three governments. For scale B the counterparts are the cutting point between classes 0 and 1 and that between classes 5 and 6.[28]

Above Class 8 on Scale A and to the left of Class 5 on Scale B are found the consistent

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[25] See *L'Année politique*, 1956, pp. 4–22.

[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 80, 97–99.

[27] #693, immediately to its negative side, was the unsuccessful second investiture attempt of Guy Mollet, thus not a confidence vote for an active Government.

[28] #104 is chosen for the dividing line between the consistent majority and the intermediates rather than #692, which is the unsuccessful investiture attempt of Antoine Pinay.

TABLE 3. COMPARISON OF SCALES A AND B (1956)

	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
10	92 Soc. 5 V.R.	8 V.R.	1 Soc. 5 UDSR 5 V.R. 1 Other	2 UDSR 1 V.R. 1 Gaul. 61 MRP	1 V.R. 1 F.R. 7 MRP	1 M.R 2 F.R.				
9			1 M.R.		2 M.R.	3 Ind.	2 F.R. 10 Ind.	2 Ind.		
8			3 M.R.		1 F.R. 1 Ind.	1 F.R. 1 Ind.	2 Ind.	2 Ind. 1 Peas.	3 Ind.	
7						1 Ind.	5 Ind.	5 Ind. 2 Peas. 1 Other		
6			1 Gaul.	1 M.R. 1 Gaul.	1 M.R. 1 Gaul.	3 F.R.	3 Ind.	4 Ind.	3 Ind.	
5					1 Gaul.	1 Gaul.	4 Ind.	4 Ind.	2 Ind.	
4						1 Gaul.	2 Ind.	1 Ind.	5 Ind.	3 Ind.
3					1 V.R.	2 F.R.		2 Ind. 1 Peas. 1 Other	2 Ind.	1 Peas.
2		3 V.R. 1 UDSR	4 V.R.		1 Gaul.			1 Ind.	2 Ind. 1 Peas.	1 Ind. 2 Oth.
1										30 Pouj. 6 Oth.
0	146 Com.	1 Com.								1 Peas.

supporters of all governments during the entire Legislature. Below Class 2 on Scale A and to the right of Class 1 on Scale B are the consistent opponents. In the remaining occupied cells are the intermediate deputies, those who supported one or more governments up to a point or who supported one or two governments consistently but not all three. Below are listed the deputies belonging to each type, grouped according to party affiliation:

Consistent Supporters	Intermediates	Consistent Opponents
93 Socialists	147 Communists	1 Peasant
7 UDSR	1 UDSR	30 Poujadists
19 Valois Radicals	9 Valois Radicals	6 Others
1 Morice Radical	8 Morice Radicals	—
1 Gaullist	12 Faure Radicals	37 Total (7%)
61 MRP	7 Gaullists	
1 Other	7 MRP	
—	74 Independents	
183 Total (37%)	6 Peasants	
	4 Others	
	—	
	275 Total (56%)	

The key to the Legislature is to be found in the intermediate category. Lacking a majority of consistent supporters governments were forced to choose between two mutually exclusive combinations determined by the inclinations of different kinds of intermediate deputies. A majority of the left could be obtained by collaborating with the deputies in the lower left hand corner of the table (Communists and Mendèsists). But the moment a Government sought to pursue a course of action which these left elements could not approve, it was forced to the right, where there were not enough reliable deputies to put together a lasting majority. All three governments fell as a result of the defection of deputies toward the upper right corner of the table, deputies in Scale A classes 6, 7 and 8 who had generally opposed the Mollet Government during its early months. All three classes were weighted heavily with Independents, the most prominent intermediate group other than the Communists. Quite clearly the balance of power which governments of the center-left faced during the period from late 1956 until the

Spring of 1958 was held by deputies whose coloration was well to the right of center.[29]

III. THE 1958–1962 LEGISLATURE

North African issues played an important role again in the 1958 Legislature, as the Algerian crisis continued to plague the French political system. However, several other issue areas shared equal time in the Assembly, as can be seen in the following list:[30]

Category	Symbol	Number of Votes
North Africa	N	10
Procedural questions	Pr	10
Agriculture	Ag	9
Budget	B	9
Church-state	Ch	8
Overseas possessions	O	5
Government (general)	G	4
Military	M	4
Social welfare	S	3
Constitutional revision	Co	1
Economic policy	Ec	1
Veterans	V	1

Procedural questions are, for the most part, votes taken on the new rules of procedure adopted by the Assembly at the outset of the Legislature. North African votes include, among others, four dealing with extremist activity in both Algeria and Metropolitan France and the measures taken by the Government to curb it.

Only six *groupes parlementaires* existed in the Legislature, partly as a result of the rules change which elevated the minimum number of deputies eligible to constitute a *groupe* from 14 to 30. In the following list the names used for purposes of this study ignore the fact that several of these groups are marriages of con-

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[29] The interpretation of the 1956 Legislature advanced here does not differ significantly from MacRae's intra-party scale analysis of the National Assembly in the Fourth Republic. See *Parliament, Parties and Society in France: 1946–1958*, *op. cit.*, pp. 157–178. *Inter*-party scale analysis does seem to bring out two features more clearly: (1) the sharp break in voting alignments occurring in late 1956; and (2) the unidimensional pattern extending through 2½ governments from late 1956 to April 1958. MacRae does note differences in scalar patterns for both the "Moderates" (Independents and Peasants) and the "Radicals" (Valois Radicals and UDSR) as between the early and late parts of the Mollet Government. He sees the cut-off point for the Radicals, however, as being in the Spring of 1957, rather than in late 1956: *ibid.*, pp. 171–173. Yet, in December, 1956, a substantial proportion of the Mendèsists voted against three confidence motions on the budget (#365, #366, and #367), although they were not yet joined by Mendès-France himself. (Indeed his three positive votes on these motions were non-scalar with respect to the rest of his voting pattern and made it impossible to give him a score.) This break-away behavior by a significant group of Radicals on motions of confidence certainly must have meant a basic re-positioning of deputies within the party by late 1956.

Beyond very general statements it is difficult to compare MacRae's results with those for this study for three reasons: (1) Scale analysis is more sensitive to slight variations in individual voting patterns within individual parties than within the Assembly at large, since individual inconsistencies are counterbalanced in the latter by the monolithic consistency of large parties like the Communists and the Socialists. (2) Since he could only employ roll call votes on which the party was divided internally, MacRae's sample of votes consulted for any given party was likely to be smaller than that used here for the Assembly as a whole and unlikely to be at all representative of it. (3) MacRae endeavored to reduce roll calls to nearly dichotomous items by interpreting abstentions as either positive or negative votes, or by creating two items out of one, interpreting the abstentions first as + votes and second as − votes. This certainly makes for a more rigorous pre-condition to scaling than is true of the procedure used in the present study, wherein abstentions were ignored in the original pairing and in the eventual *cr* calculation. However, I feared that an arbitrary assignment of abstentions to the + or − side would distort the pattern of majority and opposition voting for a string of items. Admittedly, however, in the procedure used here distortion occurs in the scoring, where it is also necessary to interpret abstentions as + or − votes. I consider this method (see footnote 22, *supra*) less arbitrary than MacRae's *for the purpose of capturing the relative positions of deputies vis-à-vis the Government*, which was not MacRae's central purpose. For MacRae's scaling procedures see *ibid.*, pp. 339–352.

[30] The 65 votes examined are from a total of 196 taken during the Legislature.

Scale A (1958)

Scrutin	Type	Date	Scrutin	Type	Date
151	Ag	Oct. 12, 1961	84	Ag	May 19, 1960
153	Ag	Oct. 18, 1961	27	Pr	June 3, 1959
196*	Co	Oct. 4, 1962	17	Pr	May 28, 1959
66	B	Dec. 17, 1959	188	Ec	June 21, 1962
112	M	Oct. 18, 1960	120	B	Nov. 13, 1960
191*	G	July 16, 1962	78	Ag	May 12, 1960
130*	M	Dec. 6, 1960	116	B	Oct. 27, 1960
177	B	Dec. 11, 1961	73	Ch	Dec. 23, 1959
122*	M	Nov. 22, 1960	7	Pr	Jan. 21, 1959
179	B	Dec. 12, 1961	72	Ch	Dec. 23, 1959
185	G	Apr. 21, 1962	32	Ch	July 1, 1959
113*	M	Oct. 24, 1960	33	Ch	July 1, 1959
36	Pr	July 21, 1959	14	S	May 14, 1959
80	Ag	May 18, 1960	70	Ch	Dec. 23, 1959
9	Pr	Apr. 28, 1959	34	Ch	July 2, 1959
76*	Pr	May 5, 1960	28	N	June 10, 1959
46	B	Oct. 29, 1959	1	G	Jan. 16, 1959
58*	G	Nov. 27, 1959	71	Ch	Dec. 23, 1959

venience of a number of parties and isolated individuals:

Official Designation	Name Employed in This Study
Groupe socialiste	Socialists
Union pour la Nouvelle République	UNR
Républicains populaires et Centre démocratique	MRP
Entente démocratique	Radicals
Unité de la République	Algerians
Indépendants et Paysans d'Action sociale	Independents

Several smaller party units remained outside these formations for all or part of the four year period, being unable to constitute *groupes parlementaires* for want of 30 members. Most notable of these were the Communists, whose ranks had been reduced to ten through the impact of the electoral law, which had replaced proportional representation with the second ballot plurality system. Since they are easily identified, the Communists will be treated hereafter as if they were an official group.

Scale analysis of the 65 items reveals the striking finding that there was a more complex multidimensional voting pattern in the First Legislature of the Fifth Republic than in the last Legislature of the Fourth Republic. Three distinct scales were pulled out, numbering 36, 11 and five items. Only the first two will be analyzed, since they contain votes on motions of censure while the third scale does not.[31] The 36-item scale (Scale A) is analyzed above in terms of the categories of votes represented:

Altogether, 55 percent of the total number of items appear on the scale. The percentage is higher for the first half of the Legislature: 58 percent of the votes taken during 1959 and 1960 appear on the scale (72 percent for 1959 alone) as opposed to 47 percent of the votes for 1961 and 1962. This distribution is not as strikingly skewed as that for the 1956 Legislature, however. More arresting is the fact that the higher numbered votes (i.e., those taken later in the Legislature) tend more than the lower numbered votes to fall at the negative end of the scale, indicating a tendency for support for the Government to fall off as the Legislature progressed. An examination of the dates of the seven motions of censure will reinforce this impression.

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[31] Of the five votes on the third scale, three deal with procedural questions (#5, #10 and #18) and two concern agriculture (#30 and #195). For speculation as to the meaning of this juxtaposition, see David M. Wood, "The Shifting Bases of Legislative Majorities in the French Fifth Republic: A Guttman Scale Analysis," paper delivered at the 1966 meeting of the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists, Chicago, April 30, 1966. The 13 non-scalar votes are widely distributed among substantive types. Three are budget votes (#63, #165 and #166), two deal with North Africa (#74 and #184), two with social welfare measures (#99 and #100), two with agriculture (#106 and #109), one with procedure (#3), one with overseas territories (#77), and one with veterans (#118). One of the North African votes (#184) was a censure motion. It differed in voting distribution from that of the main 1958 scale (see Table 4, *infra*) only in the inversion of position of some of the Algerian and Independent deputies toward the negative end of the scale.

Of the eight classifications having four or more of the original 64 votes, only two, North Africa and Overseas possessions, are underrepresented among the votes in the scale. Of the five remaining, three (Procedural questions, Agricultural and Budget) are fairly evenly distributed along the scale from the positive to the negative end, whereas two are weighted more heavily toward one end of the scale or the other. Military issues proved to be relatively troublesome for the Government, while Church-state questions accounted for six of the ten most positive votes.

The second scale identified (Scale B) reveals noteworthy differences in content from Scale A. As the following listing shows, all 11 of the votes are of the North Africa and Overseas possessions types:

SCALE B (1958)

Scrutin	Type	Date	Scrutin	Type	Date
121	N	Nov. 15, 1960	89	O	June 9, 1960
172	N	Nov. 30, 1961	162	N	Nov. 9, 1961
87	N	June 1, 1960	102	O	July 20, 1960
161	N	Nov. 8, 1961	104	O	July 20. 1960
190	N	July 5, 1962	103	O	July 20, 1960
187*	N	June 5, 1962			

Since the question of the independence of overseas possessions was involved in both kinds of votes, Scale B can be characterized as quite homogeneous in substantive content. However, the time element is also important in distinguishing this scale from Scale A. All of the Scale B votes occurred after 61 percent of the Scale A votes; and the median Scale B vote in time (#121) was taken later than 72 percent of the votes constituting Scale A. Thus the second dimension became an important factor only toward the end of the Legislature. Still, it did not erase the dominant dimension of the early months of the Legislature as had happened in the 1956 Legislature. The votes on Scale A (1958) are differentiable from those on Scale B more in substantive content than in time. The Scale A dimension continued to be the most prominent dimension in the second half of the Legislature, but it can not be said that unidimensionality prevailed at any time during the four-year period.

Table 4 exhibits the most prominent alignment of deputies in the Assembly during the 1958 Legislature. The table shows that, aside from the UNR, the Communists and the Socialists, the parliamentary groups were widely divided internally vis-à-vis the Government. Aside from a few renegades who actually departed from the party in the late stages of the Legislature (those in classes 5, 6 and 7), the UNR members solidly supported the Government. Communists, Socialists, and most of the Radicals were consistently in opposition. For most of the votes in the scale the Government enjoyed a comfortable majority, but important test votes beginning in May, 1960 showed that the support for the Government among the MRP, the Algerians and the Independents was not altogether reliable (see classes 3 through 6). Finally, in the censure vote on October 4, 1962, the Government lost the support of a key group dominated by the MRP and the Independents (Class 7). With this vote the Government's support was reduced to a minority of the Assembly, comprising the UNR itself and a handful of other deputies (see classes 9 and 10).

Table 5 presents the essential information for Scale B. On the Algerian policy of General de Gaulle, as it began to move perceptibly toward acquiescence in Algerian independence, the Government could count upon massive majorities consisting of the disciplined parties on the left and the bulk of the UNR and MRP deputies in the center of the spectrum. Opposition came from the Independents and Algerians, as well as from a few MRP and Radical

TABLE 4. SCALE A (1958)

Class	Group Composition	Cutting Point
9	169 UNR 5 MRP 3 Algerians 3 Independents 11 Others 191 Total	
		#151 (October 12, 1961), Agriculture price project: 173–270
8	15 UNR 3 Radicals 5 Independents 3 Others 26 Total	
		#196 (October 4, 1962), Motion of censure on constitutional revision: 280 *pour*
7	5 UNR 14 MRP 2 Radicals 2 Algerians 26 Independents 4 Others 53 Total	
		#191 (July 16, 1962), Motion of censure in budget debate relating to *force de frappe* and European policy: 206 *pour*
6	1 UNR 12 MRP 1 Radical 13 Independents 27 Total	
		#179 (December 12, 1961), Final vote on Financial Law, overriding Senate objection: 307–192
5	6 UNR 5 MRP 21 Algerians 15 Independents 5 Others 52 Total	
		#36 (July 21, 1959), Assembly rules of procedure: 294–126
4	1 Radical 3 Algerians 24 Independents 1 Other 29 Total	
		#76 (May 5, 1960), Motion of censure for President's refusal to convoke extraordinary session: 122 *pour*
3	1 MRP 1 Algerian 11 Independents 13 Total	
		#46 (October 29, 1959), Fiscal reform project: 380–95
2	5 MRP 3 Radicals 1 Algerian 5 Independents 1 Other 15 Total	
		#27 (June 3, 1959), Assembly rules of procedure: 427–91
1	4 MRP 6 Radicals 2 Independents 2 Others 14 Total	
		#32 (May 18, 1960), Amendment to Social Promotion project specifying application to private institutions: 441–73
0	10 Communists 44 Socialists 11 Radicals 65 Total	

TABLE 5. SCALE B (1958)

Class	Group Composition	Cutting Point
6	10 Communists 42 Socialists 155 UNR 36 MRP 6 Radicals 4 Others 253 Total	
		#121 (November 15, 1960), Request for suspension of detention of Pierre Lagaillarde: 201–219
5	8 UNR 3 MRP 1 Radical 1 Algerian 13 Total	
		#172 (November 30, 1961), Amendment to budget bill making local force in Algeria integral part of French armed forces: 218–280
4	2 UNR 7 MRP 15 Radicals 24 Independents 1 Other 49 Total	
		#87 (June 1, 1960), Request for suspension of Lagaillarde detention: 165–268
3	9 UNR 2 MRP 9 Radicals 7 Independents 27 Total	
		#161 (November 8, 1961), Credits for Algeria: 332–138
2	1 UNR 4 MRP 1 Radical 1 Algerian 15 Independents 3 Others 25 Total	
		#89 (June 9, 1960), Project approving Independence Agreements with Mali Republic: 355–68
1	3 UNR 4 Radicals 8 Algerians 12 Independents 6 Others 33 Total	
		#102 (July 20, 1960), Project approving agreements with Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville) and Chad: 384–62
0	1 UNR 13 Algerians 35 Independents 11 Others 60 Total	

deputies and UNR defectors (the deputies identified as UNR in classes 0 through 3, plus some of those labelled "Others"). Hence, while retaining its strong base of support in the center of the spectrum, the Government compensated for its loss of right-of-center support on Algerian questions by attracting the solid support of the Communists and Socialists. The latter two groups, however, did not extend their support beyond the questions covered by votes on Scale B.

The comparison of scales A and B (1958) in

TABLE 6. COMPARISON OF SCALES A AND B (1958)

	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
9	139 UNR 4 MRP 7 Others	5 UNR 1 Other	2 UNR 1 MRP 1 Ind.	6 UNR 1 Ind. 1 Other	1 Alg.		
8	8 UNR 2 Rad.	3 UNR	2 Ind.	2 UNR 2 Rad. 1 Ind.			
7	11 MRP 1 Other	1 Rad.	2 MRP 12 Ind.	1 Rad. 2 Ind.	3 Ind.	4 Ind.	2 Ind. 1 Other
6	7 MRP	1 MRP	2 MRP 1 Rad. 3 Ind.		1 UNR 4 Ind.		2 Ind.
5	1 MRP		1 MRP 2 Ind. 1 Other	2 MRP	3 Ind. 1 Other	1 UNR 5 Alg. 1 Ind. 1 Other	12 Alg. 7 Ind. 5 Others
4			1 Rad.		4 Ind.	1 Alg. 2 Ind.	11 Ind. 2 Others
3	1 MRP					3 Ind.	1 Alg. 5 Ind.
2	3 MRP			1 Rad. 1 Ind.	1 MRP	1 Rad. 1 Alg. 2 Ind. 2 Others	4 Ind.
1	2 MRP 1 Rad.		1 Rad.	2 Rad.	2 MRP		1 Ind. 2 Others
0	10 PC 42 Soc. 1 Rad.		7 Rad.				

Table 6 shows that there is very little correlation between them, considerably less than between the two 1956 scales. Deputies are scattered more widely among the cells, leaving only 31 percent of them unoccupied, as against 59 percent for the 1956 scales. Consistent supporters of the Government are found above Class 7 on Scale A, having refused to vote the fatal motion of censure of October 4, 1962, and to the left of Class 1 on Scale B. All but ten of the deputies to the left of Scale B Class 1 refused to vote for the motion of censure of June 5, 1962, condemning the Government's Algerian policy, the only censure motion on the scale. None of these ten is found above Class 7 on Scale A. Consistent opponents of the Government are found below Class 3 on Scale A and to the right of Class 2 on Scale B. The cutting point between Scale A classes 2 and 3 (#46) is the closest on the scale to the least troublesome censure motion faced by the Government (#58 of November 27, 1959). The remaining deputies on the chart are the intermediates. The following listing shows the distribution of the three types:

Consistent Supporters	Intermediates	Consistent Opponents
165 UNR	10 Communists	1 Radical
5 MRP	42 Socialists	1 Algerian
4 Radicals	2 UNR	7 Independents
1 Algerian	36 MRP	4 Others
5 Independents	17 Radicals	—
9 Others	19 Algerians	13 Total (3%)
—	71 Independents	
189 Total (46%)	12 Others	
	—	
	209 Total (51%)	

Here it can be seen that the Government enjoyed the support of a near majority of the Assembly in the face of all of the major issues which generated censure motions. Needing only a small percentage of votes to round out the majority, the Government had potentially available to it a large pool of intermediate deputies upon whom to draw for support on particular votes. The only danger to the Government was the uniting of the intermediates against it, and, given the heterogeneous nature of the intermediate pool, this could happen only as a result of the accumulation of a variety of specific complaints. In fact this did occur during the course of the period 1960 to 1962. First procedural disagreements, then military policy, then Algeria, then Europe, and finally constitutional revision peeled away elements of the Government's majority.[32] Had General de Gaulle not decided to change the mode of Presidential election, or had he followed a more orthodox means of revising the Constitution, the Government's life might have been prolonged through the continued support of the Class 7 deputies on Scale A. But this would have meant a different strategy for the next legislative elections, and very likely a less successful one from the Gaullist standpoint.[33]

IV. THE 1962 LEGISLATURE

The legislative elections of November 1962 produced a Legislature with a decidedly Gaullist coloration.[34] The UNR could count on a stable majority resting upon its own near-majority numbers and about 30 *Républicains Indépendants* (ex-Independent supporters of Finance Minister Valery Giscard d'Estaing). Apart from these defectors to the Gaullist camp, the Independent group was eclipsed by Gaullist opponents, and the MRP was seriously hurt as well, although it was still able to field a parliamentary group with the help of a few former Independents and members of the *Entente Démocratique* who were unwilling or unable to join the Radicals in their new formation, the *Rassemblement Démocratique*. On the left, the Radicals, Socialists and Communists all increased their strength in the elections. The *groupes parlementaires* in the 1962 Legislature were as follows:

Group	Main Element
Groupe communiste	Communists
Groupe socialiste	Socialists
Union pour la Nouvelle République	UNR
Rassemblement démocratique	Radicals
Centre démocratique	MRP
Républicains indépendants	Independents (Giscardiens)

The 1962 Legislature comes the closest of the three examined to true unidimensionality. Of the 47 votes studied for the period December, 1962 to November, 1965, 45 fit a single scale![35] Thus a single dominant alignment existed for the entire first three years of the Legislature.[36] The original sample of 47 items necessitates a restatement of the categories used to identify the kinds of issues involved:

Category	Symbol	Number of Votes
Budget	B	8
Military	M	7
Political	Po	5
Foreign policy	F	4
Administrative	Ad	3
Economic policy	Ec	3
Housing	H	3
Justice	J	3
North Africa	N	3
Agriculture	Ag	2
Education	Ed	2
Government (general)	G	2
Labor	L	2

The category labelled "Political" includes items dealing with the reorganization of

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[32] Careful analyses of voting trends on censure motions during the 1958 Legislature appear in Jean-Luc Parodi, *Les rapports entre le Législatif et l'Exécutif sous la Ve République* (Paris: Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1962); and Macridis and Brown, *Supplement to "The De Gaulle Republic"* (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, Inc., 1963), pp. 58–61.

[33] See Andrews and Hoffmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 88–98.

[34] A good capsule description of the re-alignment following the 1962 elections is to be found in *L'Année politique*, 1962, pp. 140–141.

[35] There was a total of 254 votes taken during the four-year period studied. The two non-scalar votes are #75 (housing) and #234 (North Africa). Neither was a motion of censure.

[36] As an additional indicator of the high degree of unidimensionality, the 1962 scale has the highest overall coefficient of reproducibility of the five scales examined here:

Scale	*cr*
1956 (A)	.976
1956 (B)	.988
1958 (A)	.970
1958 (B)	.977
1962	.993

municipal elections and the policy respecting political broadcasts on the state-owned radio and television facilities. The three Justice votes deal with the project establishing a State Security Court to replace the extraordinary military tribunal created during the Algerian crisis. Administrative votes involve the reorganization of the Paris region and the budget of the Ministry of the Interior.

The following list sets forth all of the 45 items included in the above-mentioned scale, beginning with the item with the smallest positive percentage:

1962 Scale

Scrutin	Type	Date	Scrutin	Type	Date
50	H	Oct. 9, 1963	24	J	Feb. 13, 1963
51	H	Oct. 9, 1963	33	B	May 29, 1963
44	H	July 19, 1963	2	Ag	Dec. 18, 1962
226	N	Oct. 25, 1965	28	B	May 8, 1963
104	Po	May 28, 1964	68	M	Nov. 7, 1963
43	L	July 17, 1963	111	Ad	June 11, 1964
57	N	Oct. 28, 1963	58	F	Oct. 29, 1963
118	Po	June 18, 1964	241	B	Oct. 28, 1965
94	Po	May 21, 1964	159	B	Nov. 9, 1964
11	J	Jan. 4, 1963	115	Ad	June 12, 1964
193	M	May 6, 1965	65	Ed	Nov. 6, 1963
146*	G	Oct. 27, 1964	41	L	July 17, 1963
153	Ag	Nov. 5, 1964	235	Ed	Oct. 19, 1965
87	Po	May 20, 1964	1	G	Dec. 13, 1962
238	F	Oct. 20, 1965	70	B	Nov. 9, 1963
239	Ad	Oct. 25, 1965	237	M	Oct. 21, 1965
15	J	Jan. 11, 1963	78	B	Dec. 6, 1963
203	M	May 26, 1965	23	B	Jan. 25, 1963
161	M	Dec. 2, 1964	197	Ec	May 13, 1965
242	Ec	Nov. 5, 1965	160	Ec	Nov. 26, 1964
35	F	June 13, 1963	36	F	June 13, 1963
106	Po	May 28, 1964	3	B	Dec. 18, 1962
162	M	Dec. 2, 1964			

The ordering of votes on the scale shows no evident trend toward either greater or less support for the Government during the course of the three year period. Note that support for the Government's budget was relatively high throughout the period, while housing policy and the Government's position on political matters and North African affairs received relatively weak support.

Table 7 gives the group distribution for the scale. In comparison with the scales for the two preceding legislatures, groups on this scale are quite compact and, except at its lower end, tend not to overlap to any great degree. The distribution of groups is quite similar to that for Scale A (1958) if account is taken of the realignment that took place in the center of the spectrum in the wake of the 1962 election. The arrangement for the 1962 Legislature differs from the bi-dimensional pattern of the 1958 Legislature in the absence of the deputies on the right-hand side of Scale B (1958), who had opposed the Government's Algerian policy. This element was virtually unrepresented in the new Legislature. Of the 74 Metropolitan deputies in classes 0 and 1 of Scale B (1958), only nine survived the 1962 legislative elections.

Table 7 can be used to determine the distribution of deputy types. The only censure motion voted on during the period (#146) will serve as the dividing line between consistent supporters and the rest of the Assembly. The closest cutting point is that separating classes 6 and 7. Thus the consistent supporters are those above Class 6 on the scale. The consistent opponents can be demarcated by the initial vote of approval received by the

TABLE 7. 1962 SCALE

Class	Group Composition	Cutting Point
11	146 UNR 3 RI (Républicains Indépendants) 1 Other 150 Total	
		#50 (October 9, 1963), Laurin amendment to Tinguy amendment to Housing Construction bill: 148–310
10	55 UNR	
		#51 (October 9, 1963), Tinguy amendment to Housing Construction bill: 250–210
9	11 UNR	
		#44 (July 19, 1963), Amendment to Financial project to suppress credits for state-supported building societies: 228–224
8	17 UNR 1 Other 18 Total	
		#226 (October 25, 1965), Request for special commission to study indemnification of repatriated Frenchmen: 237–225
7	28 RI 2 Others 30 Total	
		#118 (June 18, 1964), Third reading of Municipal Councillors' bill: 257–206
6	13 CD (Centre Démocratique) 3 RI 3 Others 19 Total	
		#242 (November 5, 1965), Project approving Fifth Plan: 283–184
5	26 CD 1 Other 27 Total	

Pompidou Government at the outset of the Legislature (#1).[37] This falls closest to the cutting point between classes 2 and 3 on the scale. Thus the consistent opponents are those below Class 3. Intermediates are those between classes 3 and 6, inclusive. Below are listed the compositions of the three types for the 1962 Legislature:

Consistent Supporters	Intermediates	Consistent Opponents
229 UNR 31 RI 4 Others 264 Total (56%)	13 RD 52 CD 3 RI 4 Others 72 Total (15%)	41 Communists 67 Socialists 25 RD 2 CD 3 Others 138 Total (29%)

The most striking feature of this distribution, is, of course, the comfortable majority of consistent supporters enjoyed by the Government. Although the intermediate pool was markedly reduced relative to the previous legislatures, the Government had no need of the less reliable type of support. Further comparison of this distribution with those for the other legislatures is undertaken in the concluding section.

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[37] There is no requirement for an investiture vote in the 1958 Constitution. Nevertheless, the vote on the Premier's policy statement can be regarded as an expression of the degree of support existing at the outset of the Legislature for the particular Government which Pompidou headed.

TABLE 7 (*continued*)

Class	Group Composition	Cutting Point
4	13 CD	#68 (November 7, 1963), Military Expenses article of Financial project: 297–160
3	13 RD (Rassemblement Démocratique)	#41 (July 17, 1963), Previous question opposed to project regarding strikes in public services: 146–315
2	12 RD 2 CD 1 Other — 15 Total	#78 (December 6, 1963), Text of Financial law proposed by mixed commission: 316–139
1	2 Communists 3 Socialists 6 RD 2 Others — 13 Total	#160 (November 26, 1964), Project regarding Fifth Plan: 353–120
0	39 Communists 64 Socialists 7 RD — 110 Total	#3 (December 18, 1962), First part of Financial law: 321–113

V. CONCLUSION

The principal concern of this article has been to ascertain empirically whether or not the apparent trend toward a simplified majority-opposition confrontation in French politics has been evident over the last decade at the level of legislative behavior. Two criteria have been employed to measure trends in voting behavior in the National Assembly: (1) the degree of unidimensionality in voting patterns, and (2) the distribution of role types among deputies according to the three-fold typology outlined in the opening section. Concerning the first criterion, analysis of voting patterns for the three legislatures studied leads to a rather ambiguous answer. Using the strict standards of unidimensionality employed in Guttman scaling, the most unidimensional pattern has been found for the most recent of the three legislatures studied. However, it cannot be said that a consistent trend in the direction of unidimensionality has been found. Whereas more than one dimension was discovered in the voting patterns of both the first and second legislatures in chronological order, it is possible to divide the time-span of the earliest Legislature (1956) into two sub-periods, in each of which there was substantial unidimensionality. From late 1956 until the Spring of 1958 the degree of unidimensionality was very nearly as great as that found for the first three years of the most recent Legislature (1962). In the intervening Legislature (1958) a mildly multidimensional pattern was found. Thus, at first glance, there seems to have been no clear-cut trend.

If, on the other hand, we were to adopt a less rigorous conception of dimensionality, a somewhat different answer might emerge. In both the 1956 and the 1958 legislatures governments found themselves facing less an opposition than two alternative sets of partners, each seeking to influence policy (especially regarding North Africa) in a distinct direction and to prevent the alternative element from sharing in power. While left-right terms have been used sparingly in this article, there can be no question that, in the traditional parlance of French politics, the governments of these two legislatures were governments of the center; the two dominant dimensions of each legislature involved voting cooperation of the center supporters of the governments with the right against the left on one dimension and with the left against the right on the other. The central base of support shifted noticeably to the right as a result of the 1958 elections, which decimated the ranks of the left parties and swelled the ranks of the MRP, the Independents and especially the Gaullists.

By the 1962 Legislature, however, the far right, which had included in its ranks the only consistent opponents in the two preceding legislatures as well as the fringe supporters of the center-right voting alignments, had virtually dropped out of the picture. Suddenly the Gaullists found themselves on the right-hand side of the party spectrum in the Assembly.[38] The single dimension which emerged in that Legislature reflected the fact that the Gaullists had no real alternative set of voting partners and opponents. The roles of the various parties had become frozen. To a large degree, of course, the new situation reflected the fact that the Algerian question had virtually disappeared from French politics. Once again a single prevailing structure of roles and expectations could develop in the Assembly, there being no transcendent issue which could disrupt the existing set of commitments. When the voting patterns are viewed in this more general, less technical, sense it becomes clear that, while there was not a consistent trend toward unidimensionality between 1956 and 1965, the kind of unidimensionality that prevailed in the period 1962–65 was considerably more conducive to a simplified majority-opposition confrontation than that prevailing between 1956 and 1962.

The contrast between the 1962 Legislature and its two immediate predecessors becomes all the more apparent when the percentage distributions of deputy types in the three legislatures are compared:

Deputy types	Legislature		
	1956	1958	1962
Consistent supporters	37%	46%	56%
Intermediates	56	51	15
Consistent opponents	7	3	29
	100%	100%	100%

Only in 1962 do we see the beginnings of a real opposition in the National Assembly. Although it is still overpowered by the cohesive majority, it is possible to point to a single area of the political spectrum and identify it as the Opposition, even though it was still in the 1962–65 period a delicate plant, divided between three parliamentary groups and lacking a single leader.[39] Prior to 1962 we see governments threading a dangerous course between two actively hostile part-time oppositions. However, the Gaullist influx in 1958 decisively altered the stalemate situation that had prevailed between 1956 and 1958. The Government now had enough reliable support that it could afford to choose among potential voting partners from the intermediate ranks. This made it possible for a solution to the Algerian problem to be achieved without a complete break-down of the parliamentary mechanism.

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[38] The Gaullists themselves object to the "rightist" label, and their voting behavior in the 1956 and 1958 legislatures certainly strengthens their claim to "centrist" status. Unfortunately for their claim, if not for their majority status, they emerged from the 1962 elections with nothing but thin air to their right. The *Républicains Indépendants* were the least right-of-center of the old Independents, and the *Centre Démocratique* was predominantly composed of MRP, or center, deputies. All three groups (UNR, RI and CD) could be said to occupy roughly the same ideological space: from dead center to moderate right. To be sure, de Gaulle's foreign policy puts the Gaullists to the left of center on the spectrum, but their outlook on the Constitution, with emphasis upon a strong executive, is traditionally a right-wing position in France. Thus, the extremes of their "ideological profile" go beyond those of the other two parties; but, if it were possible to devise a multi-dimensional measure of ideological position, it is likely that the UNR would be close to the other two parties, at least in a measure of central tendency. The impressions of the author are drawn from interviews in Paris with candidates of the "Fifth Republic" alliance and the *Centre Démocratique* during the campaign for the March, 1967 legislative elections, as well as from examination of campaign statements of the party leaders appearing in *Le Monde* during the campaign. A useful pre-election compilation of party positions on the primary issues of the moment is to be found in *Le Dossier politique de l'Electeur français* (Paris: Editions Planète, 1967).

[39] It is possible to hazard an assessment of the distribution of deputy types at the outset of the 1967 Legislature. An estimate can be made from the analysis of votes for the first censure motion of the Legislature appearing in *Le Monde*, May 23, 1967, p. 9. By assuming (1) that the members of the group *Progrès et Démocratie* (primarily the *Centre Démocrate*) who voted for the motion are intermediates, (2) that members of the two left groups, Communists and *Fédération des Gauches* are consistent opponents, (3) that deputies who did not vote for the motion are consistent supporters; and using their earlier scale scores to

The Algerian War thus can be seen as a factor of transcendent importance to an understanding of French politics during the period under consideration. The nature of its impact was different at different times, however. In 1956 it made for inflexibility and stalemate. In 1958 it generated events which were to result in a much more flexible and mobile system. And in 1962 its conclusion resulted in a considerable simplification of the system. To be sure, other factors contributed to these results: the personality of General de Gaulle, the institutional changes of the Fifth Republic, as well as more problematical long-term developments, such as the decline of localism in French politics in the face of the increasing importance of national leadership under the influence of the mass media, and the reputed decline of ideology in Western Europe, especially on the left side of the political spectrum. But the Algerian War was the catalyst which brought the more immediate factors to life and which conditioned the expressions which the longer-term trends would take. Whether, on balance, it hastened or retarded the appearance of a more simplified majority-opposition confrontation cannot be ascertained from the data reviewed here. The difficulty with longitudinal analysis of French politics is that it is virtually impossible to find a "normal" period sometime in the recent past with which to compare more recent developments.

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classify the isolated deputies who voted for the motion, one arrives at the following distribution:

Supporters	Intermediates	Opponents
200 UNR, etc.	38 CD, etc.	73 Communists
3 CD, etc.	1 Other	121 FGDS, etc.
42 RI	—	2 Others
5 Others	39 Total (8%)	—
—		196 Total (40%)
250 Total (52%)		

(One isolated deputy voting for the motion, who was not a member of the 1962 Legislature, is not included in this break-down.) Here we see the further advance of the opposition and the further decline of the intermediates, with the growth trend of the majority being halted and somewhat reversed. Despite the last development, however, it is striking to note the 7 percent increase in the combined strength of the majority and opposition at the expense of the intermediates.

Too much stock should not be placed in these figures as predictive of what the character of the new Legislature will be. The characterization of the Communists as consistent opponents may not withstand the test of events if the Assembly faces any foreign policy issues. As early as April, 1966 a censure motion advanced by the Socialists attacking de Gaulle's NATO policy failed to get the support of the Communists, thus joining the two ends of the 1962 scale against the middle: see *L'Année politique*, 1966, pp. 34–37. This should be sufficient warning, incidentally, that the "1962 scale" characterizes *only* the first three years of the 1962 Legislature and not necessarily the entire four, the year 1966 not having been examined.

COMMUNISM AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT*

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I. INTRODUCTION

One of the major efforts of students of comparative politics in recent years has been directed at establishing, more or less systematically, relationships between economic development and political change. Much of the literature in this area, perhaps because of its stated or unstated value and policy orientation, has been concerned with the conditions and the prospects for democracy. In the present article, we attempt to correlate economic development with another phenomenon of political change, that of Communism and, more specifically, the strength of Communist parties.

We begin with the hypothesis that the relationship between economic development and Communist party strength is curvilinear.[1] In underdeveloped countries—and these included all Communist-ruled countries at the time the Communist party came to power except East Germany and the Czech sections of Czechoslovakia—Communist parties may be regarded as merely one variety of the modernizing movements that evolved in these countries in response to the impact of Western industrialism.[2] Where no or virtually no modernizing movements have as yet developed, because there has been relatively little impact of Western industrialism and little economic development, there should, then, be no or practically no Communist parties. As economic development proceeds, modernizing movements, and hence also Communist parties, are composed largely of intellectuals and are therefore small. With the further progress of economic development and consequent social mobilization,[3] however, these movements may grow, sometimes to considerable size, as they attract support not only from more intellectuals, but also from incipient and growing labor movements, from urban middle strata, and, more rarely, from peasants.

In the now industrially more advanced countries, where economic development came from within rather than without, Communist parties historically grew out of anarcho-syndicalist or socialist movements representing some intellectuals and large numbers of workers more or less alienated from and hostile to their societies and governments. Where, in these countries, economic development is relatively backward (though more advanced than in any of the underdeveloped countries just mentioned) and workers find themselves in a minority in a largely anti-labor society, Communist parties can be expected to be strong. It is at this level of economic development that they reach their greatest strength, especially since they represent not only sizeable labor movements and intellectuals in sympathy with them, but also draw support from small peasants and the middle strata of shopkeepers and artisans, still numerous, but feeling threatened by industrialization. As economic development proceeds, however, these latter groups are absorbed by the advanced industrial economy, either to disappear or be con-

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[1] The interesting research note by Robert M. Marsh and William L. Parish, "Modernization and Communism: A Re-Test of Lipset's Hypotheses," *American Sociological Review*, 30 (December, 1965), 934–942, establishes that Communist party strength is not inversely related to economic development, as had been suggested by Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1960). Whereas Marsh and Parish attempt a critical evaluation of existing theoretical propositions, we are attempting to utilize evidence for the purpose of hypothesis testing.

[2] This interpretation of Communism rests on the analysis of one of the present authors, John H. Kautsky, "An Essay in the Politics of Development," in Kautsky (ed.), *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962).

[3] The concept of social mobilization is developed by Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," this REVIEW, 55 (September, 1961), 493–514.



Predicted Relationship between Level of Economic Development and Communist Party Strength

FIG. 1

verted into farmers or small businessmen, and workers become integrated into the society and are no longer alienated. With high economic development, then, Communist party strength may be expected to be very low.

In the interpretation of our findings we shall draw some further distinctions between types of societies at various levels of economic development and between Communist parties aggregating different interests in such societies, but the above suffices as a statement of our hypothesis.

II. THE EVIDENCE

Figure 1 presents graphically the relationship we predict between Communist party strength and level of economic development. We hypothesize that Communist party strength is lowest at the lowest stage of economic development, rises gradually with economic development, crests at a fairly high level of such development, and declines sharply with the highest level.

We have three potential measures of Communist party strength, our dependent variable: estimated membership of the Communist party, membership of the Communist party as a percentage of the working-age population, and per cent of total vote cast for the Communist party in national elections. There are difficulties with each of these, which finally limited our selection principally to one—estimated membership of the Communist party (see Appendix A).[4] To be sure, that measure does not show Communist membership as a percentage of the total population of the country, but the significance of that proportion is dubious, especially in traditional societies where modernization is just beginning and where the politically active strata of the society are small. We should really know what proportion of these active strata the Communist party membership constitutes, but no such data are available.

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[4] Data on estimated membership of Communist parties and on Communist party percentage of total votes cast in national elections appear in U. S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, *World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations* (January 1965). See pp. 1–5 of this report for a discussion of the reliability of the data. It goes without saying that Communist party membership figures are likely, for most parties, to be neither precise nor reliable. The State Department report itself states (p. 4): "The reader is reminded . . . that although the best usable sources have been consulted, communist membership figures are very difficult to obtain and are not subject to verification." Indeed, in the case of illegal Communist parties and especially of "fronts," "crypto-Communist" and divided parties, it may even be difficult to define "the" Communist party. We are, nevertheless using the State Department's 1965 estimates as the best membership figures available and feel that, for our purposes, they are adequate. Examination of the 1966 report, which became available only after our analysis was completed, indicates relatively little change in State De-

Per cent of the vote given to the Communist party in national elections might be superior to the other measures in some respects, but here also data limitations make use of this measure impractical. Above all, there are no national elections or only one-party elections in many countries, or Communist parties do not participate in elections, or published election results are unreliable or not subject to comparison. Membership of the Communist party as a percentage of the total working-age population (see Appendix A) removes some of the possible limitations found in the Communist party membership indicator. It is used only as a check on the latter measure to allow the amount of congruence between the two indicators to be computed. All that we are willing and able to assert is that our measures of Communist party membership provide at least strong partial indicators of Communist party strength.

On economic development, our independent variable, we took data and measures from Banks and Textor, *A Cross-Polity Survey*.[5] Six commonly used indices of economic development were selected from the Banks and Textor code (see Appendix B):

1) level of urbanization
2) agricultural population as a percentage of the total population
3) gross national product
4) per capita gross national product
5) status of economic development
6) international financial status

Three screening procedures eliminated all but our sample of 91 countries (see Appendix A for the country listing). First, all countries were eliminated for which we had no estimates of Communist party membership. Secondly, since Communist strength is obviously affected by different factors in Communist-ruled countries than in non-Communist ones and is hence not comparable, we omitted all Communist-ruled countries from our sample. Thirdly, only countries on which *A Cross-Polity Survey* contains data were selected.

To test the hypothesized relationship between Communist party strength and level of economic development, contingency coefficients,[6] frequency distributions and percentages were computed comparing our measures of Communist party strength—party membership and party membership as a percentage of the working-age population—to the six measures of economic development presented above. If our hypothesis is correct, the countries should be spread along the predicted path, as in Figure 1 above, when the dependent variable, Communist party membership, is compared to the measures of economic development.

First, to view the reliability between the two measures of Communist party strength, the mean and range for the contingency coefficients relating the two Communist party strength indicators and the six economic development measures are presented. The mean contingency coefficient between Communist party membership and the economic development measures is .59, whereas it reaches .55 when Communist party membership as a percentage of the working-age population and the economic development measures are related. The range of the contingency coefficients between Communist party membership and the economic development measures is from .47 to .70, and .53 to .67 between the economic development measures and Communist party membership as a percentage of the working-age population.

Two representative measures of economic development, per capita gross national product (contingency coefficient .60) and agricultural population as per cent of total population (c.c. .51), were selected to present the results of the analysis. To put the data in convenient form, an index was constructed for the purpose of evaluating the shape of the plotted relationship between economic development measures and Communist party membership. Table 1 is an example of a raw table out of which the index was constructed.

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partment estimates of world Communist party membership. Membership figures for the Communist Party of the United States, which are not given by the State Department, were obtained from *The New York Times*, June 22, 1966, Section 3, p. 1.

[5] Arthus S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, *A Cross-Polity Survey* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1963).

[6] The contingency coefficient is appropriate for tests of association for nominal and ordinal categories and non-linear relationships.

TABLE 1

Communist Party Membership	High	9	1		1	
		8	1	1	1	
		7				
		6				
		5		2		1
		4		2	2	1
		3	1	2	2	2
		2	1	2	2	
	Low	1	40	17	6	3
			over 66%	34–66%	16–33%	under 16%
			Agricultural Population as Per Cent of Population			
Index Mean			1.41	2.04	2.93	2.57

The index for Communist party membership is simply a 9-point scale which corresponds to the coded categories for Communist party membership shown in Appendix B. The frequencies in each cell were multiplied by the rank in the scale, and the mean for each total category was computed by dividing the result of the multiplication by the column frequency.

Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate the closeness with which the relationship of our economic development measures to Communist party membership agrees with our hypothesized relationship presented in Figure 1.

III. INTERPRETATION

Our evidence shows, then, that a definite curvilinear relationship exists between degree of economic development and Communist party strength. A correlation, however, is not an explanation; rather, it requires one. Since our initial hypothesis has been corroborated, we may now present a somewhat more refined version of it as our explanation, or at least interpretation, of the relationship we have established.

Even though all Communist parties profess to adhere to the same well-codified ideology, to accept the same organizational model and to pursue the same ultimate goal, and all have, until a few years ago, looked for inspiration, guidance, and support to the Soviet government, we suggest that Communist parties in different types of societies aggregate different interests.[7] We shall now briefly describe five roughly distinguishable types of societies and in each identify the major interests, if any, aggregated by the Communist party.

As stated earlier, we regard Communist parties in underdeveloped countries as modernizing movements. Both their elites and their mass following, if any, are drawn from the same social strata as those of non-Communist modernizing or so-called nationalist movements,[8] and their goals are similar and may be summed up in the interrelated demands for political and economic independence from the

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[7] Our typology of Communist parties is not dissimilar from that developed by Almond, as expanded by Burks. Gabriel A. Almond, *The Appeals of Communism* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1954), distinguished between the sectarian or deviational parties of the advanced Western industrial countries and the mass proletarian parties of France and Italy. R. V. Burks, *The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), adds a third category of national and anti-Western Communist parties to be found in underdeveloped countries, including those of Eastern Europe.

[8] Cf. Robert C. North, *Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952).

Communist Party Membership and Agricultural Population
as Percent of Population



FIG. 2

West, rapid industrialization, and land reform. Indeed, in the past two decades, many policies of the two movements have become more and more alike, the formerly sharp distinctions between Communist and non-Communist modernizers with respect to the symbols they have employed have become more and more blurred, and in the last few years even the distinct organizational character of Communist parties has been breaking down.[9]

The anti-colonial and anti-traditional modernizing movements with their characteristic love-hate attitude toward the West (which Communism shared with the others from its beginnings in Russia) are clearly a response to the impact of Western industrialism on traditional societies. The first type of society we must distinguish, then, is one in which this impact has so far been so slight as to elicit little or no response in the form of modernizing movements. Since the interests the Communist parties aggregate in underdeveloped countries are here virtually or entirely nonexistent, it is not surprising that Communist party strength in countries at the lowest level of economic development is, as we found it to be, near or at zero. Among countries to be included in our Societal Type I are Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Ethiopia, Liberia and some of the most backward former French colonies in West and Equatorial Africa.

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[9] For evidence, see John H. Kautsky, "Soviet Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries," in Kautsky, *Communism and the Politics of Development: Persistent Myths and Changing Behavior* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968), and works cited there.



FIG. 3

In societies in the early stages of economic development (Type II), modernizing movements are composed mainly of intellectuals, that is, of those relatively few natives who, usually in the course of acquiring an advanced education by Western standards, whether at home or abroad, have absorbed the Western-industrial values of the desirability of material progress and abundance, of growing social equality and political participation. In their industrially backward environments, they become anti-colonial revolutionaries favoring industrialization, and where applicable, land reform. Among these intellectuals may be those who think of themselves as Communists, whether they are organized in parties or not, and whatever relation of affiliation or rivalry to other modernizing movements they may have. Since modernizing movements are small in this type of society and Communists account generally for only a fraction of them, Communist parties, if they are organized at all, are very small at this level of economic development. Among countries included in Societal Type II are many in Africa and the Middle East not included in Type I as well as some of the least developed countries of Central and South America.

If economic development proceeds (in Societal Type III), at first under the influence of economic colonialism and then perhaps under regimes of revolutionary intellectuals, labor movements of plantation workers and miners, transportation and factory workers may emerge. They are led by intellectuals and furnish a more or less substantial mass base for their modernizing movements—Communist or non-Communist or both. Thus, in India, some trade unions are close to the Congress, others to the Communists; in Indonesia most unions were, until the coup of 1965, Communist-led; in Tunisia they are non-Communist "nationalist"; in Cuba, in pre-Castro days, some were Communist-controlled; in Argentina most have been Peronist.

Advancing economic development may also threaten the old urban middle class of artisans and shopkeepers who may then become politicized and provide some strength for the anti-colonial movement. And in some instances, where intellectuals are driven out of the cities, they may turn to the peasants, whose traditional village communities may be disintegrating under the impact of economic development, and may organize them to support the modernizing movement, again whether it be Communist or non-Communist. Thus, in China, peasant guerrilla warfare was Communist, in Algeria non-Communist "nationalist," in Vietnam it may be both.

Communist party strength varies widely in countries in Societal Type III. In some, where what mass movements have been developed have come under the leadership of non-Communist intellectuals, the Communist party may be non-existent, as in Ghana and Guinea, or small, as in Egypt (where it dissolved itself in 1965) and in Turkey. In others, however, where the Communist party has organized mass support, especially among workers and peasants, as in India and, above all, until 1965, in Indonesia, it can become a very sizable party. Among underdeveloped countries (other than Communist-ruled ones) it is in those in Societal Type III, i.e., those with the relatively highest economic development, that Communist parties attain their greatest membership strength.

The modernizing movements, Communist or non-Communist, may or may not actually advance their society to the status of industrial ones. If they do, they in effect destroy themselves and are replaced in power either by a combination of other groups, e.g., labor and business groups, or by a technical-managerial intelligentsia. Such an intelligentsia may, then, constitute another type of Communist party that appears where an underdeveloped Communist-ruled country becomes rapidly industrialized. This has happened in Russia beginning under Stalin and is probably happening in Eastern Europe and possibly in China now. Since we are excluding Communist-ruled countries from our comparative survey, we mention this type of society here only parenthetically. There is no need to assume, however, that the replacement of revolutionary intellectuals by managerial-technical intellectuals cannot also take place in non-Communist underdeveloped countries, as may be the case in Mexico. One can assume that the Communist party in such countries should be weak, since a non-Communist one will perform its functions as the organization representing the technical-managerial intelligentsia.

Our first three societal types are found in countries to which economic development has come from without, under the impact of Western industrialism. They represent roughly three levels of economic development and, on the whole, one can expect that the greater the Western impact and economic development the more support there is for the anti-colonial modernizing movement and the better the chance for a big Communist party.

Countries where economic development took place indigenously, too, may be subdivided by the degree to which such development has progressed. In some of them (Type IV), as compared to the most advanced countries, industrialization came late and slowly and has still not penetrated the entire economy. In such societies, Communist parties express the protests of people drawn chiefly from three strata, two of them large enough to provide mass support for Communism. The principal one is industrial labor, a class that remains a minority in the population and whose trade unions are both numerically and organizationally weak as compared to their counterparts in more advanced countries. Confronting a seemingly permanent strong anti-labor majority of both industrial and preindustrial propertied groups, many workers are alienated, turn their backs on their society and political system, and look for some kind of radical change. This attitude was expressed in the anarcho-syndicalist tradition at the turn of the century, to which Communism has fallen heir.

The second major stratum consists of propertyless or propertied but relatively poor small peasants and of the old middle class of shopkeepers and artisans, groups still very numerous in the non-industrialized regions of the country. They feel threatened by the advances of big industry and big commercial organizations and can thus be attracted by either the Fascists' or the Communists' anti-capitalist posture. Many are ideologically still preoccupied with their ancient fight against the Old Regime and its present-day remnants in the Church, the army and the bureaucracy, and the old revolutionary tradition is hence still alive among them. Since the Communists have inherited much of this, too, such members of the peasantry and old middle class may support the Communist party.

The third stratum from which the Communists draw some strength are the intellectuals. They, too, are frequently deeply attached to the revolutionary tradition, whose ideology their predecessors did so much to fashion. Also, they tend ideologically to associate themselves, often due to a sense of guilt, with the underprivileged proletariat.

Since industrialization has progressed relatively slowly, at least until recently, the groups mentioned above and the social and economic order against which they protest have been subject to little change. Protest has become a permanent feature of the political landscape and so has the vehicle of that protest, the Communist party. The party is thus not only large but also very stable in the support it enjoys and in its organizational structure. It is deeply entrenched in the trade unions and in many social organizations as well as the organs of local government in both industrial and rural areas and thus, paradoxically, becomes a well established and, indeed, widely respected part of the society it professes to reject.

This description, obviously, applies most nearly to France and Italy. In the underdeveloped southern regions of Italy, however, the Communist party may function in part as a modernizing movement, especially as the organizer of a peasantry demanding land reform. With advancing industrialization in Spain, it is conceivable that the formerly anarcho-syndicalist workers and poor peasants may turn to the Communist party there. And possibly the Communist parties of Greece and Finland, too, serve functions of interest aggregation similar to those of France and Italy. It is in countries of Societal Type IV, the "less developed advanced" countries of Europe, especially France and Italy, that Communist parties attain their greatest strength, because the interests they represent in these societies are numerically very large.

Quite a few now more advanced industrialized countries (Type V) share the traditional past of France of a feudal-aristocratic society. As industry grew in their hierarchical environments, workers reacted in large numbers by adhering to class-conscious socialist movements. Historically, the Communist parties of these countries originated from these movements and they have maintained some strength among radical workers and especially intellectuals in sympathy with them. However, unlike many workers of France and Italy, most of the workers in these advanced countries are not alienated. Through their economic and political power, they have become integrated into their societies and have come to share their growing wealth. As a result, workers, and intellectuals ideologically attached to the labor movement, have turned to socialist labor parties, leaving only insignificant Communist parties to exist on the fringe of the labor movement. As the socialist labor movement is now rapidly losing its radicalism and class consciousness and labor parties are making the corresponding political adjustments, a few workers and particularly some intellectuals deeply attached to the crusading socialist tradition, may yet move over to the Communist parties. Whatever slight gain may accrue to them from that source is likely to be more than offset, however, by losses due to death and defection among old-line adherents for whom the new society produces no replacements. Britain (and perhaps also Australia), Sweden and Denmark and probably Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands, Germany and Austria, and, to a large extent, Japan, all fit into this Societal Type V. In these highly industrialized countries,[10] then, Communist parties must be expected to be very weak.

Some other societies that developed advanced industry from within, but have no significant traditional aristocratic background, need not be sharply distinguished from the last-mentioned category for our purposes here. As industrial labor grew in them, it developed class consciousness or a socialist tradition only exceptionally among some groups of recent immigrants not yet fully adjusted to their new environment and especially among isolated groups of workers, like miners and lumbermen in syndicalist organizations.[11] It was from these

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[10] Agriculture is not necessarily insignificant in these countries, but their peasants—now more accurately described as farmers—are thoroughly integrated into the industrial system with respect both to what they produce and what they consume.

[11] On the relationship between labor radicalism and social isolation, see S. M. Lipset, *op. cit.*, pp. 232–236, 248–252.



The Societal Types and Agricultural Population as Percent of Population

FIG. 4

sources that the Communists received some initial support in these societies, but they were destined to disappear by absorption. What little is left of Communist strength can hardly be explained in terms of any major social group or movement. It would seem to consist largely of individuals who joined the party in response to needs arising out of personal maladjustment. The United States and Canada are major examples of such societies, though Switzerland, too, and, to some extent, Australia and Norway would seem to fit into this category (which we include in Societal Type V).

IV. SOCIETAL TYPES, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERSHIP

We have now interpreted the relationship between economic development and Communist party strength, which we demonstrated earlier, in terms of different functions performed by Communist parties in different types of societies. We have allocated each non-Communist-ruled country for which adequate data are available to one of our five societal types (see Appendix C). In applying the criteria of the five societal types outlined above, we have made frankly qualitative judgements. Since the criteria are by no means sharply defined, there are many borderline cases in which these judgements have, no doubt, been somewhat arbitrary and are subject to disagreement.

As a check on our allocation of countries to societal types and thus on our interpretation of the curvilinear relationship between economic development and Communist party strength, we related our five societal types both to economic development and to Communist party membership.

To establish whether our societal types measures are highly associated with Banks and Textor indicators of economic development, we computed a five-point index in a manner similar to that used in the index for



The Societal Types and Per Capita Gross National Product

FIG. 5

Figures 2 and 3 above. Figures 4 and 5 report linear relationships and contingency coefficients at a level which allows us to assume close correspondence between our measures of economic development and our societal types.

Finally, Figure 6 relates the five societal types to Communist party membership. The curve is closely congruent to those in Figures 2 and 3, above, which related Communist party membership to two different measures of economic development.

V. CONCLUSION

Our evidence shows that Communist party membership strength differs with different levels of economic development and our interpretation of this relationship suggests that Communist parties perform different functions, especially with respect to interest aggregation, in different types of societies. Though they have all borne the same name, Communist parties are not all alike. On the other hand, this also suggests that their Communist character, however it may be defined, does not make them unique but leaves them functionally comparable not so much with each other as with other parties and movements, especially those that perform similar functions in similar social and political environments.

It follows further that comparative analysis of Communist parties may best proceed within similar types of societies or societies grouped at similar stages of economic development. If Communist parties are to be compared using countries from different societal types or different levels of economic development, care has to be taken to provide control devices to hold the social and economic development factors constant so as to preclude actually comparing stages of economic development or modernization rather than Communist parties.

As the study of comparative politics has, in recent years, moved from the analysis of individual countries toward a truly comparative approach, there has been a growing


Communist Party Membership and Societal Types
Index of Communist Party Membership
High
9
6
5
4
3
2
1
Low
Type I
Type II
Type III
Type IV
Type V
Index Mean
1.00
1.00
2.16
5.20
2.63

FIG. 6

awareness among political scientists of the need to integrate the analysis of the politics of the Soviet Union and of other Communist-ruled countries with the study of comparative politics.[12] Economists have for some time applied the same concepts regarding economic development to Communist and non-Communist societies, but it has been historians who have first pointed to some similarities in the political processes accompanying economic development in Communist and non-Communist countries,[13] while political scientists have been relatively slow to study Soviet and Communist politics as a form of the politics of development.[14]

As the Soviet Union has moved from the ill-defined status of a "developing" country to that of a developed one, efforts at comparison with other industrially advanced societies have been made. Economists have noted uniformities in the industrialization process with respect to managers and workers;[15] sociologists have pointed to the evolution of similar individual values, including a consumer ethic;[16] and more recently two political scientists have undertaken a bold pioneering effort to compare certain aspects of the political systems of the Soviet Union and the United States.[17]

Now that political systems ruled by Communist parties are beginning to be drawn into the purview of comparison both with underdeveloped and advanced non-Communist systems and it is thus being recognized that the element of Communism does not render these systems unique, the time may be ripe for a comparison of non-ruling Communist parties with non-Communist parties and movements. It is our hope that our research, reported here, may help open the way to such a further development of the study of comparative politics.

(Editor's Note: For further discussion of the comparative study of Communist-ruled systems, see the article by Paul Shoup, pp. 185–204.)

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[12] H. Gordon Skilling, "Soviet and Communist Politics: A Comparative Approach," *The Journal of Politics*, 22 (May, 1960), 300–313; an unpublished address by Gabriel A. Almond to the Conference on Soviet and Communist Studies at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 10, 1964; H. Gordon Skilling, "Soviet and American Politics: The Dialectic of Opposites," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, 31 (May, 1965), 273–280; H. Gordon Skilling, "Interest Groups and Communist Politics," *World Politics*, 18 (April, 1966), 435–451; Robert C. Tucker, "On the Comparative Study of Communism," *World Politics*, 19 (January, 1967), 242–257; Alfred G. Meyer, "The Comparative Study of Communist Political Systems," *Slavic Review*, 26 (March, 1967), 3–12; John H. Kautsky, "Communism and the Comparative Study of Development," *ibid.*, pp. 13–17.

[13] For example, Hugh Seton-Watson, "Twentieth Century Revolutions," *The Political Quarterly*, 22 (July–September, 1951), 251–265, and the same author's *Neither War Nor Peace* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960); Robert C. Daniels, *The Nature of Communism* (New York: Random House, 1962); Theodore von Laue, *Why Lenin? Why Stalin? A Reappraisal of the Russian Revolution, 1900–1930* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964).

[14] For an attempt by one of the present authors, see Kautsky, "An Essay in the Politics of Development," *op. cit.* and *Communism and the Politics of Development*. Communist and nationalist single-party systems in underdeveloped countries are, along with Fascist ones, compared as "three species of a single political genus" by Robert C. Tucker, "Towards a Comparative Politics of Movement-Regimes," this Review, 55 (June, 1961), 281–289.

[15] For example, Clark Kerr, John T. Dunlap, Frederick H. Harbison and Charles Myers, *Industrialism and Industrial Man: The Problems of Labor and Management in Economic Growth* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960).

[16] Especially Alex Inkeles and Raymond A. Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen: Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959).

[17] Zbigniew K. Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR* (New York: Viking Press, 1964).

APPENDIX A

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF COUNTRIES AND THEIR COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERSHIP

Country	C.P. Membership[18]	C.P. Membership as Per Cent of Working Age Population [19]
Afghanistan	No known members	.000
Australia	5,000	.078
Austria	35,000	.760
Belgium	11,000	.186
Bolivia	6,500	N.A.
Brazil	31,000	N.A.
Burma	5,000	N.A.
Burundi	Nil	.000
Cambodia	100	.004
Cameroun	Nil	.000
Canada	3,500	.033
Central African Republic	Nil	.000
Ceylon	1,900	.040
Chad	Nil	.000
Chile	27,500	.650
Colombia	13,000	N.A.
Congo (Brazzaville)	Nil	.000
Congo (Leopoldville)	Very small	N.A.
Costa Rica	300	.051
Cyprus	10,000	3.243
Dahomey	Nil	.000
Denmark	5,000	.170
Ecuador	2,500	N.A.
El Salvador	200	.023
Ethiopia	Nil	.000
Finland	40,000	1.441
France	260,000	.905
Gabon	Nil	.000
Germany, Federal Republic	50,000	.138
Ghana	Nil	.000
Greece	20,000	.366
Guatemala	1,300	N.A.
Guinea	Nil	.000
Honduras	2,400	.261
Iceland	1,000	.999
India	135,000	.055
Indonesia	2,000,000	3.800
Iran	1,500	.015
Iraq	15,000	.474
Ireland	100	.006
Israel	2,000	.156
Italy	1,350,000	4.190
Ivory Coast	Nil	.000
Jamaica	Nil	.000
Japan	120,000	.200
Jordan	500	N.A.
Laos	100	N.A.
Lebanon	3,000	N.A.
Liberia	Nil	.000
Libya	Nil	.000
Luxemburg	500	.221
Malaysia	2,000	.060
Mali	Nil	.000
Mauritania	Nil	.000
Mexico	50,000	.275
Morocco	1,250	.017
Nepal	3,500	N.A.
Netherlands	12,000	.169
New Zealand	500	.039
Nicaragua	250	.031
Niger	Nil	.000
Nigeria	Less than 100	N.A.
Norway	4,500	.199
Pakistan	3,000	.007
Panama	400	.070
Paraguay	5,000	.600
Peru	8,500	.180
Philippines	1,800	.013
Portugal	2,000	.035
Rwanda	Nil	.000
Saudi Arabia	Negligible	N.A.
Senegal	Nil	.000
Sierra Leone	Nil	.000
Somalia	Nil	.000
Spain	5,000	.025
Sudan	2,500	.382
Sweden	20,000	.402
Switzerland	Less than 6,000	.167
Syria	4,000	.190
Tanganyika	Nil	.000
Togo	Nil	.000
Trinidad	Very small	N.A.
Turkey	1,000	.007
Uganda	Nil	.000
United Arab Republic	1,000	N.A.
United Kingdom	34,372 (claimed)	.114
United States	12,000 (claimed)	.007
Upper Volta	Nil	.000
Uruguay	10,000	.600
Venezuela	30,000	.760
Yemen	Negligible	N.A.

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[18] Source: U. S. Department of State, *op. cit.*

[19] Calculated from working-age (15–64) population figures obtained from *United Nations Statistical Yearbook* (New York: United Nations Statistical Office, 1963).

APPENDIX B

Code

The following measures and categories were used in our research.[20]

(1) Membership of Communist parties:
1. 5,000 and below
2. 5,001– 10,000
3. 10,001– 20,000
4. 20,001– 35,000
5. 35,001– 50,000
6. 50,001– 75,000
7. 75,001– 100,000
8. 100,001–1,000,000
9. 1,000,001 and above
10. N.A.

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[20] The economic development measures are taken from Banks and Textor, *op. cit.*, where explanations of the measures are provided.

(2) Membership of Communist party as per cent of working age population:
  0. .25 and below
  1. .26– .50
  2. .51–1.0
  3. 1.1–5
  4. N.A.

(3) Level of urbanization:
  1. High (20% or more of population in cities of 20,000 or more and 12.5% or more of population in cities of 100,000 or more)
  2. Low (less than 20% of population in cities of 20,000 or more and less than 12.5% of population in cities of 100,000 or more)
  3. Ambiguous
  9. Unascertained

(4) Agricultural population as per cent of total population:
  1. High (over 66%)
  2. Medium (34–66%)
  3. Low (16–33%)
  4. Very low (under 16%)
  9. Unascertained

(5) Gross national product:
  1. Very high ($125 billion and above)
  2. High ($25–124.9 billion)
  3. Medium ($5–24.9 billion)
  4. Low ($1–4.9 billion)
  5. Very low (under $1 billion)

(6) Per capita gross national product:
  1. Very high ($1200 and above)
  2. High ($600–1199)
  3. Medium ($300–599)
  4. Low ($150–299)
  5. Very low (under $150)

(7) Status of economic development:
  1. Developed (self-sustaining economic growth; GNP per capita over $600)
  2. Intermediate (sustained and near self-sustaining economic growth)
  3. Underdeveloped (reasonable prospect of attaining sustained economic growth by the mid-1970's)
  4. Very underdeveloped (little or no prospect of attaining sustained economic growth within the foreseeable future)
  8. Ambiguous

(8) International financial status:
  1. Very high (UN assessment of 10% or above)
  2. High (UN assessment of 1.50–9.99%)
  3. Medium (UN assessment of 0.25–1.49%)
  4. Low (UN assessment of 0.05–0.24%)
  5. Very low (minimum UN assessment of 0.04%)
  9. Unascertained

APPENDIX C

Countries by Societal Types

Type I

Afghanistan
Burundi
Cambodia
Central African Republic
Chad
Dahomey
Ethiopia
Gabon
Ivory Coast
Laos
Liberia
Libya
Mali
Mauritania
Nicaragua
Niger
Saudi Arabia
Sierra Leone
Togo
Upper Volta

Type II

Cameroun
Congo (Brazzaville)
Congo (Leopoldville)
El Salvador
Honduras
Iran
Jordan
Malaysia
Nepal
Nigeria
Panama
Paraguay
Rwanda
Senegal
Somalia
Syria
Tanganyika
Uganda
Yemen

Type III

Bolivia
Brazil
Burma
Ceylon
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cyprus
Ecuador
Ghana
Guatemala
Guinea
India
Indonesia
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Jamaica
Lebanon
Mexico
Morocco
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
Portugal
Sudan
Trinidad
Turkey
United Arab Republic
Uruguay
Venezuela

Type IV

Finland
France
Greece
Italy
Spain

Type V

Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
German Federal Republic
Iceland
Japan
Luxemburg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States

POLICY MAPS OF CITY COUNCILS AND POLICY OUTCOMES: A DEVELOPMENTAL ANALYSIS*

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ROBERT EYESTONE
University of Minnesota

I. THE PROBLEM

In spite of common challenges stemming from the common environment shared by all cities in a metropolitan region, continued and even increasing social and economic differentiation among and within cities rather than homogenization and integration are the most significant features of the contemporary metropolitan scene.[1] Cities within the same metropolitan region are not only maintaining but also developing distinct and unique "public life styles."[2] Urban sociology and urban geography have raised a multitude of questions and given a multitude of answers in seeking to account for the fact that cities facing basically similar challenges from the environment react so differently to these challenges. Most relevant research deals with the problem of differentiation and its effects on the development of cities in terms of historical settlement patterns, economic location and growth, or geographical space distribution.[3]

But differences in municipal life styles may also be the result of differences in public policies deliberately pursued by local governments in the metropolitan area. If this is so, the common pressures from the environment are evidently interpreted differently in the process of public decision-making that seeks to cope with them. It would seem, then, that metropolitan cities are in different stages of policy development. Leaving aside momentarily the meaning of "stages of policy development," we can ask a number of questions that may shed light on the relationship between environmental pressures and public policies designed to meet these pressures. If cities are in different stages of policy development, how can the stages be identified? Is policy development linear and "progressive," or is it reversible? Do the stages of policy development in fact correspond to relevant conditions of the environment? But if there are no differences in environmental challenges, what makes for arrested development in one city, while a similarly challenged city takes off or another is highly developed? On the other hand, if cities are in different stages of development, is it due to their possessing uneven resource capabilities by which environmental problems can be solved? But how can one explain why cities with equal resources adopt quite different public policies? What is the character of the policies designed to meet environmental challenges? Are they attempts to adjust the city to the changing environment, or are they attempts to control the environment, or both?

Questions like these in turn direct our attention to the need for exploring the policy perspectives of urban decision-makers. How do municipal policy-makers perceive their com-

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* The larger project of which this analysis is a part, the City Council Research Project, is sponsored by the Institute of Political Studies, Stanford University, and is supported by the National Science Foundation under contract GS 496.

[1] See, for instance, the recent work by Oliver P. Williams et al., *Suburban Differences and Metropolitan Policies: A Philadelphia Story* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1965).

[2] Oliver P. Williams in a recent paper has argued that metropolitan regions are collections of small groups of residents and the economic superstructures necessary to sustain them. Each group is characterized by the choice of a distinctive life style, and because members of the various groups wish to live in congenial environments they tend to be found in similar locations throughout the region. Precisely where they are located is a matter of economics and the remnants of past land uses in the region, but the fact of congeniality is a major cause of similarity in location choice. See "A Framework for Metropolitan Political Analysis," prepared for the Conference on Comparative Research in Community Politics, held at Athens, Georgia, November 16–19, 1966.

[3] See, for instance, F. Stuart Chapin, Jr. and Shirley F. Weiss (eds.), *Urban Growth Dynamics* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962); Wilbur R. Thompson, *A Preface to Urban Economics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1965); the relevant literature is legion.

munity's environment and problems stemming from environmental conditions? What are their short-term policy positions, and what are their long-range policy images of the future? Are their perceptions of problems, policy orientations and expectations related to the city's stage of policy development? And if this is the case, what are we to make of the relationship from a theoretical point of view? Although we do not propose to deal with all of these questions, it seems to us that they provide the cutting edge of an empirical theory of urban public policy.

II. THE PROJECT

This study of the policy maps of city councils in relationship to city policy development is part of a much larger project on municipal legislative bodies conducted in the ninety-odd cities of the San Francisco Bay metropolitan region since 1964.

The data used in this report come from the following sources: (a) city size, density and growth data from the 1960 and 1965 Censuses of Population; (b) city per capita assessed valuation data and expenditure data for planning and amenities from the *Annual Report of Financial Transactions concerning Cities of California*, for the fiscal years 1958–1959 to 1965–1966, published by the State Controller; and (c) data concerning council policy maps from interviews with city councilmen conducted in 1966 and 1967.

The interviews, using both open-ended and closed questions, averaged about three hours in length. In addition, councilmen were asked, at the end of each interview, to fill out a written questionnaire. Interviews were held, as the tabulation below shows, in 89 cities located in eight counties around the San Francisco Bay. Two councils refused to cooperate altogether, and in four others not enough councilmen were interviewed to permit analysis at the council level. Inadequate budget data in the case of six cities incorporated after 1959 further reduced the number of councils available for this analysis to 77. One city, incorporated after interviewing had begun, has been excluded from the study as has been the city-county of San Francisco because its Board of Supervisors is a much more professionalized legislative body than the other councils of the region.

	Number of Councils	Number of Councilmen
Interview targets	89	488
Access refused	– 2	– 10
	87	478
Deficient council data	– 4	– 12
	83 (93%)	466
Interview refusals		– 31
		435 (89%)
No budget data available for analysis	– 6	
	77 (87%)	

III. THE MODEL

The model guiding the analysis is a partial one, and we shall not be dealing in the analysis with all of its relevant empirical components.[4] The model predicts city policy development as a response to external and internal features of the urban environment. The external features include, but are not exhausted by, city size, density and growth as the most immediate symptoms of common challenges from the environment, as well as city resources as environmental constraints on policy outcomes. The internal features include, but are not exhausted by, the demands for certain policies made by individuals and groups as well as the policy orientations which local decision-makers themselves bring to or formulate in the course of the policy-making process. The model seeks to order these component variables and relate them to each other in a theoretically meaningful manner.

The model assumes that city size, density and growth as well as resources are antecedent variables; that individual or group demands and decision-makers' policy orientations are intervening variables; and that policy outcomes and resultant stages of policy development are consequent variables. Of course, in empirical reality neither city size, density or growth nor city resources are truly independent precisely because public policies may be designed to control the city's environment or increase its resources. But for the purpose of short-term analysis we can assume these variables to be independent.

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[4] More complete studies, using multiple correlation and regression analyses, will appear in forthcoming publications of the City Council Research Project. But see also our earlier report: Robert Eyestone and Heinz Eulau, "City Councils and Policy Outcomes: Development Profiles," in James Q. Wilson (ed.), *City Politics and Public Policy* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968).

Although we shall not deal with individual or group demands in this paper, they are likely to be related to the city's demographic features. For instance, the larger a city's population, the more and the more diverse demands are likely to be made on policy-makers (and, moreover, the more and more diverse demands for policies coping with problems stemming from environmental challenges are likely to be made). On the other hand, decision-makers' policy orientations should be independent of environmental variables, though they are likely to be related to the policy preferences of individuals or groups that are not independent of pressures from the environment.

Policy outcomes are assumed to follow each other in a characteristic sequence that constitutes the city's policy development. These outcomes are responses to environmental challenges, such as those occasioned by high population density or a high growth rate. Moreover, they are indicative of policy-makers' willingness to utilize city resources. Changes in city size or density due to growth as well as in resource capability bring about changes in policy outcomes that move the city along from one stage to another in the developmental process. The process of policy development need not be uni-directional; at least temporary reversals are possible.

Environmental challenges may or may not be perceived by policy-makers as "problems" requiring action. Even if problems are not perceived and no action is taken, there is a policy that is reflected in policy outcomes. Policy-makers' sensitivity to environmental challenges is influenced by the demands that are made on them as well as by their own policy preferences and policy images. Therefore, city policy development is not only due to changes in the environment but is mediated by policy-makers' orientations to action. For instance, whether or not resources are mobilized for development depends to a large extent on demands made on government as well as on the policy preferences of policy-makers.

However, policy-makers' perceptions of problems, policy positions and policy images—their "policy maps," so to speak—are themselves not independent of policy development. Because policy development is cumulative in that past policy outcomes constrain current policy proposals—what is feasible and what is not—policy maps are likely to be formulated, consciously or unconsciously, within the restrictive context of the stage of development in which a city is momentarily located. In other words, policy-makers cannot do as they please. The model assumes, therefore, that decision-makers' policy maps reflect as well as shape policy development.

Not all the propositions that can be derived from the model will be tested in this study. We present the model to give direction to the analysis. Particular hypotheses derived from the model will be introduced as we proceed. Our major objective is to demonstrate the utility of the typology of policy development that we construct from city budget data as indicators of policy outcomes and, indirectly, of public policy.

IV. THE CONCEPTS AND MEASURES

1. *Policy and policy outcomes.* "Policy" is defined as the relationship of a governmental unit to its environment. It finds expression in general programs and specific decisions, or in policy declarations of decision-makers. But because a policy need not be declared to be a policy, analysis cannot rely on manifest statements or overt decisions alone but must concern itself with policy outcomes. By policy outcomes we mean the concrete manifestations of policy—revenues, expenditures, regulations, court decisions, the exertion of police power, and so on. Policy outcomes, then, reflect the orientations of policy-makers, regardless of whether or not a conscious decision has been made. On the other hand, because policy outcomes may at times represent unanticipated results not intended by policy-makers, policy analysis cannot altogether ignore policy declarations. In fact, the relationship between policy intentions and policy outcomes challenges the analyst of public policy.

To develop our concept of policy further, we conceive of public policy as a response of government to challenges or pressures from the physical and social environment. Changes in public policy either adjust or adapt the political system to environmental changes, or they bring about changes in the environment. Which course of action is chosen depends on a multitude of factors—the structure of the political system, its human and physical capabilities, the degree of mass or elite involvement in the political process, the vitality of private associations making public demands; and, last but not least, the perceptions, preferences and orientations of policy-makers.

The problematics of policy-making arise out of the relationship between changes in the environment that require some response, the ways in which these changes are experienced as challenges by decision-makers, and the values that decision-makers may seek in formulating policy. Policy, then, is a response to environmental pressures, both physical and social, as well as anticipation of a future state of affairs. If this is the case, a change in policy is both causal and purposive: it is "caused" by environmental challenges, but it is also directed toward a goal and shaped by a purpose. The tension arising out of the simultaneous impact of causal and purposive "forcings" is a basic dilemma in the scientific study of politics.

Analysis of policy outcomes through time requires a classification of policies.[5] We distinguish between "adaptive" and "control" policies. The measure used as an indicator of an adaptive policy is the percentage of *total* government expenses spent for health, libraries, parks, and recreation.[6] These major accounting categories used to report expenditures presumably include the major amenities offered by cities. A "high amenities" city differs from a city with a traditional services orientation in that it spends less of city income for fire and police services or public works.[7]

The measure used to indicate a city's control policy is the percentage of all *general* government expenses spent by the planning commission. *General* government expenses include essentially all administrative expenses and salaries *not* included under fire, police or recreation categories, and so on.[8]

2. *Policy development and its measurement.* Policy outcomes are responses to changes and challenges in the environment. Policy development refers to a set of policy outcomes that follow each other sequentially through time. If the annual outcomes are similar, we speak of the resulting profile as a *stage* of policy development. Three stages will be identified: *retarded, transitional,* and *advanced.*[9] The median of medians for all cities with respect to planning and amenities expenditures over a period of eight years serves as the criterion of similar or dissimilar outcomes.

The definition of a set of sequential and similar outcomes as a stage presupposes continuity and stability. But the conception of development implies that one stage may, sooner or later, be followed by a new stage. It is unlikely that one stage will suddenly yield to another. Not only may development revert; even if development is "progressive," the transformation from one stage to the next may involve a series of dissimilar outcomes—some outcomes characteristic of an earlier stage, others characteristic of a later stage. If this

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[5] Much classificatory activity, in the field of public policy analysis as elsewhere, is a game. Either the inventors of classifications and typologies do not make it clear just what analytical purpose the classification is to serve, or they may even imply that by having a classification they have explained something. We make this point to have it understood that we are not interested in justifying or defending the particular typology of policy development that we have constructed, but in examining its utility in the analysis at hand.

[6] Since education and public welfare policies are not made at the city level in California, we cannot use expenditures in these areas as measures of policy outcomes.

[7] The amenities measure is an attempt to tap Williams' and Adrian's concept of amenities. See Oliver P. Williams and Charles R. Adrian, *Four Cities: A Study in Comparative Policy Making* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963), pp. 198–225.

[8] Expenses by the planning commission include both expenses and outlays, therefore encompassing the range of items from paper supplies to salaries of full-time city planners to special outside studies commissioned by the city planning commission. California State law requires every city to have a planning commission, but this body may be, and frequently is, a standing committee of citizens appointed by the city council and incurring no expenses charged against the city. Therefore, the actual dollar amount spent by the planning commission would seem to be a good indicator of the extent of a city's commitment to the idea of planning as a way to control the environment. General government expenses are used as the percentage base rather than total government expenses in order to make planning definitionally independent of amenity expenditures.

[9] It is important to keep in mind that while we are using categories reminiscent of such concepts as "traditional," "transitional" and "modern" used in the literature of comparative politics, our observations cover only a small segment of that part of the historical developmental process usually called "modern." It is all the more significant that, even within this small part, we can locate cities in clearly different stages of policy development. This suggests that a concept like "modern" disguises a great deal of the variance that more microscopic analysis can reveal. The point is that our stages "correspond" only analytically to similarly conceived stages used in the long-term analysis of national development.



FIG. 1. Categories of policy outcomes over eight-year period.

occurs, an eight-year profile cannot easily be assigned to one stage or another. Put differently, we cannot easily predict whether the system will remain in the earlier stage or move into a later stage.

To cope with this possibility, we define a set of sequential but dissimilar policy outcomes as a *phase* of development. The notion of phase suggests that the sequence is less clearly bounded and, perhaps, of shorter duration than a stage. As we are constructing three stages of development, we must provide for two phases—an *emergent* phase that indicates movement from the retarded to the transitional stage, and a *maturing* phase that is located between the transitional and advanced stages.

Figure 1 illustrates how annual policy outcomes are assigned to a stage or phase of policy development. If planning and amenities expenditures fall below the grand medians in every year of the eight-year sequence, the profile is classified as *retarded* (cell I); if one or the other type of expenditures falls above the grand medians, the profile is designated as transitional (cells II and III); and if both planning and amenities expenditures are above the medians in all eight years, the profile is being assigned to the *advanced* stage of development (cell IV). If during the eight-year sequence expenditures move across the median lines, the profiles represent phases of development: outcomes moving from cell I to cells II or III (arrows A) are classified as *emergent;* those moving from cells I, II or III into cell IV (arrows B) are designated as *maturing.*

Cases of "reversals" for which the model does not provide are being assigned to stages or phases of development in such a way that "reversal errors" are reduced as much as possible. This involves informed but hopefully not arbitrary assignment decisions.[10] We are satisfied that the reversals are not sufficient to invalidate the typology of policy development. As Table 1 shows, for the 82 cities whose policy profiles can be identified over an eight-year period, there were 572 opportunities for change in annual outcomes.[11] Of these oppor-

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[10] For a more detailed discussion of how the development typology was constructed and cities assigned to a stage or phase of policy development, see Eyestone and Eulau in Wilson, *op. cit.*

[11] This calculation is made as follows: over eight years, each city's annual outcomes could change seven times. This would make for 82×7, or 574 opportunities for all cities. However, as we missed data for the first fiscal year in two cities, we must deduct two opportunities, giving us the 572 figure.

TABLE 1. DEVELOPMENTAL TYPOLOGY OF CITY POLICY PROFILES WITH OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHANGE AND REVERSALS

Development Type	Cities N=	Opportunities N=	Number of Reversals (1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	Reversals N=	%=
Retarded	11	76	7	2			11	14
Emergent	14	98	5	5	1		18	18
Transitional	26	182	9	6		1	25	14
Maturing	15	104	5	6	1		20	19
Advanced	16	112	4	1			6	5
	82	572	30	20	2	1	80	14

tunities eighty, or fourteen per cent, represented reversals from one year to the next. In the other 86 per cent of opportunities, there either was no change, that is, all outcomes remained in the same stage over all eight years; or change occurred in the hypothesized ("progressive") direction. Reversals in stable stage cities are due, of course, to the assignment of some "impure" cases where reversals seem to be only temporary deviations from the regular pattern.

A validity test. In order to test the validity of the typological constructs and the underlying assumptions, we can divide the eight-year period into two four-year periods and assign each period's profile to either a stage or phase of policy development. Cross-tabulation permits us to inspect the internal movement of the policy profiles from one period to the next. If our assumptions and assignments are reasonably valid, we should be able to predict, from knowledge of a profile's location on the development scale in the first four-year period, where it will be located in the second four-year period. We predict that cities in a stage of development are less likely to move than cities in a phase of development. We also predict that when there is movement, it is more likely to be in the hypothesized "progressive" direction than in a reversed direction. Table 2 presents the results.

It is readily evident that, with some exceptions, both predictions are supported by the data. Of the 50 cities in stages of development during the 1958–1961 period, thirty or 60 per cent remained in the same stage during the following 1962–1965 period; but of the 32 cities in a phase of development during the earlier period, only nine or 28 per cent remained there in the later period. If we consider the direction of movements, it appears that of the 20 cities in stages during the earlier period that did move, sixteen or 80 per cent advanced in the expected direction. But this result is, of course, largely a function of the boundaries set to the typology: retarded cities can only move forward and advanced cities can only move backward. More significant, therefore, is the fact that none of the advanced cities reverted, suggesting that once this plateau is reached, institutionalization of policies makes reversal unlikely; and the further fact that of the ten transitional cities that did move, six moved forward and four backward. Similarly, of the 14 emergent cities that moved, ten or 71 per cent moved forward as expected and only four returned to the retarded stage in the later period; but of the nine moving maturing cities, a bare majority of five reverted to the transitional stage. Of course, these results, whether "favorable" or not from the developmental standpoint, may be influenced by the original data. Some policy outcomes as measured are in some cases very close to the median of medians cutting point that serves as the criterion for assignment, so that we may be dealing here with errors over which we have no control. Nevertheless, we believe that the weight of the evidence is sufficient to warrant our interpretation of Table 2. It is also noteworthy that few of the movements, either forward or backward, exceed one step at a time. Of the 26 cities moving forward and having an opportunity to do so by *more* than one step (i.e., those retarded, emergent and transitional in the first period), twenty-one or 81 per cent moved one step only; and of the nine cities moving backward and having an opportunity for more moves (i.e., those transitional and maturing in the first period), all but one reverted only one step.

Reversed development is an empirical fact of life. While stages of development as conceived by historians are inevitably consecutive and irreversible, policy development is in fact

TABLE 2. POLICY DEVELOPMENT OF CITIES IN DEVELOPMENTAL SEQUENCE FROM 1958–61 TO 1962–65

State of Development in 1958–61	State of Development in 1962–65				
	Retarded $N=11$	Emergent $N=14$	Transitional $N=26$	Maturing $N=15$	Advanced $N=16$
Retarded $N=16$	6	9			1
Emergent $N=16$	4	2	7	3	
Transitional $N=24$	1	3	14	5	1
Maturing $N=16$			5	7	4
Advanced $N=10$					10

reversible. Although we assume that in general stages and phases follow each other in "progressive" order, an assumption that the results of Table 2 certainly do not falsify, no rigid assumptions need or should be made about the direction of change. Policy is the creation of men and can be changed by men, within certain constraints imposed by environmental necessities, in whatever direction they prefer. Otherwise the concept of policy would make little sense.

3. *Resource capability.* A city's resource capabilities can be measured in a variety of ways. Ideally, we would like to think of resource capability as the maximum amount of income a city can expect annually when serious efforts are made to tap all possible income sources, including current revenues from taxes, borrowed funds, grants in aid, or income from utilities, and so on. However, we have no way to determine whether such efforts have been made. Moreover, were we to use the readily available city income figures as a measure of resource capability, the measure would contravene our assumption that some cities are more pressed for revenue than others. Nor can we use a measure equivalent to per capita gross national product that is used in the comparative study of nations.[12] For a high proportion of the production of any city crosses city boundaries and is not available to support local government expenditures. Needed is a measure of the wealth remaining wholly within city limits and available to local taxation or such state taxation as is refundable to the city.

The measure we are using is, therefore, total assessed valuation per capita subject to local taxation for fiscal 1965–1966, as determined by the California State Board of Equalization. In using this measure we assume that wealth in the form of private, commercial and industrial property will be a potential source of revenue, and that per capita assessed valuation is a rough indicator of a city's resource capability.[13] A city will hesitate to institute new programs or expand old ones if it has a low level of assessed valuation per capita, but may be more inclined to do so if it has a high level of valuation.

4. *Policy maps.* Policy, we must remember, is a theoretical concept imposed on observed reality. Regardless of whether specific decisions have been deliberately made or not, what we observe are policy outcomes from which city policy is inferred. If, as we shall suggest, policy outcomes as summarized in the typology of policy development are positively related to indicators of what we may consider environmental challenges, the presumption that the policy was intended to meet the pressures of the environment is strong, but it is only a presumption. And because it is only a presumption, the investigation of policymakers' "policy maps" becomes an important component of policy analysis.

What do we mean by "policy map"? In the first place, we assume that if policy is a response to environmental challenges, these challenges will have been perceived by policymakers. They may choose, consciously or unconsciously, not to act, but such non-action is also a response that will be reflected in policy outcomes. By being perceived the environmental challenges become "problems" or

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[12] For a discussion of system capabilities, see Gabriel A. Almond, "A Developmental Approach to Political Systems," *World Politics*, 17 (January, 1965), 195–203.

[13] Assessed valuation includes private houses and property, commercial property and industrial property. From private property a city derives personal property revenues and a portion of state income tax revenues; from commercial property it receives property and sales tax revenues; and from industrial property it gets property tax revenues.

"policy issues." In order to tap this facet of the policy map, we asked this question:

> Mr. Councilman, before talking about your work as a councilman and the work of the council itself, we would like to ask you about some of the problems facing this community. In your opinion, what are the two most pressing problems here in (city)?

The policy map consists, secondly, of the policy-maker's recommendations for action or "policy positions"—those preferences that he either brings into the policy-making situation or evolves in the course of decision-making. Again, his not consciously entertaining a policy position on an issue is yet to be considered a policy orientation and a component of his policy map. We therefore asked this question:[14]

> Now, looking toward the future, what one community-wide improvement, in your opinion, does this city "need most" to be attractive to its citizens?

Finally, we assume that the policy map includes the policy-maker's "ends-in-view" or values—those hopes and expectations concerning the future which policy decisions are to bring about. The following question was designed to yield what one may think of as the "policy image":

> Now, taking the broadest view possible, how do you see (city) in the future? I mean, what kind of a city would you personally like (city) to be in the next twenty-five years?

Whether these three components of the policy map constitute a consistent whole, a "perspective" as Harold Lasswell would call it,[15] is an empirical question not central to the present study, but one we shall speculate about in the conclusion. Needless to say, perhaps, knowledge of the policy map does not permit prediction about the outcome of decision-making on any particular policy issue. But we proceed on the assumption that policy maps represent important linkages between environmental challenges and public policies.

5. *Units of analysis and interpretation.* Although the data on policy maps come from interviews with individuals, our analysis uses councils as the units of analysis. Decision-making by legislative bodies is a collective act. Not the individual councilman but the council, as a whole or under the majority rule, is the effective policy-maker. Past research on legislatures, following in the wake of voting studies, has analyzed the behavior of individuals *in* the legislature in order to make statements about the behavior *of* legislatures. This procedure presents serious problems of inference. Because policy outcomes as measured by budget data are due to collective decisions (or non-decisions), the legislative group rather than the individual legislator is the more viable unit of analysis. Council perceptions, positions or images are therefore constructed or reconstructed from data about individuals or provided by individuals, permitting us to make statements about city councils and not about city councilmen. We shall report the rules followed in this procedure in the text or footnotes.[16] This type of analysis is of course made possible by the relatively large (though for satisfactory statistical purposes still all too small) number of legislative groups being investigated. As far as we know, no similar type of analysis using as many as eighty or so units has ever been undertaken in the comparative study of legislative bodies.

In reading and interpreting the tables, a number of methodological considerations must be kept in mind. In the first place, we are dealing with data that come from truly independent sources—the federal Census reporting population characteristics, city budgets reporting financial allocations, and interviews with city councilmen. These different kinds of data are used to construct quite different properties of the units—city councils—that we are observing. The Census yields data that are best interpreted as representing the council's "contextual" properties; the budget data are representative, in a very direct sense, of the council's "emergent" properties; and the interview data provide the basis for "aggregate"

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[14] This is not the only question we asked in this connection. For instance, we also asked a great many closed "agree-disagree" questions some of which we used in the earlier analysis, in Wilson, *op. cit.*

[15] See Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 25.

[16] This is not the place to discuss the methodological problems and procedures involved in "stepping up" the data from the level of the individual (micro-analysis) to the level of the group (macro-analysis). Suffice it to say that our empirical results justify the viability of the procedures, although we would be the first to admit that many technical problems remain to be solved.

TABLE 3. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CITY SIZE, DENSITY AND GROWTH AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT*

	Policy Development				
	Retarded $N=11$	Emergent $N=14$	Transitional $N=26$	Maturing $N=15$	Advanced $N=16$
Population Size					
<10,000	82%	79%	35%	13%	0%
10–50,000	18	21	46	67	44
>50,000	0	0	19	20	56
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Density					
<2,000	73%	58%	19%	41%	0%
2–4,000	18	28	50	26	44
>4,000	9	14	31	33	56
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Growth Rate					
<10%	54%	36%	43%	13%	19%
10–50%	46	49	39	47	62
>50%	0	14	19	40	19
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

* Size and density data for 1965; growth rate for 1960–65.

properties.[17] To relate properties as diverse as these is extraordinarily difficult. But for this reason one cannot simply write off even modest relationships between variables as not significant.

Second, the typology of policy development that serves as our major device for ordering the data is not a simple continuum. While the five types constitute an ordinal ranking on a scale from "more developed" to "less developed," they also represent qualitative differences associated with different levels of development. In other words, a city's movement from one stage into another may be due to structural changes in causal factors rather than simple gradual increases. This means that variables related to city policy development may well exhibit sharp changes at certain points in the developmental sequence rather than incremental changes from one stage to another. For instance, a council's orientation to action may change radically after it has left the retarded stage and entered the emergent phase and then not change at all. Also, variables need not change monotonically across the five developmental types. Development may be related, for instance, to city growth in the early stages or phases but may decline in the advanced cities. Or cities at the three intermediate levels of policy development may show characteristics not shared by the least and most developed cities. Or cities in the two phases of development may be more similar to each other than to cities in the immediate neighboring stages.

Finally, we are less impressed by "significant differences" in a statistical sense that we might find than by patterns in the distribution of the data that make theoretical sense. The small number of cases also makes difficult the controlling of one variable by another that is so necessary if spurious relationships and false interpretations are to be avoided. We have used the control technique in relating resource capability to policy development, but we have not done so with the interview data, largely because the frequencies of cases in particular cells of the tables would be greatly strained by the procedure. This makes it all the more necessary to view each table not as an isolated entity unrelated to any other table. Rather, it is the weight of all the tables inspected simultaneously that must be considered in making inferences or drawing conclusions.

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[17] Paul F. Lazarsfeld has written in many places about the variety of "group properties" that need to be distinguished in analysis lest errors of inference be made. See, for instance, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, "Evidence and Inference in Social Research," in Daniel Lerner (ed.), *Evidence and Inference* (New York: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 117–125; or Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Herbert Menzel, "On the Relation between Individual and Collective Properties," in Amitai Etzioni, *Complex Organizations* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), pp. 422–440. We are not dealing with the global, structural or relational properties of councils in this analysis.

V. THE ANALYSIS

1. *Environmental challenges and policy development.* City size, density and growth rate are direct indicators of challenges from the environment that every city faces. They bring in their wake problems that the city council may seek to solve through policies that adapt the city to the environment or that control environmental pressures. As the typology of city policy development is built on outcomes that reflect such policies, it follows:

> *Hypothesis 1a:* The larger a city's size, the more developed is city policy likely to be.
>
> *Hypothesis 1b:* The greater a city's density, the more developed is city policy likely to be.
>
> *Hypothesis 1c:* The greater a city's growth, the more developed is city policy likely to be.

Table 3 shows that the three hypotheses are not falsified by the data. Moreover, the data show a pattern of policy development that, with two exceptions, is highly linear. We have no explanation for the deviation from the pattern of the transitional cities in the low density category. With regard to growth we note, as we perhaps might have expected, a levelling-off of the effect of growth in the advanced stage, the terminus of development. Apparently, once policy development has reached the advanced stage, growth is likely to be marginal in its effect on city policy.

The data suggest that city councils adopt policies which are congruent with needs rooted in pressures from the environment. Whatever the declared policy objectives of city fathers, they tend to follow policies that either adapt the city to or seek to control the environment.

2. *Resource capability and policy development.* The resources available to a city government are an important constraint on the expenditures it can make and the policies it can follow. Resource capability is largely an objectively limiting factor, but it is also subjective in that its limiting effect is interpreted by the city council before it becomes a factor in the policy-making process. For instance, the council estimates how high a tax rate city residents are willing to approve. High resource capability is necessary for policy development, but it is not sufficient. Nevertheless, we hypothesize:

> *Hypothesis 2:* The higher a city's resource capability, the more developed is city policy likely to be.

Table 4, Part A, shows that there is no support for the hypothesis. In fact, more of the retarded cities seem to have high resource capability than any of the other cities in various stages or phases of development. However, the distributions may be misleading. As we suggested, policy development is dependent on policy-makers' willingness to mobilize resources, and their willingness to do so may depend on the intensity of pressures from the environment *regardless* of available resources. Therefore, one must control the relationship between resource capability and policy development by such indicators of environmental challenges as size, density or growth rate. Table 4, B, reports the findings.

In the smaller cities, presumably less subject to environmental challenges, fewer of the more developed than of the less developed cities are low in resource capability, just as hypothesized; but development also declines in cities of the same size with high capability, counter to the hypothesis. In the larger cities, on the other hand, resource capability is highly related to policy development in the advanced stage.

Controls for density reveal the same pattern even more distinctly. In the low density, high capability cities policy development declines, counter to the hypothesis; but in the densely populated cities high resource capability is related to policy development across the continuum in linear order.

Finally, if resource capability is controlled by growth rate, the developmental process clearly follows the hypothesized pattern only in the high growth cities with high assessed valuation (and again in linear fashion except for levelling off in the advanced stage). The data do not permit us to say anything about the slow-growing, low capability cities; but in the slow-growth, high capability and the high growth, low capability cities Hypothesis 4 is clearly falsified.

Policy-makers evidently respond to environmental pressures less in terms of the resources that are available than in terms of their willingness to mobilize these resources. It is for this reason that inquiry into policy-makers' perceptions of city problems, policy positions and policy images becomes an important part of policy analysis.

3. *Problem perceptions and policy develop-*

TABLE 4. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CITY RESOURCE CAPABILITY AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT

Assessed Valuation Per Capita	Policy Development				
	Retarded $N=11$	Emergent $N=14$	Transitional $N=26$	Maturing $N=15$	Advanced $N=16$
Part A					
>$2,600	54%	28%	38%	33%	44%
$1,700–2,600	18	44	24	47	25
<1,700	27	28	38	20	31
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Part B					
Size <25,000					
<$1,700	27%	28%	24%	13%	6%
>$1,700	73	72	39	54	6
Size >25,000					
<$1,700	—	—	15	7	25
>$1,700	—	—	23	27	62
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Density					
<2,000					
<$1,700	9%	14%	0%	7%	0%
>$1,700	63	44	19	33	0
>2,000					
<$1,700	19	14	38	13	32
>$1,700	9	28	43	47	68
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Growth					
<10%					
<$1,700	9%	0%	19%	0%	6%
>$1,700	46	36	23	13	13
>10%					
<$1,700	18	28	19	20	25
>$1,700	27	36	39	67	56
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

ment. Environmental challenges are not self-evident. They become evident only if and when they give rise to "problems" that come to the attention of policy-makers. The perception of a problem means that traditional ways of doing things—policies—are inadequate or at the very least that their adequacy is in question. It is through the perception of problems, then, that the policy process is set in motion. But, if policy-makers do not respond to problems generated by environmental challenges, either by not perceiving them or not acting upon them, this does not mean that there is no policy. It simply means that prevailing policy continues.

In collegial bodies like legislatures or councils a problem is a problem if the members *between them* are aware of the problem, but it is not necessary for all or even most of the members to perceive it. Different members

TABLE 5. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROBLEM DIVERSITY AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT

Diversity Score Quartile	Policy Development				
	Retarded $N=9$	Emergent $N=12$	Transitional $N=25$	Maturing $N=15$	Advanced $N=16$
I. (Most)	45%	33%	20%	27%	6%
II.	22	17	28	20	44
III.	22	33	28	13	31
IV. (Least)	11	17	24	40	19
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Index	+34	+16	−4	−13	−13

have access to different aspects of the environment. Because of varied membership elected collegial bodies can be more sensitive to the environment than administrative hierarchical organizations. "Problem diversity" therefore refers to the absolute number of different problems articulated by a council, adjusted for comparison across councils by the total number of mentions in each council.[18] Because as we have seen, the more developed cities face more severe environmental challenges, we formulate:

Hypothesis 3: The more diverse the problems perceived by a council, the more developed is city policy likely to be.

Table 5 shows that this hypothesis is falsified by the data. In fact, problem diversity is greatest among the councils of the retarded cities where one might least expect it and declines almost linearly in the following stages and phases, though there is some levelling off at the more developed end of the development continuum.

How can one interpret this finding? One plausible answer is that policy develops in response to few but intensively felt problems, while a multitude of minor problems that are not critical do not stimulate the policy process. If this is so, we should expect that problems are more "visible" to the council as a whole in the more developed than in the less developed cities. A measure of "problem visibility" must take account not only of the absolute number of problems that are articulated, but also of the number of councilmen who articulate any one problem.[19] We postulate:

TABLE 6. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROBLEM VISIBILITY AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT

Visibility Score Quartile	Policy Development				
	Retarded $N=9$	Emergent $N=12$	Transitional $N=25$	Maturing $N=15$	Advanced $N=16$
I. (High)	22%	17%	28%	40%	12%
II.	11	33	24	13	45
III.	0	25	36	20	31
IV. (Low)	67	25	12	27	12
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Index	−45	−8	+16	+13	0

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[18] That is, the absolute number of individual problems named was divided by all problem responses made in a council. The resulting scores, that could range from zero to one, were rank-ordered and divided into the quartile ranges used in the analysis.

[19] That is, the number of problems named was multiplied by the number of respondents and divided by all responses squared. The resulting score was subtracted from one to rank-order the

TABLE 7. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AGREEMENT ON SPECIFIC PROBLEM AND GENERAL PROBLEM AREA AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT

Single Problem Agreement	Policy Development				
	Retarded $N=9$	Emergent $N=12$	Transitional $N=25$	Maturing $N=15$	Advanced $N=16$
67–100%	22%	50%	36%	47%	46%
51–66%	45	25	32	20	43
50–50%	33	25	32	33	13
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Index	−11	+25	+4	+14	+33
Problem Area Agreement					
67–100%	33%	17%	32%	13%	37%
51–66%	0	8	16	54	13
0–50%	67	75	52	33	50
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Index	−34	−58	−20	−20	−13

Hypothesis 4: The more visible problems are to the council, the more developed is city policy likely to be.

Table 6 tends to support the hypothesis, although there is some dropping-off at the advanced stage. One might expect this because, as the very concept "advanced" suggests, a council in this stage of policy development is likely to have the challenges stemming from the environment well in hand. As a result, not only are fewer problems perceived in this stage, but the few problems are so self-evident that, though of great urgency, they fail to stand out as particularly visible.

Problem visibility may be thought of as setting the council's legislative agenda. The more visible a problem, the more likely it is to be considered by the council. But the visibility is at most a necessary and not a sufficient condition for legislative action. In order to act, the council must in fact be agreed that the problem is a problem. We therefore measure the degree of council agreement on the single most visible problem as well as council agreement on the general policy area that seems most problematic.[20] We propose:

Hypothesis 5: The more agreement on the single most visible problem, the more developed is city policy likely to be.

Hypothesis 6: The more agreement on the most visible problem area, the more developed is city policy likely to be.

Table 7 tends to support these hypotheses, but we note an interesting deviation from the expected patterns in the cities of the emergent phase. While on the single problem measure more councils in the emergent phase reveal high agreement, these councils are least agreed on the general area of problems facing their cities. We can only speculate on these

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councils from high to low. The formula then is: $1-NP\times NR/r^2$, where NP = number of problems, NR = number of respondents, and r = number of total responses.

[20] The measure of agreement on a single problem is simply the proportion of councilmen among all respondents who mentioned the most frequent problem. For the measure of problem area agreement, the number of responses in the area receiving the most responses was divided by the number of responses in all areas. Five "problem areas" were provided for classification of individual problems: Services and Utilities, Amenities, Promotion and Development, Social and Remedial Problems, and Governmental and Intergovernmental Problems.

TABLE 8. PROBLEMS AND PROBLEM AREAS PERCEIVED AS PRESSING BY CITY COUNCILS

Types of Problems Perceived	Policy Development Retarded $N=9$	 Emergent $N=12$	 Transitional $N=25$	 Maturing $N=15$	 Advanced $N=16$	 Total $N=77$
Services & Utilities						
Sewerage & drainage	1	1	5	2	—	9
Sanitation & disposal	—	1	—	—	—	1
Water sources	1	—	1	—	1	3
Financing services	—	1	2	4	3	10
Total in Area	2	3	8	6	4	23
Per cent in Area	22%	25%	32%	40%	25%	30%
Amenities						
Total in Area	—	—	—	—	—	—
Promotion & Development						
Planning, master plan	—	1	—	—	3	4
Zoning & maintenance	2	1	4	—	—	7
Transportation & traffic	—	1	5	2	3	11
Attract business & industry	—	1	2	—	—	3
Urban renewal & development	—	1	—	—	3	4
Assessment and taxes	—	—	—	2	—	2
Total in Area	2	5	11	4	9	31
Per cent in Area	22%	42%	44%	27%	57%	40%
Social & Remedial						
Water pollution	—	—	—	—	1	1
Race & ethnic problems	—	—	—	—	1	1
Educational problems	—	—	—	1	—	1
Housing	1	—	—	—	—	1
Total in Area	1	—	—	1	2	4
Per cent in Area	11%	0%	0%	7%	12%	5%
Governmental & Intergovernmental						
Annexation	1	—	—	—	—	1
Local government personnel	—	1	—	—	—	1
Citizen participation	—	—	—	—	1	1
Total in Area	1	1	—	—	1	3
Per cent in Area	11%	8%	0%	0%	6%	4%
Not Classifiable	3	3	6	4	0	16
	34%	25%	24%	26%	0%	21%
Grand total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

results. It may be that being in the emergent phase is, on the one hand, a disorienting condition that makes it difficult to achieve agreement on the general area of problems that require action; but that, precisely because of this condition, high agreement can be reached on the single most urgent problem. However, we also note that all councils, regardless of level of policy development, can evidently reach agreement more readily on a specific problem than on a general area of related problems.

What kinds of problems or problem areas are most salient to city councils? And is such salience related to policy development? Although we do not propose to introduce a formal hypothesis, we are altogether unprepared for the results obtained. Taking all those councils

TABLE 9. REASONS GIVEN FOR PROBLEMS AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT

Type of Reasons	Policy Development*				
	Retarded $N=9$	Emergent $N=12$	Transitional $N=25$	Maturing $N=15$	Advanced $N=16$
Operational-financial	22%	8%	36%	20%	25%
Inevitable-uncontrolable	78	92	84	73	62
Political	11	17	12	27	38

* Percentages total more than 100 since any one council could give sets of reasons that are numerically tied.

where at least three councilmen had named the same problem, we obtain the findings reported in Table 8.

As Table 8 shows, no three councilmen in any council, whatever the city's stage or phase of development, articulated problems relating to amenities; and only a few councils on various levels of development mustered enough members who considered planning or zoning as especially pressing problems. We shall leave it to another occasion to interpret the full implications of the results reported in Table 8. Suffice it to say here that problems involving provisions for amenities clearly do not rank high on the agenda of problems considered pressing. Put differently, amenities appear to be luxuries that councils are willing to indulge in only after other urban problems, notably sewerage and drainage, financing of services and transportation, have been solved. But planning and zoning also do not stand out as pressing problems. Either these matters are being satisfactorily handled already, so that they are perceived as problems by only a few councils, or they are not recognized as viable means for coping with environmental challenges.[21]

When asked why they considered a problem to be a problem, a variety of reasons were given by councilmen that could be coded into three categories—operational and financial, political, and inevitable or uncontrollable. Councils were characterized in terms of the dominant set of reasons that were given.[22] We do not entertain any particular hypothesis about how councils on various levels of development are likely to rationalize their city's problems. But we note two results in Table 9. First, great majorities of councils in all cities, regardless of level of policy development, attribute community problems to circumstances beyond their control. This is to say that a substantial number of problems, as we have speculated all along, have their roots in environmental conditions. But we also note that "political" reasons are given by more councils as we move from the retarded to the advanced stage of development. The linearity of the data suggests that politicization of the decision-making milieu in these cities may well be related to policy development. The more politicized the social environment, the more likely it seems to be that policy development takes place.

4. *Policy positions and policy development.*

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[21] Our measure of salience, as mentioned in the text, was whether a problem or problem area was mentioned by at least three respondents. We shall not try to interpret the proportions obtained for the services and utilities as well as promotion and development areas across the developmental continuum because the results may be an artifact of council size. As five councils in the transitional stage, three in the maturing phase and seven in the advanced stage had more than five members (usually seven), and as no retarded or emergent council had more than five members, clearly any one problem had more of a chance to be named by at least three respondents in the more developed cities. But as, for instance, nine of the advanced councils had only five members, yet all advanced councils are accounted for in naming at least one problem, the council size factor does not seem to have too much of a distorting effect. But we note it as interesting that the more developed a city's policy, the more councils tend to mention problems related to utilities and services and to promotion and development.

[22] The dominant set of reasons was simply defined as that set which included the most responses among all sets, regardless of absolute number.

TABLE 10. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IMPROVEMENT DIVERSITY AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT

Improvement Score Quartile	Policy Development				
	Retarded $N=9$	Emergent $N=12$	Transitional $N=25$	Maturing $N=15$	Advanced $N=16$
I. (Most)	33%	50%	20%	13%	31%
II.	33	17	36	33	0
III.	11	8	16	27	57
IV. (Least)	22	25	28	27	12
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Index	+11	+25	− 8	−14	+19

Once problems have been identified and agreed upon as agenda items, the legislature or council will seek to evolve a policy position. A policy position by the council, whether held by all members or only a majority, is of course an emergent property of the council following upon interaction, deliberation and possibly compromise, and it is not simply the addition of individual members' policy preferences. What we are tapping, then, when we ask individual councilmen to suggest the "most needed" community-wide improvement and then aggregate these recommendations, is not the council's policy as it emerges in the voting situation, but rather the initial state of a council position before the legislative process has had an opportunity to affect the decisional outcome.[23] But as actual council policy is reflected in the policy outcomes out of which the typology of policy development is constructed, inquiry into the hypothetical initial state of the policy process can shed light on the dynamics of policy-making. We shall first explore the diversity and visibility of improvement recommendations made by councils in varying stages and phases of policy development. Again we stipulate:

Hypothesis 7: The more diverse improvements recommended in a council, the more developed is city policy likely to be.

And again, as with problem perceptions, we find the diversity hypothesis falsified by the data.[24] As Table 10 shows, highly diverse improvement proposals are just as likely to be made in the less developed as in the most developed councils. However, though problem and improvement proposal diversity is low in the more developed cities, and perhaps because of it, we expect that the improvement

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[23] We could argue our case more liberally on statistical grounds and possibly test it if we had more and numerically more diverse legislative bodies available for analysis: the larger a legislative body, the more likely it is that averaged individual preferences will approximate, if not correspond to, the preference of the collectivity.

[24] The improvement diversity measure was constructed in the same way as the problem diversity measure. See fn. 18, above.

TABLE 11. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IMPROVEMENT VISIBILITY AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT

Improvement Score Quartile	Policy Development				
	Retarded $N=9$	Emergent $N=12$	Transitional $N=25$	Maturing $N=15$	Advanced $N=16$
I. (High)	11%	25%	28%	7%	31%
II.	22	17	16	46	31
III.	33	25	24	40	13
IV. (Low)	33	33	32	7	25
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Index	−22	− 8	− 4	0	+ 6

TABLE 12. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AGREEMENT ON SPECIFIC IMPROVEMENT AND GENERAL IMPROVEMENT AREA AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT

Single Improvement Agreement	Policy Development				
	Retarded $N=9$	Emergent $N=11$*	Transitional $N=25$	Maturing $N=15$	Advanced $N=16$
67–100%	11%	0%	12%	7%	6%
51–66%	0	36	20	33	19
0–50%	89	64	68	60	75
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Index	−78	−64	−56	−53	−69
Improvement Area Agreement					
67–100%	22%	45%	40%	60%	37%
51–66%	45	45	28	33	44
0–50%	33	10	32	7	19
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Index	−11	+35	+ 8	+53	+18

* One council in this type could not be properly measured and had to be dropped from the tabulation.

recommendations that are made are highly visible in these cities. Hence:

Hypothesis 8: The more visible the improvements recommended in a council, the more developed is city policy likely to be.

Table 11 supports the hypothesis.[25] Recommendations for improvements are more visible in the developed than the less developed cities, and only in maturing and advanced cities do a majority of councils fall into the two upper visibility quartiles.

We expect on the basis of this finding that councils in the more developed cities are more agreed on what specific improvements or what general improvement areas are needed than councils in the less developed cities:

Hypothesis 9: The more agreement there is in a council on the single most needed improvement, the more developed is city policy likely to be.

Hypothesis 10: The more agreement there is in a council on a general improvement area, the more developed is city policy likely to be.

Table 12 presents the data.[26] They represent some interesting findings. In the first place, with respect to agreement on the single most visible improvement proposal made, there is a very low level of agreement regardless of a city's location on the policy development continuum. Only few councils are highly agreed, and only a few more manage to achieve better than simple majority agreement. In all types of city policy development, majorities of the councils fall below the majority criterion needed for agreement. Interestingly, and though the percentage differences are small, fewer councils in both types of "phase" cities are in the non-agreement category than councils in the "stage" cities. But, in general, we must consider Hypothesis 9 as being falsified by the data.

If we turn to the less demanding Hypothesis 10—less demanding because agreement is needed only on a general area rather than on a specific case of improvement—the data give only weak support to the hypothesis. Although few of the retarded councils are high on improvement area agreement and the more developed councils tend in the expected direction, the significant aspect of the table is that only one council in each of the two types of "phase" cities is unable to achieve a minimal level of agreement. The tendency already noted in connection with single improvement agreement is exaggerated under the less demanding

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[25] The improvement visibility measure was constructed in the same manner as the problem visibility measure. See fn. 19, above.

[26] The improvement agreement measures are the same as those used in connection with problem agreement. See fn. 20, above.

TABLE 13. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NEEDED IMPROVEMENT AREAS AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT

Improvement Area	Policy Development Retarded $N=9$	Emergent $N=11$	Transitional $N=25$	Maturing $N=15$	Advanced $N=16$
Services and utilities	0%	0%	0%	7%	0%
Promotion and development	0	8	4	14	25
Amenities	11	25	28	26	25
Less than 3 informants	89	67	68	53	50
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

condition of general improvement area agreement.

What are we to make of these unexpected findings? Are they merely due to random fluctuations in the data, or are they of theoretical significance? We must seek an explanation in the nature of the emergent and maturing phases of policy development as these were defined. Cities in these phases undergo sudden bursts of activity, reflected in policy outcomes, that move them from one stage into another. It would seem that this unfolding of policy-making "energy" is greatly aided by *pre-decisional* agreement or at least by relatively little disagreement in councils as to what improvements or areas of improvement are most needed. This finding and our interpretation suggest that we are tapping a very real component of the policy process by aggregating individual responses into a group response.[27]

What types of improvement were recommended by the councils that are agreed? Because of the dispersion of single improvement recommendations, we shall present only the data on improvement areas.[28] What is of interest in the data presented in Table 13 is, first of all, that the improvement areas are quite different from the comparable problem areas of Table 8. Only one council in a maturing city suggested services and utilities as an area needing improvements. But while no council had perceived amenities as a *problem*, a fourth of the councils in each of the developmental types, except the retarded, reported that amenities constitute an area where improvements are needed.

This discontinuity in council policy maps from problem perceptions to policy positions requires explanation. Does it mean that councils do not behave rationally? One might be inclined to think so, but discontinuity is not necessarily the same thing as inconsistency. Because amenities are not recognized as "problems," it does not follow that councils may not wish to pursue policies to obtain amenities for their cities. For policies, we argued, are not simple conditioned responses to environmental challenges; they are also the products of those ends-in-view, values or images of the future that policy-makers carry with them into the policy-making situation. While the policy positions articulated in response to the question about needed improvements may not be relevant to the problems that councils perceived and articulated, they are certainly not inconsistent with them. The results suggest that policy images are important components of the council's policy map as a whole.

5. *Policy images and policy development.* What kind of future a legislative body envisages is likely to color its perceptions of environmental challenges and its current policy preferences. But images of the future are also likely to be projections of current trends in a city's policy development. They tend to orient the council toward the future and may influence future development, but they are not independent of present tendencies. Moreover, the more limited the legislature's jurisdiction, the better-defined its image is likely to be. In the case of municipal

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[27] We would like to point out here that we had very similar results in the earlier study in which we used a *closed* agree-disagree scale measuring attitudes concerning the scope of government activity and in which we used *individual* councilmen as our units of analysis: see Eyestone and Eulau, in Wilson, (ed.), *op. cit.*

[28] An improvement area was assumed to be salient in council preferences if at least three respondents articulated problems in the area.

TABLE 14. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLICY IMAGE AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT

Content of Image	Policy Development Retarded $N=9$	 Emergent $N=12$	 Transitional $N=25$	 Maturing $N=15$	 Advanced $N=16$
Residential-recreational	56%	50%	52%	27%	13%
Split or non-classifiable	22	8	12	7	19
Balanced and/or industrial	22	42	36	66	68
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

councils whose tasks are well set by statutory requirements and limitations we can expect that long-range goals are well-defined.

Because we know that policy development varies with demographic indicators of environmental challenges such as size, density and growth, and because we also can assume that these indicators are highly related to ecological factors such as residential patterns or level of industrialization, we hypothesize:

Hypothesis 11a: The more developed a city's policy, the more will councils tend to envisage the city's future as "balanced" or industrial.
Hypothesis 11b: The less developed a city's policy, the more will councils tend to envisage the city's future as residential and/or recreational.

The ease with which it was possible to classify responses into the categories of "residential" or "recreational," on the one hand, and of "balanced" or "industrial," on the other hand, supports our speculation that long-range images or goals are likely to be well-defined in legislative bodies with limited scopes of action.[29] As Table 14 shows, the reciprocal Hypotheses 11a and 11b are well supported by the data.

Because policy images are well-defined, we hypothesize that there is a great deal of agreement within the councils on policy goals. But as, by definition, the less developed cities are engaged in a more limited range of activities than the more developed ones, we can expect the difference to be reflected in the level of agreement:

Hypothesis 12: The less developed a city's policy, the greater the proportion of councils reaching high agreement on the image of city future.

Table 15 supports the hypothesis. It not only supports it but reveals an extraordinarily

TABLE 15. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AGREEMENT ON POLICY IMAGE AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT

Policy Image Agreement	Policy Development Retarded $N=9$	 Emergent $N=12$	 Transitional $N=25$	 Maturing $N=15$	 Advanced $N=16$
100%	78%	67%	52%	53%	50%
67–99%	0	25	32	27	31
51–66%	0	0	4	13	0
Split or non-classifiable	22	8	12	7	19
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

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[29] Because an "industrial" future was envisaged in only a handful of councils, we combined this category with the "balanced" category which implies that the council envisages a balance in residential, commercial and industrial development.

high level of agreement, especially in the retarded and emergent cities where two-thirds and more of the councils are unanimously agreed on the policy image. But in the transitional, maturing and advanced cities, too, most councils agree on long-range goals by overwhelming majorities. We are dealing here, it seems, with that substantive consensus on values that facilitates the democratic process of bargaining, compromise and adjustment. It is within this consensus that disagreements over particular policies can be resolved and lasting community conflicts be reduced to manageable format. However, the fact that agreement on future goals is inversely related to policy development represents a profound dilemma for democratic theory.

VI. CONCLUSION

A metropolitan city's development toward distinct and differentiated styles of social life is powerfully shaped by policies that are responses to challenges from the metropolitan environment. Whether a city stands still, moves forward to reach a new level of development or reverts to an earlier state depends on the strength of such challenges as can be measured by city size, density or growth rate. In general, development involves the adoption of policies that either adapt the city to the changing environment or control the environment. In this process of adjustment and control through appropriate policies the city's resource capabilities seem to play only a limited part. It appears that policy-makers' willingness to tap city resources in order to adopt appropriate policies is a critical component of the policy development process.

Policy-makers' willingness to set their city on a course of development depends on the content of their policy maps—how they perceive the problems facing the city, what preferences they entertain with regard to policy alternatives, and how they envisage the city's future. In general, it seems that municipal decision-makers' policy maps constitute a consistent whole, although there may be discontinuities and deviations. It also appears, in general, that the various components of the policy map are meaningfully related to the stage or phase of city policy development. There is in the councils of a metropolitan region such as that around the San Francisco Bay a satisfactory level of agreement on what the problems are that cities in different stages of development face, and there is very high agreement on what the city's future should be like. There is less agreement, as one might expect, on the specific policies that should be adopted to obtain the goals that are envisaged, but there is sufficient agreement on the general area of issues that needs attention.

It has been the burden of our argument that the systematic study of public policy cannot be content with correlating indicators of environmental challenges or indicators of resource capability to policy outcomes. Rather, it was our assumption that policy development is greatly influenced by the predilections, preferences, orientations and expectations of policy-makers—in short, by the political process itself. The data presented in the analysis, though limited, confirm the validity of this assumption. Yet, as we noted, the fact that level of agreement on policy goals seems to be inversely related to policy development raises many problems for the policy-maker. Not the least important is the question of how a developed community can maintain a sufficient consensus on public goals. In the city councils of the San Francisco Bay metropolitan region a high level of agreement on policy goals still exists. Whether it will continue to exist in the face of increasing differentiation of areas within the city challenges the urban political process.

THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES*

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Most people who study politics are in general agreement, it seems to me, on at least two propositions. First, we agree that for a political system to be viable, for it to succeed in performing tasks of authoritative resource allocation, problem solving, conflict settlement, and so on, in behalf of a population of any substantial size, it must be institutionalized. That is to say, organizations must be created and sustained that are specialized to political activity.[1] Otherwise, the political system is likely to be unstable, weak, and incapable of servicing the demands or protecting the interests of its constituent groups. Secondly, it is generally agreed that for a political system to be in some sense free and democratic, means must be found for institutionalizing representativeness with all the diversity that this implies, and for legitimizing yet at the same time containing political opposition within the system.[2]

Our growing interest in both of these propositions, and in the problems to which they point, can begin to suggest the importance of studying one of the very few extant examples of a highly specialized political institution which over the long run has succeeded in representing a large number of diverse constituents, and in legitimizing, expressing, and containing political opposition within a complex political system—namely, the U.S. House of Representatives.

The focus of my attention here will be first of all descriptive, drawing together disparate strands—some of which already exist in the literature[3]—in an attempt to show in what sense we may regard the House as an institutionalized organ of government. Not all the necessary work has been done on this rather difficult descriptive problem, as I shall indicate. Secondly, I shall offer a number of speculative observations about causes, consequences, and possible lessons to be drawn from the institutionalization of the House.

The process of institutionalization is one of

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[1] A good recent summary of literature bearing on this point as it applies to the study of political development may be found in Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, 17 (April, 1965), 386–430.

[2] Robert A. Dahl speaks of "the three great milestones in the development of democratic institutions—the right to participate in governmental decisions by casting a vote, the right to be represented, and the right of an organized opposition to appeal for votes against the government in elections and in parliament." In enumerating these three great achievements of democratic government, Dahl also implies that they are embodied principally in three main institutions: parties, elections, and legislatures: Robert A. Dahl (ed.), *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966), p. xi. See also William Nisbet Chambers "Party Development and the American Mainstream," especially pp. 18–19, in Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham (eds.), *The American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development* (New York: Oxford, 1967).

[3] See for example, Nelson W. Polsby, "Congressional Research and Congressional Data: A Preliminary Statement" (mimeo) delivered at the Conference on Congressional Research, sponsored by the Inter-university Consortium for Political Research and the Social Science Research Council at the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., April 3–4, 1964; H. Douglas Price, "The Congressman and the Electoral Arena" (mimeo, 1964); and T. Richard Witmer, "The Aging of the House," *Political Science Quarterly*, 79 (December, 1964), 526–541.

the grand themes in all of modern social science. It turns up in many guises and varieties: as Sir Henry Maine's discussion of the change from status to contract in the history of legal obligations,[4] as Ferdinand Tönnies' treatment of the shift from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*,[5] as Max Weber's discussion of the development of "rational-legal" modes of legitimization as an alternative to "traditional" and "charismatic" modes,[6] as Durkheim's distinction between "mechanical" and "organic" solidarity in his treatment of the consequences of the division of labor[7] and finally—dare we say finally?—as the central process at work in the unfolding of organizations that are held to obey Parkinson's Law.[8]

Such theoretical riches are bound to prove an embarrassment to the empirical researcher, since, unavoidably, in order to do his work, he must pick and choose among a host of possibilities—not those that initially may be the most stimulating, but those that seem most likely to be reflected in his data, which, perforce, are limited.[9] Thus the operational indices I am about to suggest which purport to measure empirically the extent to which the U.S. House of Representatives has become institutionalized may strike the knowledgeable reader as exceedingly crude; I invite the ingenuity of my colleagues to the task of suggesting improvements.

For the purposes of this study, let us say that an institutionalized organization has three major characteristics: 1) it is relatively well-bounded, that is to say, differentiated from its environment. Its members are easily identifiable, it is relatively difficult to become a member, and its leaders are recruited principally from within the organization. 2) The organization is relatively complex, that is, its functions are internally separated on some regular and explicit basis, its parts are not wholly interchangeable, and for at least some important purposes, its parts are interdependent. There is a division of labor in which roles are specified, and there are widely shared expectations about the performance of roles. There are regularized patterns of recruitment to roles, and of movement from role to role. 3) Finally, the organization tends to use universalistic rather than particularistic criteria, and automatic rather than discretionary methods for conducting its internal business. Precedents and rules are followed; merit systems replace favoritism and nepotism; and impersonal codes supplant personal preferences as prescriptions for behavior.

Since we are studying a single institution, the repeated use of words like "relatively" and "tends" in the sentences above refers to a comparison of the House of Representatives with itself at different points in time. The descriptive statement: "The House of Representatives has become institutionalized over time" means then, that over the life span of this institution, it has become perceptibly more bounded, more complex, and more universalistic and automatic in its internal decision making. But can we find measures which will capture enough of the meaning of the term "institutionalization" to warrant their use in an investigation of the process at work in the U.S. House of Representatives?

I. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BOUNDARIES

One aspect of institutionalization is the differentiation of an organization from its environment. The establishment of boundaries in a political organization refers mostly to a channeling of career opportunities. In an undifferentiated organization, entry to and exit from membership is easy and frequent. Leaders emerge rapidly, lateral entry from outside to positions of leadership is quite common, and persistence of leadership over time is rare. As an organization institutionalizes, it stabilizes its membership, entry is more difficult, and turnover is less frequent. Its leadership professionalizes and persists. Recruitment to leadership is more likely to occur from within, and the apprenticeship period lengthens. Thus the organization establishes and "hardens" its outer boundaries.

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[4] Sir Henry Sumner Maine, *Ancient Law* London: John Murray, 1908), pp. 220–325.

[5] Ferdinand Tönnies, *Community and Society* (*Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*) (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1957). See, in particular, the introductory commentary by Charles P. Loomis and John C. McKinney, "The Application of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft as Related to Other Typologies," *ibid.*, pp. 12–29.

[6] Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1947), pp. 328ff.

[7] Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1947).

[8] C. Northcote Parkinson, *Parkinson's Law* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957).

[9] The only successful modern attempt I am aware of that employs a classical theory of institutionalization in an empirical study of something other than a bureaucracy is Harold W. Pfautz's "Christian Science: The Sociology of a Social Movement and Religious Group" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, 1954). See also Harold W. Pfautz, "The Sociology of Secularization: Religious Groups," *The American Journal of Sociology*, 41 (September, 1955), 121–128, and Pfautz, "A Case Study of an Urban Religious Movement: Christian Science" in E. W. Burgess and D. J. Bogue (eds.), *Contributions to Urban Sociology* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. 284–303.

Such measures as are available for the House of Representatives unmistakably show this process at work. In the 18th and 19th centuries, the turnover of Representatives at each election was enormous. Excluding the Congress of 1789, when of course everyone started new, turnover of House members exceeded fifty per cent in fifteen elections—the last of which was held in 1882. In the 20th century, the highest incidence of turnover (37.2 per cent—almost double the twentieth century median) occurred in the Roosevelt landslide of 1932—a figure exceeded forty-seven times—in other words almost all the time—in the 18th and 19th centuries. As Table 1 and Figure 1 make clear, there has

TABLE 1. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BOUNDARIES: DECLINE IN PERCENTAGE OF FIRST TERM MEMBERS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1789–1965

Congress	Year of 1st Term	% 1st Term Members	Congress	Year of 1st term	% 1st Term Members
1	1789	100.0	45	1877	46.6
2	1791	46.5	46	1879	42.3
3	1793	56.5	47	1881	31.8
4	1795	38.9	48	1883	51.5
5	1797	43.1	49	1885	38.0
6	1799	36.0	50	1887	35.6
7	1801	42.5	51	1889	38.1
8	1803	46.9	52	1891	43.8
9	1805	39.9	53	1893	38.1
10	1807	36.2	54	1895	48.6
11	1809	35.9	55	1897	37.9
12	1811	38.5	56	1899	30.1
13	1813	52.6	57	1901	24.4
14	1815	42.9	58	1903	31.3
15	1817	59.2	59	1905	21.0
16	1819	40.8	60	1907	22.5
17	1821	45.2	61	1909	19.9
18	1823	43.2	62	1911	30.5
19	1825	39.4	63	1913	34.4
20	1827	33.2	64	1915	27.2
21	1829	41.0	65	1917	16.0
22	1831	38.0	66	1919	22.7
23	1833	53.7	67	1921	23.6
24	1835	40.0	68	1923	27.1
25	1837	48.6	69	1925	16.3
26	1839	46.3	70	1927	13.3
27	1841	37.7	71	1929	17.7
28	1843	66.7	72	1931	19.0
29	1845	49.0	73	1933	37.2
30	1847	50.4	74	1935	23.4
31	1849	53.1	75	1937	22.7
32	1851	53.3	76	1939	25.5
33	1853	60.5	77	1941	17.0
34	1855	57.5	78	1943	22.9
35	1857	40.2	79	1945	15.8
36	1859	45.1	80	1947	24.1
37	1861	53.9	81	1949	22.3
38	1863	58.1	82	1951	14.9
39	1865	44.3	83	1953	19.5
40	1867	46.0	84	1955	11.7
41	1869	49.2	85	1957	9.9
42	1871	46.5	86	1959	18.2
43	1873	52.0	87	1961	12.6
44	1875	58.0	88	1963	15.2
			89	1965	20.9

Data for 1st through 68th Congresses are from Stuart A. Rice, *Quantitative Methods in Politics* (New York: Knopf, 1928), pp. 296–297. Data for 69th through 89th Congresses are calculated from *Congressional Directories*.

TABLE 2. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BOUNDARIES: INCREASE IN TERMS SERVED BY INCUMBENT MEMBERS OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1789–1963

Congress	Beginning Term	Mean Terms of Service*	Congress	Beginning Term	Mean Terms of Service*
1	1789	1.00	45	1877	2.11
2	1791	1.54	46	1879	2.21
3	1793	1.64	47	1881	2.56
4	1795	2.00	48	1883	2.22
5	1797	2.03	49	1885	2.41
6	1799	2.23	50	1887	2.54
7	1801	2.25	51	1889	2.61
8	1803	2.14	52	1891	2.44
9	1805	2.36	53	1893	2.65
10	1807	2.54	54	1895	2.25
11	1809	2.71	55	1897	2.59
12	1811	2.83	56	1899	2.79
13	1813	2.31	57	1901	3.11
14	1815	2.48	58	1903	3.10
15	1817	1.93	59	1905	3.48
16	1819	2.15	60	1907	3.61
17	1821	2.23	61	1909	3.84
18	1823	2.29	62	1911	3.62
19	1825	2.42	63	1913	3.14
20	1827	2.68	64	1915	3.44
21	1829	2.55	65	1917	3.83
22	1831	2.59	66	1919	3.74
23	1833	2.15	67	1921	3.69
24	1835	2.23	68	1923	3.57
25	1837	2.13	69	1925	3.93
26	1839	2.17	70	1927	4.26
27	1841	2.30	71	1929	4.49
28	1843	1.76	72	1931	4.48
29	1845	1.90	73	1933	3.67
30	1847	2.00	74	1935	3.71
31	1849	1.92	75	1937	3.84
32	1851	1.84	76	1939	3.91
33	1853	1.69	77	1941	4.24
34	1855	1.81	78	1943	4.22
35	1857	2.04	79	1945	4.50
36	1859	2.02	80	1947	4.34
37	1861	1.83	81	1949	4.42
38	1863	1.75	82	1951	4.73
39	1865	2.00	83	1953	4.69
40	1867	2.12	84	1955	5.19
41	1869	2.04	85	1957	5.58
42	1871	2.11	86	1959	5.37
43	1873	2.07	87	1961	5.65
44	1875	1.92	88	1963	5.65

* Total number of terms served divided by total number of Representatives.



FIG. 1. The Establishment of Boundaries: Decline in Percentage of First Term Members, U.S. House of Representatives, 1789–1965.*

* Data from Table 1.



FIG. 2. The Establishment of Boundaries: Increase in Terms Served by Incumbent Members of the U.S. House of Representatives, 1789–1963.*

* Data from Table 2.

been a distinct decline in the rate at which new members are introduced into the House. Table 2 and Figure 2 make a similar point with data that are partially independent; they show that the overall stability of membership, as measured by the mean terms of members (total number of terms served divided by total number of Representatives) has been on the rise.

These two tables provide a fairly good indication of what has happened over the years to rank-and-file members of the House. Another method of investigating the extent to which an institution has established boundaries is to consider its leaders, how they are recruited, what happens to them, and most particularly the extent to which the institution permits lateral entry to and exit from positions of leadership.

The classic example of lateral movement—possibly the most impressive such record in American history—is of course contained in the kaleidoscopic career of Henry Clay, seventh Speaker of the House. Before his first election to the House, Clay had already served two terms in the Kentucky House of Representatives, and had been sent by the legislature to the U.S. Senate for two nonconsecutive short terms. Instead of returning to the Senate in 1811, he ran for the Lexington seat in the U.S. House and was elected. He took his seat on March 4, 1811, and eight months later was elected Speaker at the age of 34. Three years later, he resigned and was appointed a commissioner to negotiate the Treaty of Ghent with Great Britain. The next year, he returned to Congress, where he was again promptly elected Speaker. In 1820 he resigned once again and left public office for two years. But in 1823 he returned to the House, served as Speaker two more terms, and then resigned again, to become Secretary of State in John Quincy Adams' cabinet. In 1831, Clay became a freshman Senator. He remained in the Senate until 1844, when he resigned his seat. Five years later he re-entered the Senate, this time remaining until his death in 1852. Three times (in 1824, 1832, 1844) he was a candidate for president.[10]

Clay's career was remarkable, no doubt, even

TABLE 3. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BOUNDARIES: YEARS SERVED IN CONGRESS BEFORE FIRST SELECTION AS SPEAKER

Date of Selection	Speaker	Years	Date of Selection	Speaker	Years
1789	Muhlenberg	1 or less	1861	Grow	10
1791	Trumbull	3	1863	Colfax	8
1795	Dayton	4	1869	Pomeroy	8
1799	Sedgwick	11	1869	Blaine	6
1801	Macon	10	1875	Kerr	8
1807	Varnum	12	1876	Randall	13
1811	Clay	1 or less	1881	Keifer	4
1814	Cheves	5	1883	Carlisle	6
1820	Taylor	7	1889	Reed	12
1821	Barbour	6	1891	Crisp	8
1827	Stephenson	6	1899	Henderson	16
1834	Bell	7	1903	Cannon	28
1835	Polk	10	1911	Clark	26
1839	Hunter	2	1919	Gillett	26
1841	White	6	1925	Longworth	22
1843	Jones	8	1931	Garner	26
1845	Davis	6	1933	Rainey	28
1847	Winthrop	8	1935	Byrns	25
1849	Cobb	6	1936	Bankhead	15
1851	Boyd	14	1940	Rayburn	27
1855	Banks	2	1946	Martin	22
1857	Orr	7	1962	McCormack	34
1859	Pennington	1 or less			

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[10] On Clay, see Bernard Mayo, *Henry Clay: Spokesman of the New West* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1937); Glyndon G. Van Deusen, *The Life of Henry Clay* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1937); Mary Parker Follett, *The Speaker of the House of Representatives* (New York: Longman's, Green, 1896), pp. 69–82; and Booth Mooney, *Mr. Speaker* (Chicago: Follett, 1964), pp. 21–48.

in a day and age when the boundaries of the House of Representatives were only lightly guarded and leadership in the House was relatively open to lateral entry. But the point to be emphasized here is that Clay's swift rise to the Speakership is only slightly atypical for the period before the turn of the 20th century.

Table 3 demonstrates that there has been a change over time in the seniority of men selected for the Speakership. Before 1899, the mean years of service of members selected for the Speakership was six; after 1899, the mean rises steeply to twenty-six. Figure 3 and Table 4 summarize the gist of the finding in compact form.

Just as 19th-century Speakers arrived early at the pinnacle of House leadership, many left early as well and went on to other things: freshman Senators, state legislators, Cabinet members, and judges in the state courts. One became President of the U.S., one a Justice of the Supreme Court, one a Minister to Russia, one the Mayor of Auburn, New York, and one the Receiver-General of the Pennsylvania land office. Indeed, of the first twenty-seven men to be Speaker, during the first eighty-six years of the Republic, *none* died while serving in the House of Representatives. In contrast, of the last ten Speakers, six died while serving, and of course one other sits in the House today. Table 5 and Figure 4 give the relevant information for all Speakers.

TABLE 4. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BOUNDARIES: SUMMARY OF YEARS SERVED IN CONGRESS BEFORE FIRST SELECTION AS SPEAKER

	Before 1899	1899 and after
8 years or less	25	0
9–14 years	8	0
15–20 years	0	2
21–28 years	0	10
	—	—
	33 Speakers	12 Speakers

The importance of this information about Speakers' careers is that it gives a strong indication of the development of the Speakership as a singular occupational specialty. In earlier times, the Speakership seems to have been regarded as a position of political leadership capable of being interchanged with other, comparable positions of public responsibility—and indeed a high incidence of this sort of interchange is recorded in the careers of 19th century Speakers. That this sort of interchange is most unusual today suggests—as do the other data presented in this section—that one important feature in the development of the U.S. House of Representatives has been its differentiation from other organizations in the political system, a stabilization of its membership, and a growing specialization of its leaders



FIG. 3. The Establishment of Boundaries: Mean Years Served in Congress Before First Becoming Speaker by 20-year Intervals.*

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* Data from Table 3.

TABLE 5. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BOUNDARIES: EMERGENCE OF CAREERS SPECIALIZED TO HOUSE LEADERSHIP

Speaker (term)	Elapsed years between last day of service as Representative and death	How Speakers finished their careers
1. Muhlenberg (1789–90, 1793–94)	6	Receiver-general of Pennsylvania Land Office
2. Trumbull (1791–92)	14	Governor of Connecticut
3. Dayton (1795–98)	25	Senator 1805; private life
4. Sedgwick (1799–1800)	12	Judge of Supreme Court of Massachusetts
5. Macon (1801–06)	17	Senate
6. Varnum (1807–10)	10	U.S. Senate and State Senate, Massachusetts
7. Clay (1811–13, 1815–19, 1823–24)	27	Senate
8. Cheves (1814)	42	President, Bank of U.S.; Chief Commissioner of Claims under Treaty of Ghent; private life
9. Taylor (1820, 1825–26)	21	State Senate, New York; private life
10. Barbour (1821–22)	11	Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court
11. Stevenson (1827–33)	23	Minister to Great Britain; Rector, University of Virginia
12. Bell (1834)	28	Senate; private life
13. Polk (1835–38)	10	President of U.S.
14. Hunter (1839–40)	40	State Treasurer, Virginia; Collector, Tappahannock, Virginia
15. White (1841–42)	1	Judge, 19th Judicial District, Virginia
16. Jones (1843–44)	3	Representative to Virginia State House of Delegates and Speaker
17. Davis (1845–46)	12	U.S. Commissioner to China, Governor of the Oregon Territory
18. Winthrop (1847–48)	44	Senator by appointment; unsuccessful candidate for Senate, Governor; private life
19. Cobb (1849–50)	11	Secretary of Treasury, Buchanan cabinet; Confederate major general; private life
20. Boyd (1851–54)	4	Lt. Governor of Kentucky
21. Banks (1855–56)	3	Served many nonconsecutive terms *after* Speakership; unsuccessful candidate; private life
22. Orr (1857–58)	14	Minister to Russia
23. Pennington (1859–60)	1	Failed of reelection; died soon after
24. Grow (1861–62)	4	Speaker in 37th; later private life; later still reelected to Congress; declined renomination; private life
25. Colfax (1863–68)	16	Private Life; Vice-President
26. Pomeroy (1869)	36	Speaker 1 day; Mayor of Auburn, New York; private life
27. Blaine (1869–74)	17	Secretary of State; President, Pan-American Congress
28. Kerr (1875)	0	Speaker at his death, 1876
29. Randall (1876–80)	0	House of Representatives
30. Keifer (1881–82)	22	Not renominated to House after served as Speaker; Major General in Spanish American War; Returned later to House; private life
31. Carlisle (1883–88)	20	Senate, Secretary of Treasury; private life
32. Reed (1889–90, 1895–98)	3	Private life; law practice
33. Crisp (1891–94)	0	U.S. House of Representatives (nominated for Senate at time of death)
34. Henderson (1899–1902)	3	Private life; retired, House of Representatives

TABLE 5 (*continued*)

Speaker (term)	Elapsed years between last day of service as Representative and death	How Speakers finished their careers
35. Cannon (1903–10)	3	Retired, House of Representatives
36. Clark (1911–18)	0	House of Representatives
37. Gillett (1919–24)	10	Senate; private life
38. Longworth (1925–30)	0	House of Representatives
39. Garner (1931–32)	32+	Vice-President; private life
40. Rainey (1933–34)	0	House of Representatives, Speaker
41. Byrns (1935–36)	0	House of Representatives, Speaker
42. Bankhead (1936–39)	0	House of Representatives, Speaker
43. Rayburn 1940–45, 1947–52, 1955–61)	0	House of Representatives, Speaker
44. Martin (1946–47, 1953–54)	1+	Defeated for renomination, 1966, in his 82nd year and his 44th consecutive year of House service
45. McCormack (1962–67)	0+	House of Representatives, presently Speaker (1967)



FIG. 4. The Establishment of Boundaries: Emergence of Careers Specialized to House Leadership.*

* Data from Table 5.

to leadership of the House as a separate career.[11]

The development of a specifically House leadership, the increase in the overall seniority of members, and the decrease in the influx of newcomers at any point in time have the effect not only of separating the House from other organizations in the political system, but also

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[11] This pattern has been suggested before, by Douglas Price and myself, in unpublished papers (see Footnote 3). It is apparently not unique to the House. David Rothman, on what seem to me to be tenuous grounds, suggests something similar for the U.S. Senate in *Politics and Power: The U.S. Senate 1869–1901* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966). Consider, for a better example, where the United States gets its military leaders today and compare with this observation on the Mexican war period:

> The President [Polk] now undertook to offset this Whig advantage by making a number of Democratic generals. . . . He thereupon proceeded to name numerous Democrats to command the new divisions and brigades. . . . Even this flock of Democratic generals did not erase Polk's fears. After he had committed the command to Scott he considered giving the top authority to a civilian. He wanted to commission Senator Thomas Hart Benton a lieutenant general, and give him overall command. . . .

(Roy F. Nichols, *The Stakes of Power: 1845–1877*' New York: Hill and Wang, 1961, pp. 16, 17.) One would expect civilians to serve high in the officer corps in wars of total mobilization, such as the Civil War and World War II, but not in a conflict involving only a partial mobilization, such as the Mexican War, Korea or Viet Nam. Nevertheless, the full professionalization of our army took place only in this century. During the Spanish-American War, another war of partial mobilization, the business of fighting was still carried on partially by militia and by federal volunteer reigments—irregulars—who fought side by side with, but independently of, regular troops. See Walter Millis, *Arms and Men* (New York: G. P. Putman's Sons, 1956), pp. 167–210. See also a contemporary Washington newsman's report: Arthur Wallace Dunn, *From Harrison to Harding* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons 1922), Vol. I, pp. 240ff, 272–274. Dunn says (Vol. I, pp. 240–41): "From the very beginning politics cut a leading part in the war. The appointments of generals and many other officers were due to influence rather than to merit or fitness . . . One of these [appointments] was General Joe Wheeler, a member of Congress from Alabama. When he appeared with the twin stars of a major general on his shoulders, he joyously exclaimed: 'It is worth fifteen years of life to die on a battlefield'. . . . 'He will have twenty thousand men under him [remarked a critic] who do not share his opinion, and they will not care to lose fifteen years of their lives to give Joe Wheeler a glorious death.' " See also Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1957), esp. pp. 222–269. Huntington dates the rise of the American military as a profession from after the Civil War.

Consider also the following observation about the U.S. Supreme Court: "In the early years, resignations tended to occur for all sorts of reasons; Chief Justice Jay resigned to assume the governorship of New York, for example. But as the Court's prestige increased, justices found fewer reasons to step down from the bench": Samuel Krislov, *The Supreme Court in the Political Process* (New York: Macmillan, 1965), p. 9. David Danelski has suggested in a personal communication that while in its earliest years, the U.S. Supreme Court was neither a prestigious nor well-bounded institution, it became so more rapidly than the House, as the following table indicates:

Decade Appointed	Number of Justices Appointed	Average Tenure
1789–99	12 justices	10.3 years
1800–09	4	25.0
1810–19	2	29.0
1820–29	3	18.0
1830–39	6	20.3
1840–49	4	18.7
1850–59	3	12.3
1860–69	5	21.0
1870–79	5	18.0
1880–89	7	13.6
1890–99	6	16.1
1900–09	4	14.2
1910–19	7	15.0
1920–29	5	14.0
1930–39	6	20.0+ (Black and Douglas still on)
1940–49	8	9.4

It is, of course, not uncommon for students of the Court to view the leadership of Chief Justice Marshall as highly significant in stabilizing the role of the Court in the political system and in enlarging its influence. Other indicators useful in tracing the institutionalization of the federal judiciary might be to study changes in the professional training of persons who have become federal judges, the increase in the number of judges on inferior federal courts, the codification of procedures for dealing with constitutional questions, the routinization of procedures for the of facilitating the growth of stable ways of doing business within the institution, as we shall see shortly.

II. THE GROWTH OF INTERNAL COMPLEXITY

Simple operational indices of institutional complexity and universalistic-automated decision making are less easy to produce in neat and comparable time series. As for the growth of internal complexity, this is easy enough to establish impressionistically, but the most obvious quantitative measure presents a drastic problem of interpretation. The temptation is great to measure internal differentiation by simply counting the number of standing committees in each Congress. This would produce a curiously curvilinear result, because in 1946 the number of standing committees was reduced from 48 to 19, and the number has since crept up only as far as 20.[12]

But the "streamlining," as it was called,[13] of 1946 can hardly be said to have reduced the internal differentiation of the House. On the contrary, by explicitly delineating the legislative jurisdictions of the committees, by consolidating committees with parallel and overlapping functions, by assigning committees exclusive oversight responsibilities over agencies of the executive branch, and by providing committees with expanded staff aid, the 1946 reorganization contributed to, rather than detracted from, the reliance of the House upon committees in the conduct of its business. Thus the mute testimony of the sheer numbers of committees cannot be accepted as an appropriate index of internal complexity. I shall therefore attempt a more anecdotal accounting procedure.

Briefly, the growth of internal complexity can be shown in three ways: in the growth in the autonomy and importance of committees, in the growth of specialized agencies of party leadership, and in the general increase in the provision of various emoluments and auxiliary aids to members in the form of office space, salaries, allowances, staff aid, and committee staffs.

A wholly satisfactory account of the historical development of the House committee system does not exist. But perhaps I can swiftly sketch in a number of plausible conclusions from the literature.

From the perspective of the present-day United States, the use of standing committees by Congress is scarcely a controversial issue.[14] Yet, in the beginning the House relied only very slightly upon standing committees. Instead of the present-day system, where bills are introduced in great profusion and automatically shunted to one or another of the committees whose jurisdictions are set forth in the rules, the practice in the first, and early Congresses was for subjects to be debated initially in the whole House and general principles settled upon, before they were parceled out for further action—fact-finding, detailed consideration or the proposal of a bill—to any one of four possible locations: an officer in the

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granting of certiorari, and the growth of a bureaucracy to administer the federal court system. See, *inter alia*, Mr. Justice Brandeis' dissent in *Ashwander vs. T.V.A.* 297 U.S. 346–348; Edwin McElwain, "The Business of The Supreme Court as Conducted by Chief Justice Hughes," *Harvard Law Review*, 63 (November, 1949), 5–26; Merlo J. Pusey, *Charles Evans Hughes* (New York: Macmillan, 1951), Vol. II, pp. 603–690; Frederick Bernays Wiener, "The Supreme Court's New Rules," *Harvard Law Review*, 68 (November, 1954), 20–94; and Chief Justice Vinson's address before the American Bar Association, "The Work of the Federal Courts," September 7, 1949, reprinted in part in Walter F. Murphy and C. Herman Pritchett (eds.), *Courts, Judges and Politics* (N. Y.: Random House, 1961), pp. 54–58.

[12] The combined totals of standing committees and subcommittees might be a better guide; but reliable information about subcommittees only exists for the most recent two decades.

[13] I believe the word is George Galloway's. See *Congress at the Crossroads* (New York: Crowell, 1946), p. 340.

[14] It certainly is, on the other hand, in the present-day United Kingdom, where purely legislative committees are regarded as a threat to the cohesion of the national political parties because they would give the parliamentary parties special instruments with which they could develop independent policy judgments and expertise and exercise oversight over an executive which is, after all, not formally constituted as an entity separate from Parliament. Thus committees can be construed as fundamentally inimical to unified Cabinet government. For an overview see Bernard Crick, *The Reform of Parliament* (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor, 1965); *The Political Quarterly*, 36 (July–September, 1965); and Andrew Hill and Anthony Whichelow, *What's Wrong with Parliament?* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1964), esp. pp. 64–82. See also a most illuminating essay by Robert C. Fried on the general conditions under which various political institutions (including legislatures) are strong or weak within their political systems: *Comparative Political Institutions* (New York: Macmillan, 1966), esp. p. 31.

Executive Branch, a Committee of the Whole, a Select Committee formed *ad hoc* for the reception of a particular subject, or a standing committee. Generally, one of the alternatives to standing committees was used.

Of the First Congress, Harlow writes:

> The outstanding feature of procedure in the House was the important part played by the Committee of the Whole. Much of the business in the House of Delegates of Virginia was transacted in that way, and the Virginians were influential enough to impose their methods upon the federal House. . . . It was in Committee of the Whole that Congress worked out the first tarriff bill, and also the main outlines of such important measures as the laws organizing the executive departments. After the general principles were once determined, select committees would be appointed to work out the details, and to frame bills in accordance with the decision already agreed upon in Committee of the Whole. Considerable work was done by these select committees, especially after the first session.[15]

And Alexander says:

> In the early history of the House the select committee . . . was used exclusively for the consideration of bills, resolutions, and other legislative matters.[16] As business increased and kindred subjects became scattered, however, a tendency to concentrate inaugurated a system of standing committees. It rooted itself slowly. There was an evident distrust of the centralizing influence of permanent bodies. Besides, it took important business from the many and gave it to a few, one standing committee of three or five members often taking the place of half a dozen select committees.[17]

It is difficult to disentangle the early growth of the standing committee system from concurrent developments in the party system. For as Alexander Hamilton took control of the administration of George Washington, and extended his influence toward men of like mind in Congress, the third alternative to standing committees—reference to a member of the Executive Branch—became an important device of the Federalist majority in the House.

> By the winter of 1790 [Harlow writes] Hamilton was attracting attention because of his influence over Congress. . . . His ready intelligence grasped the truth at once that Jefferson spent more than ten years learning: that not even the Constitution of the United States could keep apart two such inseparable factors in government as executive and legislature.[18]

In the first two Congresses Hamilton is said to have used the Federalist caucus to guide debate in the Committee of the Whole, and also to have arranged for key financial measures to be referred directly to himself for detailed drafting.[19] This practice led, in the Second Congress, to sharp clashes with followers of Jefferson, who

> made it perfectly clear that if they should ever get the upper hand in Congress, they would make short work of Hamilton, and restore to the House what they considered to be its constitutional authority over finance.[20]

The Republicans did in fact gain the upper hand in the Third Congress (elected in 1792) and they restored detailed power over finances to the Committee of the Whole. This did not work satisfactorily, however, and in the Fourth Congress a Committee on Ways and Means was formed. Harlow says:

> The appointment of . . . standing committees, particularly . . . Ways and Means, was in a way a manifestation of the Republican theory of government. From their point of view, the members of the House, as the direct representa-

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[15] Ralph V. Harlow, *The History of Legislative Methods in the Period Before 1825* (New Haven: Yale, 1917), pp. 127–128. See also Joseph Cooper, "Jeffersonian Attitudes Toward Executive Leadership and Committee Development in the House of Representatives 1789–1829," *Western Political Quarterly*, 18 (March, 1965), 45–63; and Cooper, "Congress and Its Committees in the Legislative Process" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Government, Harvard University, 1960), pp. 1–65.

[16] On changes in the use of select committees, Lauros G. McConachie says: "Business of the earlier Houses went to hosts of select committees. At least three hundred and fifty were raised in the Third Congress. A special committee had to be formed for every petty claim. A bill founded on the report of one small committee had to be recommended to, or carefully drafted by, yet another committee. But the decline in the number of these select committees was strikingly rapid. In twenty years, at the Congress of 1813–1815 with its three war sessions, it had fallen to about seventy": *Congressional Committees* (New York: Crowell, 1898), p. 124. See also Galloway, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

[17] DeAlva Stanwood Alexander, *History and Procedure of the House of Representatives* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1916), p. 228.

[18] Harlow, *op. cit.*, pp. 141.

[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 120–150.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 151.

tives of the voters, ought to be the mainspring of the whole system. Hitherto, the Federalists had sold their birthright by permitting the executive to take a more active part in the government than was warranted by the Constitution. The Republicans now planned to bring about the proper balance between the different branches, by broadening at once the scope of the operations of the House, and restricting the executive. It was the better to enable the House to take its assigned part that the new type of organization was worked out. Just as the heads of departments were looked upon as agents of the executive, so the committees would be considered as the agents of the House.[21]

During the presidency of Thomas Jefferson, committees were constituted and employed as agents of the President's faction in Congress which was in most matters actively led by the President himself. Binkley says:

> . . . When the House of Representatives had elected its Speaker and the committee chairmen had been appointed it was apparent to the discerning that lieutenants of the President had not appointed them, but his wishes, confidentially expressed, had determined them just as surely as if he had formally and publicly nominated them. Here was the fulfillment of Marshall's prediction that Jefferson would "embody himself in the House of Representatives."[22]

There is, however, some doubt as to Jefferson's absolute mastery over committee appointments, since it is also reported that Speaker Macon was extremely important in constituting the committees, and, in particular, in keeping John Randolph on as chairman of the Ways and Means Committee for some time after Randolph had repeatedly and violently broken with the Jefferson administration.[23]

Recently the suggestion has been made that the direct evidence is slight and contradictory that political parties in Congress went through rapid organization and differentiation in the earliest years of the Republic. This revisionist interpretation lays greater stress upon boarding house cliques, more or less sectional and more or less ideologically factional in their composition, as the heretofore neglected building blocks out of which the more conventionally partisan Congressional politics of the Jacksonian era eventually grew.[24]

But even revisionists concede to Jefferson a large influence over Congressional politics; the conventional accounts of the growth of the committee system are pretty much undisturbed by their critique. In essence, by the early years of the 19th century, the House committee system had passed through two distinct phases: the no-committee, Hamiltonian era, in which little or no internal differentiation within the institution was visible; and a Jeffersonian phase, in which factional alignments had begun to develop—these were exploited by the brilliant and incessant maneuverings of the President himself, who selected his lieutenants and confidants from the ranks of Congress *ad hoc*, as political requirements and opportunities dictated. During this period a small number of standing committees existed, but were not heavily relied upon. Their jurisdictions were not so securely fixed that the Speaker could not instead appoint select committees to deal with business that ought to have been sent to them.[25]

The advent of Henry Clay and the victory of the War Hawk faction in the elections of 1810 brought the committee system to its third phase. Clay for the first time used the Speaker's prerogative of appointment of members to committees independently of Presidential designs. There is some question whether Clay's appointment policies were calculated to further his policy preferences or merely his popularity (and hence his Presidential ambitions) within the factionally divided house,[26] but there seems no reason to doubt that Clay won for the Speakership a new measure of independence as a power base in the American political system. Under Clay five House committees were constituted to oversee expenditures in executive departments, the first major institutionalization of the Congressional function of oversight. William N. Chambers writes:

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[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 157–158.

[22] Wilfred E. Binkley, *President and Congress* (New York: Vintage, 1962), p. 64.

[23] Of Randolph's initial appointment as chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, in the Seventh Congress, Noble Cunningham writes: "in view of the close friendship of [Speaker] Macon and Randolph, it is unlikely that Jefferson had any influence in the choice of Randolph as Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee": *Jeffersonian Republicans in Power* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1963), p. 73. See also Henry Adams, *John Randolph* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1886), pp. 54–55, 123–165ff; and Adams, *History of the United States of America During the Administrations of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison* (New York: Boni, 1930), Vol. III, p. 128.

[24] This interpretation is the brilliant achievement of James S. Young in *The Washington Community: 1800–1828* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966). It harmonizes with Richard P. McCormick's notion of a series of historically discrete American party systems. See McCormick, *The Second American Party System* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966).

[25] See Wilfred Binkley, "The President and Congress," *Journal of Politics*, 11 (February, 1949), 65–79.

> [By] 1814 the committee system had become the dominant force in the chamber. Thus effective power was exercised not by the President, as had been the case with Jefferson, but by factional Congressional leaders working through the speakership, the caucus, and the committees.[27]

For the next 100 years the committee system waxed and waned more or less according to the ways in which committees were employed by the party or faction that dominated the House and elected the Speaker. Figures from the latter decades of the 19th century testify amply to the leeway afforded Speakers—especially new ones—in constituting committees regardless of their prior composition.[28] In part, it was Speaker Cannon's increasing use of this prerogative in an attempt to keep control of his fragmenting party that triggered the revolt against his Speakership in 1910–11, and that led to the establishment of the committee system as we know it today.[29]

Under the fourth, decentralized, phase of the committee system, committees have won solid institutionalized independence from party leaders both inside and outside Congress. Their jurisdictions are fixed in the rules; their composition is largely determined and their leadership entirely determined by the automatic operation of seniority. Their work is increasingly technical and specialized, and the way in which they organize internally to do their work is entirely at their own discretion. Committees nowadays have developed an independent sovereignty of their own, subject only to very infrequent reversals and modifications of their powers by House party leaders backed by large and insistent majorities.

To a degree, the development over the last sixty years of an increasingly complex machinery of party leadership within the House cross-cuts and attentuates the independent power of committees. Earlier, the leading faction in the House elected the Speaker and the Speaker in turn distributed the chairmanships of key committees to his principal allies and opponents. Thus the work of the House was centralized to the extent that the leading faction in the House was centralized. But differences of opinion are not uncommon among qualified observers. The Jeffersonian era, for example, is widely regarded as a high point of centralization during the 19th century. Harlow reports:

> From 1801 to 1808 the floor leader was distinctly the lieutenant of the executive. William B. Giles, who was actually referred to as "the premier, or prime minister," Caesar A. Rodney, John Randolph of Roanoke, and Wilson Cary Nicholas all held that honorable position at one time or another. It was their duty to look after party interests in the House, and in particular to carry out the commands of the President. The status of these men was different from that of the floor leader of today. . . They were presidential agents, appointed by the executive, and dismissed at his pleasure.[30]

But another observer, a Federalist congressman quoted by Noble Cunningham, suggests that the Jeffersonian group was not at all times well organized:

> The ruling faction in the legislature have not yet been able to understand each other. . . . There evidently appears much rivalry and jealousy among the leaders. S[amuel] Smith thinks his experience and great address ought to give him a preponderance in all their measures, whilst Nicholson evidently looks upon these pretensions of his colleague with contempt, and Giles thinks the first representative of the Ancient Dominion ought certainly on all important occasions to take the lead, and Johnny Randolph is perfectly astonished that his great abilities should be overlooked. There is likewise a great number of other

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[26] See Young, *op. cit.*, pp. 131–135.

[27] William Nisbet Chambers, *Political Parties in a New Nation* (New York: Oxford, 1963), p. 194.

[28] See Nelson W. Polsby, Miriam Gallaher and Barry Spencer Rundquist, "The Growth of the Seniority System in the Selection of Committee Chairman in the U.S. House of Representatives" (mimeo., October, 1967).

[29] *Ibid.* Chang-wei Chiu says, "The power of appointing committees by the Speaker was a real issue in the attempts to reform the House. In the eyes of the insurgents no change would be of any real and permanent value to the country if that change did not take away from the Speaker the power of appointing standing committees": *The Speaker of The House of Representatives Since 1896* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928), pp. 71–72.

[30] Harlow, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

> persons who are impatient of control and disposed to revolt at any attempts at discipline.[31]

This certainly squares with the reports of Jefferson's own continued attempts, also revealed in his letters, to recruit men to the House with whom he could work.[32]

Despite Jefferson's difficulties, he was the most consistently successful of all the 19th century Presidents in "embodying himself in the House of Representatives." After Jefferson, the Speaker became a power in his own right; not infrequently he was a candidate for the Presidency himself, and the House was more or less organized around his, rather than the President's, political interests. There was no formal position of majority leader; the leading spokesman for the majority party on the floor was identified by personal qualities of leadership and by the favor of the Speaker (or in the Jeffersonian era, of the President) rather than by his institutional position.[33]

Later, however, the chairman of the Ways and Means Committee—a key post reserved for the chief lieutenant of the Speaker—became *de facto* floor leader, a natural consequence of his responsibilities in managing the tariff bills that were so important in 19th century congressional politics. Occasionally the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations was the *de facto* leader, especially during periods of war mobilization, when the power of the House in the political system was coextensive with the power of the purse.[34] In the last part of the 19th century, however, the Committee on Appropriations was temporarily dismantled, and the chairman of Ways and Means Committee began to receive the formal designation as party leader.

The high point of the Ways and Means chairman's power came in the aftermath of the 1910 revolt against the Speaker. The power of committee appointments was for Democrats lodged in the Ways and Means Committee. Chairman Oscar Underwood, in cooperation with President Wilson, for a time (1911–1915) eclipsed the Speaker and the committee chairmen by operating the majority party by caucus.[35]

But Underwood's successor as Chairman of Ways and Means, Claude Kitchin (majority leader 1915–1919), disapproved of Wilson's war policies; this made it cumbersome and impractical for the leader of the majority on the floor and in caucus to hold this job by virtue of what was becoming an automatic succession through seniority to the chairmanship of Ways and Means. A separation of the two roles was effected after the Democrats became the minority in 1919.[36] Ever since then, the majority leader's job has existed as a full-time position; the incumbent now holds a nominal, junior committee post but he rarely attends committee meetings. At the same time, the majority leader has become less of a President's man, and the caucus is now dormant as an instrument of party leadership—although it now sometimes becomes a vehicle, especially at the opening of Congress, for the expression of widespread dissatisfaction by rank-and-file House members. Thus, while binding votes on policy matters have not been put through the caucus by party leaders, the Republican caucus has three times in recent years deposed party leaders and the Democratic caucus has deprived three of its members of their committee seniority.

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[31] Cunningham, *op. cit.*, p. 74. The quotation is from a letter from Roger Griswold to John Rutledge, December 14, 1801.

[32] See Jefferson's letters to Barnabas Bidwell and Wilson Cary Nicholas cited in *ibid.*, pp. 89–92. Also Henry Adams, *History, op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 166–171.

[33] Randall Ripley, in his forthcoming Brookings study, *Party Leadership in the House of Representatives* (mimeo, 1966) says: "The Majority leader did not become a separate and consistently identifiable party figure until some time around the turn of the century." Ripley also discusses the indeterminancy of the minority leadership in the mid-19th century. Of an earlier period (1800–1828) Young (*op. cit.*, pp. 126–127) writes: "Party members elected no leaders, designated no functionaries to speak in their behalf or to carry out any legislative task assignments. The party had no whips, no seniority leaders. There were no committees on committees, no steering committees, no policy committees: none of the organizational apparatus that marks the twentieth-century congressional parties. . . ." On pp. 127–130 Young argues that although there were a number of party leaders in the House, there was no fixed majority leader. "[W]hile the names of Randolph, Giles, Nicholas and Rodney appear more frequently, at least twenty Republican legislators in the eight years of Jefferson's administration are either explicitly identified as leaders in the documentary record or are associated with activities strongly suggesting a role of presidential spokesmanship" (p. 130).

[34] From 1865–1869, for example, Thaddeus Stevens left the chairmanship of Ways and Means (a post he had held from 1861–1865) to become chairman of the new Committee on Appropriations. See Samuel W. McCall, *Thaddeus Stevens* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1899), pp. 259–260. McCall says, oddly, that at the time the Appropriations Committee was not very important, but this is hard to credit. From 1895–1899, Joseph G. Cannon was floor leader and chairman of Appropriations. See Edward T. Taylor, *A History of the Committee on Appropriations* (House Document 299, 77th Congress, 1st Session) (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1941).

[35] See George Rothwell Brown, *The Leadership of Congress* (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1922), pp. 175–177, 183–184; Oscar King Davis, "Where Underwood Stands," *The Outlook* (December 23, 1911), 197–201. At p. 199: "Every move Mr. Underwood has made, every bill he has brought forward, he first submitted to a caucus. . . . Not until the last man had had his say was the vote taken that was to bind them all to united action in the House. Every time that vote has been either unanimous or nearly so, and invariably it has approved Mr. Underwood." See also Binkley, "The President and Congress," *op. cit.*, p. 72.

Formally designated party whips are, like the differentiated post of majority leaders, an innovation principally of the twentieth century. The first whips date back to just before the turn of the century. In the early years, the designation seems to have been quite informal, and it is only recently that an elaborate whip system, with numerous deputies, a small staff, and formal procedures for canvassing members, has been established by both parties in the House.[37]

Thus, we can draw a contrast between the practices of recent and earlier years with respect to formal party leaders other than the Speaker:

(1) Floor leaders in the 20th century are officially designated; in the 19th, they were often informally designated, indefinite, shifting or even competitive, and based on such factors as personal prestige, speaking ability, or Presidential favor.[38]

(2) Floor leaders in recent years are separated from the committee system and elected by party members; earlier they were prominent committee chairmen who were given their posts by the Speaker, sometimes as a side-payment in the formation of a coalition to elect the Speaker.[39]

(3) Floor leaders today rely upon whip systems; before 1897 there were no formally designated whips.

A third indicator of the growth of internal organization is the growth of resources assigned to internal House management, measured in terms of personnel, facilities, and money. Visitors to Washington are not likely to forget the sight of the five large office buildings, three of them belonging to the House, that flank the Capitol. The oldest of these on the House side was built just after the turn of the century, in 1909, when a great many other of our indices show significant changes.

Reliable figures, past or present, on personnel assigned to the House are impossible to come by; but it is unlikely that a commentator today would agree with the observer early in this century who said:

> It is somewhat singular that Congress is one of the few legislative bodies that attempts to do its work almost entirely without expert assistance—without the aid of parliamentary counsel, without bill drafting and revising machinery and without legislative and reference agencies, and until now it has shown little inclination to regard with favor proposals looking toward the introduction of such agencies.[40]

Indeed, the only major contemporary study we have of congressional staff speaks of present "tendencies toward overexpansion of the congressional staff," and says that "Three-fourths of the committee aides interviewed" thought that professional staffs of committees were sufficiently large to handle their present work load.[41]

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[36] See Ripley, *op. cit.*; Hasbrouck, *op. cit.*, p. 94; and Alex M. Arnett, *Claude Kitchin and the Wilson War Policies* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1937), pp. 42, 71–72, 75–76, 88–89 and passim.

[37] See Randall B. Ripley, "The Party Whip Organization in the United States House of Representatives" this REVIEW, 58 (September, 1964), 561–576.

[38] See, e.g., Alexander, *op. cit.*, pp. 111–114. "[W]ith very few exceptions, the really eminent debaters . . . were in the Senate; otherwise, MacDuffie [who served 1821–1834], Chief of the Hotspurs, could scarcely have justified his title to floor leader," p. 114.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 110: "In selecting a floor leader the Speaker often names his party opponent."

[40] James W. Garner, "Executive Participation in Legislation as a Means of Increasing Legislative Efficiency," *Proceedings of the American Political Science Association at its Tenth Annual Meeting* (Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1914), p. 187.

[41] Kenneth Kofmehl, *Professional Staffs of Congress* (Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1962), pp. 97–99. The quotation is at p. 99. Kofmehl presents a short, nonquantitative historical sketch of the growth of committee staffs on pp. 3–5. See also Samuel C. Patterson "Congressional Committee Professional Staffing: Capabili-

TABLE 6. THE GROWTH OF INTERNAL COMPLEXITY: EXPENDITURES MADE BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES*

Fiscal Year	Expenditures (1000s dollars)	Fiscal Year	Expenditures (1000s dollars)	Fiscal Year	Expenditures (1000s dollars)
1872	1,952	1915	5,081	1961	47,324
1873	3,340	1916	4,917	1962	50,295
1874	2,687	1917	5,400	1963	52,983
		1918	5,331	1964	55,654
1875	2,030	1919	5,304	1965	58,212
1876	2,201				
1877	2,232	1920	7,059	1966 (est.)	65,905
1878	2,183	1921	6,510	1967 (est.)	70,883
1879	2,230	1922	6,001		
		1923	6,588		
1880	2,137	1924	6,154		
1881	2,191				
1882	2,188	1925	7,761		
1883	2,339	1926	7,493		
1884	2,405	1927	7,526		
		1928	7,623		
1885	2,466	1929	7,813		
1886	2,379				
1887	2,232	1930	8,260		
1888	2,354	1931	8,269		
1889	2,416	1932	8,310		
		1933	7,598		
1890	2,567	1934	7,154		
1891	2,520				
1892	2,323	1935	8,007		
1893	2,478	1936	8,377		
1894	2,844	1937	8,451		
		1938	8,139		
1895	2,945	1939	8,615		
1896	2,843				
1897	3,108	1940	9,375		
1898	2,948	1941	9,511		
1899	3,063	1942	9,678		
		1943	9,361		
1900	2,981	1944	10,944		
1901	3,066	1945	11,660		
1902	3,088				
1903	3,223	1946	14,243		
1904	3,247	1947	16,012		
		1948	18,096		
1905	3,367	1949	18,110		
1906	3,517	1950	20,330		
1907	3,907				
1908	4,725	1951	21,053		
1909	5,005	1952	23,474		
		1953	23,622		
1910	4,897	1954	23,660		
1911	5,066	1955	26,610		
1912	4,741				
1913	5,148	1956	34,587		
1914	5,012	1957	36,738		
		1958	39,524		
		1959	43,882		
		1960	44,207		

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* *Sources:* U.S. Executive Office of President. Bureau of the Budget. *The Budget of United States Government.* Annual Volumes for 1921–1967. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office

U.S. Treasury Department. *Combined Statement of Receipts, Expenditures and Balances of the United States Government.* Annual volumes for 1872–1920. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office.

Needless to say, that work load has grown, and, though it is impossible to say precisely by how much, congressional staffs have grown as well. This is roughly reflected in figures that are more or less comparable over time on that portion of the legislative budget assigned to the House. These figures show the expected increases. However, except for the jump between 1945 and 1946, reflecting the new provisions for staff aid of the Legislative Reorganization Act, the changes in these figures over time are not as abrupt as is the case with other of our time series. Nor would changes over time be even as steep as they are in Table 6 if these figures were corrected for changes in the purchasing power of the dollar. So we must regard this indicator as weak, but nevertheless pointing in the expected direction.

III. FROM PARTICULARISTIC AND DISCRETIONARY TO UNIVERSALISTIC AND AUTOMATED DECISION MAKING

The best evidence we have of a shift away from discretionary and toward automatic decision making is the growth of seniority as a criterion determining committee rank and the growth of the practice of deciding contested elections to the House strictly on the merits.

The literature on seniority presents a welter of conflucting testimony. Some commentators date the seniority system from 1910;[42] others say that seniority as a criterion for determining the committee rank of members was in use well before.[43] Woodrow Wilson's classic account of *Congressional Government* in 1884 pays tribute both to the independence of the committees and their chairman and to the absolute discretion of the Speaker in the committee appointment process.[44] It is clear that the Speaker has no such power today. In another paper my colleagues and I present a detailed preliminary tabulation and discussion on the extent to which seniority in its contemporary meaning was followed in the selection of committee chairmen in the most recent 40 Congresses.[45] The central finding for our present purposes (summarized in Table 7 and Figure 5) is that the seniority system—an automatic, universally applied, nondiscretionary method of selection—is now always used, but that formerly the process by which chairmen were selected was highly and later partially discretionary.

TABLE 7. THE GROWTH OF UNIVERSALISM: VIOLATIONS OF SENIORITY IN THE APPOINTMENT OF COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1881–1963

Percentage of Committees on which the chairman was not selected by seniority, averaged by decades

Congress:	47–51	52–56	57–61	62–66
Years:	1881–89	1891–99	1901–09	1911–19
Average: Violations of Seniority	60.4%	49.4%	19%	30.8%
Congress:	67–71	72–76	77–81	82–88
Years:	1921–29	1931–39	1941–49	1951–63
Average: Violations	26%	23%	14%	.7%

The figures for before 1911 can be interpreted as indicating the use of the Speaker's discretion in the appointment of committee chairmen. After 1911, when committee appointment powers are vested in committees on committees, the figures principally reflect the growth of the norm that no one man should

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ties and Constraints," a paper presented at the Planning Conference of the Comparative Administration Group, Legislative Services Project, Planting Fields, New York, December 8–10, 1967; and Lindsay Rogers "The Staffing of Congress" *Political Science Quarterly*, 56 (March, 1941), 1–22.

[42] George B. Galloway, *op. cit.*, p. 187; George Goodwin, Jr., "The Seniority System in Congress" this REVIEW, 53 (June, 1959), p. 417.

[43] Chiu, *op. cit.*, pp. 68–72; James K. Pollock, Jr., "The Seniority Rule in Congress," *The North American Review*, 222 (1925), 235, 236; Asher Hinds, "The Speaker of the House of Representatives," this REVIEW, 3 (May, 1909), 160–161.

[44] Woodrow Wilson, *Congressional Government* (New York: Meridian Books, 1956) (First edition, 1884). See, for example, on pp. 85–86: "The Speaker is expected to constitute the Committees in accordance with his own political views . . . [and he] generally uses his powers as freely and imperatively as he is expected to use them. He unhesitatingly acts as the legislative chief of his party, organizing the Committees in the interest of this or that policy, not covertly or on the sly, as one who does something of which he is ashamed, but openly and confidently, as one who does his duty. . . ." Compare this with p. 82: "I know not how better to describe our form of government in a single phrase than by calling it a government by the chairmen of the Standing Committees of Congress. This disintegrate ministry, as it figures on the floor of the House of Representatives, has many peculiarities. In the first place, it is made up of the elders of the assembly; for, by custom, seniority in congressional service determines the bestowal of the principal chairmanships. . . ."

[45] Polsby, Gallaher, and Rundquist, *op. cit.*



FIG. 5. The Growth of Universalism; Decline in Violations of Seniority, Committee Chairmen, U.S. House of Representatives, 1881–1963.*

* Data from Table 7.

serve as chairman of more than one committee. Congressmen often sat on a large number of committees, and senior men rose to the top of more than one committee, but allowed less senior men to take the chair, much as the custom presently is in the U.S. Senate. After 1946, when the number of committees was drastically reduced, this practice died out, and a strictly automated system of seniority has asserted itself.

The settlement of contested elections on some basis other than the merits seems in earlier years to have been a common phenomenon. To this point, we can bring the testimony of a number of quotes and anecdotes, widely separated in time. Here are a few examples:

1795: A foreshadowing of future developments arose in the contested election of Joseph B. Varnum, of Massachusetts, in the Fourth Congress. This case became the focus of a struggle for power between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists. It is an early instance of the triumph of the rule that all too often might makes right, at least in the settlement of election contests in the House of Representatives.

Varnum's election was contested on the principal ground that the Board of Selectmen of his home town (of which Board he was a member) had returned sixty votes more than there were qualified voters in the town. Since he had been elected with a certified overall plurality of eleven votes, investigation was warranted. Theodore Sedgwick, leader of the Federalists in the House, suggested that testimony be taken . . . inasmuch as the House alone had the power to compel the town clerk to produce the records containing the names of the illegal voters, if indeed any existed. Varnum, an Anti-Federalist, strongly protested against such a procedure. . . . He proposed . . . that petitioners . . . should present the names of the illegal voters, if they could do so. . . . This was impossible, since only the town clerk had access to the voting records of the town. The Anti-Federalists, who controlled the House at the time, on a party-line vote sustained Varnum's objections . . . in fact, the controlling faction even went so far as to adopt a resolution, again by a partisan vote, declaring that "the charges against [Varnum] are wholly unfounded. . . ." "Thus, amidst an outburst of derisive laughter, the incident closed like a harliquinade."[46]

1860's: I served in my second term on the Committee on Elections. . . . Election cases in the House up to that time were . . . determined entirely by party feeling. Whenever there was a plausible reason for making a contest the dominant party in the House almost always awarded the seat to the man of its own side. There is a well-authenticated story of Thaddeus Stevens, that going into the room of the Committee on Elections, of which he was a member, he found a hearing going on. He asked one of his Republican colleagues what was the point in the case. "There is not much point to it," was the answer. "They are both damned scoundrels." "Well," said Stevens, "which is the Republican damned scoundrel? I want to go for the Republican damned scoundrel."[47]

1869: All traces of a judicial character in these proceedings are fast fading away. . . . Each case is coming to be a mere partisan struggle. At the dictate of party majorities, the Committee [on Elections] must fight, not follow, the law and the evidence. . . . This tendency is so manifest . . . that it has ceased to be questioned, and is now but little resisted . . . [E]fforts . . . to hold the judgments of the Committee on Elections up above the dirty pool of party politics have encountered such bitter and unsparing denunciation, and such rebuke for treason to party fealty, that they are not likely often to be repeated.[48]

1890: The [elections] committee usually divides on the line of party . . . and the House usually follows in the same way. . . . The decision of election cases invariably increases the party which organized the House and . . . appoints the majority of the Committee on Elections. Probably there is not an instance on record where the minority was increased by the decision of contested cases. . . . It may be said that our present method of determining election cases is . . . unjust to members and contestants and fails to secure the representation which the people have chosen.[49]

1895: A most casual inspection of the workings of the present system of deciding election contests will show that it barely maintains the form of a judicial inquiry and that it is thoroughly tainted with the grossest partisanship. . . . When it is alleged that members of a minority do not generally contest seats, a striking tribute is paid to the partisanship of the present system.[50]

1899: The Republican majority in this House

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[46] John Thomas Dempsey, "Control by Congress over the Seating and Disciplining of Members" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Michigan, 1956), pp. 50–51. The final quotation is from Alexander, *op. cit.*, p. 315.

[47] George F. Hoar, *Autobiography of Seventy Years* (New York: Scribner, 1903), Vol. I, p. 268. Hoar claims that during the time he served on the Elections Committee in the Forty-second Congress (1871–73), contested elections were settled on the merits.

[48] Henry L. Dawes, "The Mode of Procedure in Cases of Contested Elections," *Journal of Social Science* (No. 2, 1870), 56–68. Quoted passages are at p. 64. Dempsey, *op. cit.*, pp. 83–84, identifies Dawes as a one-time chairman of the House Committee on Elections. See also C. H. Rammelkamp, "Contested Congressional Elections," *Political Science Quarterly*, 20 (Sept., 1905), 434–435.

[49] Thomas B. Reed, "Contested Elections," *North American Review*, 151 (July, 1890), 112–120. Quoted passages are at pp. 114 and 117. See also Alexander, *op. cit.*, p. 323.

[50] Report from Elections Committee No. 3, Mr. McCall, chairman, quoted in Rammelkamp, *op. cit.*, p. 435.

> [56th Congress] was reduced about fifty from the previous Congress, but before the [first] session closed, a dozen or more Democrats lost their seats in election contests, which gave the Republicans a comfortable majority with which to do business.[51]
>
> 1905: Today it is simply a contest between two parties for political influence and the rewards of office, or sometimes a contest between the majority in the House and a constituency of the minority party. . . . In the period [1865–1905, 39th through 58th Congresses] . . . the majority deprived itself of seats only nine times, while it deprived the minority of seats eighty-two times.[52]

A journalist writing at the beginning of the twentieth century summarizes the situation as he had encountered it over a twenty-year period:

> It may be said . . . that there is no fairness whatever exercised in . . . contests for seats, especially where the majority needs the vote for party purposes. Hundreds of men have lost their seats in Congress, to which they were justly entitled upon all fair, reasonable, and legal grounds, and others put in their places for purely partisan reasons. This has always been so and doubtless will continue so. . . . [53]

In fact, it has not continued so; nowadays, contested elections are settled with much more regard to due process and the merits of the case than was true throughout the nineteenth century. By 1926, a minority member of the Committee on Elections No. 1 could say:

> In the eight years I have served on Elections Committees and six years upon this Committee, I have never seen partisanship creep into that Committee but one time. There has not been any partisanship in the Committee since the distinguished gentleman from Utah became Chairman of that Committee. A Democrat was seated the last time over a Republican by this Committee, and every member of the Committee voted to seat that Democrat.[54]

This quotation suggests a method by which the development of universalistic criteria for settling contested House elections can be monitored, namely, measuring the extent to which party lines are breached in committee reports and in voting on the floor in contest cases. I have made no such study, but on the basis of the accumulated weight of contemporary reports such as I have been quoting, I predict that a time series would show strict party voting in the 19th century, switching to unanimity or near-unanimity, in most cases, from the early years of the 20th century onward.

Attempts to establish legal precedents for the settlement of contested elections date from the recommendations of the Ames Committee in 1791. In 1798 a law was enacted prescribing a uniform mode of taking testimony and for compelling the attendance of witnesses. This law was required to be renewed in each Congress and was allowed to lapse in 1804. Bills embodying similar laws were proposed in 1805, 1806, 1810, 1813, and 1830. Not until 1851 was such a law passed, which provided for the gathering of testimony forming the bases of the proofs of each contestant's claim, but not for rules concerning other aspects of contested elections. More significant, however, was a clause permitting the House to set the law aside in whole or in part in specific cases, which apparently the House availed itself of with some regularity in the 19th century. With a few modifications this law is still in effect.[55]

The absolute number of contests shows a decrease in recent decades, as does the number of contests in relation to the number of seats. This suggests that the practice of instigating contests for frivolous reasons has passed into history; contemporary House procedures no longer hold out the hope of success for such contests.[56] Table 8 and Figure 6 give the figures, by decades.

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[51] O. O. Stealey, *Twenty Years in the Press Gallery* (New York: published by the author, 1906), p. 147.

[52] Rammelkamp, *op. cit.*, pp. 421–442. Quoted passages are from pp. 423 and 434.

[53] Stealey, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

[54] Quoted in Paul De Witt Hasbrouck, *Party Government in the House of Representatives* (New York: Macmillan, 1927), p. 40.

[55] See U.S., *Revised Statutes of the United States*, Title II, Ch. 8, Sections 105–130, and Dempsey, *op. cit.*, pp. 55–60. For indications of attempts to routinize the process of adjudication by setting up general criteria to govern House disposition of contested elections, see two 1933 cases: Gormley vs. Goss (House Report 893, 73rd Congress; see also 78 *Congressional Record*, pp. 4035, 7087, April 20, 1934) and Chandler vs. Burnham (House Report 1278, 73rd Congress; see also 78 *Congressional Record*, pp. 6971, 8921, May 15, 1934).

[56] On the relatively scrupulous handling of a recent contest see Richard H. Rovere, "Letter from Washington," *The New Yorker* (October 16, 1965), 233–244. Rovere (at p. 243) identifies criteria governing the report on the 1965 challenge

TABLE 8. THE GROWTH OF UNIVERSALISM: CONTESTED ELECTIONS IN THE HOUSE BY DECADES, 1789–1964

Congress	Number of Contested Seats	Mean Seats in House for Decade	% Seats Contested Per Congress*
1– 5 (1789–1798)	16	89.8	3.56
6–10 (1799–1808)	12	126.6	1.90
11–15 (1809–1818)	16	166.4	1.92
16–20 (1819–1828)	12	202.6	1.18
21–25 (1829–1838)	11	230.0	.96
26–30 (1839–1848)	17	231.8	1.46
31–35 (1849–1858)	23	233.0	1.98
36–40 (1859–1868)	73	196.4	7.44
41–45 (1869–1878)	72	273.0	5.28
46–50 (1879–1888)	58	312.2	3.72
51–55 (1889–1898)	87	346.8	5.02
56–60 (1899–1908)	41	374.4	2.20
61–65 (1909–1918)	36	417.4	1.72
66–70 (1919–1928)	23	435.0	1.06
71–75 (1929–1938)	25	435.0	1.14
76–80 (1939–1948)	15	435.0	.68
81–85 (1949–1958)	12	435.0	.56
86–88 (1959–1964)	8	437.0	.90

* Column 2 divided by column 3, over the number of Congresses (5 except in last instance).

Sources: Dempsey *op. cit.*, Appendix I, and George B. Galloway, *History of the U.S. House of Representatives* (House Document 246, 87th Congress, 1st Session) (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 215–216.

There is today, certainly, no wholesale stealing of seats. If any bias exists in the system, it probably favors the protection of incumbents irrespective of party,[57] and hence (we may surmise not incidentally) the protection of the boundaries of the organization.

IV. CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, CONCLUSIONS

It seems reasonable to conclude that one of the main long-run changes in the U.S. House of Representatives has been toward greater institutionalization. Knowing this, we may wish to ask, at a minimum, three questions: What caused it? What follows from it? What can this case tell us about the process in general? It is not from lack of space alone that our answers to each of these questions will be brief and highly speculative.

Not much, for example, is known about the causes of institutionalization. The best theoretical guess in the literature is probably Durkheim's: "The division of labor varies in direct ratio with the volume and density of societies, and, if it progresses in a continuous manner in the course of social development, it is because societies become regularly denser and generally more voluminous."[58] "Density" in at least some sense is capable of being operationalized and measured separately from its institutional consequences. For present purposes, the proposition can probably be rendered as follows: As the responsibilities of the national government grew, as a larger proportion of the national economy was affected by decisions taken at the center, the agencies of the national government institutionalized.[59] Another, complementary, translation of the density theorem would be that as organizations grow in size, they tend to develop internally in ways predicted by the theory of institutionalization. Size and increasing workload seem to me in principle measurable phenomena.[60] Size alone, in fact, seems almost

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by the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party to the entire Mississippi House delegation in the following passage: ". . . the majority could find no way to report favorably [on the challenge] without, as it seemed to them, abandoning due process and their constitutional responsibilities. Neither, for that matter, could the minority report, which went no further than to urge continued study."

[57] See, e.g., the assignment of burden of proof in Gormley vs. Goss and Chandler vs. Burnham, *loc. cit.*

[58] Durkheim, *op. cit.*, p. 262. Durkheim in turn cites Comte as describing this mechanism. Weber's notion, that the central precondition for the development of bureaucratic institutions is the money economy, strikes me as less interesting and less plausible. See H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (N. Y.: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 204–209. See, however, Weber's comment (p. 211): "It is obvious that technically the great modern state is absolutely dependent upon a bureaucratic basis. The larger the state, and the more it is or the more it becomes a great power state, the more unconditionally is this the case."

[59] Cf. Young, *op. cit.*, pp. 252–253, who seems to put great stress on public attitudes and local political organization as causes of the growth in the influence of the central government.

[60] George Galloway's *History of the U.S. House of Representatives*, 87th Congress, 1st Session, House Document No. 246 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 215–216, has a convenient scorecard on the size and party composition of the House for the first 87 Congresses. Mere size has been found to be an indifferent predictor of the internal complexity of bureaucratic organizations. See Richard H. Hall, J. Eugene Haas and Norman J. Johnson, "Organizational Size, Complexity, and Formalization," *American Sociological Review*, 32 (December, 1967), 903–912.



FIG. 6. The Growth of Universalism: Contested Elections in the House by Decades, 1789–1964.*

* Data from Table 8.

too easy. Until a deliberative body has some minimum amount of work to do, the necessity for interaction among its members remains slight, and, having no purpose, coordination by means of a division of labor, rules and regulations, precedents and so on, seem unlikely to develop. So a somewhat more complicated formula has to be worked out, perhaps relating the size of an organization to the amount of work it performs (e.g., number of work-days per year, number of full-time as opposed to nominal members, number of items considered, number of reports rendered) before the strength of "density" and "volume" can be tested as causes of the process of institutionalization.

A discussion of the consequences of the House's institutionalization must be equally tentative. It is hard—indeed for the contemporary observer, impossible—to shake the conviction that the House's institutional structure does matter greatly in the production of political outcomes. A recent popular account begins:

> A United States Congressman has two principal functions: to make laws and to keep laws from being made. The first of these he and his colleagues perform only with sweat, patience and a remarkable skill in the handling of creaking machinery; but the second they perform daily, with ease and infinite variety.[61]

No observer who focuses upon policy results, or who cares about the outputs of the American legislative process, fails to note the "complicated forms and diversified structure" which "confuse the vision, and conceal the system which underlies its composition."[62] All this is such settled knowledge that it seems unnecessary to mention it here. Still, it is important to stress that the very features of the House which casual observers and freshman legislators find most obstrusive are principal consequences of (among other things) the process we have been describing.[63]

[61] Robert Bendiner, *Obstacle Course on Capitol Hill* (N. Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 15.

[62] Woodrow Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

[63] This is not to say, however, that the policy output of the House is exclusively determined by its level of institutionalization. The 88th, 89th and 90th Congresses all represent more or less equivalent levels of institutionalization, yet their policy outputs varied greatly. Nevertheless if the casual observer asked why it took thirty years, more or less, to get the New Deal enacted in the House, and what sorts of strategies and circumstances made the legislative output of the 89th

It is, however, not merely the complexity or the venerability of the machinery that they notice. These, in our discussion so far, have been treated as defining characteristics rather than consequences of institutionalization. What puzzles and irks the outside observer is a partial displacement of goals, and a focus of resources upon internal processes at the expense of external demands, that come as a consequence of institutionalization. This process of displacement is, of course, well known to social theory in other settings.[64] A closer look at the general character of this displacement is bound to suggest a number of additional consequences.

For example, representatives may find that the process of institutionalization has increased their incentives to stay within the system. For them, the displacement of resources transforms the organization from a convenient instrument for the pursuit of social policies into an end value itself, a prime source of gratification, of status and power.[65]

The increasing complexity of the division of labor presents an opportunity for individual Representatives to specialize and thereby enormously increase their influence upon a narrow range of policy outcomes in the political system at large. Considered separately, the phenomenon of specialization may strike the superficial observer as productive of narrow-minded drones. But the total impact of a cadre of specialists operating over the entire spectrum of public policies is a formidable asset for a political institution; and it has undoubtedly enabled the House to retain a measure of autonomy and influence that is quite exceptional for a 20th century legislature.[66]

Institutionalization has, in the House, on the whole meant the decentralization of power. This has created a great many important and interesting jobs within the House, and thus increased the attractiveness of service therein as a career. Proposed reforms of Congress which seek to move toward a recentralization of Congressional power rarely consider this fact. But it is at least possible that some moves to restore discretion to the Speaker, or to centralized party agencies outside Congress, would reduce the effectiveness of Congress far below the level anticipated, because the House would come to be less valued in and of itself, its division of labor would provide less of a power base for subject matter specialists, and the incentives to stay within the organization would sharply decline.

Thus we can argue that, along with the more obvious effects of institutionalization, the process has also served to increase the power of the House within the political system and to spread somewhat more widely incentives for legislators to participate actively in policy-making.

A final possible consequence of institutionalization can be suggested: that the process tends to promote professional norms of conduct among participants. Indeed, something like these norms are built into the definition of institutionalization by some commentators.[67] But the built-in norms typically mentioned in discussions of "organization men" have to do with the segmental, ritualized interaction that characterizes organizations coordinated by hierarchical means; slightly different predictions about norms would have to be made for more decentralized, more egalitarian institutionalized legislative bodies.

In fact, there is coming to be a sizeable body of literature about the norms of professional legislative conduct. Time and again, the norms of predictability, courtesy, and reciprocity are offered by professional legislators as central to the rules of the legislative game.[68] Thus, we can

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Congress possible, answers would have to refer quite extensively to structural properties of the institution.

[64] See, e.g. Peter M. Blau, *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), *passim*; Philip Selznick, *TVA and the Grass Roots* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953), esp. pp. 250ff.

[65] See Philip Selznick, *Leadership in Administration* (Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1957).

[66] This position disagrees with Sidney Hyman, "Inquiry into the Decline of Congress," *New York Times Magazine*, January 31, 1960. For the argument that 20th century legislatures are on the whole weak see David B. Truman, "The Representative Function in Western Systems," in Edward H. Buehrig (ed.), *Essays in Political Science* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966), pp. 84–96; Truman, *The Congressional Party* (New York: Wiley, 1954), pp. 1–10; Truman, "Introduction: The Problem and Its Setting," in Truman (ed.), *The Congress and America's Future* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 1–4. For the beginning of an argument that the U.S. Congress may be an exception, see Nelson W. Polsby, *Congress and the Presidency* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1964), pp. 2, 31–32, 47–115.

[67] See Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 69, pp. 330–34; and Gerth and Mills, *op. cit.*, pp. 198–204.

[68] See, for example, Donald Matthews, "The Folkways of the U.S. Senate," this REVIEW, 53 (December, 1959), 1064–1089; John C. Wahlke,

suggest a hypothesis that the extent to which these norms are widely applied in a legislative body is a direct function of that body's structural institutionalization. Appropriate tests can be made cross-sectionally, by comparing contemporary legislatures that vary with respect to boundary-maintenance, internal complexity, and universalistic-automated internal decision making. Historically, less satisfactory tests are possible, since a number of vagaries enter into the determination of what is recorded and what is not, and since antecedent factors may account for both structural and normative institutionalization. This makes it hard to estimate the dispersion and importance of norms of conduct.

Nevertheless, the history of the House does suggest that there has been a growth in the rather tame virtues of reciprocity, courtesy, and predictability in legislative life since the turn of the century. Clem Miller describes human relations in the House of today:

> One's overwhelming first impression as a member of Congress is the aura of friendliness that surrounds the life of a congressman. No wonder that "few die and none resign." Almost everyone is unfailingly polite and courteous. Window washers, clerks, senators—it cuts all ways. We live in a cocoon of good feeling. . . .[69]

No doubt there are breaches in the fabric of good fellowship, mostly unpublicized, but the student of Congress cannot refrain even so from comparing this testimony with the following sampling of 19th century congressional conduct:

> Upon resuming his seat, after having replied to a severe personal arraignment of Henry Clay, former Speaker White, without the slightest warning, received a blow in the face. In the fight that followed a pistol was discharged wounding an officer of the police. John Bell, the distinguished Speaker and statesman, had a similar experience in Committee of the Whole (1838). The fisticuffs became so violent that even the Chair would not quell it. Later in the day both parties apologized and "made their submissions." On February 6, 1845, Edward J. Black, of Georgia, "crossed over from his seat, and, coming within the bar behind Joshua R. Giddings as he was speaking, made a pass at the back of his head with a cane. William H. Hammett, of Mississippi, threw his arms round Black and bore him off as he would a woman from a fire. . . ."
>
> When Reuben M. Whitney was before a committee of investigation in 1837, Bailie Peyton, of Tennessee, taking offense at one of his answers, threatened him fiercely, and when he rose to claim the committee's protection, Mr. Peyton, with due and appropriate profanity, shouted: "You shan't say one word while you are in this room; if you do I will put you to death." The chairman, Henry A. Wise, added: "Yes; this insolence is insufferable." As both these gentlemen were armed with deadly weapons, the witness could hardly be blamed for not wanting to testify before the committee again.
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> "These were not pleasant days," writes Thomas B. Reed. "Men were not nice in their treatment of each other."[70]

Indeed they were not: Nineteenth century accounts of Congressional behavior abound in passages like these. There is the consternation of members who put up with the presence on the floor of John Randolph's hunting dogs.[71] There is the famous scene on May 22, 1851, when Representative Preston Brooks of South Carolina entered the U.S. Senate and beat Senator Charles Sumner senseless with a cane,[72] and the record contains accounts of more than one such occasion:

Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and Leroy C. Ferguson, *The Legislative System* (New York: Wiley, 1962), pp. 141–169; Alan Kornberg, "The Rules of the Game in the Canadian House of Commons," *The Journal of Politics*, 26 (May, 1964), 358–380; Ralph K. Huitt, "The Outsider in The Senate," this REVIEW, 55 (September, 1961), 566–575; Nicholas A. Masters, "Committee Assignments in The House of Representatives," this REVIEW, 55 (June, 1961), 345–357; Richard F. Fenno, Jr., "The House Appropriations Committee as a Political System: The Problem of Integration," this REVIEW, 56 (June, 1962), 310–324.

[69] Clem Miller, *Member of the House* (John W. Baker, ed.) (New York: Scribner, 1962), p. 93. See also pp. 80–81 and 119–122.

[70] Alexander, *op. cit.*, pp. 115–116. The internal quotations are from John Quincy Adams' *Diary* and from an article by Reed in the *Saturday Evening Post*, December 9, 1899.

[71] Mayo, *op. cit.*, p. 424; William Parkes Cutler and Julia Perkins Cutler (eds.), *Life, Journals and Correspondence of Reverend Manasseh Cutler* (Cincinnati: Robert Clark and Co., 1888), Vol. II, pp. 186–189.

[72] A motion to expel Brooks from the House for this act was defeated; but soon thereafter Brooks resigned anyway. He was subsequently reelected to fill the vacancy caused by his resignation. See *Biographical Directory of The American Congress, 1774–1961* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 604.

When Matthew Lyon, of Kentucky, spat in his face, [Roger] Griswold [of Connecticut, a member 1795–1805] stiffened his arm to strike, but remembering where he was, he coolly wiped his cheek. But after the House by its vote failed to expel Lyon, he "beat him with great violence," says a contemporary chronicle, "using a strong walking-stick."[73]

With all the ill will that the heat of battle sometimes generates currently, the House has long since left behind the era of guns and dogs, canings and fisticuffs, that occupied so much of the 19th century scene. No doubt this reflects general changes in manners and morals, but it also reflects a growth in the value of the House as an institution capable of claiming the loyalty and good behavior of its members.[74] The best test of the hypothesis, to be sure, remains the cross-sectional one. If American state legislatures, for example, can be found to differ significantly with respect to structural institutionalization, they may also be found to vary concomitantly with respect to the application of the norms of professional legislative life.[75]

Finally, the study of the institutionalization of the House affords us a perspective from which to comment upon the process in general. First, as to its reversibility. Many of our indicators show a substantial decay in the institutional structure of the House in the period surrounding the Civil War. In sheer numbers, the House declined from 237 members in the Congress of 1859 to 178 in the Congress of 1861; not until a decade later did the House regain its former strength. Frivolous contests for seats reached a height in this period, and our rank-and-file boundary measures reflect decay as well. It may be true, and it is certainly amusing, that the strength of the British Admiralty grows as the number of ships declines;[76] but that this illustrates an inflexibly narcissistic law of institutional growth may be doubted. As institutions grow, our expectations about the displacement of resources inward do give us warrant to predict that they will resist decay, but the indications of curvelinearity in our present findings give us ample warning that institutions are also continuously subject to environmental influence and their power to modify and channel that influence is bound to be less than all-encompassing.

Some of our indicators give conditional support for a "take-off" theory of modernization. If one of the stigmata of the take-off to modernity is the rapid development of universalistic, bounded, complex institutional forms, the data presented here lend this theory some plausibility.[77] The "big bang" seems to come in the 1890–1910 period, on at least some of the measures.

In conclusion, these findings suggest that increasing hierarchical structure is not a necessary feature of the institutionalization process. Organizations other than bureaucracies, it seems clear, also are capable of having natural histories which increase their viability in the modern world without forcing them into uniformly centralized patterns of authority.

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[73] Alexander, *op. cit.*, pp. 111–112. Other instances of flagrant misbehavior are chronicled in Ben Perley Poore, *Perley's Reminiscences of Sixty Years in the National Metropolis* (Philadelphia: Hubbard, 1886), Vol. I, pp. 394–395; and William Plumer, *Memorandum of Proceedings in the United States Senate* (Everett Somerville Brown, ed.) (New York: Macmillan, 1923), pp. 269–276.

[74] A report on decorum in the 19th Century House of Commons suggests that a corresponding toning down has taken place, although Commons was palpably a good bit less unruly to start with. Says an ecstatic commentator, "Like so much else that is good in the institutions of Parliament, the behaviour of the House has grown straight, or, like a river, purified itself as it flowed": Eric Taylor, *The House of Commons At Work* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1961), pp. 85–87. Anthony Barker says: "The close of the 19th Century has been described by Lord Campion as the ending of informality and the beginning of rigid government responsibility for policy in the procedures of the House of Commons": "'The Most Important And Venerable Function': A Study of Commons Supply Procedure," *Political Studies*, 13 (February, 1965), p. 45.

[75] Perhaps secondary analysis comparing the four states (California, New Jersey, Tennessee, Ohio) in the Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson study (*op. cit.*) will yield an acceptable test of the hypothesis. This study has good information on the diffusion of legislative norms; it is less strong on structural data, but these might be relatively easy to gather.

[76] Parkinson, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

[77] The growth of political institutions does not play a particularly important part in the interpretation offered by W. W. Rostow in *The Stages of Economic Growth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), see, e.g., pp. 18–19, but these may afford at least as good support for his theory as some of the economic indicators he proposes.

THE TRANSMISSION OF POLITICAL VALUES FROM PARENT TO CHILD*

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In understanding the political development of the pre-adult one of the central questions hinges on the relative and differentiated contributions of various socializing agents. The question undoubtedly proves more difficult as one traverses a range of polities from those where life and learning are almost completely wrapped up in the immediate and extended family to those which are highly complex social organisms and in which the socialization agents are extremely varied. To gain some purchase on the role of one socializing agent in our own complex society, this paper will take up the specific question of the transmission of certain values from parent to child as observed in late adolescence. After noting parent-child relationships for a variety of political values, attention will be turned to some aspects of family structure which conceivably affect the transmission flows.

I. ASSESSING THE FAMILY'S IMPACT

"Foremost among agencies of socialization into politics is the family." So begins Herbert Hyman's discussion of the sources of political learning.[1] Hyman explicitly recognized the importance of other agents, but he was neither the first nor the last observer to stress the preeminent position of the family. This viewpoint relies heavily on both the direct and indirect role of the family in shaping the basic orientations of offspring. Whether the child is conscious or unaware of the impact, whether the process is role-modelling or overt transmission, whether the values are political and directly usable or "nonpolitical" but transferable, and whether what is passed on lies in the cognitive or affective realm, it has been argued that the family is of paramount importance. In part this view draws heavily from psychoanalytic theory, but it is also influenced by anthropological and national character studies, and by the great emphasis on role theory in sociological studies of socialization. In part the view stems also from findings in the area of partisan commitment and electoral behavior indicating high intergenerational agreement. Unfortunately for the general thesis, such marked correlations have been only occasionally observed in other domains of political life. Indeed, other domains of political life have been rarely explored systematically with respect to the central question of articulation in parent-child political values.[2] Inferences, backward and forward extrapolations, and retrospective and projective data have carried the brunt of the argument.

A recent major report about political socialization during the elementary years seriously questions the family's overriding importance. In contrast to the previously-held views that the family was perhaps preeminent or at least co-equal to other socializing agents stands the conclusion by Robert Hess and Judith Torney that "the public school is the most important and effective instrument of political socialization in the United States," and that "the family transmits its own particular values in relatively few areas of political socialization and that, for the most part, the impact of the family is felt only as one of several socializing agents and institutions."[3] Hess and Torney see the primary influence of the family as the agent which promotes early attachment to country and government, and which thus "insures the stability of basic institutions."[4]

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[1] Herbert Hyman, *Political Socialization* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1959), p. 69.

[2] Most of these few studies, cited by Hyman, *op. cit.*, pp. 70–71, are based on extremely limited samples and nearly all took place between 1930–1950.

[3] Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, *The Development of Basic Attitudes and Values Toward Government and Citizenship During the Elementary School Years, Part I* (Cooperative Research Project No. 1078, U.S. Office of Education, 1965), pp. 193, 200.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 191.

Hence, "the family's primary effect is to support consensually-held attitudes rather than to inculcate idiosyncratic attitudes."[5] The major exception to these conclusions occurs in the area of partisanship and related matters where the family's impact is predictably high.

The Hess and Torney argument thus represents a major departure from the more traditional view. They see the family's influence as age-specific and restricted in its scope. In effect, the restriction of the family's role removes its impact from much of the dynamic qualities of the political system and from individual differences in political behavior. The consensual qualities imparted or reinforced by the family, while vital for comprehending the maintenance of the system, are less useful in explaining adjustments in the system, the conflicts and accommodations made, the varied reactions to political stimuli, and the playing of diverse political roles. In short, if the family's influence is restricted to inculcating a few consensual attributes (plus partisan attachment), it means that much of the socialization which results in individual differentiation in everyday politics and which effects changes in the functioning of the political system lies outside the causal nexus of the parent-child relationship.

The first and primary objective of the present article will be to assay the flow of certain political values from parent to child. Our attention will be directed toward examining the variation in the distributions of the offsprings' values as a function of the distribution of these same values among their parents. This is not to say that other attitudinal and behavioral attributes of the parents are unimportant in shaping the child's political orientations. For example, children may develop authoritarian or politically distrustful attitudes not because their parents are authoritarian or distrustful but because of other variables such as disciplinary and protection practices.[6] Such transformations, while perhaps quite significant, will not be treated here. Rather, we will observe the degree to which the shape of value distributions in the child corresponds to that of his parent. Most of the values explored do not reflect the basic feelings of attachment to the political system which supposedly originate in the early years,[7] but much more of the secondary and tertiary values which tend to distinguish the political behavior of individuals and which contribute to the dynamics of the system.

Study Design. The data to be employed come from a study conducted by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan in the spring of 1965. Interviews were held with a national probability sample of 1669 seniors distributed among 97 secondary schools, public and nonpublic.[8] The response rate for students was 99 percent. For a random third of the students the father was designated for interviewing, for another random third the mother was designated, and for the other third both parents were assigned. In the permanent absence of the designated parent, the other parent or parent surrogate was interviewed. Interviews were actually completed with at least one parent of 94 percent of the students, and with both parents of 26 percent of the students, or 1992 parents altogether. Among parents the response rate was 93 percent.[9] Two features of the student and parent samples should be underscored. First, since the sample of students was drawn from a universe of 12th graders, school drop-outs in that age cohort, estimated at around 26 percent for this time period, were automatically eliminated. Second, due mainly to the fact that more mothers than fathers constitute the head of household in single-parent families, the sample of parents is composed of 56 percent mothers.[10]

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[5] *Ibid.*, p. 192.

[6] Illustrative of this argument is Frank A. Pinner's careful rendering in "Parental Overprotection and Political Distrust," *The Annals*, 361 (September, 1965), 58–70. See, in the same issue, Fred I. Greenstein, "Personality and Political Socialization: The Theories of Authoritarian and Democratic Character," pp. 81–95.

[7] In addition to the Hess and Torney report, evidence for this is supplied by, *inter alios*, Fred I. Greenstein, *Children and Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965); and David Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's Image of Government," *The Annals*, 361 (September, 1965), 40–57.

[8] Of the original ninety-eight schools, drawn with a probability proportionate to their size, eighty-five (87%) agreed to participate; matched substitutes for the refusals resulted in a final total of ninety-seven out of 111 contacted altogether (87%).

[9] Additional interviews were conducted with 317 of the students' most relevant social studies teachers and with the school principals. Some 21,000 paper-pencil questionnaires were administered to all members of the senior class in 85 percent of the sample schools.

[10] In any event, initial controls on parent (as well as student) sex suggest that parent-student agreement rates on the values examined here

Our basic procedure will be to match the parent and student samples so that parent-student pairs are formed. Although the actual number of students for whom we have at least one parent respondent is 1562, the base number of pairs used in the analysis is 1992. In order to make maximum usage of the interviews gathered, the paired cases in which both the mother and father were interviewed (430) are each given half of their full value.[11] A further adjustment in weighting, due to unavoidably imprecise estimates at the time the sampling frame was constructed, results in a weighted total of 1927 parent-student pairs.[12]

Using 12th graders for exploring the parental transmission of political values carries some distinct characteristics. In the first place, most of these pre-adults are approaching the point at which they will leave the immediate family. Further political training from the parents will be minimal. A second feature is that the formal civic education efforts of society, as carried out in the elementary and secondary schools, are virtually completed. For whatever effect they may have on shaping the cognitive and cathectic maps of individuals, these various formal and informal modes of citizenship preparation will generally terminate, although other forms of educational preparation may lie ahead, especially for the college bound. A final consideration is that while the family and the educational system have come to some terminal point as socializing agents, the pre-adult has yet to be much affected by actual political practice. Neither have other potentially important experiences, such as the establishment of his own nuclear family and an occupational role, had an opportunity to exert their effects. Thus the 12th grader is at a significant juncture in his political life cycle and it will be instructive to see the symmetry of parental and student values at this juncture.

Adolescent Rebellion. It should be emphasized that we are not necessarily searching for patterns of political rebellion from parental values. Researchers have been hard-pressed to uncover any significant evidence of adolescent rebellion in the realm of political affairs.[13] Pre-adults may differ politically from their parents—particularly during the college years—but there is scant evidence that the rebellion pattern accounts for much of this deviance. Data from our own study lend little support to the rebellion hypotheses at the level of student recognition. For example, even of the 38 percent of the student sample reporting important disagreements with their parents less than 15 percent placed these disagreements in a broadly-defined arena of political and social phenomena. And these disagreements do not necessarily lie in the province of rebellion, as one ordinarily construes the term.

There is, furthermore, some question as to whether adolescent rebellion as such occurs with anything approaching the frequency or magnitude encountered in sociological writings and the popular literature. As two scholars concluded after a major survey of the literature dealing with "normal" populations:

> In the large scale studies of normal populations, we do not find adolescents clamoring for freedom or for release from unjust constraint. We do not find rebellious resistance to authority as a dominant theme. For the most part, the evidence bespeaks a modal pattern considerably more peaceful than much theory and most social comment would lead us to expect. 'Rebellious youth' and 'the conflict between generations' are phrases that ring; but, so far as we can tell, it is not the

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differ little among parent-student sex combinations. This will be discussed in more detail below.

[11] The alternative to half-weighting these pairs is to subselect among those cases where both mother and father were interviewed. Half weighting tends to reduce the sampling variability because it utilizes more data cases.

[12] It proved impossible to obtain accurate, recent figures on 12th grade enrollment throughout the country. Working with the data available and extrapolating as necessary, a sampling frame was constructed so that schools would be drawn with a probability proportionate to the size of the senior class. After entry was obtained into the sample schools and precise figures on enrollments gathered, differential weights were applied to correct for the inequalities in selection probabilities occasioned by the original imprecise information. The average weight equals 1.2.

[13] Hyman, *op. cit.*, p. 72, and n. 6, p. 89. See also Robert E. Lane, "Fathers and Sons: Foundations of Political Belief," *American Sociological Review*, 24 (August, 1959), 502–511; Eleanor E. Maccoby, Richard E. Matthews, and Anton S. Morton, "Youth and Political Change," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 18 (Spring, 1954), 23–39; Russell Middleton and Snell Putney, "Political Expression of Adolescent Rebellion," *American Journal of Sociology*, 68 (March, 1963), 527–535; and Robert H. Somers, "The Mainsprings of the Rebellion: A Survey of Berkeley Students in November, 1964," in Seymour Martin Lipset and Sheldon S. Wolin (eds.), *The Berkeley Student Revolt* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), p. 547.

ring of truth they carry so much as the beguiling but misleading tone of drama.[14]

To say that rebellion directed toward the political orientations of the parents is relatively rare is not to say, however, that parent and student values are consonant. Discrepancies can occur for a variety of reasons, including the following: 1) Students may consciously opt for values, adopted from other agents, in conflict with those of their parents without falling into the rebellion syndrome. 2) Much more probable are discrepancies which are recognized neither by the parent nor the offspring.[15] The lack of cue-giving and object saliency on the part of parents sets up ambiguous or empty psychological spaces which may be filled by other agents in the student's environment. 3) Where values are unstable and have low centrality in a belief system, essentially random and time-specific responses to stimuli may result in apparent low transmission rates. 4) Another source of dissonant relationships, and potentially the most confounding one, is that life cycle effects are operative. When the pre-adult reaches the current age of his parents, his political behavior might well be similar to that of his parents even though his youthful attitudes would not suggest such congruency. This is an especially thorny empirical question and nests in the larger quandry concerning the later life effects of early socialization.

II. PATTERNS OF PARENT-CHILD CORRESPONDENCES

Confronted with a number of political values at hand we have struck for variety rather than any necessary hierarchy of importance. We hypothesized a range of correlations dependent in part on the play of factors assumed to alter the parent-student associations (noted above). We have purposely deleted values dealing with participative orientations and, as noted previously, those delving into sentiments of basic attachment and loyalty to the regime. The values selected include party identification, attitudinal positions on four specific issues, evaluations of socio-political groupings, and political cynicism. For comparative purposes we shall glance briefly at parent-student congruences in the religious sphere.

To measure agreement between parents and students we rely primarily on correlations, either of the product-moment or rank-order variety. While the obvious alternative of percentage agreement may have an intuitive appeal, it has several drawbacks. Percentage agreement is not based on the total configuration of a square matrix but only on the "main diagonal." Thus two tables which are similar in percentage agreement may represent widely differing amounts of agreement if deviations from perfect agreement are considered. Moreover, percentage agreement depends heavily on the number of categories used, so that the degree of parent-student similarity might vary for totally artificial reasons. Correlations are more resistant to changes in the definition of categories. Finally, correlations are based on relative rankings (and intervals in the case of product-moment correlations) rather than on absolute agreement as percentage agreement usually is. That is, if student scores tend to be higher (or lower) than parent scores on a particular variable, but the students are ranked similarly to their parents, a high correlation may be obtained with very little perfect agreement.

Party Identification. Previous research has established party identification as a value dimension of considerable importance in the study of political behavior as well as a political value readily transmitted from parents to children. Studies of parent-youth samples as well as adult populations indicate that throughout the life cycle there is a relatively high degree of correspondence between respondents' party loyalities and their parents'. Our findings are generally consistent with those of these earlier studies.

The substantial agreement between parent and student party affiliations is indicated by a tau-b (also called tau-beta) correlation of .47, a statistic nearly unaffected by the use of three, five, or all seven categories of the party identification spectrum generated by the question sequence.[16] The magnitude of this

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[14] Elizabeth Douvan and Martin Gold, "Modal Patterns in American Adolescence," in Lois and Martin Hoffman (eds.), *Review of Child Development Research* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1966), Vol. II, p. 485.

[15] For an analysis of students' and parents' knowledge of each other's political attitudes and behavior, see Richard G. Niemi, "A Methodological Study of Political Socialization in the Family" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Michigan, 1967).

[16] This figure is based on parent-student pairs in which both respondents have a party identification; eliminated are the 2 percent of the pairs in which one or both respondents are apolitical or undecided. The product-moment correlation for these data is .59. The standard SRC party identification questions were used: see Angus Camp-

statistic reflects the twin facts of the presence of a large amount of exact agreement and the absence of many wide differences between students and parents. When the full 7×7 matrix of parent-student party loyalties is arrayed (Table 1), the cells in which parents and students are in unison account for a third of the cases. The cells representing maximum disagreement are very nearly empty. Despite our earlier contention, collapsing categories and considering percentage agreement in the resulting table does make good substantive sense with regard to party identification. In this instance the collapsed categories have a meaning beyond just broader segments of a continuum, and are associated with a general orientation toward one party or the other or toward a neutral position between them. Thus arrayed, 59 percent of the students fall into the same broad category as their parents, and only seven percent cross the sharp divide between Republicans and Democrats.

The observed similarity between parents and students suggests that transmission of party preferences from one generation to the next is carried out rather successfully in the American context. However, there are also indications that other factors (temporarily at least) have weakened the party affiliations of the younger generation. This is most obvious if we compare the marginal totals for parents and students (Table 1). The student sample contains almost 12 percent more Independents than the parent sample, drawing almost equally on the Republican and Democratic proportions of the sample. Similarly, among party identifiers a somewhat larger segment of the students is but weakly inclined toward the chosen party.

TABLE 1. STUDENT-PARENT PARTY IDENTIFICATION

Parents	Students Strong Dem.	 Weak Dem.	 Ind. Dem.	 Ind.	 Ind. Rep.	 Weak Rep.	 Strong Rep.	Total
Party Identification								
Strong Dem.	9.7%	8.0	3.4	1.8	.5	.9	.5	24.7%
Weak Dem.	5.8	9.0	4.2	2.6	.7	1.6	.7	24.7
	(32.6)[a]			(13.2)		(3.6)		(49.4)
Ind. Dem.	1.6	2.1	2.1	1.7	.8	.7	.2	9.3
Ind.	1.1	1.6	1.6	2.7	1.2	.9	.5	9.7
Ind. Rep.	.1	.5	.8	.9	.9	1.3	.5	4.9
	(7.0)			(12.7)		(4.1)		(23.9)
Weak Rep.	.3	2.1	1.6	2.3	1.9	5.0	1.9	15.0
Strong Rep.	.2	.9	.8	.8	2.4	3.3	3.5	11.7
	(3.4)			(9.7)		(13.6)		(26.7)
Total	18.8%	24.2	14.5	12.8	8.4	13.6	7.7	100.0%
	(43.0)			(35.7)		(21.3)		
			tau-b = .47				N = 1852	

[a] The full 7×7 table is provided because of the considerable interest in party identification. For some purposes, reading ease among them, the 3×3 table is useful. It is given by the figures in parentheses; these figures are (within rounding error) the sum of the numbers just above them.

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bell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960), Ch. 6.

Nor are these configurations simply an artifact of the restricted nature of the parent sample, since the distribution of party identification among the parents resembles closely that of the entire adult electorate as observed in November, 1964 (SRC 1964 election study).

A number of factors might account for the lesser partisanship of the students, and we have only begun to explore some of them. On the one hand, the students simply lack their parents' long experience in the active electorate, and as a consequence have failed as yet to develop a similar depth of feeling about the parties.[17] On the other hand, there are no doubt specific forces pushing students toward Independence. The experience of an ever-widening environment and the gradual withdrawal of parental power may encourage some students to adopt an Independent outlook. The efforts of schools and of teachers in particular are probably weighted in the same direction. If these forces are at work, high school students may be gradually withdrawing from an earlier position of more overt partisanship. But, whatever the exact nature of the causes, they clearly draw off from the partisan camp a small but significant portion of the population as it approaches full citizenship.

Opinions on Specific Issues. One way in which political values are expressed is through opinions on specific issues. However, as Converse has shown, many opinions or idea elements not only tend to be bounded by systems of low constraint but are also quite unstable over relatively short periods of time among mass publics.[18] Hence in comparing student responses with parent responses the problem of measurement may be compounded by attitude instability among both samples. Rather than being a handicap instabilities actually sharpen the test of whether significant parent-to-child flows occur. One would not expect unstable sentiments to be the object of any considerable political learning in the family. It seems unlikely that many cues would be given off over matters about which the parents were unsure or held a fluctuating opinion. Even in the event of numerous cues in unstable situations, the ambivalent or ambiguous nature of such cues would presumably yield instability in the child. In either case the articulation between parent and child beliefs would be tempered.

We have selected four specific issues for examination. Two involve public schools; given the populations being studied, schools are particularly relevant attitude objects. Furthermore these two issues envelope topics of dramatic interest to much of the public—integration in the schools and the use of prayers in schools. After an initial screening question weeded out those without any interest at all on the issues, the respondents were asked if they thought the government in Washington should "see to it that white and Negro children go to the same schools" or if the government should "stay out of this area as it is none of its business." On the prayers in school question the respondents were asked if they believed "schools should be allowed to start each day with a prayer" or that "religion does not belong in the schools."[19] Taken in the aggregate the high school seniors proved less likely to sanction prayers in school than did the parents (although a majority of both answered in the affirmative) and more willing to see the federal government enforce segregation than were the adults (with both yielding majorities in favor). These differences are moderate; no more than 14 percentage points separate like-paired marginals on the prayer issue and no more than 10 points on the integration issue. The cross-tabulation of parent and student responses produces moderately strong coefficients, as shown in the first two entries of Table 2.

Combining as they do some very visible population groupings along with topics of more than usual prominence in the mass

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[17] This is suggested by an analysis of different age groups among the active electorate: see *Ibid.*, pp. 161ff. For evidence that the depth of adult attachment to party is not necessarily uniform across electoral systems see M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, "Party Identification at Multiple Levels of Government," *American Journal of Sociology*, 72 (July, 1966), 86–101.

[18] Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David E. Apter (ed.), *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 206–261. The following section borrows from Converse's discussion. Robert E. Agger takes a somewhat different view of instabilities in "Panel Studies of Comparative Community Political Decision-Making," in M. Kent Jennings and L. Harmon Zeigler (eds.), *The Electoral Process* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall 1966), pp. 265–289.

[19] Sizeable proportions of both parents and students elected to state a middle or "depends" response, particularly on the first question. Such responses occupy a middle position in our calculation of the rank order correlations. On the first issue 10 percent of the pairs were dropped because either the parent or child opted out on the initial screen; the corresponding figure for the second issue is 19 percent.

TABLE 2. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARENT-STUDENT ATTITUDES ON FOUR ISSUES

Federal government's role in integrating the schools	.34[a]
Whether schools should be allowed to use prayers	.29
Legally elected Communist should be allowed to take office	.13
Speakers against churches and religion should be allowed	.05

[a] Each of the correlations (tau-b) in this table is based on at least 1560 cases.

media and local communities, it would be surprising if there were not at least a moderate amount of parent-student overlap. The wonder is not that the correlations are this high, but rather that they are not higher. If correlations no higher than this are produced on issues which touch both generations in a manner which many issues assuredly do not, then one would speculate that more remote and abstract issues would generate even less powerful associations.

This hypothesizing is borne out by the introduction of two other issues. Both parents and students were asked to agree or disagree with these two statements: "If a Communist were legally elected to some public office around here, the people should allow him to take office"; and "If a person wanted to make a speech in this community against churches and religion, he should be allowed to speak." In general, the pre-adults took a slightly more libertarian stance on the two issues than did the parents, but the differences in any of the like-paired marginals do not exceed 14 percent. These similarities mask extremely tenuous positive correlations, however, as the second pair of items in Table 2 reveals.

These two issues carry neither the immediacy nor the concreteness which may be said to characterize the two issues dealing with integration and prayers in the schools. Indeed, one might question whether the two statements represent issues at all, as the public normally conceives of issues. At any rate it is improbable that the students are reflecting much in the way of cues emitted from their parents, simply because these topics or related ones are hardly prime candidates for dinner-table conversation or inadvertent cue-giving. Nor do they tap some rather basic sentiments and attitude objects which permeate the integration and prayers issues. Such sentiments are more likely to be embedded in the expressive value structure of the parents than are those having to do with some of the more abstract "fundamental" tenets of democracy as exemplified in the free speech and right to take office issues. That adults themselves have low levels of constraint involving propositions about such fundamental tenets has been demonstrated by McClosky, and Prothro and Grigg.[20] Given this environment, the lower correlation for the two more abstract propositions is predictable.

Although the issues we have examined by no means exhaust the variety of policy questions one might pose, they probably exemplify the range of parent-student correspondences to be found in the populace. On all but consensual topics—which would perforce assume similar distributions among virtually all population strata anyway—the parent-student correlations obtained for the integration and prayer issues probably approach the apex. In part this may be due to unstable opinions and in part to the effects of agents other than the family. It is also possible that the children will exhibit greater correspondences to their parents later in the life cycle. But for this particular point in time, the articulation of political opinions is only moderately strong on salient, concrete issues and virtually nil on more abstract issues.

Evaluations of Socio-Political Groupings. Collectivities of people which are distinguished by certain physical, locational, social, religious, and membership characteristics (the list is obviously not exhaustive) often come to serve as significant political reference groups for individuals. While distinguishable groups may carry affective neutrality, it seems to be in the nature of mass behavior that these groups most often come to be viewed with greater or lesser esteem. The intersection of group evaluations and the political process comes when claims or demands are made by or upon significant portions of such groupings. The civil rights movement of the past decade is perhaps the most striking contemporary example. As Converse has suggested, social groupings are likely to have greater centrality for mass publics than abstract idea elements per se.[21] Thus when particular issues and public policies become imbued with group-related properties, the issues acquire considerably more structure and concreteness for the mass public than would be the normal case.

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[20] Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," this REVIEW, 58 (June, 1964), 361–382; and James W. Prothro and Charles W. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement," *Journal of Politics*, 22 (May, 1960), 276–294.

[21] Converse, *op. cit.*

To what extent is the family crucial in shaping the evaluations of social groupings and thus—at a further remove—the interpretation of questions of public policy? Some insight into this may be gained by comparing the ratings applied by the parents and students to eight socio-political groupings. While the groups all carry rather easily recognized labels, they do differ in terms of their relative visibility and their inclusive-exclusive properties. They include Protestants, Catholics, Jews, Negroes, Whites, Labor Unions, Big Business, and Southerners.

To measure the attitudes toward these groups, an instrument dubbed the "feeling thermometer" was used. The technique was designed to register respondents' feelings toward a group on a scale ranging from a cold 0 to a warm 100. In the analysis we will treat this scale as interval level measurement. We have also examined the data using contingency tables and ordinal statistics; our conclusions are the same regardless of the method used.

Turning first to the mean ratings, given in Table 3, we find a striking similarity in student and parent aggregate scores. The largest difference is five points and the average difference is only 2.2 points. Additionally, the standard deviations for the two samples (not shown) are extremely similar across all groupings. Nor were there significant tendencies for one sample to employ more than the other the option of "unawareness" or "no feelings" (a reading of 50 on the thermometer) about the groupings. Moreover, the aggregate differences which do occur are not immediately explicable. For example, students rate Southerners slightly lower than parents, as we expected, but the difference in ratings of Negroes is negligible, which was unanticipated. Students rate Whites and Protestants somewhat lower than parents. This is not matched, however, by higher evaluations of the minority groups—Jews, for example.

TABLE 3. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARENT-STUDENT GROUP EVALUATIONS

Group Evaluated	Parent-Student Correlations	Mean Ratings	
		Parent	Student
Catholics	.36[a]	72	70
Southerners	.30	66	62
Labor Unions	.28	60	60
Negroes	.26	67	69
Jews	.22	67	63
Whites	.19	84	83
Protestants	.15	84	79
Big Business	.12	64	63

[a] Each of the product-moment correlations in this table is based on at least 1880 cases. The corresponding tau-b's are (top to bottom) .28, .22, .22, .20, .18, .19, .13, .08.

Given these extraordinarily congruent patterns it is rather startling to see that they are patently not due to uniform scores of parent-child pairs. As shown in Table 3, the highest correlation between the parent and student ratings is .36 and the coefficients range as low as .12. Even the highest correlation is well below that found for party identification (where the product-moment coefficient was .59 for the seven-fold classification), and for several groupings the relationships between parent and student scores are very feeble. If the child's view of socio-political groupings grows out of cue-giving in the home, the magnitude of the associations should exceed those observed here.

It is beyond the task of this paper to unravel thoroughly these findings. The range of correlations does provide a clue as to the conditions under which parent-student correspondences will be heightened. In the first place the three categories producing the lowest correlations appear to have little socio-political relevancy in the group sense. Whites and Protestants are extremely inclusive categories and, among large sectors of the public, may simply not be cognized or treated in everyday life as groupings highly differentiated from society in general. They are, in a sense, too enveloping to be taken as differentiated attitude objects. If they do not serve as significant attitude objects, the likelihood of parent to child transmission would be dampened. In the third case—Big Business—it seems likely that its visibility is too low to be cognized as a group qua group.

As the parent-student correlations increase we notice that the groupings come to have not only highly distinguishable properties but that they also have high visibility in contemporary American society. Adding to the socio-political saliency thereby induced is the fact that group membership may act to increase the parent-student correlations. One would hypothesize that parent-student pairs falling into a distinguishable, visible grouping would exhibit higher correlations in rating that same grouping than would nonmembers. Taking the four groupings for whom the highest correlations were obtained, we divided the pairs into those where both the parent and the child—except in the case of labor unions—were enveloped by the groupings versus those outside the groupings. Although none of the hypothesized relationships was contravened, only the coefficients for evaluations of Southerners provided a distinct demarcation between members and nonmembers (tau-b = .25 for Southern pairs, .14 for non-Southerners). It is quite possible that measures capturing membership identification and intensities would improve upon these relationships.

As with opinions on specific issues, intrapair correlations on group evaluations are at best moderately positive, and they vary appreciably as a result of socio-political visibility and, to a small degree, group membership characteristics. What we begin to discern, then, is a pattern of congruences which peak only over relatively concrete, salient values susceptible to repeated reinforcement in the family (and elsewhere, perhaps), as in party identification and in certain issues and group evaluations. It is conceivable that these results will not prevail if we advance from fairly narrow measures like the ones previously employed to more global value structures. We now turn to an illustrative example. It so happens that it also provides an instance of marked aggregate differences between the two generations.

Political Cynicism. Political cynicism and its mirror image, trust, offer an interesting contrast to other variables we are considering. Rather than referring to specific political issues or actors, cynicism is a basic orientation toward political actors and activity. Found empirically to be negatively related to political participation, political cynicism has also been found to be positively correlated with measures of a generally distrustful outlook (personal cynicism).[22] Political cynicism appears to be a manifestation of a deep-seated suspicion of others' motives and actions. Thus this attitude comes closer than the rest of our values to tapping a basic psycho-political predisposition.

Previous research with young children suggests that sweeping judgments, such as the essential goodness of human nature, are formed early in life, often before cognitive development and information acquisition make the evaluated objects intelligible. Greenstein, and Hess and Easton, have reported this phenomenon with regard to feelings about authority figures; Hess and Torney suggest similar conclusions about loyalty and attachment to government and country.[23] Evaluative judgments and affective ties have been found among the youngest samples for which question and answer techniques are feasible. This leads to the conclusions that the school, mass media, and peer groups have had little time to influence these attitudes.

It seems to follow that the family is the repository from which these feelings are initially drawn. Either directly by their words and deeds or indirectly through unconscious means, parents transmit to their children basic postures toward life which the children carry with them at least until the development of their own critical faculties. Although our 12th graders have been exposed to a number of influences which could mitigate the initial implanting, one should expect, according to the model, a rather strong correspondence between parent and student degrees of political cynicism.

To assess the cynicism of parents and students, a Guttman scale was constructed from five questions asked of both samples. All questions dealt with the conduct of the national government.[24] In each sample the items formed a scale, with coefficients of reproducibility of .93 and .92 for parents and students, respectively. The aggregate scores reflect a remarkably lesser amount of cynicism among students than among parents. This is apparent in the marginal distributions in Table 4, which show the weight of the parent distribution falling much much more on the cynical end of the scale. Similarly, while a fifth of the students were more cynical than their parents, three times this number of parents were more cynical than their children. The students may be retreating from an even more trusting attitude held earlier, but compared to their parents they still see little to be cynical about in national political activity.

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[22] Robert E. Agger, Marshall N. Goldstein, and Stanley A. Pearl, "Political Cynicism: Measurement and Meaning," *Journal of Politics*, 23 (August, 1961), p. 490; and Edgar Litt, "Political Cynicism and Political Futility," *Journal of Politics*, 25 (May, 1963), 312–323.

[23] Greenstein, *op. cit.*, Ch. 3; Robert D. Hess and David Easton, "The Child's Changing Image of the President," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 24 (Winter, 1960), 632–644; and Hess and Torney, *op. cit.*, pp. 73ff.

[24] The items are as follows:

1) Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are a little crooked, not very many are, or do you think hardly any of them are?
2) Do you think that people in the government waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don't waste very much of it?
3) How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right—just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time?
4) Do you feel that almost all of the people running the government are smart people who usually know what they are doing, or do you think that quite a few of them don't seem to know what they are doing?
5) Would you say that the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?

Here is a case where the impact of other socialization agents—notably the school—looms large. The thrust of school experience is undoubtedly on the side of developing trust in the political system in general. Civic training in school abounds in rituals of system support in the formal curriculum. These rituals and curricula are not matched by a critical examination of the nation's shortcomings or the possible virtues of other political forms. Coupled with a moralistic, legalistic, prescriptive orientation to the study of government is the avoidance of conflict dimensions and controversial issues.[25] A direct encounter with the realities of political life is thus averted or at least postponed. It would not be surprising, then, to find a rather sharp rise in the level of cynicism as high school seniors move ahead in a few years into the adult world.

Students on the whole are less cynical than parents; relative to other students, though, those with distrustful, hostile parents should themselves be more suspicious of the government, while those with trusting parents should find less ground for cynicism. Against the backdrop of our discussion, it is remarkable how low the correspondence is among parent-student pairs. Aside from faint markings at the extremities, students' scores are very nearly independent of their parents' attitudes (Table 4). The cynicism of distrustful parents is infrequently implanted in their children, while a smaller group of students develops a cynical outlook despite their parents' views. Political cynicism as measured here is not a value often passed from parent to child. Regardless of parental feelings, children develop a moderately to highly positive view of the trustworthiness of the national government and its officials.

These findings do not mean that parents fail to express negative evaluations in family interaction nor that children fail to adopt some of the less favorable attitudes of their parents. What is apparently not transmitted is a *generalized* cynicism about politics. Thus while warmth or hostility toward specific political objects with high visibility may be motivated by parental attitudes, a more pervasive type of belief system labelled cynicism is apparently subject to heavy, undercutting influences out-

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[25] These are old charges but apparently still true. After a survey of the literature on the subject and on the basis of a subjective analysis of leading government textbooks in high schools, Byron G. Massialas reaches similar conclusions: see his "American Government: 'We are the Greatest'," in C. Benjamin Cox and Byron G. Massialas (eds.), *Social Studies in the United States: A Critical Appraisal* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, Inc., 1967), pp. 167–195.

TABLE 4. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARENT-STUDENT SCORES ON THE CYNICISM SCALE

	Students							
	Least Cynical			Most Cynical			Row Totals	Marginal Totals[a]
Parents	1	2	3	4	5	6		
Least Cynical—1	25%	27	33	13	1	2	101%	8%
2	19	28	38	9	1	5	100	12
3	18	28	37	10	3	4	100	33
4	16	23	41	13	3	4	100	17
5	15	19	35	19	3	9	100	9
Most Cynical—6	12	22	36	18	4	8	100	21
Marginal Totals[a]	17%	25	37	13	3	5		100%
			tau-b = .12				N = 1869	

[a] Marginal totals show the aggregate scaler patterns for each sample.

side the family nexus. These influences are still operative as the adolescent approaches adult status.

Working with another encompassing set of values we encountered much the same patterns as with cynicism. After obtaining their rank orderings of interest in international, national, state, and local political matters the respondents were allocated along a 7-point scale of cosmopolitanism-localism through an adaptation of Coombs' unfolding technique.[26] On the whole the students are considerably more cosmopolitan than the parents, and the paired correlation is a modest .17. Both life cycle and generational effects are undoubtedly at work here,[27] but the central point is that the students' orientations only mildly echo those of their parents.

What results from juxtaposing parents and their children on these two measures of cynicism and cosmopolitanism-localism is the suspicion that more global orientations to political life do not yield parent-student correspondences of greater magnitude than on more specific matters. If anything, the opposite is true—at least with respect to certain specifics. It may be that the child acquires a minimal set of basic commitments to the system and a way of handling authority situations as a result of early experiences in the family circle. But it appears also that this is a foundation from which arise widely diverse value structures, and that parental values are an extremely variable and often feeble guide as to what the pre-adult's values will be.

Religious Beliefs. Up to this point we have traversed a range of political and quasi-political values, and have witnessed varying, but generally modest degrees of parent-student correspondences. To what extent does this pattern also characterize other domains of social values? For comparative purposes we can inject a consideration of religious beliefs. Like party preference, church affiliation among pre-adults is believed to be largely the same as parental affiliation. Such proves to be the case among our respondents. Of all parent-student pairs 74 percent expressed the same denominational preference. That this percentage is higher than the agreement on the three-fold classification of party identification (Democrat, Republican, Independent) by some 15 percent suggests that by the time the pre-adult is preparing to leave the family circle he has internalized the church preference of his parents to a moderately greater extent than their party preference.

There are some perfectly valid reasons for this margin. To a much greater extent than party preference, church preference is likely to be reinforced in a number of ways. Assuming attendance, the child will usually go to the same church throughout childhood; the behavior is repeated at frequent intervals; it is a practice engaged in by greater or lesser portions of the entire family and thus carries multiple role-models; formal membership is often involved; conflicting claims from other sources in the environment for a change of preference are minimal except, perhaps, as a result of dating patterns. Religious affiliation is also often imbued with a fervid commitment.

In contrast, party preference is something which the child himself cannot transform into behavior except in rather superficial ways; reinforcement tends to be episodic and varies according to the election calendar; while the party preference of parents may vary only marginally over the pre-adult years, voting behavior fluctuates more and thus sets up ambiguous signals for the child; other sources in the environment—most noticeably the mass media—may make direct and indirect appeals for the child's loyalty which conflict with the parental attachments. Given the factors facilitating intrafamilial similarities in church preference, and the absence of at least some of these factors in the party dimension, it is perhaps remarkable that congruity of party identification approaches the zone of church-preference congruity.

We found that when we skipped from party identification to other sorts of political values the parent-student correlations decreased perceptibly. May we expect to encounter similar behavior in the realm of religious values? One piece of evidence indicates that this is indeed the case. Respondents were confronted with a series of four statements having to do with the literal and divine nature of the Bible, ranging from a description of the Bible as "God's word and all it says is true" to a statement denying the contemporary utility of the book.

Both students and parents tended to view the Bible with awe, the parents slightly more so than the students. But the correlation (tau-beta) among parent-student pairs is only a moderately strong .30. As with political values, once the subject matter moves out from central basic identification patterns the transmission of parental values fades.[28] And, as with political values, this may be a function of instability—although this seems less likely for the rendering of the Bible—the impingement of other agents—particularly likely in this case—or the relative absence of cue-giving on the part of the parents. The more generalizable proposition emerging from a comparison of political and religious orientations is that the correlations obtained diminish when the less concrete value orientations are studied.

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[26] A description of this operation and some results are given in M. Kent Jennings, "Pre-Adult Orientations to Multiple Systems of Government," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, XI (August, 1967), 291–317. The underlying theory and technique are found in Clyde Coombs, *A Theory of Data* (New York: Wiley, 1964), esp. Ch. 5.

[27] This is discussed in more detail in Jennings, *op. cit.*

III. FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS AND TRANSMISSION PATTERNS

We have found that the transmission of political values from parent to child varies remarkably according to the nature of the value. Although the central tendencies lie on the low side, we may encounter systematic variations in the degree to which values are successfully transmitted according to certain properties of family structure. That is, whether the transmittal be conscious and deliberate or unpurposive and indirect, are there some characteristics of the family unit which abet or inhibit the child's acquisition of parental values? We shall restrict ourselves to a limited set of variables having theoretical interest.

In order to dissect the parent-student relationships by controlling for a variety of independent variables, we shall retain the full parent-student matrices and then observe correlations within categories of the control variables.[29] The political values to be examined include party identification, political cynicism, political cosmopolitanism, four specific political issues, and the ratings assigned to three minority population groupings—Catholics, Negroes, and Jews. This makes ten variables altogether, but for some purposes the issues and the group ratings are combined into composite figures.

Parent and Student Sex Combinations. Various studies of adolescents have illustrated the discriminations which controls for sex of parent and sex of child may produce in studying the family unit.[30] Typically these studies have dealt with self-development, adjustment problems, motivational patterns, and the like. The question remains whether these discriminations are also found in the transmission of political values.

Part of the common lore of American political behavior is that the male is more dominant in political matters than the female, in his role both of husband and of father. And among pre-adults, males are usually found to be more politicized than females. While our findings do not necessarily challenge these statements, they do indicate the meager utility of sex roles in explaining parent-student agreement. The correlations between parent-student values show some variation among the four combinations of parent and student sex, but the differences are usually small and inconsistent across the several values. Of the sixty possible comparisons for the ten political variables (i.e., $\binom{4}{2} = 6$ pairs of correlations for each variable), only eight produce differences in the correlations greater than .10, and thirty-three fall within a difference of less than .05. The average parent-student correlations for these variables are: Mother-Son, .22; Mother-Daughter, .24; Father-Son, .20; Father-Daughter, .22. Thus the values of the father are not more likely to be internalized than those of the mother; nor do sons register consistently different rates of agreement than daughters. Finally, the particular sex mix of parent and child makes little difference. We also found that the use of sex combinations as controls on other bivariate relationships usually resulted in minor and fluctuating differences. Whatever family characteristics affect differential rates of value transmission, they are only marginally represented by sex roles in the family.

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[28] To compare directly the amount of correspondence on interpretation of the Bible with church membership information, which is nominal-level data, we used the contingency coefficient. Grouping parent and student church affiliations into nine general categories, the coefficient is .88, compared to .34 for the Bible question.

[29] A more parsimonious method is to develop agreement indexes and to relate the control variables to these indexes. This results in a single statistic and contingency table for each control variable rather than one for each category of the control variable. Experience with both methods indicates that similar conclusions emerge, but retaining the full matrices preserves somewhat better the effects of each category of the control variable.

[30] See, e.g., Charles E. Bowerman and Glen H. Elder, "Adolescent Perception of Family Power Structure," *American Sociological Review*, 29 (August, 1964), 551–567; E. C. Devereux, Urie Bronfenbrenner, and G. J. Suci, "Patterns of Parent Behavior in the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany: A Cross-National Comparison," *International Social Science Journal*, 14 (UNESCO, 1963), 1–20; and Morris Rosenberg, *Society and the Adolescent Self-Image* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), Ch. 3.

Affectivity and Control Relationship. Another set of family characteristics employed with considerable success in studies of the family and child development has to do with the dimension of power or control on the one hand, and the dimension of attachment or affectivity on the other.[31] One salient conclusion has been that children are more apt to use their parents as role models where the authority structure is neither extremely permissive nor extremely autocratic and where strong (but not overprotective) supportive functions and positive affects are present.

Although these dimensions have been employed in various ways in assessing the socialization of the child, they have rarely been utilized in looking at value transmission per se. In the nearest approach to this in political socialization studies, college students' reports suggested that perceived ideological differences between parent and child were higher when there was emotional estrangement, when the parental discipline was perceived as either too high or too low, and when the parent was believed to be interested in politics.[32] Somewhat related findings support the idea that affective and power relationships between parent and child may affect the transferral of political orientations.[33]

Affectivity and control relationships between pre-adults and their parents were operationalized in a number of ways, too numerous to give in detail. Suffice it to say that both parent and offspring were queried as to how close they felt to each other, whether and over what they disagreed, the path of compatibilities over the past few years, punishment agents, perceived level of parental control, parent and student satisfaction with controls, the nature and frequency of grievance processing, and rule-making procedures.

In accordance with the drift of previous research we hypothesized that the closer the student felt to his parent the more susceptible he would be to adopting, either through formal or informal learning, the political values of the parent. This turned out to be untrue. The closeness of parents and children, taking either the parent's report or the child's report, accounts for little variation in the parent-student correlations. This is true whether closeness to mother or father is considered and regardless of the student's sex. Similarly, other measures of affective relationships give little evidence that this dimension prompted much variation in the correlations among pairs.

Turning to the power relationships between parent and child we hypothesized two types of relationships: 1) the more "democratic" and permissive these relationships were the greater congruency there would be; and 2) the more satisfied the child was with the power relationships the greater would be the congruency. Where patterning appears it tends to support the first hypothesis. For example, those students avowing they have an "average" amount of autonomy agree slightly more often with their parents than do those left primarily to their own resources and those heavily monitored by their parents. More generally, however, the power configuration—either in terms of its structure or its appraised satisfactoriness—generated few significant and consistent differences. This proved true whether we relied on the parent's account or the student's.

As with sex roles, the affective and control dimensions possess weak explanatory power when laid against parent-to-student transmission patterns. In neither case does this mean that these characteristics are unimportant for the political socialization of the young. It does mean that they are of little help in trying to account for the differential patterns of parent-student congruences.

Levels of Politicization. Another set of family characteristics concerns the saliency and cue-giving structure of political matters within the family. One would expect parents for whom politics is more salient to emit more cues, both direct and indirect. Other things being equal, the transmission of political values would vary with the saliency and overt manifestations of political matters. Cue-giving

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[31] A discussion of these dimensions is found in Murray Straus, "Power and Support Structure of the Family in Relation to Socialization," *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 26 (August, 1964), 318–326. See also Wesley C. Becker, "Consequences of Different Kinds of Parental Discipline," in Martin and Lois Hoffman (eds.), *Review of Child Development* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1964), Vol. 1, pp. 169–208; William H. Sewell, "Some Recent Developments in Socialization Theory and Research," *The Annals*, 349 (September, 1963), 163–181; Glen H. Elder, Jr., "Parental Power Legitimation and Its Effects on the Adolescent," *Sociometry*, 26 (March, 1963), 50–65; and Douvan and Gold, *op. cit.*

[32] Middleton and Putney, *op. cit.*

[33] Lane, *op. cit.*; and Maccoby et al., *op. cit.*

TABLE 6. FAMILY POLITICIZATION AND PARENT-STUDENT AGREEMENT ON A RANGE OF POLITICAL VALUES[a]

Frequency of:	Party Identification	Political Cynicism	Cosmopolitanism-Localism	Group Ratings[b]	Prayer and Integration Issues[c]	Freedom Issues[c]
Husband-Wife Political Conversations						
Very often	.54	.19	.22	.20	.36	.13
Pretty often	.49	.15	.11	.20	.30	.10
Not very often	.45	.11	.14	.24	.28	.06
Don't talk	.32	.08	.22	.23	.32	.08
Student-Parent Political Conversations						
Several times/week	.49	.16	.17	.22	.32	.08
Few times/month	.45	.12	.16	.21	.35	.14
Few times/year	.41	.10	.18	.30	.18	−.05
Don't talk	.47	.02	.12	.20	.26	.06

[a] Each tau-b correlation in this table is based on at least 82 cases.

[b] Average ratings of Negroes, Catholics, and Jews on the "feeling thermometer."

[c] See p. 175 for a description of these issues.

would structure the political orientations of the child and, in the absence of rebellion, bolster parent-student correspondences. The absence of cue-giving would probably inject considerable instability and ambiguity in the child's value structure. At the same time this absence would invite the injection of other socializing agents whose content and direction might vary with parental values. In either event parental-offspring value correspondences should be reduced in the case of lower political saliency and cue-giving.

Turning to the data, it is evident that while the hypothesis receives some support for party identification and political cynicism, it does not hold generally. Illustratively, Table 6 provides the parent-student correlations for party indentification, cynicism, cosmopolitanism, averaged group evaluations, and two pairs of issues. The two politicization measures capture different elements of family politicization—the extent of husband-wife conversations about politics (reported by parents) and the frequency of student-parent conversations related to political affairs (reported by students). The correspondence between parent and student cynicism is mildly related to both of these measures, while party identification is clearly affected by parental conversations, but not by student-parent political discussions. The other opinions and values show no consistent relationships with either measure of politicization. Similar results were obtained when politicization was measured by the general political interest among parents and students, parent-student disagreements regarding political and social matters, and parents' participation in political campaigns.

That the level of family politicization affects somewhat the flow of party identification and cynicism but is unrelated to the transmission of other variables should not be ignored. The extremely salient character of party loyalties, which results in the higher overall parent-student correlation, and the summary nature of the cynicism variable suggest characteristics that may determine the relevancy of family politicization for the transmission of political values. The essential point, though, is that the level of politicization does not uniformly affect the degree of parent-student correspondence. Students with highly politicized backgrounds do not necessarily resemble their parents more closely than students from unpoliticized families. Whether it is measured in terms of student or parent responses, taps spectator fascination with or active engagement in politics, or denotes individual-level or family-level properties, varying amounts of politicization do not uniformly or heavily alter the level of correspondence between parent and offspring values.[34]

Since our findings are mostly on the null side, it is important to consider the possibility that interaction effects confound the relationship between family characteristics and transmission patterns. Previous work suggests that affectivity and power relations in the family will be related to parent-child transmission primarily among highly politicized families. Only if politics is important to the parents will acceptance or rejection of parental values be affected by the parent-child relationship. In order to test this hypothesis, student-parent agreement was observed, controlling for family politicization and affectivity or power relations simultaneously. No strong interaction effects emerge from this analysis. The affectivity and power dimensions sometimes affect only the highly politicized, sometimes the most unpoliticized, and at other times their effect is not at all dependent on the level of politicization.[35] The lack of impressive bivariate relationships between family characteristics and the transmission rate of political values is not due to the confounding influence of multiple effects within the family.

With hindsight, reasons for the failure of the hypothesized relationships bearing on family structure can be suggested. But to give a clear and thorough explanation and test alternative hypotheses will be difficult and time-consuming. One exploratory avenue, for example, brings in student perceptions of parental attitudes as an intervening variable. Another is concerned with the relative homogeneity of the environment for children of highly politicized backgrounds versus youngsters from unpoliticized familes. A third possibility is the existence of differential patterns of political learning and, in particular, a differential impact of the various socializing agents on children from politically rich versus those from politically barren backgrounds.[36] It is also possible that knowledge about later political development of the students would help explicate these perplexing configurations.

IV. A CONCLUDING NOTE

In our opening remarks we noted the conflicting views regarding the importance of the family as an agent of political learning for the child. This paper has been primarily concerned with a fairly narrow aspect of this question. We sought evidence indicating that a variety of political values held by pre-adults were induced by the values of their parents. Thus our test has been rather stringent. It has not examined the relative impact of the family vis-à-vis other socializing agents, the interaction effects of the family and other agents, nor the other ways in which the family may shape political orientations.

Having said this, it is nevertheless clear that any model of socialization which rests on assumptions of pervasive currents of parent-to-child value transmissions of the types examined here is in serious need of modification. Attitude objects in the concrete, salient, reinforced terrain of party identification lend support to the model. But this is a prime exception. The data suggest that with respect to a range of other attitude objects the correspondences vary from, at most, moderate support to virtually no support. We have suggested that life cycle effects, the role of other socializing agents, and attitude instabilities help account for the very noticeable departures from the model positing high transmission. Building these forces into a model of political learning will further expose the family's role in the development of political values.

A derivative implication of our findings is that there is considerable slack in the value-acquisition process. If the eighteen-year old is no simple carbon copy of his parents—as the results clearly indicate—then it seems most likely that other socializing agents have ample opportunity to exert their impact. This happens, we believe, both during and after childhood. These opportunities are enhanced by the rapid socio-technical changes occurring in modern societies. Not the least of these are the transformations in the content and form of the mass media and communication channels, phenomena over which the family and the school have relatively little control. It is perhaps the intrusion of other and different stimuli lying outside the nexus of the family and school which has led to the seemingly different *Weltanschauung* of the post-World-War-II generation compared withit s immediate predecessor.

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[34] Nor was the intensity of parental feelings related in any consistent fashion to the amount of parent-student correspondence.

[35] There is a moderate tendency for those children feeling most detached from their parents to exhibit greater fluctuation in agreement with their parents—at various levels of politicization—than is true of those feeling most attached to their parents.

[36] At another level, the explanation may be in the lack of validity of students' and parents' reports of family structure. See Niemi, *op. cit.* Ch. II and pp. 184–185.

The place of change factors or agents thus becomes crucial in understanding the dynamics at work within the political system. Such factors may be largely exogenous and unplanned in nature, as in the case of civil disturbances and unanticipated consequences of technical innovations. Or they may be much more premeditated, as with radical changes in school organization and curriculum and in enforced social and racial interaction. Or, finally, they may be exceedingly diffuse factors which result in numerous individual student-parent differences with no shift in the overall outlook of the two generations. Our point is that the absence of impressive parent-to-child transmission of political values heightens the likelihood that change factors can work their will on the rising generation. Shifting demands on the political system and shifting types of system support are natural outgrowths of these processes.

COMPARING COMMUNIST NATIONS: PROSPECTS FOR AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH

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The past decade has witnessed a rapid, but uneven, growth in comparative studies. While certain types of political systems have received the lion's share of attention, others have remained backwaters of comparative research, experiencing little or no development in the application of comparative techniques. The comparative study of communist states, until recently, fell into the latter category—relatively neglected and certainly not enjoying the reputation and prestige of work with newly emerging nations or Western political systems.

Now this state of affairs is undergoing a change, or at least the promise of one. In the past several years, the possibility of developing comparative techniques in the study of communist political systems has become the object of growing interest and has provoked not a little discussion and debate.[1] The opportunities and the problems that face this field—especially in developing empirically oriented comparative analysis—are the subject of the present article.

I. THE RECENT STUDIES OF COMMUNIST SYSTEMS

The comparative study of communist systems, although only recently attracting interest as a source for generating new insights into the nature of communist systems, has roots in a long and productive tradition of cross-national research on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Descriptive comparisons of the political systems of the communist bloc have appeared with regularity since World War II,[2] and have recently been utilized in the study of the communist nations of Asia.[3] For well over a decade, experts on communist countries have been making contributions to comparative works on political parties, interest groups, public administration and other specialized fields of study amenable to cross-national analysis.[4] The study of ideological and political developments in the communist world has been conducted largely within a comparative framework,[5] while an extensive literature has developed on the comparative study of communist legal systems[6] and differences and similarities in the process of modernization in China and the Soviet Union.[7] In sheer volume, this material undoubtedly equals and perhaps exceeds comparative studies dealing with Western political systems, or under-developed countries.

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[1] H. Gordon Skilling, "Soviet and Communist Politics: A Comparative Approach," *Journal of Politics*, 22 (May, 1960), 300–313; Robert C. Tucker, "On the Comparative Study of Communism," *World Politics*, 19 (Jan., 1967), 242–257; symposium on comparative politics and communist systems in *Slavic Review*, 26 (March, 1967), 1–28. The problems of comparing China and Soviet Russia were the subject of a meeting sponsored by the American Council of Learned Societies in the spring of 1966. Professor Lucian Pye has outlined the problems of comparative research with communist nations in his address, "Comparative Politics and Communist Studies," delivered to the 62nd Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1966.

[2] Hugh Seton Watson, *The East European Revolution* (1951); Ygael Gluckstein, *Stalin's Satellites in Europe* (1952); Alvin Z. Rubinstein (ed.), *Communist Political Systems* (1966).

[3] A. Doak Barnett (ed.), *Communist Strategies in Asia: A Comparative Analysis of Governments and Parties* (1963); Robert A. Scalapino, *The Communist Revolution in Asia* (1965).

[4] Joseph LaPalombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (1963); Harold Lasswell, *World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements* (1963); Henry W. Ehrmann, *Interest Groups on Four Continents* (1958); Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, *Political Culture and Political Development* (1965); Sigmund Neumann, *Modern Political Parties* (1956).

[5] Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (1961); Richard Lowenthal, *World Communism* (1966); Walter Laqueur and Leopold Labedz (eds.), *Communism and Revolution: the Strategic uses of Political Violence* (1964); H. Gordon Skilling, *Communism National and International* (1964). Although primarily concerned with international politics, note should also be made of the series of monographs issued under the auspices of the Hoover Institute on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, which includes studies on the Soviet Union and the world communist system, the Mongolian People's Republic, the Korean People's Republic, and the Chinese People's Republic.

[6] A project on the comparative study of the legal systems of the USSR, China, Poland and Yugoslavia has led to the publication of several monographs: Jerome A. Cohen, "The Criminal Process in the People's Republic of China," *Harvard Law Review*, 79 (1966), 469–474; John N. Hazard, "The Soviet Legal Pattern's Spread

It is nevertheless true that this considerable body of literature has not produced a method of studying communist states which could be called distinctively comparative. The use of comparative data has been limited; typologies of communist systems have not developed to any great degree, and there has been conspicuously lacking, in the study of communist systems, a conceptual framework, such as the notion of pluralism or the process of modernization, which could unify and orient empirical studies of communist states along comparative lines.[8]

There are many reasons why this has been so. The need to develop a familiarity with a wide variety of cultures and languages, the paucity of empirical information on communist systems, and the difficulties and dangers involved in carrying out on-the-spot research have in the past discouraged persons from attempting comparative work with communist countries. In the realm of comparative theory, the fact that existing methodology has been derived largely from experience with Western political systems has created special problems for comparative work with communist states.

Perhaps the single most important factor discouraging comparative research with communist systems in the past was the monolithic uniformity of communist states. Once having analyzed the communist political system as it existed in the Soviet Union, there was usually little to be gained, it seemed, from broadening the scope of the analysis to include a number of communist nations. Even when variations in political forms did exist (such as the presence of a pseudo multi-party system in certain communist countries), the obvious artificiality of the differences in question militated against utilizing the comparative approach.

For a number of reasons the barriers to comparative work just enumerated no longer appear so formidable. Communist political systems are more and more characterized by institutional differences and contrasting economic and social policies. Perhaps even more important is the fact that the evolution taking place in the communist world is for the most part in a "Western" direction. Rightly or wrongly, the consequence of this has been that tested methods of comparative analysis, such as the study of interest groups, now appear applicable to communist political systems for the first time.

The evolution of communist political systems in a direction which encourages the utilization of comparative techniques is not universal, nor is there agreement on its importance. It is still felt by many that communist states, because they are organized from above with little regard for popular feelings or social pressures, are not amenable to most forms of comparative analysis even when they differ one from another. In its extreme form this attitude finds expression in the assertion that only the ideologies and policies of the directing organs of the parties concerned are the determining, and therefore comparable, elements of communist political systems.[9]

Without becoming too deeply involved in the implications of this view of totalitarian political systems, it can be suggested that there has often in the past been manifest an unjustifiably rigid attitude toward the scope of comparative analysis and its applicability to communist nations. In point of fact it is impossible to state categorically that comparative

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Abroad," *University of Illinois Law Forum* (Spring, 1964), 277–297; Aleksander W. Rudzinski, "The New Communist Civil Codes of Czechoslovakia and Poland," *Indiana Law Journal,* 41 (Fall, 1965), 33–68. Among many comparative legal studies dealing with communist systems, mention should also be made of Vladimir Gosovski and Kazimierz Grzybowski (eds.), *Government, Law and Courts in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe* (1959); Ivo Lapenna, *State and Law: Soviet and Yugoslav Theory* (1964); Istvan Szaszy, *Private International Law in the European People's Democracies* (Budapest, 1964). A pioneering work in this field is Samuel Sharp, *New Constitutions in the Soviet Sphere* (1950).

[7] Kurt London (ed.), *Unity and Contradiction* (1962); Walter Laqueur and Leopold Labedz (eds.), *The Future of Communist Society* (1962); Franz Shurmann, "Comparative Politics of Russia and China," paper delivered to the 61st Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1965.

[8] Exceptions have included the work of R. V. Burks, *The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe* (1961) and Gordon Skilling, whose recent volume, *The Governments of Communist East Europe* (1966), is a truly comparative text. A pioneering work in comparisons of the United States and the Soviet Union is Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington, *Political Power USA/USSR* (1964).

[9] Roy Pierce, "Liberty and Policy as Variables," this REVIEW, 57 (Sept., 1963), 659.

analysis will always produce better results with one type of political system than another. Inevitably, a great number of variables influence the outcome of comparative work; as a consequence, the research techniques employed, or the aims of the particular study, may be as important in determining the practicality of employing the comparative method as the identity of the group of nations chosen for the purposes of comparison. This, in fact, has always been true, even when communism was confined largely to the Stalinist totalitarian model.

Several examples may be given to illustrate this point. While some counting techniques apply better to non-communist than to communist systems, there are cases, such as in the comparative analysis of elites, in which mathematical correlations have been more extensively used in comparative work with communist countries than with non-communist ones.[10] There are many types of functional problems, such as are apparent in the manipulation of mass communications to enhance the authority of a regime, which can be studied by comparative methods in communist states when such an approach might prove impractical, or less rewarding, when applied to other types of systems. Systems analysis was first employed in comparative work with communist states,[11] and the first proposal to develop a "working model" of an advanced contemporary society was made in conjunction with the Harvard study of the Soviet Union.

In the search for subjects amenable to comparative study, it must be borne in mind that one's concept of the limits of the comparative method necessarily plays an important role. Comparisons of national units, while they constitute an obvious starting point for measuring the utility of comparative research, are not the only way in which work in the field is conducted.

Replicative studies, for example, may make valuable contributions to comparative work and never compare nations as such. There is also a place in the comparative approach for the study of different periods in one nation's development (so-called vertical comparisons) and the analysis of regional differences within one country if they have, as part of their purpose, the study of similarities and differences among political systems. One or another of these methods may, at any given time, prove more useful or have greater potential than another when dealing with a specific type of political system, and it is a sign of maturity in comparative analysis that the application of one of these methods is not thought to exclude or pre-empt the use of others.

One might sum up the argument so far by suggesting that while the comparative method has not in the past produced distinctive insights or techniques in connection with the analysis of communist political systems, a wide array of comparative approaches is available for use in the study of these systems, and there is no *a priori* reason why many cannot be applied with equal success to both communist and non-communist nations alike.

The task of applying the comparative method to communist systems nevertheless involves difficult problems of method and theory, if only because the emergence of a new field of comparative research has usually been tied to the development of concepts which form "take-off points" for comparison. It is a perplexing and even sensitive point how such a theory is to emerge in the field of comparative communist studies, or even whether it should be sought for at all. No discussion of the prospects for comparative work with communist systems can avoid the difficulties encountered in the search for a secure foundation on which to build this new field, however, and it is with this fundamental problem that the next part of the discussion is concerned.

II. THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS AND TASKS

The theoretical and methodological problems that must be overcome in developing a new field of comparative studies range over a wide area, from the development of typologies and dynamic concepts of evolution and change, to the problem of gathering data and applying quantitative comparative techniques. For purposes of simplification, the discussion will concentrate on three tasks which have always been of primary importance for the growth of new types of comparative work: developing typologies and classifications of political systems; building models; and compiling and evaluating comparative data.

1. *Developing Typologies.* The classification and typing of communist systems pose special problems for the comparative political scientist.[12] Within the communist world, while there

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[10] Reference to elite studies will be made in more detail in section III of this article.

[11] Systems studies of communist states are discussed below.

[12] The literature on typologies relevant to communist states includes Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (1956); Gabriel A. Almond, "Com-

is great diversity, there is no obvious pattern of development which would permit one to point to major sub-groups or distinctive system types, with the exception of the now historical system of pure Stalinism. Communist states are not always easy to identify; Cuba comes to mind as a country whose claim to be communist is still open to question, and some persons would also exclude Yugoslavia from the communist camp.

Global typologies, indispensable when discussing contemporary political systems, are nevertheless difficult to utilize in making distinctions among communist states. All too often, plausible and convenient categories, such as totalitarian or authoritarian systems types, tend to break down when communist states begin to evolve out of the standard Stalinist pattern. If the Yugoslav political system has lost its totalitarian characteristics, for example, what exactly has it become? Is it perhaps now authoritarian? Some discussion hints at this, but the term authoritarian hardly seems appropriate to a modernizing elite or a communist oligarchy of the type that rules Yugoslavia today. Should the country then be designated as a newly emerging nation with a one-party system and a modernizing elite? The objection to this suggestion lies in the fact that communist Yugoslavia has always been a "newly emerging" nation with a one-party system; that is, the reason for the re-classification is not suggested in the new category that is being applied as a result of the changes that have taken place in the system. Nor is Yugoslavia's past revolutionary experience adequately accounted for in this description of the country as a newly emerging nation.

The phenomenon of modernization offers another illustration of the imprecision that surrounds the classification of communist political systems. At what stage in the modernization process does one place communist states in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union: are they "modern," "mixed," or "traditional"? Even the most advanced communist state has some characteristics of a developing nation, and all share so many features in common regardless of their level of economic development that the significance of differences in degrees of modernization seems much less clear than when dealing with non-communist systems. In an effort to deal with some of these problems of comparison, Professor Brzezinski once referred to the Soviet Union as "quasi-modern,"[13] an interesting observation on the character of Soviet society, but difficult to use for comparative purposes.

Because of these obvious difficulties, the problem of classification of communist systems may have to be dealt with on a common sense basis at first, beginning with an effort to determine what obvious characteristics identify this type of system. What these characteristics are is in itself a debatable point,[14] but it would not seem unreasonable to suggest that certain fundamental traits reappear consistently in our conception of the communist form of rule. Ideology is an obvious common denominator of communist governments; party supremacy and the experience of a period of revolutionary rule in which the pre-communist social order is destroyed are others. A descriptive definition of the limits of the group being considered for comparison might then run something along the following lines: communist states should be considered comparable among themselves, or treated as a distinct category for purposes of comparison with other types of political systems, if they have adopted the Marxist ideology, if they have experienced a revolution which has destroyed the power structure of the earlier system, and if the Party has acquired a monopoly in the decision-making processes of the societies in question, exercising decisive control over all major political, economic and cultural organizations.

This common sense definition admittedly has many deficiencies: it relies heavily on the fact that most communist states have their origins in the Stalinist form of communism; it does not provide an unambiguous guide to

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parative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics*, 18 (Aug., 1956), 391–409; Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), *The Politics of Developing Areas* (1960); Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell Jr., *Comparative Politics: a Developmental Approach* (1966); Robert A. Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis* (1963); Karl Lowenstein, *Political Power and the Governmental Process* (1957); Barrington Moore Jr., "Notes on the Acquiring of Political Power," *World Politics*, 8 (Oct., 1955), 1–20; Robert C. Tucker, "Toward a Comparative Politics of Movement Regimes," this REVIEW, 55 (June, 1961), 281–293; David Apter, *The Politics of Modernization*, (1965), pp. 22–25.

[13] *Political Power USA/USSR*. Edward Shils has called the Soviet Union a "tyrannically deformed manifestation of potentialities which are inherent in the process of modernization." Frederick C. Barghoorn quoting Shils in Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, *loc. cit.*

[14] The problem is discussed by Alfred G. Meyer, "The Comparative Study of Communist Political Systems," *Slavic Review*, 20 (March, 1967), 5–6.

which systems should be considered part of the communist world and which should not; and it does not solve the problem of making broad distinctions among types of systems within the communist camp.

In practical comparative work, meanwhile, the significance of being able to utilize precise classifications or typologies varies with the nature of the question being asked. In the case of certain types of elite studies, for example, where the method employed is that of accumulating replicative data, the number of countries utilized and their exact location on a taxonomic chart may not be of crucial importance. On the other hand, if one employs statistical data to develop comparisons among major types of political systems, or to identify the salient characteristics of each type of system (as Banks and Textor have done),[15] the placement of a country in one category rather than another may materially affect the over-all results, especially if the countries being compared are rank-ordered. To cite a more extreme case, the attempt to construct paradigms of systems types based on pairs of mutually exclusive characteristics such as the Parsonian system of pattern-variables, or the modern-traditional dichotomy, makes extraordinary demands on the typologist,[16] far beyond the capabilities of most theoretical work on communist systems undertaken up until the present time.

2. *Building Models*. Closely related to the development of typologies, but nevertheless a distinct branch of comparative analysis in its own right, is the conceptualization and testing of models of political systems. Models are important for comparative methodology because they seek to establish the central characteristics and interrelationships of a specific type of political system. Out of this work may emerge a variety of comparative insights into functional relationships, stresses and strains characteristic of the system in question, and, hopefully, guidelines for the measurement and comparison of the general performance of the system with other types. Measuring the stability of political systems is a good example of the kind of empirical and comparative analysis that requires some simple model in order to be successful.

Practically all theorizing on communist systems has aimed at creating the elements of a model, and over the years, the number of contending approaches has steadily grown: the totalitarian model (which has received a useful restatement in a comparative context by Harry Eckstein and David Apter);[17] the model of the one party state;[18] the bureaucratic model;[19] and the structural-functional model.[20]

None of these approaches to communist systems has won complete acceptance. The only one of these models which may be said to be the product of contemporary comparative methodology, the structural-functional model, has introduced some new elements into thinking about communist systems, but when applied to specific cases has proven by and large vague and disappointing.[21]

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[15] Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, *A Cross-Polity Survey* (1963).

[16] For examples of this type of work, see Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, *Toward a General Theory of Action* (1951), p. 185; Barrington Moore, *Terror and Progress* (1954), p. 185; Herbert Spiro, *World Politics: The Global System* (1966), Ch. 3; Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, *op. cit.*, pp. 22–23.

[17] *Comparative Politics: a Reader* (1963), pp. 433–439.

[18] Robert C. Tucker, "Toward a Comparative Politics of Movement Regimes," *op. cit.*

[19] Suggested in the works of Bertram Wolfe, *Six Keys to the Soviet System* (1956); David Dallin, *The Changing World of Soviet Russia* (1956); Leon Trotsky, *The Revolution Betrayed* (1937); and Milovan Djilas, *The New Class* (1957). For a restatement of some of the elements of this approach, see Allan Kassof, "The Administered Society: Totalitarianism Without Terror," *World Politics*, 16 (July, 1964), 558–575 and Alfred Meyer, *op. cit.*

[20] Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, *op. cit.*, David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (1965) and *A Framework for Political Analysis* (1965); Frederick C. Barghoorn, *Politics in the USSR* (1966).

[21] One may take as an example the suggestion by Gabriel Almond that input activities embracing "interest articulation" are universal functional requisites of political systems, when in communist states they are normally largely dysfunctional in effect. David Easton has encountered similar problems in his model which stresses the entrance of "demands" into the political system, with the implication that without such inputs there could be no political system. In Easton's analysis the autonomy of decision-making in totalitarian states is taken into account by speaking of "within puts," but the difference between them and normal "inputs" into the system is never fully clarified. Other elements of Easton's approach put more stress on elite analysis, and as a consequence, have greater applicability to totalitarian states. For further criticisms of the structural-functional

approach, see Robert E. Dowse, "A Functionalist's Logic," *World Politics*, 18 (July, 1966), 607–622.

The problem of constructing working models of communist systems in fact involves one in difficult questions concerning the nature of functional relationships in society and the fundamental characteristics of political systems. It is to the credit of the field of communist studies that investigation of this problem began as early as the 1950's when several ambitious projects were undertaken to create systems models of communist societies—models which in turn could be used for locating "vulnerabilities," or strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet system. This research advanced sufficiently to prove the complexity of functional models, but was unfortunately suspended before many of the basic problems could be thoroughly analyzed and essential data collected.[22]

This early experience, combined with the insights of the structural-functional school, nevertheless suggests possible ways of approaching model-building in comparative work with communist states. Functional models, if oriented toward developmental problems, are feasible and much easier to work with than the macro-static type of model implied in the systems approach or by structural-functional concepts.[23] By utilizing a wide range of comparisons and combining them with historical perspectives, the developmental model may be given certain attributes of a static model. For example, through examining the workings of the Stalinist system over time, and under different national conditions, its performance capabilities and functional inter-dependencies can be appraised much more accurately than in the vulnerability studies of the early 1950's. Because Stalinist systems have shown a tendency to excess, forcing certain lines of action to the point of rapidly diminishing returns, functional comparisons might find it useful to experiment with concepts of marginal utility in building models, concentrating on the limits which experience has shown circumscribed the capacities of the Stalinist system under different historical and national conditions. In this way functional analysis might free itself of the difficulties which have resulted from focusing exclusively on "vulnerabilities" (or strengths and weaknesses) or on the systems concept of "total interdependence," when constructing macro-static models.

The generalized notion of systems also contains certain insights which should not go unutilized in comparative work with communist countries. Implicit in the structural-functional model, and explicit in general systems theory, is the distinction between self-regulating social systems in a state of primary equilibrium, and secondary types of systems guided by feedback mechanisms manifest in the activities of the political system. The value of this concept in analyzing the operation of modern governments lies not simply in the emphasis which is thereby placed on the activities of communication and decision-making, but in the suggestion that complex societies can only operate efficiently if the political system performs a feedback function, regulating and sustaining highly specialized and complex activities which in turn may themselves perform important control functions in the society in question. When the state nevertheless seeks to replace these processes and institutions with its own bureaucratic forms of rule, entirely new functional problems are created, about which there has been much speculation, but little methodical comparative analysis aimed at the development of working models.[24]

These exercises in model-building by no means exclude the study of power relationships, and above all, re-examination of the concept of totalitarianism in such a way as to make it more amenable to empirical research. Any comparative study of the Stalinist system would necessarily have as one of its goals the clarification of the dynamics of the totalitarian form of government. This being the case, there does not appear to be any more justification for the position that the comparative approach will replace totalitarian theory than for the thesis that communist systems, because they are (or were) totalitarian, cannot be subjected to comparative forms of analysis.

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[22] Clyde Kluckhohn, Alex Inkeles and Raymond A. Bauer, "Strategic Psychological and Sociological Strengths and Vulnerabilities of the Soviet Social System," Russian Research Center, Harvard University (Oct., 1954); Barrington Moore, Jr., "The Strengths and Weaknesses of the Soviet System," Air University, Human Resources Research Institute, Maxwell Air Force Base (Dec., 1952); Irwin Sanders, "Research for Evaluation of Social Systems Analysis," Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas (Sept. 15, 1957); Raymond Bauer *et al.*, *How the Soviet System Works* (1956); William A. Lybrand, "Outline of an Analytic Approach to Predicting Societal System Recovery From Air Attack," AFOSR Technical Note 60-1416, ASTIA AD No. 255770 (March, 1961).

[23] The possibilities of developing comparative models based on a dynamic analysis of performance of political systems is dealt with briefly by A. M. Halpern, "Contemporary China as a Problem for Political Science," *World Politics*, 15 (April, 1963), 361–375 and is stressed by Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *op. cit.*, Ch. 8.

[24] See Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington, *op. cit.*, p. 124, where the Soviet political system is described using cybernetic terminology. Also relevant are Ludwig von Bertalanffy, "General Systems Theory," *General Systems Yearbook* (1956), Vol. I, pp. 1–100.

3. *Compiling and Evaluating Comparative Data.* Developing a fund of comparative data is perhaps the most crucial of the three tasks facing the field of comparative communist studies. Unless new sources of information can be found and reasonably accurate data accumulated, there is the danger that comparative studies of communist systems will remain suspended in limbo, unable to build on a solid empirical foundation. And while prospects for gathering data on communist countries have improved dramatically in recent years, great problems remain—both in evaluating the extent and reliability of materials originating from communist sources, and in utilizing this information productively in comparative research.

Of the various types of data used for comparative work, statistical materials, or "aggregative data" as Karl Deutsch has called it,[25] is by far the most important. In the communist nations, it is available in widely differing quantities and degrees of reliability. On mainland China, only one census has been carried out (in 1953), and even after its completion, official Chinese figures on the size of the Chinese population varied greatly, sometimes by as much as 24 million in a single year.[26] Chinese data on the size of the state apparatus, social mobility, social stratification and income differentials is limited largely to statistics from the mid-1950's on the number of persons engaged in certain occupations[27] and recently acquired material from the same period on salary scales in non-agricultural occupations.[28] Aggregative data on social, economic and political conditions in other Asian communist countries, and on Cuba, is also sparse or unavailable in a form convenient for comparative research.[29] Information on the Mongolian Peoples Republic is difficult to obtain, although available in somewhat greater amounts than for the communist states of the Far East.[30]

By way of contrast, aggregative data on several Eastern European countries is relatively plentiful and reliable, even by Western standards. In Yugoslavia, three censuses have been held since the communists came to power (in 1948, 1953 and 1961). A wide range of aggregative data is made available through the statistical services of the federal, republic and local governments, and quantitative analyses of such activities as local government, workers councils, problems of urbanization and modernization, the distribution of incomes, size of the bureaucracy and other topics have been carried out by individual scholars and government-sponsored research institutes.[31]

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[25] See his remarks in Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan, *Comparing Nations: the Use of Quantitative Data in Cross National Research* (1966), p. 41.

[26] Amrit Lal, "China's Perennial Census Problem," *Eastern World*, 18 (May, 1964), 10–12. For a useful summary of statistical information available on China, still accurate in most particulars, see Lawrence Kraider and John Aird, "Sources of Demographic Data on Mainland China," *American Sociological Review*, 24 (Oct., 1959), p. 623.

[27] John Philip Emerson, *Non-Agricultural Employment in Mainland China, 1949–1958* (1965).

[28] At the time of writing, still in the process of translation. See also Central Intelligence Agency, *Average Annual Money Earnings of Workers and Staff in Communist China, 1949–1950* (Oct., 1960). The most recent source of data on mainland China is U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *An Economic Profile of Mainland China*, (1967), Vol. II.

[29] For data on Cuba, see The Cuban Economic Research Project, *A Study on Cuba* (1965). Sources for North Vietnamese statistical materials are cited in lê chaû, *Le Viet Nam Socialiste: Une Économie de Transition* (1966).

[30] See G. G. S. Murphy, *Soviet Mongolia* (1966).

[31] Some representative materials, ranging from statistical summaries to analyses in depth in which aggregative data have been employed in Yugoslavia include: Savezni zavod za statistiku, "Narodni odbori srezovi i opština: sastav odbora i izborni rezultati" [Peoples Councils of the Districts and localities: composition of committees and elections results], No. 134 (1959); Zavod SR Slovenije za statistike, "Prikazi in študije," No. 6 (1964), which deals with the membership of the workers councils in Yugoslavia; Savezni zavod za statistiku, "Rezultati popisa službenika i-x-1956 [Results of the Census of Functionaries i-x-1956] (1957); Dušan Čalić,

Poland and Hungary have developed their statistical reporting rapidly in the last decade, providing valuable information on demographic problems, social stratification, the standard of living, and other areas of interest for comparative work.[32] While other Eastern European countries and the USSR have not equalled this output, they are improving their statistical services steadily and now make available basic information on the population, economy and social structure unobtainable a decade ago.[33]

Many difficulties accompany the use of this data for comparative purposes, and a great deal of cooperation is necessary at the international level if national statistics are to be gathered and presented in a way that permits meaningful comparisons. Communist statistics, while they must be used with great care, do show signs of becoming more truly comparable than in the past. Although the Soviet Union, above all, has displayed great reluctance in cooperating with Western nations in order to make available comparative data in the social sciences—and has produced data comparing communist and Western systems largely for propaganda purposes[34]—there has been an increasing awareness within the bloc that

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Industrializacija Jugoslavije [The Industrialization of Yugoslavia] (1963); Petar J. Marković, *Strukturne promene na selu kao rezultat ekonomskog razvitka period 1900–1960* [Structural Changes in the Village as a Result of the Economic Development of the Period 1900–1960] (1963). A guide to decision making by the federal government is provided by a description of the decisions made by the federal government in Savezna Narodna Skupština, *Izveštaj Savezno Izvršnog Veča* [Report of the Federal Executive Committee], annual report. Incomes are reported by branch of industry and percentage of employees receiving certain levels of income in the Statistical Annual (*Statistički godišnjak*): more methodical and revealing data on income differentials of various segments of society has been gathered by the Slovenian statistical bureau and published in its bulletin, *Statistično Gradivo.* Studies employing sample survey data and analyses of elections will be cited below.

[32] A number of the more important Polish works using aggregative data will be cited in the discussion to follow. Of general interest are Andrzej Karpiński *et al.*, *Problemy rozwoju gospodarczego Polski Ludowej 1944–1964* [Problems of the Economic Development of People's Poland, 1944–1964] (1965); Adam Sarapaty (ed.), *Przemiany społeczne w Polsce Ludowej* [Social Change in People's Poland] (1965); Ryszard Turski, *Dynamika przemian spolecznych w Polsce* [The Dynamics of Social Change in Poland] (1961); Edward Rosset, *Oblicze demograficzne Polski Ludowej* [The Demographic Face of People's Poland] (1965). Studies issued by the Hungarian Statistical Office, Központi Statisztikai O Hivatal, have dealt with a wide variety of social and demographic problems; a number are cited below.

[33] Basic data on economic and social activities in the USSR appears in the statistical annual *Narodnoe khozi͡aistvo SSSR* [The National Economy of the USSR] which resumed publication in 1957 after a lapse of almost two decades. Aggregative data on education, occupational structure, national composition of the population of the USSR and other subjects may be found in the statistical journal *Vestnik Statistiki* and in the annual *SSSR v tsifrakh* (also published for a number of the Union Republics). For a recent study on the Soviet Union giving a compilation of demographic data from Soviet sources, U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *New Directions in the Soviet Economy*, Part III, *The Human Resources* (1966). All of the remaining East European governments have published statistical yearbooks; all have held one or more censuses in the post-war period.

[34] An example of the Soviet approach toward sharing comparative data was provided by the 1958 Prague conference of social scientists sponsored by UNESCO; the American participant remarked that the Soviet social scientists "never quite admit that studies of social and economic conditions, to be truly comparable, must include free and open use of data from the Eastern (Communist) countries, as well as from others. In some deep sense, they regard their case as different": Everett C. Hughes, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 1 (March, 1959), 290. For Soviet publications giving comparative statistics on the bloc, *Ekonomika Sotsialisticheskikh stran v tsifrakh* [The Economies of Socialist Countries in Figures] (1965); I͡a. I͡a. Kotkovskiĭ *et al.*, *Sopostavlenie urovneĭ ekonomicheskogo razvitii͡a sotsialisticheskikh stran* [Determining the Level of Economic Development of Socialist Countries] (1965). For comparison of the Soviet and American economies with a clear propagandistic intent, "Nauchnai͡a konferentsii͡a po voprosam metodologii spostavlenii͡a osnovynkh ekonomicheskikh pokazateleĭ SSSR i S Sh A [Scientific Conference on the Question of Methodology in Establishing the Basic Economic Indicators of the USSR and the USA], *Vestnik Statistika*, No. 1 (1963), 29–73.

accurate comparative data on common economic and social problems is essential. Through Comecon committees and scholarly conferences, steps are being taken to develop uniform standards for the bloc in the compilation of data on economic problems, the standard of living, and other subjects.[35] At the same time, the fund of Western knowledge on national incomes, levels of consumption and the budgetary expenses of Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union is steadily growing, providing valuable data which is more accessible than that made available in communist countries.[36]

There are obvious drawbacks to using aggregative data from communist countries. Most statistics are not directly concerned with politics (we shall deal with some exceptions shortly), and are restricted largely to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. What is available nevertheless constitutes an indispensable basis for comparing both the social determinates of political action and the stages of development through which communist countries are presently passing. Most of this material has until now gone unutilized in the study of communist countries.

In comparative research, aggregative data should be supplemented by sample survey data where possible. Thus, if reliable electoral statistics are not available, survey research may still tell us something about the feelings of people toward their government. Information obtained in this way provides a means of testing for cross-cultural differences on a wide range of political issues, as the work of Almond and Verba has demonstrated.[37] Sample surveys may also be the only way in which to obtain certain types of purely factual information, for example, on consumption habits, or in respect to patterns of communication.

In the study of communist countries, sample survey data has been obtained in several ways. One method has been to interview refugees, escapees, or persons from communist countries who are temporarily abroad. A modest number of projects utilizing this type of information have been organized over the years; the value of such work has varied considerably from the highly respected and influential Harvard study of Soviet refugees to the little utilized data gathered from Hungarian Freedom Fighters by several research teams in 1956 and 1957.[38] Although the number of escapees from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union has diminished over the years, efforts to question persons who have resided in the Soviet Union continue.[39] At the same time, Radio Free Europe and other organizations interested in the Soviet bloc interview persons temporarily in the West to gain information on public opinion in Eastern European nations.[40] An important pioneering effort in comparative research was carried out by John Armstrong through interviewing West European diplomats and businessmen familiar with Soviet administrative practices, comparing these practices to European methods of public administration.[41]

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[35] Publications of Comecon include *Metodologicheskie polozheniīā pokazateleĭ statistiki truda stran chlenov SEV* [Methodological Positions Concerning Statistical Indicators of Labor in Member Countries of COMECON], (1963); *Metodologicheskie polozheniīā pokazatelei statistiki naseleniīā stran chlenov SEV* [Methododological Positions Concerning the Population of the Countries of COMECON]. In another area, see M. Mód (ed.), *The Standard of Living: Some Problems of Analysis and International Comparison* (Budapest, 1962).

[36] See the volumes issued under the Research Project on National Income in East Central Europe, Columbia University, *Czechoslovak National Income and Product in 1947–48 and 1955–56* (1962); *Hungarian National Income and Product in 1955* (1963); *Polish National Income and Product, 1954, 1955, and 1956* (1965). Much of this information is summarized by Maurice Ernst, "Postwar Economic Growth in Eastern Europe (A Comparison with Western Europe)," *New Directions in the Soviet Economy, op. cit.*, Part IV, pp. 875–916.

[37] *The Civic Culture* (1963).

[38] The earliest and most successful of these studies was the Harvard project on the Soviet Union. Its results have been given in Alex Inkeles and Raymond A. Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen: Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society* (1959). Studies on Eastern Europe have included the interviewing of refugees by Siegfried Kracauer, *Satellite Mentality: Political Attitudes and Propaganda Susceptibilities of Non-communists in Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia* (1956); the survey of between 500 and 600 refugees from the Hungarian revolution by the Special Operations Research Office in early 1957, the results of which can be found in Special Operations Research Office, *Socio-Psychological Information on Hungarian Refugees*, 3 vols. (no date); the work on Hungarian Freedom Fighters carried out under the auspices of Columbia University, the results of which have not been published but are on file in the Columbia University Library. Information from this project was utilized by Paul Zinner, *Revolution in Hungary* (1962). Under the auspices of the Free Europe Press, Henry Gleitman and Joseph J. Greenbaum carried out interviews of Hungarian refugees from the 1956 revolution. The results of this study were presented in several articles by the two organizers of the project: "Hungarian Socio-Political Attitudes and Revolutionary Action," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 24 (Spring, 1960), 64–76; "Attitudes and Personality Patterns of Hungarian Refugees," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 25 (Fall, 1961), 35–65. A fourth study of Hungarian refugees was carried out by International Research Associates, *Personal Interviews with 1,000 Hungarian Refugees in Austria* (1957).

Sample survey methods have also been employed to gain information on China from Mainland Chinese now residing in Hong Kong. Political obstacles, and the difficulty of administering questionnaires to respondents who are largely illiterate, have nevertheless limited the scope of these projects,[42] and most material gathered from Chinese escapees has been obtained through interviews conducted by individual scholars on a small scale.[43]

Fortunately for comparative communist studies, these limited sources of sample survey data have been augmented in recent years by studies carried out by social scientists in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Their findings, although occasionally suffering from respondent bias and lax methodology (the former has been particularly evident in some Yugoslav projects), are bound to have an impact on both comparative and non-comparative research on communist systems. As a result of extensive polling and interviewing, data on social mobility, the impact of modernization, the attitudes of the younger generation and patterns of communication is becoming available in ever-increasing amounts.[44] Research on many types of institutions characteristic of communist societies such as youth work brigades, or workers councils, is feasible, using cross-national data gathered by sociologists in Eastern Europe. It is now not uncommon for Western and Eastern European scholars to collaborate in studies aimed at testing cross-cultural or cross-national differences; the work of David McClelland in measuring achievement motivation among Polish enterprise managers and American businessmen is an outstanding example of the fruitful results of such cooperations.[45] Research which has been carried out by the University of Pennsylvania on attitudes towards local government, with the cooperation of social scientists from both Yugoslavia and Poland, is a unique effort to test cross-cultural values with a political content.[46] Studies in political sociology in Poland have on occasion tested for cross-cultural differences between Polish and Western societies, replicating Western studies.[47]

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[39] Interviewing of persons from the Soviet Union has been going on under the auspices of the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, in connection with the study of communications in communist countries.

For more on the study of communications, see Part III below.

[40] In the past six years, Radio Free Europe has interviewed over 20,000 East European citizens visiting in the West, preparing reports on such issues as "The Psycho-Political Climate in Bulgaria" (Dec., 1960); "The Attitude of Young Czechoslovaks Regarding War and Peace" (Feb., 1966); and "Flight Motivation of Refugees from Four Soviet Bloc Countries (Sept., 1963). A summary of the results of these studies can be found in "What Do East Europeans Think," *East Europe*, 15 (March, 1960), 26–28.

[41] John Armstrong, "Sources of Administrative Behavior: Some Soviet and Western European Comparisons," this REVIEW, 59 (Sept., 1965), 643–655.

[42] In the Chinese case, the problems facing sample survey work with displaced persons were evaluated as "appalling" at a conference held on the subject in 1962 under the sponsorship of the American Council of Learned Societies. Prior to that time two major studies had been organized. One was under the auspices of the UN and dealt with the problems of refugees, but contained data of interest for the political scientist: Dr. Edvard Hambro, *The Problems of Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong* (1955). The other early study was carried out under the direction of the Special Operations Research Office and involved the interviewing of approximately 2,000 Mainland Chinese on various aspects of communications in communist China, especially word of mouth communications. Unclassified results of this study are available through the organizer of the research, Barton Whaley: "Propin China: A Study of Word of Mouth Communications in Communist China." In 1964–65, Paul Hiniker, working under the auspices of the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, interviewed over 400 Chinese refugees on the effects of mass communications: "The Effect of Mass Communication in Communist China," (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, MIT June, 1966).

[43] For a recent example of this type of work, see A. Doak Barnett, *Cadres, Bureaucracy and Political Power in Communist China* (1967)

[44] Polish interest in public opinion sampling dates from 1956; since that time the most active group in the field has been the Public Opinion Research Center (OBOP). The OBOP has worked with a national quota sample of some 3,000 persons and until recently some 25 studies a year were being carried out under its auspices. Despite a reaction against public opinion polling by the Communist leadership in Poland, work of this kind continues. Descriptions of Polish sample survey work include Wladyslaw Markiewicz, "Sociological Research in People's Poland," in Stanislaw Ehrlich (ed.), *Social and Political Transformations in Poland* (1964), pp. 221–254; Andrzej Sicinski, "Public Opinion Surveys in Poland," *International Social Science Journal*, 15 (1963), 91–109; Emilia Wilder, "Sociology in Eastern Europe: Poland," *Problems of Communism*, 14 (Jan.–Feb., 1965), 62–66. Among the many Polish studies, the following may be noted as genuine contributions to our knowledge of the political attitudes of groups in Poland: Stefan Nowak, "Środowiskowe determinanty ideologii społeczney studentow War-

Poland and Yugoslavia (especially the former) have taken the lead in gathering sample survey data, while in some cases (Bulgaria, Rumania), public opinion polling is still in its infancy and heavily influenced by political and propaganda considerations.[48] Sample survey work in the Soviet Union stands

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szawy [Environmental Determinants of Social Ideology of Warsaw Students]," *Studia Socjologiczne* (1962), 143–180; Józef Koszek, "Postawy spoteczno-polityczne chtopów," [Social-Political Attitudes of the Peasants], *Studia Socjologiczno Polityczne* (1964), 207–249; Stefan Nowak, "Egalitarian Attitudes of Warsaw Students," *American Sociological Review*, 25 (April, 1960), 219–231. Yugoslav sample survey work has been carried out chiefly through the Institute for Social Sciences, Belgrade, and the Institute for Sociology and Philosophy at the University of Ljubljana. Studies have included testing of a national sample for opinions on the Yugoslav constitution, the party congress, and the national question; sampling of local functionaries to gain information on decision-making in local government and in the workers council; studies of mass communications; and polling of the attitudes of the younger generation. Important sources for this material include: Stanislaw Skrzypek, "The Political, Cultural and Social Views of Yugoslav Youth," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 29 (Spring, 1965), 87–106; publications of the Institute for Social Sciences, including the series *Jugoslovensko javno mnenje* [Yugoslav Public Opinion]; *Javno mnenje o prednacrtu novog Ustava* [Public Opinion on the Draft of the New Constitution] (1964); Vojin Hadžistević *et al.*, *Tendencije i praksa neposrednog upravljanja radnika u ekonomskim jedinicama* [Tendencies and Practice in the Direct Administration of the Workers in Economic Units] (1963); Slavko Milosavljevski, *Saveti narodnih odbora: organizacija i funkcionisanje* [Councils of the People's Committees: Organization and Functioning] (1963). Slovenian studies can be found in Institut za Sociologijo in Filizofijo pri univerzi v Ljubljani, *Informativni Bilten*, *passim*. Studies on social mobility, modernization and communications are cited below.

[45] *The Achieving Society* (1961).

[46] The progress of the study is described in International Social Science Council mimeographed report, "International Studies of Values in Politics: Report of the Third International Roundtable, Warsaw, Poland, July 16–26, 1966" (1966).

[47] Antonina Kłoskowska, "National Concepts and Attitudes of Children in a Middle Sized City in Polish Western Territories," *The Polish Sociological Journal*, No. 1–2 (June–Dec., 1961), 43–56 (in which the author applied the questionaires of O. Klineburg and W. E. Lambert, given in *International Social Science Journal*, 11 (1959), 221–238, on national attitudes to Polish children); Jozef Kadzielski, "*Miedzypokoleniowa ruchliwosc spoleczna mieszkancow Lodzi* [Inter-Generational Mobility of Lodz Inhabitants]," *Przeglad Socjologiczny*, 17 (1963), 114–218, in which aggregate data on mobility in Lodz is compared with similar data for the cities of Indianapolis and Aarhus.

[48] The Bulgarians have now set up a "Methodical Research Office" under the Bulgarian State Radio to carry out opinion polls of radio listeners.

Rumania has been calling for greater objectivity in the social sciences, but has been slow to set up any polling organizations. The Hungarians are well-advanced in market research and have carried out time-budget studies, polls on the use of leisure time and of mass media. The Czechs now have established a sociological institute under the Academy of Sciences which is working in this field, and in 1966 an institute for the study of public opinion was formed in Prague. This is in addition to the institute for sociological research in Bratislava, which was the first to carry out sample-survey studies. For some reports on this activity, Ralph K. White, "Social Science Research in the Soviet Bloc," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 28 (Summer, 1964), 20–26; Edward Taborsky, "Sociology in Eastern Europe: Czechoslovakia," *Problems of Communism*, 14 (Jan–Feb., 1965), 62–66; Peter C. Ludz, "Sociology in Eastern Europe: East Germany," *ibid.*, pp. 66–67.

somewhere between these extremes, having produced what are largely propagandistic studies on attitudes of the youth,[49] but at the same time allowing the advocates of quantitative research in the social sciences to popularize their views and to produce studies of interest on the working class, the use of leisure time, and certain other subjects.[50]

At one time the Chinese communists engaged in a limited amount of polling; rural social surveys were conducted and village histories compiled with the assistance of members of the Young Communist League. The object of this work was, however, not to gather scientific information on conditions in the villages, but to obtain evidence that could be used to convince the peasant that living conditions in the villages had improved under communist rule.[51]

Even in this brief summary it is clear that the situation in respect to the gathering of data on communist countries is changing rapidly, opening new avenues of research which should greatly assist the development of comparative communist studies. The limits to our knowledge are, nevertheless, impressive and sobering. Obviously the fund of data is growing unevenly, and in the case of China (and perhaps Albania) may even be deteriorating in value as time passes. Putting the data that are available into comparative form presents many methodological difficulties, especially when one is working with the results of sample survey studies. Even in areas where the use of comparative data is relatively simple, such as the analysis of elites, great difficulties may arise in obtaining comprehensive and reliable information for all countries under examination.[52] More often than not, the task is beyond the capacities of the lone researcher, and requires a team effort.

Nevertheless, it is to be hoped that the trend toward making increasing amounts of data available will ease the task of applying quantitative techniques to comparative work with communist countries. Information is slowly being made available on political subjects (the social background of party members, for example)[53] which for years were considered sensitive or off limits. There is now a reasonable hope, inconceivable a decade ago, that social scientists in communist countries will assume much of the burden of gathering and analyzing data on such basic problems as social stratification, modernization, and to a limited extent, power elites. Finally, consideration must be given to the existence of great amounts of *unutilized* data, especially in connection with the study of Asian communism; John Lewis has demonstrated that significant results with comparative implications can be gathered from such materials, often of local or regional origin.[54]

The problems of theory and methodology which we have touched on in the preceding pages—classification, model building, and data collection—are clearly of a kind which will challenge the comparative political scientist to the utmost. What success can be expected in these areas is, of course, a highly speculative question, difficult to answer in a field which is still just beginning to explore its potentialities.

On balance, it seems reasonable to conclude that the field of comparative communist studies is not yet in a position to become a quantitative discipline, in the sense that hypotheses will be routinely generated and then confirmed by methods of statistical probability, rank ordering, or other counting techniques. On the other hand, a more modest but no less important goal, that of placing comparative work with communist countries on a firm empirical basis, seems feasible and highly desirable.

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[49] Boris A. Grushin, V. Chikin, *Ispoved' pokoleni͡ia* [Confessions of a Generation] (1962).

[50] A useful review of these studies can be found in Elizabeth Ann Weinberg, "Soviet Sociology: 1960–1963," Center for International Studies, MIT, Oct. 11, 1964. For Soviet accounts, Akademi͡ia Nauk SSSR, Institut Filosofii, *Kolichestvennie metodi v sotsiologii* [Quantitative Methods in Sociology] (1966). For opposition to the use of quantitative methods in studying Soviet society, see L. A. Baĭdel'dinov, *Statistika v sotsiologicheskom issledovanii* [Statistics in Sociological Research] (1965).

[51] H. Lethbridge, "Classes in Class," *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, Aug. 8, 1963, pp. 333–334; Maurice Freedman, "Sociology in China: A Brief Survey," *British Journal of Sociology*, 13 (June, 1962), 173.

[52] Carl Beck, on the basis of his experience with East European elites, has remarked that "Communist statistics on the social composition of the party are unreliable, not comparable, and unavailable for certain periods of time": "Bureaucracy and Political Development in Eastern Europe," in LaPalombara, *op. cit.*, p. 292.

[53] For example, Czechoslovakia did not release data on the party's composition until recently. Although most of this information must be gained from scattered reports of party congresses and plenums, compilations of data are sometimes made available by the communist parties. An excellent example of this type of publication is the valuable volume of the Uzbekistan party, *Kommunisticheska͡ia Partiia Uzbekistana v tsifrakh: Sbornik statisticheskikh materialov 1924–1964 gody* [The Communist Party of Uzbekistan in Figures: Collection of statistical Materials 1924–1964] (Tashkent, 1964). The Soviet party census of 1927 is discussed below.

[54] John W. Lewis, "The Study of Chinese Political Culture," *World Politics*, 18 (1966), 503–524.

Perhaps the chief obstacle to developing a distinctive field of comparative communist studies is no longer the difficulty of obtaining data, but the problem of whether it is possible for comparative work with communist systems to develop a unifying concept with the aid of which the field can develop its own distinctive theories and research strategies. No such concept exists (either as a derivative of totalitarian theory, or of the structural-functional approach) which could win general acceptance among students of communist systems at the present time. It is evident, in this connection, that comparative work with communist systems is developing in a context different from that which characterized the emergence of other areas of comparative work. For it is the departure of communist practice from its unifying concept—the Stalinist pattern of totalitarianism—which is largely responsible for stimulating interest in comparative analysis, rather than the bringing of order out of diversity through the identification of common developmental problems, or structural characteristics (modernization, or democracy).

For this reason, the rapid development of all-inclusive models or typologies seems less likely than the appearance of several different types of models, and perhaps even a number of methods of classifying communist political systems, each serving its own particular purpose. Rather than relying on abstract theory to tie these models together, the comparative study of communist systems must be given a sense of unity through the realization that in communist ideology, party rule, and the experience of totalitarian methods of control (either in the present or in the past), there is combined a distinct and unique response to the demands of contemporary society and the competitive struggle for survival which is the product of the present-day nation-state system. Values and institutions are still similar enough throughout the communist world that a balance between unity and diversity—admittedly so useful in comparative analysis—is maintained and can be exploited for research purposes. Even in such widely differing systems as those that exist in China and Yugoslavia, for example, there are enough basic forces acting in common to make the comparative study of the two systems (and phenomena within those systems, such as regionalism) a worthwhile and rewarding task.

Does this mean that the comparative study of communist systems will nevertheless remain an ill-defined field of research, seeking but never attaining the theoretical insights associated with the development of comparative studies in other areas? Admittedly one can draw this conclusion from the preceding discussion, although juxtaposing communist and non-communist comparative studies is a deceptive practice, often resulting in an exaggerated estimate of the results which have been achieved in the latter field.

The potentialities of comparative communist studies cannot be accurately gauged, however, without considering all forms of on-going research, both that which is related to the development of typologies, models and the utilization of empirical data, and problem-oriented, or "middle-range" studies. While it is not possible to examine the latter category in as great detail as might be desired, a few observations on the status of middle-range comparative work are indispensable. Out of these remarks may also emerge the hint of a strategy for comparative analysis of communist systems which will make maximum use of the empirical materials now becoming available on communist nations.

III. MIDDLE-RANGE COMPARATIVE STUDIES

It is characteristic of most research in the comparative field—especially that which seeks to utilize empirical materials—that it encompasses both a very small number of truly comparative works and a very large number of studies which are not strictly comparative but provide information in a form which may be utilized for comparative purposes. So it is in the case of middle-range comparative work with communist countries today. The number of comparative empirical studies, uncompromisingly defined, is small, beginning with the pioneering work of E. V. Burks, and including the elite studies now being carried on by Carl Beck,[55] the cross-cultural investigations of Armstrong and the University of Pennsylvania team mentioned earlier, some of the comparative analysis of China and the Soviet Union, and perhaps also the effort of Brzezinski and Huntington to compare the United States and the Soviet Union.

It is a distinctive feature of middle-range research, in addition, that it often approaches its subject matter not with the intent of adding to our knowledge of the political process as a *system*, but through the utilization of elite theory, the investigation of principles of social stratification or modernization, or with the aid of other concepts having a comparative orientation but not concerned with comparing nations or political systems as such. Most of this type of research will be something more than "middle-range," more often than not involving quite complex and fundamental theoretical problems. This, of course, complicates the work of comparative analysis by introducing new theoretical considerations into the picture but, practically speaking, may be the more fruitful approach as long as general political systems theory remains in a state of flux.

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[55] See the discussion of elites that follows.

If one can accept this approach as part of the natural process of expanding comparative empirical research into a new area, and at the same time agree to consider studies which have evident comparative implications even if they are not, strictly speaking, cross-national in scope, then a rich and varied pattern of middle-range work on communist countries is already discernible, much of it going on within the communist countries themselves.[56]

The study of social stratification and social mobility, of great importance in assessing the impact of ideology and politics on communist societies, is especially advanced in Poland.[57] Materials on social stratification are also appearing in other communist countries and basic data in this field is now available for a majority of the communist systems of Eastern Europe. Although comparative studies of social stratification are still a rarity, valuable work has been done by Western scholars on individual communist states, especially the Soviet Union, Germany and Czechoslovakia.[58] Social mobility in China has recently been treated in the context of the process of industrialization and the impact of the "cultural revolution."[59] Analysis of the distribution of employed persons among various types of occupations has been carried out by both Western and communist social scientists, and serves as a valuable additional source of data on social stratification in communist systems.[60]

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[56] In locating empirical studies originating in communist countries, the following bibliographies are useful: *International Bibliography of the Social Sciences*, series on political science and sociology; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, *Bibliography of Social Science Periodicals and Monograph Series: Foreign Social Science Bibliographies Series* (Poland, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, China, Yugoslavia, and the USSR); Jerzy J. Wiatr, "Political Sociology in Eastern Europe: A Trend Report and a Bibliography," *Current Sociology*, 13 (1965). For recent Soviet works in the Social Sciences: Murray Feshbach, "A Selected Bibliography of Recent Soviet Monographs," Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, *op. cit.*, Part IV, pp. 977–1026. A guide to early empirical work in Yugoslavia is found in the mimeographed report of the Institute for Social Sciences, Belgrade, *Bibliografska anatocija dela empirijskog karaktera iz oblasti drustvenih nauka* [Annotated Bibliography of Materials of an Empirical Character in the Social Sciences] (1964). For East Germany, Peter C. Ludz (ed.), "Studien und Materialen zur Soziologie der DDR," *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozial-psychologie* (1964), pp. 327–418. Emilia Wilder, *op. cit.*, refers to a bibliographic survey of Polish materials listing 62 books and 871 dissertations in the field of sociology for the period 1958–1961, in *Trybuna Ludu*, April, 29, 1964. For China, see Peter Berton and Eugene Wu, *Contemporary China: A Research Guide* (1967); Hungarian materials listed in Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, Könyvtara, *Magyar Közgazdasági és Statisztikai Irodalom: Bibliografia* . . . [Hungarian Bibliography of Economics and Statistics] (1963). For Bulgarian works, L. Dzherova and H. Toteva, *Bibliografi͡a NA Bulgarskata statisticheskai͡a literatura, 1878–1960* [Bibliography of Bulgarian Statistical Literature, 1878–1960] (1961); Czech studies are reported in Karel Kozelka and Čeňek Zatloukal, "Sociologie: Přehled české a slovenské výběr ze zahraniční literatury [Sociology: A Survey of Czech and Slovak and a Selection of Foreign Literature]," *Prehled Literatury*, No. 3 (1965). A partial guide to the NEP period in Russia is provided by *Katalog knig po obshchestvennim Voprosam* [Catalogue of Books on Social Questions] (Moscow, 1926) and *Sistematicheskiĭ ukazatel' sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoĭ literaturi izdannoĭ Gosizdatom za vremi͡a s 1919 po 1924 gg.* [Systematic Index to Social-Economic Literature Published by Gosizdat from 1919 to 1924] (Moscow, 1924).

[57] Outstanding for its concern with empirical analysis of social stratification in Poland has been the series "Z badan klasy robotniczej i inteligencji" [Research on the Working Class and Intelligentsia] edited by Jan Szczepanski, which now runs to 20 volumes. A major contribution to the theoretical literature has been made by Stalinslaw Ossowski, *Class Structure in the Social Consciousness* (1963). Other significant Polish works include B. Gatęski (ed.), *Spofeczno-Ekonomiczna Strukture Wsi* (Social Economic Structure of the Peasantry] (1961); Adam Sarapaty (ed.), *Socjologia Zawodow* [Sociology of Occupations] (1965); ———, *Studia nad uwarstwieniem i ruchliwośćia spoteczna w Polsce* [A Study of Stratification and Social Mobility in Poland] (1965); Antoni Rajkiewicz, *Zatrudnienie w Polsce Ludowej w latach 1950–1970: Dynamika i struktura* [Employment in People's Poland in the Years 1950–1970: Dynamics and Structure] (1965).

Meanwhile, research on elites is being pressed by American political scientists and has been taken up, if cautiously, by the East Europeans.[61] Aggregative and sample survey data on mass communications in communist societies is accumulating in the West and in Eastern Europe, and researchers at the Center for International Studies, MIT, have been using this material and their own data to develop models of communist communication systems.[62] Studies of elections, with all the obvious difficulties they entail, have been carried out in Yugoslavia and Poland, and provide certain insights into political behavior when used in conjunction with other types of information.[63] In recent years American schol-

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[58] Among many works, the following may be cited as representative and providing a wide variety of data on social stratification in Eastern Europe and the USSR: Karl Lungwitz, *Über die Klassen Struktur in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik: eine Sozial-ökonomisch-statistische Untersuchung* (Berlin, 1962); Akademii͡a Nauk SSSR, Institut Istorii, *Izmenenii͡a v chislennosti i sostave sovetskogo rabochego klassa: Sbornik stateĭ* [Changes in the Number and Composition of the Soviet Working Class: Collection of Articles] (1961); A. Bogarskiĭ, "O tak nazyvaemoĭ 'sotsial'noi mobilnosti'," [On So-Called Social Mobility] *Voprosy Filosofii* (1958), pp. 64–73; Alex Inkeles, "Social Stratification and Mobility in the Soviet Union, 1940–1950," *American Sociological Review*, 15 (1950), 465–473; Janina Markiewicz-Lagneau, "Les Problèmes de Mobilité Sociale en U.R.S.S.," *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique*, 7 (April-June, 1966), 161–188; *Sčítání lidu, domů a bytů v Československé Socialistické Republice k 1 březnu 1961, Díl II: Sociální, ekonomická a profesionální skladba obyvatelstva* [Census of Population, Housing and Flats in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic of 1 March, 1961, Part II: Social, Economic and Professional Composition of the Population]; Daniel Kubat, "Social Mobility in Czechoslovakia," *American Sociological Review*, 28 (1963), 212; Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, *Társadalmi Rétegzödés Magyarországon* (*15,000 Háztartás* 1963) [The Social Stratification of Hungary (15,000 Households)] (1966); Republica Populară Romînă, Direcţia Centrală de Statistică, *Recensămîntul Populatiei Din 21 Februarie 1956: Structura Social-Economică A Populaţiei*. . . . [Population Census of 21 February 1956: Social-Economic Structure of the Population] (1960); Miroslav Pecujlić, *Promene u socijalnoj strukturi Jugoslavije* [Changes in the Social Structure of Yugoslavia] (1963); Miloš Ilií *et al., Socijalna struktura i pokretlivost kadničke klase Jugoslavije* [Social Structure and Mobility of the Working Class in Yugoslavia] (1963); Marko Markov, *Kam vprosa za klasovite izmenenja* I *NRB* [Problems of Class Changes in the BPR (Bulgarian Peoples Republic)] Sofia, 1960; Pavel Machonin, "Structure Sociale de la Tchechoslovaquie Contemporaine," *Reserches Internationales a la Lumiére du Marxisme* (May-June, 1966), pp. 41–58; Petru Dimitriu, "Elemente der Einheit und der Differenzierung in der Klassenstruktur der Ostblóckstaaten," *Ost Europa*, 12 (1962), 403–420; R. Lukić and Ljubomir Marković, *Klasni Sastav u socijalističkim zemljama* [The Class Structure in Socialist States] (1960).

[59] John W. Lewis, "Political Aspects of Mobility in China's Urban Development," this REVIEW, 60 (Dec. 1966), 899–912.

[60] John Philip Emerson, *op. cit.;* Murray S. Weitzman and Andrew Elias, *The Magnitude and Distribution of Civilian Employment in the USSR, 1928–1959* (April, 1961); Gertrude Schroder, "Industrial Wage Differentials in the USSR," *Soviet Studies*, 17 (Jan., 1966), 303–317; J. Pacuraru, "Planned Development and Labour Force Structure in Rumania, 1950–1965," *International Labor Review*, (Dec., 1966), 535–549; János Timár, *Planning the Labour Force in Hungary* (1966); Werner Bosch, *Die Sozialstruktur in West und Mitteldeutschland* (Bonn, 1958); T. Frejka, "Dlouhodobý vývoj odvětvové struktury společenské pracovní síly" [Long-Range Evolution of the Branch Structure of the Society's Working Force] *Politická Ekonomie*, (Aug., 1966), 661–673; Minko Minkov, *Naselenieto i rabotnata sila v Bulgarii͡a* [Population and the Working Force in Bulgaria] (Sofia, 1966). Polish and Yugoslav works have been cited earlier in connection with social stratification and availability of aggregative data.

[61] John A. Armstrong, "Party Bifurcation and Elite Interests," *Soviet Studies*, 17 (April, 1966), 417–430; Grey Hodnett, "The Obkom First Secretaries," *Slavic Review*, 24 (Dec., 1965), 636–652; Zygmunt Bauman, "Economic Growth, Social Structure, Elite Formation: The Case of of Poland," *International Social Science Journal* 16 (1964), 203–216; Jeremy R. Azrael, *Managerial Power and Soviet Politics* (1966); John A. Armstrong, *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite: A Case Study of the Ukranian Apparatus* (1959); Daniel Kubat, "Patterns of Leadership in a Communist State; Czechoslovakia 1946–1958," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, 21 (Oct., 1961), 305–318; K. Valentin Müller, *Die Manager in der Sowjetzone: Eine Empirische Untersuchung zur Soziologie der Wirtschaftlichen und Militärischen Führungsschicht in Mitteldeutschland* (1962); Charles C. Moskos Jr., "From Monarchy

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to Communism: The Social Transformation of the Albanian Elite," in Herbert R. Barrington *et al.*, *Social Change in Developing Areas* (1965), pp. 205–221; R. C. Angell *et al.*, "Social Values and Foreign Policy Attitudes of Soviet and American Elites," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 8 (Dec., 1964), 330–491; Frederick C. Tiewes, *Provincial Party Personnel in Mainland China* 1956–1966 (Columbia University, East Asian Institute, 1967); John W. Lewis, *Leadership in Communist China* (1963); Zygmunt Bauman, "Struktura władzy społeczności lokalnej: Konceptualizacja badań [Pattern of Power in a Local Community: Conceptualization of Research]," *Studia Socjologiczno Polityczne*, No. 12 (1962), 7–30; J. Jerovšek, "Neformalne strukture odlučanje na nivoj opčine [Informal Structure of Decision Making at the Level of the opstina]," *Sodobnost* (Ljubljana), No. 12, 1964; Radošin Rajović, *Proces stvaranja opštinskih pravnih propsia* [The Process of Creating Opstina Ordinances] (1962). Among on-going research projects whose results were not available for this article, special note should be taken of the study of East European elites using computer techniques at the University of Pittsburgh. Some results are included in Carl Beck, "Bureaucratic Conservatism and Innovation in Eastern Europe," paper delivered to the 1966 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

[62] A sizeable literature on communications and propaganda in communist countries now exists. Some studies of relevance for comparative work using empirical data, or relying on sample survey methods, include Richard R. Fagen, "Mass Media Growth: A Comparison of Communist and Other Countries," *Journalism Quarterly*, 41 (Autumn, 1964), 563–567 and 572; Alex Inkeles, *Public Opinion in Soviet Russia* (1958); Raymond Bauer and David B. Gleicher, "Word of Mouth Communication in the Soviet Union," (Maxwell Air Force Base, Human Resources Institute, 1953); Special Operations Research Office, "Propin China: A Study of Word of Mouth Communications in Communist China," *op. cit.;* Paul Hiniker, "The Effects of Mass Communication in Communist China," *op. cit.* Some of the materials produced by the Center of International Studies, MIT, Research Program on Problems of International Communication and Security include Alan P. I. Liu, "Growth and Modernizing Function of Rural Radio in Communist China," *Journalism Quarterly*, 41 (Autumn, 1964), 573–577; ———, "The Use of Traditional Media for Modernization in Communist China," Center for International Studies, MIT (Oct., 1965); F. Gayle Durham, "Radio and Television in the Soviet Union," Center for International Studies, MIT (June, 1965). For Polish materials, see Andrzej Sicinski, "Surveys of Mass Communication of the Public Opinion Research Center," *Polish Sociological Journal*, No. 1–2 (June–Dec., 1961), 97–101. The best work on communications in Yugoslavia has been carried out by the Institute for Sociology and Philosophy at the University of Ljubljana; the results can be found in the bulletin of the institute, Institut z sociologijo, *Informativni Bilten.* See also Institut društvenih nauka, *Sredstva masovnog komuniciranja u Jugoslaviji* [Media of Mass Communication in Yugoslavia] (1966); and Samuel L. Popkin, "A Model of a Communication System," *The American Behavioral Scientist*, 8 (May, 1965), 8–11.

[63] See Austin Ranney (ed.), *Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics* (1962), 235–251; J. Wiatr, "Niektóre zagadnienia opinii publicznej w świetle wyborów 1957 i 1958 [Several Problems of Public Opinion in the Light of the Elections of 1957 and 1958]," *Studia Socjologiczno Polityczne*, No. 4 (1959); Z. A. Pelczynski and D. E. Butler (ed.), *Elections Abroad* (1959), 119–166; Stanislaw Bereza, "Wybory do Dzielnicowej rady narodowej Warzawa-Ochata w roku 1958 [Elections to the Peoples Council of Warsaw-Ochata During 1958], *Studia Socjologiczno Polityczne*, No. 2 (1959), 161–164. These studies have analyzed class and regional participation in Polish elections according to the number of registered voters that participate in elections, and the percentage voting for the front. In addition, the process of "negative selection" in Polish elections, by which it is possible to cross names off the single slate of candidates and thus change the order in which persons are elected from that given on the official list, has been used to determine the popularity of various types of persons as candidates for office. Perhaps the best summary of the economic and social influences on voting detected by these methods, cast in the form of an explicit comparison with assumptions concerning electoral behavior in the West, can be seen in Jerzy J. Wiatr, "Economic and Social Factors of Elec-

ars have turned to the study of interest groups in communist societies, and Eastern European social scientists have been following suit.[64] Finally, the study in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union of contemporary social problems and trends—urbanization, raising the standard of living, aiding lesser developed regions, to cite a few examples—is growing both in scope and scholarly value.[65]

The appearance of this material signals something of a revolution in the study of communist societies by persons both inside and outside the communist orbit. The fact that these empirical studies do not always live up to the exacting standards required of comparative work is nevertheless apparent. Their shortcomings resemble those discussed earlier: there is far from complete coverage of all communist states (even in Eastern Europe); the quality of individual studies varies widely; and the emphasis is generally on the study of communist societies, rather than political systems.

A further problem, evident in practically all current empirical work carried on both in Eastern Europe and in the West, is the failure of theory to keep up with practical research and the collection of data. The theoretical difficulties that middle-range research has been encountering are actually two-fold: the need to refine theory in the chosen realm of research (interest groups, elites and the like), and the difficulties that arise in taking into account those aspects of communist political systems which set them apart from other systems types. Theorizing on elites in communist systems, for example, has lagged behind the collection of data in recent years, notwithstanding a number of attempts, by Western and Eastern European scholars, to develop a set of theoretical propositions concerning elite structurs in communist and non-communist societies.[66]

In the study of interest groups, on the other hand, the difficulty arises that uncritical application to communist systems of comparative concepts developed for the analysis of Western societies may obscure and confuse differences between the two types of systems. Even when the Western concept is tailored to fit the situation prevailing in communist

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toral Behavior," *The Polish Sociological Journal*, No. 3–4 (Jan.–June, 1962), 65–75. In communist countries the presence of two candidates is practically unknown, but when Yugoslavia briefly experimented with such a system in 1953, issues and attitudes began to emerge among the electorate. See Thomas F. Hammond, "Yugoslav Elections: Democracy in Small Doses," *Political Science Quarterly*, 70 (March, 1955), 57–74. For the 1965 elections, Institut društvenih nauka, *Skupštinski izbori 1965* [Parliamentary Elections 1965] (1966).

[64] H. Gordon Skilling, "Interest Groups and Communist Politics," *World Politics*, 18 (April, 1966), 435–451; Henry W. Morton (ed.), *Soviet Policy Making: Studies of Communism in Transition* (1966). Włodzimierz Wesełowski, "Class Domination and the Power of Interest Groups," *The Polish Sociological Journal*, No. 3–4 (Jan.–June, 1962), 53-64; Jovan Djordjevic, "Interest Groups and the Political System of Yugoslavia," in Henry W. Ehrmann, *Interest Groups on Four Continents* (1958), 197–228; Michael Lakatos, "K niektorým problémom štruktury našej politickej sústavy [On Some Problems of the Structure of Our Political System]," *Pravni Obzor*, 1 (1965), 26–36, cited by H. Gordon Skilling, *op. cit:* T. H. Kuliev, *Problema interesov v Sotsialisticheskom obshchestve* [Problems of Interest in Socialist Society] (1967).

[65] For Polish works in this field, see earlier references on aggregative data. Also representative of this type of analysis are Dolfe Vogelnik, *Urbanizacija kao odraz privrednog razvoja FNRJ* [Urbanization as an Expression of the Economic Development of Yugoslavia] (1961); László Lengyel, "Vélemények és Tények as Életszinvonalról [Opinions and Facts About the Living Standard]," *Statisztikai Szemle*, No. 2 (Feb., 1966), 139–157 and No. 3 (March, 1966), 227–244; Branko Kubović, *Regionalno aspekt privrednog razvitka Jugoslavije* [Regional Aspects of Economic Development in Yugoslavia] (1961); M. V. Bakhrakh, "Issledovanie urovni͡a ekonomicheskogo razviti͡a raĭona (na primere Moldavskoĭ SSR) [Investigation of the Level of Economic Development of Regions (Using the Example of the Moldavian SSR)]" in Akademii͡a Nauk SSSR, *Voprosi Metodiki Issledovanii͡a Razmeshchenii͡a Proizvodstva* [Questions of Method in Research on the Location of Production] (1965), 26–46; N. M. Rimashevskai͡a, *Ekonomicheskii analiz dohodov rabochikh i Sluzhashchikh* [Economic Analysis of the Incomes of Workers and Functionaries] (1965); Stanislaw Ehrlich (ed.), *Social and Political Transformations in Poland* (1964). Western sources on modernization and the standard of living are cited below.

[66] Ossowski, *op. cit.:* Suzanne Keller, *Beyond the Ruling Class* (1963); Carl Beck *et al.*, *A Survey of Elite Studies* (Special Operations Research Office Memo 65-3, March, 1965); Raymond Aron, "Social Structure and the Ruling Class," *British Journal of Sociology*, 1 (March, 1950), 1–16 and 126–143; ———, *La Lutte de Classes* (1964).

states, it is hard to escape the implication that the barriers separating Western and communist systems are being levelled, even to the extent that there is no longer any essential difference between the two system types. Thus, in the very process of developing methods for comparative communist analysis, the study of the field is robbed of its distinctiveness.

These problems are by and large recognized by those engaged in empirical research on communist countries, and, with greater sophistication and knowledge, it is to be hoped that a satisfactory balance will be struck between emphasizing what is unique to communist political systems and what they share in common with other types of systems. At the same time, growing awareness of the data now available on communist systems should spur the search for new areas of middle-range research, giving the field more balance and depth.

One such area for future work might be that of modernization. Although the concept does pose difficulties when applied to communist states, there is a great deal that can be done by way of clarifying the character of the modernization process in communist systems. This involves the utilization of existing studies of the modernizing process, both theoretical and data-oriented, and material now becoming available in the communist countries themselves (the recent volume, *Yugoslavia, A Multi-National State*, by Jack Fischer, is a pioneer effort in this area).[67]

Another form of middle-range research, relatively neglected in the past, involves the study of historical systems. This approach is applicable not only to the Stalinist-type systems of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, but also to the period of the NEP in Russia. Although not strictly comparable to later developments in other communist countries, the NEP produced an interesting body of statistical information and other forms of empirical data. Some of this material, such as the party census of 1927, has utility in conjunction with comparative work on contemporary communist systems.[68]

A different type of approach utilizing quantitative information involves the analysis of relatively clear-cut types of data which pose interesting theoretical and practical problems concerning communist systems. Thus one might wish to ask why party membership in communist countries usually remains within certain more or less well-defined limits, measured as a percentage of the total population of communist states. Investigation of this problem would require both analysis in depth, and cross-nationally.[69]

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[67] There are a number of excellent studies in which data for the global analysis of modernization is gathered and analyzed, using information from communist countries as well as non-communist, but the results are not given in a form which can be used for the comparative analysis of communist systems. See Leo F. Schnore, "The Statistical Measurement of Urbanization and Economic Development," *Land Economics*, 37 (Aug., 1961), 229–245; Norton Ginsburg, *Atlas of Economic Development* (1961). Some interesting insights into the pattern of industrialization in communist nations can be gained from Brian J. L. Berry, "An Inductive Approach to the Regionalization of Economic Development" in Norton Ginsburg (ed.), *Geography and Economic Development*, University of Chicago Department of Geography Research Paper No. 62 (1960), 97. Data on relative levels of consumption prior to World War II—and the problems that arise in making such a comparative analysis—are given in M. K. Bennett, "International Disparities in Consumption Levels," *The American Economic Review*, 11 (Sept., 1951), 632–649. Important for comparative analysis of the standard of living in the post-war period are Maria-Elisabeth Ruban *Die Entwicklung des Lebensstandards in der Sowjetunion* (1965); Central Intelligence Agency, *A Comparison of Consumption in the USSR and the United States* (1964); Václav Holešovský, "Personal Consumption in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, 1950–1960, A Comparison," *Slavic Review*, 24 (Dec., 1965) 622–635; Janet G. Chapman, *Real Wages in the Soviet Union since 1928* (1963). For other quantitative approaches to measuring development, see Charles K. Wilbur, "A Nonmonetary Index of Economic Development," *Soviet Studies*, 17 (April, 1966), 408–416, and Jack Fischer, *op. cit.*

[68] Aggregative data appeared in this period on a wide variety of subjects important for cross-national and comparative analysis, including social stratification (class differences and occupational breakdowns), data on communications (mail turnover, number of radio stations, and the like), and economic and demographic data. From this period date some of the few statistics ever published on the size of the party in administrative organs, trade unions, and other important institutions in Soviet society. Statistics on the number of arrests and related information on crime were also published in this period, and data can even be found from the early 1920's on the size of the security organs. Valuable data is also available from the early 1920's on the social composition of the party and local government organs at the local level. Two censuses (in addi-

In dealing with middle-range research one must consider not only the type of problem to be investigated, but the units to be chosen for comparison. This problem, although we have reserved it for last, is in many ways the most troublesome in middle-range comparative work with communist countries. Not only do the limitations of the analyst in language skills, area competency and so on act as a restraining factor, but the peculiar problems of cross-national work with communist states often place limits on the types of strategies or techniques which may be employed when utilizing comparative data.

Thus research based on comparisons among the thirteen or fourteen communist states now in existence must take into account the small number of units involved; that in respect to any given problem only a certain percentage of these countries will have the right type of data; and that in a still smaller number of cases will the information be utilizable in comparative form.

These problems are not confined to the comparative study of communist systems, but do apply to the communist states with special force. In the case of such quantitative methods as rank-ordering or factor analysis, the small number of nations involved poses an especially serious problem; such techniques have usually dealt with communist states only within the context of broad, global, samples, and even in this case the results have not always been satisfactory.[70]

Under the circumstances, it may be that in whatever area middle-range research choses to work (elites, modernization, or some aspect of the political process), the best results may be achieved by maintaining a flexible frame of reference. Case studies might be used to generate hypotheses and refine existing concepts, and these could be combined with cross-national comparisons at whatever level—national, regional or local—is most convenient under the circumstances. Rank-ordering or regression techniques, if employed, might experiment with intra-national and cross-national regional comparisons of nation-states. Already a certain amount of success has been achieved using this method in the study of regionalism in China.[71] In recent years, the desirability of developing data banks on regional and local differences has been debated;[72] in Poland, regression analysis has actually been applied in a comparative form in the study of local government.[73]

This is only the bare suggestion of a strategy, and one which at that deals with only a single aspect of the comparative study of communist nations. The immediate need is to stress a balanced approach in which middle-range research, basic theoretical work, and the study of communist values and ideologies would all play an equal role. Karl Deutsch aptly described the challenge that lies ahead when he pointed out (in reference to the comparative field generally) that "there is before us an intellectual need and a desperately difficult task, a task which cannot be accomplished in itself by committees or conferences, but can only be pioneered by individuals and then

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tion to a number of industrial censuses and the party census of 1927) were carried out in 1920 and 1926. The main sources for this data are *Trudy Tsentral'nogo Statisticheskogo Upravleni͡ia* [Works of the Central Statistical Administration] in which the results of the censuses are included; *Statisticheskiĭ ezhegodnik* [Statistical Annual]; *Narodnoe khozi͡aistvo SSSR* [National Economy of the USSR], published through 1932; Statisticheskiĭ otdel Tsentral'nogo komiteta Vsesoi͡uznoĭ Kommunisticheskoĭ Partii (Bol'shevikov), *Bsesoi͡uznai͡a partiinai͡a perepis' 1927 goda* [All-Union Party Census for 1927] 8 vols. (1927); Bsesoi͡uznai͡a Kommunisticheskai͡a Partii͡a (Bol' shevikiv) Tsentraln'yi komitet BKP (b) Organizatsionno-instruktorskiĭ Otdel, *Sostav VKP (b) v tsifrakh* [Composition of the All-Union Communist Party in Figures], 11 Vols.

[69] For data on the membership of communist parties U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, *World Strength of Communist Party Organizations.* Compilations of prominent officials in communist countries are available in the State Department volumes, *Intelligence Research Aid.*

[70] Philip Cutright, "National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis," *American Sociological Review*, 28 (April, 1963), 253–264; Ivo K. Feierabend, "Correlates of Political Stability," paper delivered to the 1963 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association; Phillip M. Gregg and Arthur S. Banks "Dimensions of Political Systems: Factor Analysis of a Cross Polity Survey," this REVIEW, 59 (Sept., 1965), 602–614.

[71] See the discussion in John W. Lewis, "The Study of Chinese Political Culture," *op. cit.*

[72] Stein Rokkan (ed.), *Data Archives for the Social Sciences* (1965), pp. 122–127.

[73] Stanislaw Rokita, "Analiza czynnikowa w badaniach regionalynch [Factor Analysis in Regional Research]," *Przeglad Statystyczny* (1966), 245–260.

developed by the criticisms, the discussions, and the cooperation of many scientists over many years. It is necessary to put together . . . three types of theory—the broad general perspective, the hard specific findings, and the middle-range models and techniques so that we will eventually get a choice of broad intellectual systems, encompassing a wide range of phenomena and permitting the recognition of rich and complex patterns."[74]

On balance, there is no reason why the comparative analysis of communist systems cannot follow this path sketched for comparative studies in general. We lack convenient typologies and unifying concepts for communist systems, but we are on sound ground in treating these systems as distinctive and separate from other major types of systems, amenable to model-building and other forms of basic comparative research. Not being bound in any way by an "ideal type" or evolutionary model, we are free to assemble building blocs of data applicable to a wide variety of situations (both past and present) and to encourage the broadest possible utilization of new and existing comparative techniques. If the communist systems continue in their present course of widening diversity and (in most cases) evolutionary change, efforts to gather data and develop theory can be subjected to continuous on-going review and validation.

To do all of this, of course, requires confidence and a desire to work on the frontiers of political science. It also seems important to remind ourselves that comparative analysis cannot be considered as "replacing" existing methods of analysis or traditional theoretical frameworks, but rather as reinforcing them, making them more effective. If we can maintain this attitude, and keep the new field broad and flexible so that it may grow, there is no doubt that it will eventually make a major contribution to the study of communist political systems.

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[74] Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

A THEOREM ABOUT VOTING*

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The objective of this essay is to present a simple decision-theoretic model of individual rational voting in a single-member district, using the simple-majority single-ballot system of election, and to derive the following theorem from the model: The rational voter votes for the candidate (party) associated with the outcome he (the voter) most prefers.

The model and theorem may interest students of voting for at least two reasons. First, the theorem contradicts the classical argument that "there is one eventuality in a multiparty system that does not arise in a two-party system: a rational voter may at times vote for a party other than the one he most prefers."[1] The theorem asserts, by contrast, that what is true for the two-party case is also true for the multi-party case. Thus, the model andtheorem sharply differ from the classical theory of party systems. The ramifications of this conflict may affect some conventional views about the decline of third parties, the differences between two-party and multi-party systems, as well as (perhaps) other topics.

Second, within the model, rational voting is a very simple thing. The rational voter needs to know neither the numerical probabilities of the outcomes nor the outcomes' numerical utilities for him. Thus, from the perspective of survey research on voting behavior, the model is realistic in the sense that it does not require the rational voter to make elaborate calculations. This suggests the possibility that studies of the psychology of voting may be integrated with studies of rational (mathematical) decision-making, with prospects of theoretical advantages for both types of analysis.

The model adopts the most widely accepted rule for rational decision-making: The voter (decision-maker) maximizes the expected value of utility.[2] The model also assumed a single-member district operating under the simple-majority single-ballot system of elections.[3]

Denote the candidates (parties) by C_1, C_2, $\cdots$, C_n. The alternative courses of action available to the voter are to vote for C_1, or to vote for C_2, $\cdots$, or to vote for C_n. (The problem is how the voter should vote rather than whether or not he should vote.) These possible votes are denoted by V_1, V_2, $\cdots$, V_n. The possible outcomes, ignoring ties,[4] are that C_1 will win, or C_2 will win, or C_n will win. Denote these outcomes by W_1, W_2, $\cdots$, W_n. The voter's relative evaluation of these outcomes (his utilities) are designated by U_1, U_2, $\cdots$, U_n.

The (objective) conditional probability that a particular outcome W_i will occur, given a particular decision to vote for C_j, can be represented by $P(W_i/V_j)$. The possible outcomes and alternative courses of action, as well as the corresponding conditional probabilities, are represented in the following matrix:

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* The original proof of the theorem was privately circulated in April, 1965. The penultimate version of this paper was appended to the author's doctoral dissertation, "The Decline of the British Liberal Party: A Comparative and Theoretical Analysis," (Michigan State University, 1966), Appendix 1. The author is indebted to several persons for their private criticisms but especially to Harold T. Casstevens II for suggesting an elegant simplification of the original proof.

[1] Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), p. 47. See also Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties,* trans. Barbara and Robert North (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1955), pp. 223–226.

[2] "In fact, use of this criterion is often cited as a necessary (if not sufficient) condition for rational choice." Russell L. Ackoff, *Scientific Method* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1962), p. 38. A diffuse intellectual debt is owed to Ackoff's stimulating book.

[3] The restriction to a single district is consistent with Downs' analysis of the entire nation as a single district (*op. cit.*, pp. 23–24) and with Duverger's remarks about local bi-partism (*op. cit.*, p. 223). The restriction fits by-elections (special elections) in Britain, Canada, the United States and elsewhere, but the general election situation is more complex. Although the theorem is derived for simple-majority single-ballot systems, an implication appears to be that (for many analytical purposes) first preference votes in preferential systems (e.g., Australia) are equivalent to votes in plurality single-ballot systems, but this conjecture is not proved in the present paper.

[4] Ignoring ties is similar to ignoring the possibility that a coin will fall on its edge. This simplification is convenient since there is no voting choice uniquely associated with a tie, but it should be noted that if a tie occurs, then there is no election. (The man named Nobody is not an incumbent skin to the *status quo* which may reign after motions are defeated in committee voting.)

$$\begin{array}{llcccc} & & \multicolumn{4}{c}{\text{Possible Outcomes}} \\ & & W_1 & W_2 & \cdots & W_n \\ \text{Alternate} & V_1 & P(W_1/V_1) & P(W_2/V_1) & \cdots & P(W_n/V_1) \\ \text{Courses} & V_2 & P(W_1/V_2) & P(W_2/V_2) & \cdots & P(W_n/V_2) \\ \text{of Action} & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \\ & V_n & P(W_1/V_n) & P(W_2/V_n) & \cdots & P(W_n/V_n) \end{array}$$

It seems clear that the voter's decision has some (although, perhaps, only a very slight) effect upon the probabilities, that is, that a particular candidate's chances are somewhat enhanced if the voter decides to vote for that candidate.[5] This means, in formal terms, that $P(W_1/V_1) > P(W_1/V_2), \quad \cdots, \quad P(W_1/V_1) > P(W_1/V_n)$, and similarly for the probabilities in each of the other columns. A corollary is that $P(W_i/V_i) > 0$.[6]

If EV_i is the expected value of the ith course of action, the three-candidate problem is given by the following set of equations:

$$\begin{aligned} &(1) \quad [P(W_1/V_1)]U_1 + [P(W_2/V_1)]U_2 \\ &\qquad\qquad + [P(W_3/V_1)]U_3 = EV_1 \\ &(2) \quad [P(W_1/V_2)]U_1 + [P(W_2/V_2)]U_2 \\ &\qquad\qquad + [P(W_3/V_2)]U_3 = EV_2 \\ &(3) \quad [P(W_1/V_3)]U_1 + [P(W_2/V_3)]U_2 \\ &\qquad\qquad + [P(W_3/V_3)]U_3 = EV_3 \end{aligned}$$

The voter should select the V_i that maximizes the expected value.

These equations can be simplified by postulating that, if the voter changes his decision from V_i to V_j, then the probability of C_i winning decreases and the probability of C_j winning increases, but the probability of C_k winning is not affected.[7] Thus, in the three-candidate case, $P(W_1/V_2) = P(W_1/V_3)$, $P(W_2/V_1) = P(W_2/V_3)$, $P(W_3/V_1) = P(W_3/V_2)$, and the simplified equations are:

$$\begin{aligned} &(4) \quad [P(W_1/V_1)]U_1 + [P(W_2/V_1)]U_2 \\ &\qquad\qquad + [P(W_3/V_1)]U_3 = EV_1 \\ &(5) \quad [P(W_1/V_2)]U_1 + [P(W_2/V_2)]U_2 \\ &\qquad\qquad + [P(W_3/V_1)]U_3 = EV_2 \\ &(6) \quad [P(W_1/V_2)]U_1 + [P(W_2/V_1)]U_2 \\ &\qquad\qquad + [P(W_3/V_3)]U_3 = EV_3 \end{aligned}$$

Subtracting Equation (5) from Equation (4), we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} (7) \quad & [P(W_1/V_1)]U_1 - [P(W_1/V_2)]U_1 \\ & \quad + [P(W_2/V_1)]U_2 \\ & \quad - [P(W_2/V_2)]U_2 = EV_1 - EV_2 \end{aligned}$$

When the terms in Equation (7) are recombined, we successively obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} (8) \quad & U_1[P(W_1/V_1) - P(W_1/V_2)] \\ & \quad + U_2[P(W_2/V_1) - P(W_2/V_2)] \\ & \quad = EV_1 - EV_2 \\ (9) \quad & U_1[P(W_1/V_1) - P(W_1/V_2)] \\ & \quad - U_2[P(W_2/V_2) - P(W_2/V_1)] \\ & \quad = EV_1 - EV_2 \end{aligned}$$

Since the possible outcomes are assumed to be mutually exclusive and exhaustive, the probabilities in each row of the original matrix have a sum equal to one, and as a result, so do the probabilities in each of the Equations (1)–(6). Thus, with respect to Equations (4) and (5), the following result holds:

$$\begin{aligned} (10) \quad & P(W_1/V_1) + P(W_2/V_1) \\ & \quad = P(W_1/V_2) + P(W_2/V_2) \end{aligned}$$

and transposing we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} (11) \quad & P(W_1/V_1) - P(W_1/V_2) \\ & \quad = P(W_2/V_2) - P(W_2/V_1) \end{aligned}$$

If $K = P(W_1/V_1) - P(W_1/V_2)$, then K is a positive real number ($K > 0$) and Equation (9) can be reduced to:

$$(12) \qquad KU_1 - KU_2 = EV_1 - EV_2$$

and recombined as:

$$(13) \qquad K(U_1 - U_2) = EV_1 - EV_2$$

Therefore, the ordinal ranking of the expected values depends solely upon the ordinal ranking of the utilities. A corollary is that the rational voter does not need to know the (objective) conditional probabilities.

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[5] This postulate seems to be intuitively obvious, although its consequences (perhaps) are not. The Shapley-Shubik *a priori* power index is suggestive for this axiom. See L. S. Shapley and Martin Shubik, "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," this REVIEW, 48 (1954), 787–792.

[6] This corollary (roughly speaking, that if any voter decides to vote for any candidate, then that candidate has some chance of winning) follows directly from the preceding postulate but, nevertheless, appears to conflict with the classical theory of parties.

[7] This reduction postulate is not intuitively obvious, and as a result, subjective probabilities are not used in the present model. Although the postulate does not contradict the mathematical theory of probability, and although such small magnitudes cannot be empirically measured (at least at the present time), the consequences of the postulate (in a theoretical context) certainly deserve to be tested. The theorem presented in this paper is, of course, such a testable consequence.

By convention the voter most prefers C_1's winning—that is, W_1 is preferred to W_2 and W_1 is preferred to W_3—and, hence, $U_1 > U_2$ and $U_1 > U_3$.[8] Thus, with respect to Equation (13), $EV_1 > EV_2$. The rational voter selects V_1 instead of V_2, and by a similar argument[9] the rational voter selects V_1 instead of V_3. Thus, in the three-candidate situation, the rational voter votes for the candidate (party) associated with the outcome he most prefers. A corollary is that the rational voter does not need to know the numerical values of his utilities.

This type of argument is obviously quite general and holds for any number of candidates in a single-member district using the simple-majority single-ballot system of election.

The decision rule (viz., maximize the expected value of utility) and the analysis of probabilities are, of course, the core of the present model. These may be illustrated, and the relationship between the model and the classical theory of political parties can be indicated, by an imaginary but numerical example.

Let us suppose that the voter intends to vote for the third candidate C_3, viz., intends to select V_3 as a course of action, and that the (objective) conditional probabilities are: $P(W_1/V_3) = .34$, $P(W_2/V_3) = .33$, and $P(W_3/V_3) = .33$. Further, let us suppose the voter changes his mind and decides to vote for the second candidate C_2, and that the (objective) conditional probabilities become: $P(W_1/V_2) = .34$, $P(W_2/V_2) = .35$, and $P(W_3/V_2) = .31$. With this hypothetical case, the (let us say) "absolute" probability that C_1 will be elected has not changed but the (let us say) "relative" probability that C_1 will be elected has strikingly changed; the voter's switch makes C_2 rather than C_1 the most likely winner. The classical theory of party systems seems to have focused upon "relative" probabilities; perhaps its implicit decision rule has been: Never vote for the candidate you least prefer; of the remaining candidates vote for the one who (if you vote for him) has the best chance of winning. This decision rule may be "rational" in some sense, but it is not the decision rule incorporated in the present model.

The present model has the advantage, from the perspective of the psychology of voting, of not postulating calculations by the rational voter. Thus, perhaps, the difference between rational voters and actual voters is smaller than is commonly assumed. This possibility deserves examination by survey research,[10] but the distinction between preferring a candidate's personality and preferring a candidate's winning must be carefully drawn. A highest preference for a particular candidate's personality or stands on the issues or party affiliation, is not equivalent to a highest preference for that candidate's winning; in the language of decision theory, the latter is an outcome, the former are not. If this distinction can be successfully drawn in questionnaires, studies of the psychology of voting might be integrated with studies of rational decision-making, with prospects of theoretical advantages for both types of analysis, by construing the so-called socio-economic determinants of voting choices as determinants of preference structures.

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[8] Simple preferences are universally accepted as the basis for calculating utilities. The debate pivots about how to transform the non-numerical preferences into numerical utilities, but an isomorphic ordinal ranking is generally accepted as a fundamental characteristic of a suitable transformation. See R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, *Games and Decisions* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1957), Chapter 2.

[9] Start by subtracting Equation (6) from Equation (4).

[10] An appropriately designed survey study of a British by-election, pitting Conservative-Labour-Liberal candidates against one another, might serve as a "crucial experiment" for the model and theorem.

A MEASURE OF THE POPULATION QUALITY OF LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT*

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This paper attempts to examine carefully the problem of determining a numerical measure which reflects the quality of the population apportionment in a legislative body. We desire a single index, an index which takes advantage of the available population data, and an index which is readily understood. It should be said that we are not concerned with the much more difficult problem of legislative districting—actually drawing district boundaries on a map—but concentrate our attention only on the quality of apportionment in the particular, but important, sense of population equality.

In order to accomplish this purpose I review a number of increasingly complex possibilities and eventually arrive at a measure which superficially seems somewhat esoteric, but which turns out ultimately to be easily interpretable.

It will be convenient to proceed heuristically with the development by carrying along a small concrete example. For this purpose, consider the six congressional districts of Connecticut. For the 89th Congress, the population of each of these districts was:[1]

District	Population
1	422,766
2	411,919
3	409,693
4	482,135
5	404,520
6	404,201

Our problem here is to combine these numbers in some meaningful fashion to yield a single number or index; again, a number; which explicates the notion of quality of population apportionment (or, conversely, of population malapportionment).

Now, for the above data, the average, or mean, district population is 422,539. It seems clear, that, if the population apportionment were ideal, each of the six districts would have a population equal to this average district population. Of course, this ideal would probably never occur exactly in practice (particularly when the average district population is not a whole number!).

We can determine numerical deviations from this ideal by subtracting the average district population, 422,539, from each of the actual district populations given above. Carrying out the desired subtractions, we have:

District	Deviation Populations
1	+227
2	−10,620
3	−12,846
4	+59,596
5	−18,019
6	−18,338

To combine these six deviation populations into a meaningful index, the obvious thing to do would be to take their sum or their average value. However, the obvious thing is meaningless, for the algebraic sum of the district deviation populations is zero and, more generally, will be zero for any problem. (A mathematical proof of this is given in almost any statistics text.) A second thought would be to ignore the negative signs for the deviation populations of districts 2, 3, 5, and 6 and find the mean absolute (i.e., always positive) deviation.

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A preliminary description of the coefficient *b* developed in this paper appeared in the author's, "An Objective Method for Establishing Legislative Districts," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 10 (May, 1966), 200–213.

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[1] These data were obtained from: U.S. Bureau of the Census. *Supplement to Congressional District Data Book. Redistricted States. Connecticut (Districts of the 89th Congress)*, U.S. Government Printing Office. Washington, D.C., 1965.

For the above data, this figure is 227+10,620+12,846+59,596+18,019+18,338 divided by six, which is 19,941. This mean deviation serves as a measure of population *mal*apportionment (population malapportionment because clearly this measure becomes larger as the quality of population apportionment becomes worse). But the mean deviation, mathematically, is a statistic to be eschewed; it is virtually impossible to handle algebraically and, despite its simple interpretation, has been almost completely abandoned by professional statisticians since the turn of the century.

A second way to get rid of the negative signs in the district deviation populations is to square each of them, and then, for an overall measure of malapportionment, find the average of these squared deviations. For our problem, the six congressional districts of Connecticut, this mean squared deviation is $748{,}417{,}577\frac{2}{3}$. The computation we have just described yields what technically is known as the variance, and is the most common measure of dispersion in statistics. Redundant with the variance is its positive square root, called the standard deviation, which for our problem is 27,357.2. For descriptive purposes the standard deviation is usually preferred to the variance because it is measured in the same units as the original data.

As a general measure of malapportionment the standard deviation of the district populations, as outlined above, may be criticized because it is very much affected by the size of the district populations themselves. For example, in our problem, a district with half the average district population would have a deviation population of $-211{,}269\frac{1}{2}$, while for a legislative body with an average district population of 10,000, an equally malapportioned district (in the sense of having half the ideal population) would have a deviation population of only −5,000. To develop a measure of malapportionment which is independent of the average district population, we simply divide all the district populations by their average, thus rendering all subsequent analysis relative to the average district population. The ratio of a district population to the average district population is termed the population ratio of that district; for Connecticut's congressional districts, the population ratios are as shown in table (see col. 2). It is clear that the ideal value for a population ratio is one, and that consequently a population ratio gives the proportion of the ideal population that a given district is. Note that, regardless of the quality of apportionment, the average population ratio is always exactly equal to one.[2] Thus, upon subtracting one from each of the above population ratios for Connecticut, squaring and summing the resulting deviation population ratios, and dividing by six, we have the variance of the population ratios, 0.004189. Taking the square root of the variance, we have the standard deviation, 0.06472. The standard deviation of figures whose average is one has a special name: the coefficient of variation. As a measure of malapportionment, the coefficient of variation was first suggested by Schubert and Press.[3]

District	Population Ratio
1	1.0005
2	.9749
3	.9696
4	1.1410
5	.9574
6	.9566

Schubert and Press, noting that the coefficient of variation became larger as the quality of apportionment became worse, sought an index which would reverse the direction of measurement so that larger values of the new index would correspond to better apportionment. To this end they defined the inverse coefficient of variation, ICV, as

$$\text{ICV} = \frac{1}{1+c},$$

where c is the coefficient of variation. For our Connecticut problem $\text{ICV} = 1/(1+0.06472) = 0.9392$.

Under perfect apportionment, the coefficient of variation is zero; upon substituting $c=0$ in the above formula, we have the maximum value of the ICV of one:

$$\text{ICV(max)} = 1.$$

Note that as c, the coefficient of variation, becomes larger than zero, the ICV becomes smaller than one. It may be proved mathematically that the largest possible value of c is $\sqrt{k-1}$, where k is the number of districts under consideration;[4] thus, the smallest possible ICV is:

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[2] Let n_j be the population of the jth of k districts and let $n = \sum n_j$ be the total population. Now the average district population is n/k so that a population ratio r_j is kn_j/n. Then $\sum r_j = \sum kn_j/n = kn/n = k$. Since the sum of the k population ratios is k, their average value must be one.

[3] Glendon Schubert and Charles Press, "Measuring Malapportionment," this REVIEW, 58 (June, 1964), 302–327.

$$\text{ICV(min)} = \frac{1}{1 + \sqrt{k-1}}$$

For $k=2$ districts, ICV(min) $=0.5$; for $k=82$ districts, ICV(min) $=0.1$.

We suggest that it is unfortunate that the minimum possible ICV is a function of the number of districts: strictly speaking, it is not appropriate to contrast ICVs for two legislatures which are of different sizes, although we note that ICV(min) $\rightarrow 0$ as $k \rightarrow \infty$.

A second objection to the ICV (and all the other measures considered so far) is somewhat more subtle. Consider the above population ratios for Connecticut's congressional districts: while their mean value is necessarily exactly equal to one, four of them are less than one and two of them are greater than one. In other words, the population ratios are not symmetrically placed about their mean. That this should occur is not surprising, for observe that while the minimum possible population ratio is zero, the maximum possible population ratio is k, where again k is the number of districts. For k greater than two, then, there is a much larger range of possible values for population ratios' deviating positively from their mean of one than for such ratios' deviating negatively. But since the algebraic sum of the deviations must be zero, the result typically is fewer, generally larger, positive deviations and more, generally smaller, negative deviations, as illustrated by our Connecticut example.

A distribution of population ratios, such as that just portrayed, is said to be positively skewed, because the most common technical measure of skewness,[5] the parameter γ_1, takes on positive values when the skewness is in the direction described. For our Connecticut problem $\gamma_1=+1.5985$. The generality of this observation—positive skewness of population ratios—is shown in data given by Schubert and Press:[6] of the 99 state legislative chambers in the United States (remember that Nebraska has a unicameral legislature) 93 have positively skewed distributions of population ratios.

Now, in the statistical description of distributions, it is usually considered undesirable to deal with skewed distributions: it is preferable to perform some sort of transformation on the data to render the distribution symmetric. When faced with a positively skewed distribution, the most common transformation used for attempting to symmetrize a distribution is to take the logarithm of each value in the distribution. This suggests that for our problem it would be wise to find the logarithms of the population ratios.

A test of the validity of dealing with the logarithms of population ratios lies in the answer to the question, "Consider a district with a population ratio of two—a district with twice as large a population as is ideal. What population ratio would a district have which is equally malapportioned in the other direction?" If the answer to this question is one-half, implying that it is just as inequitable to have a district with half the ideal population as it is to have a district with twice the ideal population, then a decision to take logarithms is correct. Were one to deal directly with the population ratios, as in the ICV and other measures considered above, then a district with a population ratio of zero—no one at all in the district—would be one whose malapportionment implicitly would be considered no worse than a district with twice the ideal population, in the sense that two and zero are equally spaced from one.

One particular way effectively of looking at the (sum of the) logarithms of the population ratios, without actually taking logarithms, is to consider the product of the population ratios. (Remember that the logarithm of a product is the sum of the logarithms.) As a very simple example, take a $k=2$ district legislature, where the two districts have population ratios r_1 and r_2, and where $r_2=2-r_1$ because the sum of the two population ratios must be two. Now let us view the product of the population ratios, r_1r_2, as a function of r_1 and $r_2 (r_1 \leq r_2)$.

From the following figures (see page 211) it is clear that the product of the population ratios becomes larger as apportionment becomes better, assuming a value of zero when the apportionment is the worst possible, reaching a value of one

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[4] It is readily seen that the worst possible apportionment occurs when the entire population is in one of the k districts. When this occurs we have one population ratio deviation of $k-1$ and $k-1$ deviations of -1. The sum of the squared deviations is then $(k-1)^2+(k-1)(-1)^2 = (k-1)(k-1+1) = (k-1)k$. The mean squared deviation, or variance, is $(k-1)k/k = k-1$, and the root mean square deviation, or standard deviation, is $\sqrt{k-1}$.

[5] Maurice G. Kendall, *The Advanced Theory of Statistics, Volume I* (London, 1948, 4th ed.), pp. 81–82.

[6] Glendon Schubert and Charles Press, "Malapportionment Remeasured," this REVIEW, 58 (December, 1964), 966–970.

r_1	r_2	r_1r_2
1.0	1.0	1.00
0.8	1.2	.96
0.6	1.4	.84
0.4	1.6	.64
0.2	1.8	.36
0.0	2.0	.00

when the apportionment is perfect. This suggests that, more generally, we may take the product of the population ratios as a measure of the quality of apportionment.

$$\Pi r_j$$

where r_j is the population ratio of district j and the capital pi indicates the operation of taking the product. However, this quantity has the undesirable feature of being affected by k, the number of districts; to remove this characteristic we find g, the kth root of the product,[7]

$$g = \sqrt[k]{\Pi r_j}.$$

The quantity g is the well-known statistical measure of central tendency, the geometric mean. In our special case, where the sum of the numbers under consideration is a constant, the geometric mean functions as a measure of dispersion, as is desired for our problem.

For a given set of positive numbers, it may be proved mathematically that the geometric mean is less than or equal to the arithmetic mean (i.e., less than or equal to the usual average).[8] Thus the geometric mean for our problem is less than or equal to one, and becomes increasingly less than one as the legislature under consideration becomes more malapportioned. For our Connecticut problem the geometric mean is 0.9980, reflecting the very good apportionment for these six districts.

But the geometric mean g takes on values quite close to one even under substantial malapportionment. As a simple example, consider again a legislature with only two districts having population ratios of 0.4 and 1.6, i.e., a legislature where one of its two districts has four times the population of its other district. In this instance $g=\sqrt{(0.4)(1.6)}=\sqrt{0.64}=0.8$, a seemingly large index for such a badly apportioned two district legislature.

To establish a measure which appears better to reflect the quality of apportionment, but a measure which is functionally related to the geometric mean, consider again the special case of $k=2$ districts. Let r_1 and r_2 be the two district population ratios with, of course, $r_1+r_2=2$. Also let r_1 be the smaller population ratio—a population ratio which is less than or equal to one. Now if $b=r_1$ $(b\leq 1)$, let us find the relationship between b and g. The geometric mean here is the square root of the product of the two population ratios

$$g = \sqrt{r_1r_2}.$$

This may be expressed as

$$g = \sqrt{r_1(2-r_1)},$$

since $r_2=2-r_1$. But $b=r_1$, as defined above, so that we can write

$$g = \sqrt{b(2-b)}.$$

This equation gives g as a function of b; to find b as a function of g, square both members of the equation above to obtain,

$$g^2 = b(2-b),$$

rearrange terms,

$$b^2 - 2b + g^2 = 0,$$

and solve the resulting quadratic equation for b:

$$b = 1 - \sqrt{1-g^2},$$

taking the negative sign in solving the quadratic, since $b\leq 1$. Knowing the geometric mean, g, of the population ratios, we can, with this last formula, find b. The maximum possible value of g is one, therefore the maximum possible value of b is

$$\begin{aligned} b(\max) &= 1 - \sqrt{1-1} \\ &= 1. \end{aligned}$$

The minimum possible value of g is zero, therefore the minimum possible value of b is

$$\begin{aligned} b(\min) &= 1 - \sqrt{1-0} \\ &= 0. \end{aligned}$$

Thus, as the quality of apportionment varies from the worst possible to perfect, b varies from zero to one. But note that unless g is exactly equal to zero or one, b is always smaller than g; in the example above with two districts with population ratios $r_1=0.4$ and $r_2=1.6$, $g=0.8$, but $b=1-\sqrt{1-g^2}=0.4$, better revealing the malapportionment.

More generally, we shall compute b, our measure of the quality of apportionment, using this formula, regardless of the number of districts. For the Connecticut problem

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[7] Consider a k district legislature with half the districts having population ratios r_1 and the other half having population ratios r_2, $r_2\neq r_1$. Clearly, $\prod r_j$ goes to zero as k becomes large. However, in this example, $g=\sqrt{r_1r_2}$, regardless of k.

[8] Kendall, *op. cit.*, pp. 33–34.

$$b = 0.9373.$$

It must be admitted that the calculation of b, by hand, is troublesome and tricky, requiring the informed use of logarithms. On the other hand, with the assistance of an electronic computer, the calculation is extremely simple.[9]

Let us now turn to a crucial question, namely: how is the measure b to be interpreted; does it have any simple meaning, or is it an abstract index which may be understood only through experience?

To interpret the meaning of b, consider its derivation. It is exactly the smaller population ratio in a two-district legislature. Thus, it is seen that $\frac{1}{2}b$ is the minimum proportion of the total population which is capable of electing half, i.e., one, of the legislators in a two district legislature. The question arises of whether this relationship holds for legislative bodies with more than two districts. From the data at the beginning of the paper, the three smallest congressional district populations of Connecticut are 409,693, 404,520 and 404,201. Dividing their sum, 1,218,414 by 2,535,234, the total population of Connecticut, we obtain 0.481, the minimum proportion of the population able to elect half the congressmen. But for these data, one half of our measure b is $0.9373/2 = 0.469-$. Half of our index b is then slightly less than the minimum proportion of the entire population capable of electing half the legislators. Or, the minimum proportion of the electorate that can elect half the legislators is at least as large as $\frac{1}{2}b$. This relationship holds not only for our example but for all problems; this assertion is proved mathematically in the final section of this paper.

Consider now the classic Dauer-Kelsay index.[10] It is given by the minimum proportion of the total population able to elect a majority of the legislators, and obviously is always larger than the minimum proportion able to elect half the legislators. Consequently, it is also true that half our measure b is less than the Dauer-Kelsay index. In symbols, if d is the Dauer-Kelsay index and d^* is the minimum proportion of the population able to elect half the legislators, then we have, for all problems

$$2d > 2d^* \geq b.$$

So that our measure b, despite the circuitous route by which it was developed, has a particularly simple interpretation: $\frac{1}{2}b$ must always be a conservative estimate of the Dauer-Kelsay index.[11]

Knowing these relationships between the Dauer-Kelsay index and b prompts us to propose verbal labels to be attached to various possible values of b:

b	Quality of Apportionment
0.95–1.00	excellent
0.90–0.95–	good
in the 0.80s	fair
in the 0.70s	poor
below 0.70	terrible

This taxonomy is suggested with some diffidence as it implies value judgments which, strictly, are beyond the scope of this paper.

A natural question arises: why have we gone to all the trouble of developing the measure b, a measure whose rationale is complicated and a measure which, with primitive equipment, is troublesome to compute, when half of it is merely a lower bound to the Dauer-Kelsay index? Why not simply obtain the Dauer-Kelsay index? The answer is that the Dauer-Kelsay index can be misleading; in particular, it can suggest a well-apportioned legislature that is very badly apportioned. For example, consider a five district legislature with population ratios:

District	Population Ratio
1	0.00
2	1.25
3	1.25
4	1.25
5	1.25

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[9] A Fortran version of a program to compute b, given the district populations, is available from the writer. More generally, please write regarding any computational problem involving the measure b for a particular set of data.

[10] Manning J. Dauer and Robert G. Kelsay, "Unrepresentative States," *National Municipal Review*, 44 (1955), 515–575, 587.

[11] The discussion here has been rendered somewhat cumbersome by having defined b to range from zero to one. Had we originally defined it as half as large it would numerically have been more directly comparable with the Dauer-Kelsay index. However, most indices in science vary from zero to one and consequently we have followed this convention in our definition of b.

Fifty percent of the population here is able to elect a majority (3 of 5) of the legislators—seemingly a good apportionment. Yet one of the districts has no population at all![12] For this extreme case, our measure b is zero, appropriately showing the absurdly bad apportionment. Another way of looking at this distinction is to point out that our index b considers all the population ratios (except in the extreme case of a population ratio exactly equal to zero), while the Dauer-Kelsay index effectively groups together (and fails to distinguish among) the smaller districts, and groups together (and fails to distinguish among) and larger districts.

Another criticism of the Dauer-Kelsay index is that both its minimum possible value and its maximum possible value are affected by k,[13] and thus, as for the ICV, strictly speaking it is not appropriate to compare Dauer-Kelsay indices for legislatures of different sizes.

As further numerical examples, in Table 1 are given the values of k, b, $\frac{1}{2}b$, d^*, the minimum proportion of the population able to elect half the legislators, and d, the Dauer-Kelsay index, for each state's delegation to the U.S. House of Representatives.[14] (Not included, of course, are those small states with only one representative. Also not included are Hawaii and New Mexico, each of which elected two congressmen at large. In Table 1 the reported ks for Maryland, Ohio, and Texas are one less than their congressional apportionment for the 89th congress, as each of these states elected one congressman at large.) It is seen that the correlation between b (or $\frac{1}{2}b$) and d^* is almost perfect. The lack of close correlation between b (or $\frac{1}{2}b$) and d is due almost entirely to the artifactually large Dauer-Kelsay indices for the small states, as discussed in footnote 13, a bias which is shown also by the strong negative relationship between the number of districts and the Dauer-Kelsay index. On the other hand, the correlation between k and b is almost exactly zero, suggesting the essential independence of the number of districts and our measure.

As a final comment I point out that it is possible to use b not only as a measure of the quality of apportionment, but to use it also actually to carry out an apportionment. This is done by maximizing b in dispensing legislative seats. The rationale and technical details of this method of apportionment will appear in a forthcoming paper.

MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX

In this mathematical appendix we prove that, for a given set of data, twice the Dauer-Kelsay index is necessarily greater than the quantity b developed in this paper.

Let $r_1, r_2, \cdots, r_k$ be the population ratios of the districts, where k is the number of districts, where

$$\sum_{j=1}^{k} r_j = k, \qquad (1)$$

and where the population ratios are ordered such that

$$r_1 \leq r_2 \leq \cdots \leq r_k. \qquad (2)$$

Then the Dauer-Kelsay index d is given by

$$d = \sum_{j=1}^{(k+2)/2} r_j/k, \qquad (3)$$

for k even, and

$$d = \sum_{j=1}^{(k+1)/2} r_j/k, \qquad (4)$$

for k odd.

The quantity b is defined as

$$b = 1 - \sqrt{1 - g}, \qquad (5)$$

where g is the geometric mean of the population ratios:

$$g = \left(\prod_{j=1}^{k} r_j \right)^{1/k}. \qquad (6)$$

We shall now prove that:

$$2d > b. \qquad (7)$$

Let

$$d^* = \sum_{j=1}^{k/2} r_j/k \qquad (8)$$

for k even, and

$$d^* = \left(\sum_{j=1}^{(k-1)/2} r_j + \tfrac{1}{2} r_{(k+1)/2} \right) \Big/ k \qquad (9)$$

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[12] Regardless of k, the number of districts, it is always possible to construct an example where the Dauer-Kelsay index is at least 0.50, and still have one of the districts with no population.

[13] The maximum possible value for the Dauer-Kelsay index is $(k+2)/2k$ for k even, and $(k+1)/2k$ for k odd. The minimum possible value is $2/k$ for k even, and $1/k$ for k odd. From these formulas it is seen that when k gets small the Dauer-Kelsay index becomes spuriously inflated.

[14] These data are for districts of the 89th Congress, using population figures from the 1960 census. The basic reference is: U.S. Bureau of the Census. *Congressional District Data Book.* (*Districts of the 88th Congress*), U.S. Government Printing Office. Washington, D.C., 1963. Eight states redistricted between the 88th and 89th Congress; revised figures for these states were obtained from pamphlets, for which a typical reference is given in footnote 1.

TABLE 1. MEASURES OF THE QUALITY OF APPORTIONMENT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATIONS OF THE U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

State	k	b	$\frac{1}{2}b$	d^*	d	Quality of Apportionment
Alabama	8	.896	.448	.459	.586	fair
Arizona	3	.547	.273	.321	.490	terrible
Arkansas	4	.771	.386	.388	.678	poor
California	38	.859	.430	.448	.473	fair
Colorado	4	.924	.462	.468	.718	good
Connecticut	6	.937	.469	.481	.643	good
Florida	12	.736	.368	.405	.487	poor
Georgia	10	.890	.445	.454	.558	fair
Idaho	2	.771	.386	.386	1.000	poor
Illinois	24	.851	.426	.441	.482	fair
Indiana	11	.764	.382	.407	.449	poor
Iowa	7	.923	.466	.475	.547	good
Kansas	5	.866	.433	.447	.548	fair
Kentucky	7	.811	.406	.421	.489	fair
Louisiana	8	.798	.399	.424	.544	poor
Maine	2	.957	.479	.479	1.000	excellent
Maryland	7	.596	.298	.314	.374	terrible
Massachusetts	12	.928	.464	.471	.557	good
Michigan	19	.988	.494	.495	.521	excellent
Minnesota	8	.910	.455	.460	.589	good
Mississippi	5	.762	.381	.406	.509	poor
Missouri	10	.904	.452	.458	.559	good
Montana	2	.813	.406	.406	1.000	fair
Nebraska	3	.890	.445	.455	.624	fair
New Hampshire	2	.907	.453	.453	1.000	good
New Jersey	15	.751	.376	.396	.429	poor
New York	41	.915	.458	.465	.477	good
North Carolina	11	.842	.421	.439	.486	fair
North Dakota	2	.946	.473	.473	1.000	good
Ohio	23	.734	.367	.396	.417	poor
Oklahoma	6	.681	.340	.365	.539	terrible
Oregon	4	.740	.370	.412	.704	poor
Pennsylvania	27	.855	.428	.446	.464	fair
Rhode Island	2	.930	.465	.465	1.000	good
South Carolina	6	.813	.407	.426	.600	fair
South Dakota	2	.537	.269	.269	1.000	terrible
Tennessee	9	.695	.347	.384	.440	terrible
Texas	22	.619	.309	.333	.377	terrible
Utah	2	.714	.357	.357	1.000	poor
Virginia	10	.832	.416	.432	.527	fair
Washington	7	.883	.442	.458	.528	fair
West Virginia	5	.871	.436	.447	.553	fair
Wisconsin	10	.982	.491	.493	.593	excellent

for k odd. The quantity d^* is the minimum proportion of the population able to elect half the legislators (in contrast to the Dauer-Kelsay index's being the minimum proportion of the population able to elect a majority of the legislators). For k odd, half the population ratio of the middle, i.e., the $(k+1)/2$, district is included in computing d^*. Note that this index d^* is half the mean of the first $k/2$ population ratios. It is obvious that

$$d > d^*. \tag{10}$$

Now let

$$g_L = \left(\prod_{j=1}^{k/2} r_j \right)^{2/k} \tag{11}$$

and

$$g_U = \left(\prod_{j=(k+2)/2}^{k} r_j \right)^{2/k} \tag{12}$$

for k even, and

$$g_L = \left(r_{(k+1)/2}^{1/2} \prod_{j=1}^{(k-1)/2} r_j \right)^{2/k} \tag{13}$$

and

$$g_U = \left(r_{(k+1)/2}^{1/2} \prod_{j=(k+3)/2}^{k} r_j \right)^{2/k}, \tag{14}$$

for k odd. The quantity g_L is the geometric mean of the population ratios of the smaller $k/2$ districts and g_U is the geometric mean of the population ratios of the larger $k/2$ districts. For k odd, we have assigned half the population ratio of the middle district to g_L and half to g_U.

Now $2d^*$ is the arithmetic mean of the smaller $k/2$ districts; consequently,

$$2d^* \geq g_L, \tag{15}$$

since the arithmetic mean is always greater than or equal to the geometric mean.

The geometric mean g of all k population ratios is given by (6); using (11) and (12) or (13) and (14) it is seen that

$$g = \sqrt{g_L g_U}. \tag{16}$$

Substituting (16) in (5), we have

$$b = 1 - \sqrt{1 - g_L g_U}. \tag{17}$$

The arithmetic mean of the population ratios of the $k/2$ larger districts is $2-2d^*$, since, remembering (1), the sum of the arithmetic means of the smaller $k/2$ and the larger $k/2$ districts must be two. Then

$$2 - 2d^* \geq g_U \tag{18}$$

again because the arithmetic mean must be greater than or equal to the geometric mean. From (15)

$$2 - 2d^* \leq 2 - g_L, \tag{19}$$

and thus, from (18) and (19),

$$2 - g_L \geq g_U. \tag{20}$$

Consider the quantity

$$a = 1 - \sqrt{1 - g_L(2 - g_L)}. \tag{21}$$

Using (20) in contrasting (17) and (21), we see that

$$a \geq b. \tag{22}$$

But from (21)

$$a = g_L. \tag{23}$$

Upon combining (10), (15), (23), and (22),

$$2d > 2d^* \geq g_L = a \geq b, \tag{24}$$

and we see that $2d > b$, which was to be proved.

IMAGE OF A PRESIDENT: SOME INSIGHTS INTO THE POLITICAL VIEWS OF SCHOOL CHILDREN*

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The map of the child's political world is slowly beginning to be filled in. The areas best filled in so far are his view of certain government officials (President, judges, policemen, etc.) and his understanding (or lack of understanding) of the operation of specific political institutions (legislatures, parties, etc.).[1] Of all persons in government none is as well known as the President of the United States. Even at an early age children know his name and even his party affiliation.[2] Best documented so far is the nature of the child's affection for the President. Apparently he enjoys the child's deep respect, admiration, loyalty, and even love.[3] Some scholars have gone so far as to imply that he symbolizes nation, leadership, and father all in one.[4] This being the case, it seems imperative that we ask: Is the President merely a symbol of leadership who will be loved irrespective of the political stands he takes, or is he seen as a genuine political figure who stands for specific political principles, legislation, etc.? At the moment this is the area about which we know least. It is but a slight exaggeration to say that we know very little indeed about the child's cognitive awareness of policy stands and differences among major officials, presidential candidates, etc. Even more unknown to us is *what* they associate with the name of a specific President that could be classified as being genuinely political. Precisely because we know so much of their affective orientation towards him, it seems important to know how much—if any—political content children associate with a specific President in office.

The opportunity to ask and answer that question presented itself when my colleagues and I undertook a large-scale survey of school children's reactions to the death of President Kennedy.[5] In the course of the interview schedule we introduced a number of questions designed to elicit the political image children had of the late President. We considered these questions as strictly exploratory since the literature on children did not permit us to develop any rigorous hypotheses. Consequently, we proceeded from two different and mutually exclusive assumptions: If the child's image of even so vivid and articulate a political figure as John F. Kennedy should prove to be void of political content, then his orientation to the political world is indeed almost exclusively affective, as had been suggested by some previous research. If, on the other hand, children do remember the late President for specific political acts or stands, we would feel safe to conclude that children's orientation towards the President is political and should not be equated with generalized trust of authority.

As benchmark for political awareness we used the existing knowledge of adults' awareness of the political stands taken by Presidents and presidential candidates. The findings of the major public opinion institutes as well as the classic voting behavior studies of Paul Lazarsfeld and his associates all seem to indi-

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* Support for this investigation came from a grant from the National Institute of Health (MH 10112-01).

[1] Fred Greenstein, *Children and Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), especially pp. 12–14.

[2] *Ibid.;* also see the work of David Easton, Robert Hess, and Jack Dennis, especially: Robert D. Hess, "The Socialization of Attitudes Toward Political Authority: Some Cross National Comparisons," *International Social Science Journal,* 15 (1963), 542–559; Robert D. Hess and David Easton, "The Child's Changing Image of the President," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 24 (1960), 632–644; and David Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's Image of Government," *The Annals,* 361 (1965), 40–57.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] Judith Torney and Robert Hess, "The Child's Idealization of Authority," a paper presented to the American Psychological Association meeting at St. Louis in 1962.

[5] Roberta S. Sigel, "An Exploration into Some Aspects of Political Socialization: School Children's Reaction to the Death of a President," in Martha Wolfenstein and Gilbert Kliman (eds.), *Children and the Death of a President: Multi-Disciplinary Studies* (New York: Doubleday, 1965), pp. 30–59; and Roberta S. Sigel, "Television and the Reactions of School Children to the Assassination," in Bradley S. Greenberg and Edwin B. Parker (eds.), *The Kennedy Assassination and the American Public: Social Communication in Crisis* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), pp. 199–219.

cate that American adults are not well informed on the stands and policy preferences of the Chief Executive.[6] What is known that is unique to him usually concerns personal attributes (such as his looks, family, etc.) while the political "image voters have of candidates [and Presidents] is influenced by their party images . . . often the image [of party and man] is highly interwoven."[7] The findings of the Survey Research Center, for example, found that the Eisenhower image actually became less rather than more political as he approached his second term while citizens' references to his likeable personal qualities "rose substantially."[8] Eisenhower may, of course, have been a special case, but the fact remains that Americans do not maintain a detailed check over the political actions of the Chief Executive; rather they are aware of some of the more dramatic issues with which his administration is popularly associated while for the rest they are content to evaluate him in terms of personality, party, and prosperity. Under these circumstances, we would say that a child's view of the President shall be considered political if he can associate the President with specific political actions, stands, or causes which transpired during his term of office but that the number of such recalls need not be numerous or deep.

I. METHODOLOGY

The political questions were embedded in a lengthy questionnaire whose main focus was children's reactions to the assassination and to the subsequent apprehension and murder of his assassin. The questionnaire was a paper and pencil instrument administered within twenty-one days after the assassination to 1,349 primary and secondary school children (grades 4–12) in metropolitan Detroit. The children were told that the questionnaire meant to explore their reaction to certain public events, that it was in no way related to their school standing, and that their answers were anonymous. Their teachers were not present during the administration. Grades six and up completed the questionnaire in the customary manner. But to the fourth-graders each item was read aloud, one at a time, before requesting an answer. The sample constitutes a good cross-section of the metropolitan Detroit school population, including all social classes and ethnic and religious groups. The schools were so chosen as to have good representation from upper, middle, blue collar class and slum neighborhoods and to have sufficient representation of children from the various ethnic, racial, and religious groups characteristic of the city. The schools were not, however, chosen on a strict probability basis.

We asked two types of political or potentially political questions:

(1) information questions which were forced choice and clearly political, such as one concerning the President's party affiliation and a check list of eight items featuring relatively recent political events (foreign and domestic) where children were asked to check off only those events with which the President had been involved during his term of office;

(2) four open-ended questions of which only one requested specific political information. All answers were coded as political which referred to political issues, policies, acts, events or tasks performed by Kennedy during his administration. The four open-ended questions were introduced early in the questionnaire, long before we had touched upon political content. The questions requested children to complete the sentence (a) "what I remember most about the President," (b) "what I liked about him,"[9] (c) "what kinds of things can people do to make sure that President Kennedy is remembered?", and (d)—the only clearly political question—"what can you remember that President Kennedy did as President? Write of the things he did in his job as President, not what he did in his private life."[10] Questions a, b and c, of course, do not convey any political cues; they are neutral and, therefore, are intended as a test of children's political sensitization. Only the child for whom

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[6] See especially Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948); Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1960), pp. 171–183.

[7] Roberta S. Sigel, "The Effect of Partisanship in the Perception of Political Candidates," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 28 (1964), p. 496.

[8] Campbell et al., *op. cit.*, p. 28.

[9] The question about liking was asked after the question about remembering to avoid forcing an affective response in the last instance.

[10] We used the phrase "did in his job" rather than to talk about his political contribution in order to make it comprehensible for 4th–6th graders. Initially we were concerned that the phrase "in his job" might be too ambiguous and would not focus children's attention on the specifically political. Experience with the pilot interview reassured us that children understood the question.

politics has salience would give spontaneous political responses here. Question d, on the other hand, clearly requests political information and, therefore, does not constitute a test of *spontaneous* political reaction; rather it constitutes a test of complete political unawareness. The child who cannot recall anything political when asked to make a political recall must be judged to be politically unaware and to relate to the President in non-political terms. The four questions are useful for yet another purpose: they can tell us something about the nature of the child's political image of the President—is it merely role-prescriptive ("he signs treaties and enforces the law"), or is it issue-oriented and discriminates the individual President from the office? Answers were coded as being "political" when they referred to policies ("He was for the Medicare Bill"), issues ("He favored Civil Rights"), or role ("He enforces the laws passed by Congress"). For purposes of analysis, issue- and policy-type answers were treated separately from role-type answers whenever feasible.

II. THE POLITICAL IMAGE

Children's image of the late President was far more political in an issue-oriented sense than the literature might have led us to believe.[11] The issues may have been perceived in a shallow and naive manner, but they were perceived. To be sure, his image was not exclusively political or issue-oriented. For most children the memory of John F. Kennedy evoked a mixture of personality, political achievement or failure, and office-related tasks ("he looked after our country"; "he met with Khrushchev and other important people to lead our country"). But political issues and acts also featured prominently in this image: children did not ignore the major issues and policies of his administration; they were part and parcel of the Kennedy image. In short, his image is not a bland one of the Great Leader, nor is it merely symbolic of the Presidency; rather it is politically differentiated and somewhat issue-oriented.

What is even more significant is that politically-aware answers, such as "he tried to get us Medicare but failed" or "he was a leader and defender of my Negro race" was volunteered not in answers to any probings about Kennedy's achievements but simply as a response to the neutral question, "What I remember most about President Kennedy is . . . ," a question which was asked early during the questionnaire and before any political cues had been introduced. Political answers to this non-political question were volunteered by only a third (32 percent) of the children while 55 percent referred to personal characteristics of the President, but we are impressed by the fact that as many as a third spontaneously thought of the late President in political terms and not just in personal or symbolic ones. Even when they were asked for affective responses ("What I liked about President Kennedy"), 20 percent gave political answers. And still more impressive is the fact that as early as the fourth grade—a stage at which children supposedly are almost totally oblivious of the existence of political issues and ideologies—24 percent volunteered political answers. Political awareness does not seem to be a function of social class. Working class children—who usually tend to show much less political interest than upper middle class children[12]—were politically aware, although it must be conceded that they recalled different and fewer political events.

The political component of the Kennedy image became clearest when children thought about him in connection with his "job" as President.[13] Almost all then offered political answers and only 16 percent offered recollections referring to personal attributes (such as his kindness, courage, etc.). Many children, especially the older ones, recalled more than one action of the late President.[14] The average number of political issues recalled is 1.2, but many 10th and 12th graders found time to discuss four and more political events.

And what do children recall of the politics of the Kennedy era? They recall him as the peacemaker and crusader for civil rights. Children's concern for peace and sensitivity to the tensions on the international scene were marked. There is no doubt that even young children were aware that they were living in troubled times full of international conflicts and dangers of war. Foreign affairs and peace together were mentioned more frequently than any other issues. However, when peace is separated from foreign affairs, civil rights

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[11] Greenstein, *op. cit.*, Chapter 4, especially tables on pp. 58–59.

[12] Wilbur Schramm, Jack Lyle, and Edwin B. Parker, *Television in the Lives of Our Children* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), p. 233.

[13] The discussion which follows above refers to responses to the question: "What can you remember that President Kennedy *did* as a President?"

[14] It is, of course, possible that younger children, too, recalled more but just had more trouble writing it down.

TABLE 1. "WHAT I REMEMBER MOST ABOUT PRESIDENT KENNEDY"

Type of Response	All Children	4th	6th	8th	10th	12th
		Grade				
Personal*	55%	54%	49	51	59	63
Political	32	29	32	35	31	32
Miscellaneous**	10	11	17	12	7	3
No Answer	3	6	2	2	3	2
	100%	100%*	100%	100%	100%	100%
	n=1,349†	264	281	339	249	216

* Refers to answers which only talked about the President's personal or private life.
** Inappropriate and uncodable answers included in miscellaneous.
† Column ns are the same in Tables 2, 3-A, 3-B, and 4.

becomes the most frequently recalled issue; peace ranks second, and foreign affairs third. These three items alone account for half of all the responses.

The tremendous impact of the civil rights struggle will be discussed later. Let us consider here the children's views of Kennedy the peacemaker. They felt deeply indebted to him because they believed he had averted war, and he "was always trying to stop new wars." What was it that had made children so conscious of the likelihood of war? Mostly the Cuban Crisis. The possibility of a World War over the presence of Russian missiles in Cuba apparently had been very real and frightening to many children. An eleven year old girl thought Kennedy "saved the world [from a war] when there was the Cuban Crisis." Rare indeed was the child who in this context did not refer to the Cuban Crisis.

The threat of nuclear war entered the consciousness even of some very young children—reference to nuclear weapons, missiles, etc., occurred often—and caused children to welcome the Test Ban Treaty, overtures to Soviet Russia, diplomatic negotiations, and other attempts to reduce the threat of war. The extent to which peace and family security are intertwined is symbolized in the comment of a 13 year old lower class girl: "I liked President Kennedy because he prevented war, and my father has a better job now."

An 18 year old girl from an upper middle class background liked President Kennedy for "his ability to make me feel secure," and later, when she was asked to tell what he did in office, mentioned a long list of foreign affairs activities—almost all on behalf of peace.[15] A

TABLE 2. THE THINGS PRESIDENT KENNEDY DID IN HIS JOB AS PRESIDENT

Reference to	All Children	4th	6th	8th	10th	12th
		Grade				
Personal traits	16%	37%	25%	8%	6%	1%
Political actions:						
Civil Rights	25	5	14	28	32	51
Peace	18	19	23	14	15	16
Foreign Affairs	16	5	11	24	26	13
Misc. Political	15	15	15	16	13	15
No Answer	9	16	8	9	7	4
Misc. Uncodable	1	3	4	1	1	0
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

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[15] While concern for peace may well have been sparked by the Cuban Crisis, not all youngsters approved of Kennedy's handling of it (a 17 year

9 year old girl explained, "He made peace because he did not want war."

The Cuban Crisis then was perhaps the first vivid threat to peace and security which this generation of school children could recall. It filled them with worry and with gratitude for the man who had averted the threat of war, who had made them feel secure again. Consequently, they thought of him as a man-of-peace.

Some children (notably upper middle class boys) gained this sense of security not so much from Kennedy's peaceful overtures during the crisis as from the decisiveness with which he challenged the Russians. They were happy that he "settled the Cuban situation outright, no pussyfooting around" (12th grade boy) and that he "made Khrushchev sweat" (10th grade girl). To these children his great service lay in the fact that "he stood up to Khrushchev [and thus] prevented World War III" (8th grade son of a wealthy executive).

Closely related to the image of Kennedy the peacemaker is that of Kennedy the man in search of the friendship of all nations, large and small, poor and rich.[16] Frequent references are made to his foreign aid program ("he sent money to foreign countries," 7th grade girl), his desire to win friends for the United States through the Peace Corps, his efforts on behalf of disarmament (the Test Ban Treaty is mentioned frequently), and in general "his ability to keep peace and help other countries" (13 year old boy). No other attempt on behalf of better international relations impressed them quite as much as his efforts to establish more cordial relations with Premier Khrushchev and the Soviet Union, or as a 13 year old prep-schooler put it, "his ability to maintain a friendship with Communist countries." Some children went so far as to equate these efforts with "signing a peace treaty with Russia," and they thought of his exchanges with Khrushchev as "peace talks."

Civil rights was the single issue most associated with the late President. They seem to have seen him as a latter-day Abraham Lincoln, an emancipator bent on granting the Negroes freedom and equality. Awareness of the civil rights issue was highly dependent on age and rose more sharply and dramatically with age than did awareness of other issues (although awareness of all issues rose with age). In the 4th grade only 5 percent associated the President with civil rights, but in the 12th grade 51 percent did so. Maybe this was because civil rights is a more abstract concept than peace or "a job for dad" and hence harder for younger children to comprehend. Maybe the explanation can be found in the schools themselves; as a rule it is not an issue discussed in elementary school—some even tend to avoid it. School notwithstanding, the President—in the eyes of Detroit youth—was better known for his efforts on behalf of equal rights for Negroes than he was for any other efforts. Negro children, of course, were even more aware of this. But the image of the President as the champion of civil rights and "the defender of the Negro race" cut across race and prevailed for all children.

The impact of the civil rights crusade is best illustrated by sample quotations from the children's protocols. A 9 year old white boy wrote: "he stopped the war, he made sure the Negroes could get in, he upheld the Constitution," and a 9 year old Negro boy wrote: "he would try to help the Negro people." A 6th grade 10 year old white girl put it this way: "He tried to pass the Civil Rights Bill; stopped the Mississippi scandal"; another white girl (age 11): "President Kennedy worked on programs for civil rights, less segregation, and physical fitness," while an 11 year old Negro girl in a slum school wistfully wrote: "He tried to let Negro people live an intelligent life." A 14 year old 8th grade Negro boy was far less enthusiastic: "Well, he didn't do such a good job helping the Negro" and refused to speculate further on any other accomplishment during Kennedy's term in office.

Further evidence for the potency of the civil rights issue can be deduced from children's replies to another question. We presented them with a checklist of eight items featuring relatively recent political events (foreign and domestic) and asked them to check off only those events with which the President has been involved during his term of office.[17] Only 27 percent identified all items correctly; but 69 percent correctly identified the item "forcing Governor Barnett to let James Meredith go to the University of Mississippi." Even in the 4th grade 41 percent knew of it, and in the 6th grade the event was known to a majority (see Tables 3-A and 3-B).

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old boy thought he had "goofed," and a 13 year old girl said: "he made me mad the way he handled the Cuban Crisis").

[16] Peace, for example, is mentioned by 19 percent of the 4th and 16 percent of the 12th graders; foreign affairs by 5 percent and 13 percent respectively.

[17] The check-list was offered much later than the other question so as not to suggest answers to them.

TABLE 3-A. KNOWLEDGE OF POLITICAL EVENTS WITH WHICH PRESIDENT KENNEDY WAS CONNECTED

Extent of Knowledge	All Children	4th	6th	8th	10th	12th
		Grade				
100% Correct Information	27%	6%	13%	26%	47%	52%
Partially Correct*	72	92	86	73	53	47
Omitted Answers	1	2	1	1	0	1
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

* No child answered all items incorrectly.

For full impact these figures must be contrasted with the children's total score: In the fourth grade only 6 percent achieved a perfect score but 41 percent knew of Mississippi; and in the 6th only 13 percent has a perfect score but 62 percent knew of Mississippi. Even when only those children with imperfect scores are examined, knowledge of the Mississippi episode remained high (38 percent for 4th graders and 57 percent for 6th graders). Specific political knowledge may for the most part be negligible in the early grades but not knowledge of some of the dramatic episodes of the times. I doubt, however, that it was merely the drama which accounted for the recall.[18] Reading the protocols cannot help but convince one that children were concerned with the nature of the issue itself, and much less with the drama—thus, for example, the Meredith affair *per se* is cited rarely in the open-ended question but the right to equal schooling is.

Other political issues or actions for which the President is remembered deal with economics; the conflict with the steel industry and the possibility of a steel strike were mentioned, the pending tax cut got attention from quite a few junior high and high school students, but most of all they referred to economic measures on behalf of the poor: jobs first and foremost but also Medicare, food stamps, and other related measures. For example: Fourth grade Negro boy: "He help people get a job and eat." Eighth grade white boy: "He kept my dad working." Eighth grade Negro girl: "Well, he bought stamps for poor which mean you pay $38 and get $66 in stamps. . . ." Tenth grade Negro boy: "He asked for $1.25 an hour for worker." Twelfth grade white girl: "He tried to help unemployment though it is doubtful if he really did."

Interestingly enough, some of the Kennedy measures which related to youth, such as the Physical Fitness Program, the Anti-Dropout Campaign and the Peace Corps, received relatively scant attention.

Age, as we would expect, was significantly related to a child's political awareness. Thus over a third (37 percent) of the 4th graders still thought of him only in personal terms but only 1 percent of the 12th graders did so. In 8th grade almost all children (except for

TABLE 3-B. AWARENESS OF KENNEDY'S STAND IN MEREDITH EPISODE

Awareness of Stand	All Children	4th	6th	8th	10th	12th
		Grade				
Aware of it	72%	41%	62%	78%	90%	92%
Unaware	27	57	37	21	10	7
Omitted Answers	1	2	1	1	0	1
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

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[18] Greenstein, *op. cit.*, p. 99, suggests that politics do not interest children but dramatic events, such as satellites and integration crises, do.

TABLE 4. NUMBER OF POLITICAL RESPONSES TO QUESTION "WHAT KENNEDY DID IN HIS JOB AS PRESIDENT"

Number of Responses	All Children	4th	6th	8th	10th	12th
		Grade				
No Answer or Blank	8%	11%	6%	8%	7%	4%
Too Vague	4	7	9	2	0	1
Answer not Political	21	49	33	14	8	2
One Political Response	35	28	40	44	35	23
Two or More Political Responses	32	5	12	32	50	70
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

8 percent) thought of Kennedy in political terms.[19] The 8th grade seems to constitute a rather sharp breaking point on a number of other items as well.[20] These changes are so abrupt as to suggest that at this stage important departures from more childish ways of thinking about politics take place which make subsequent changes in the 10th and 12th grades comparably smaller. In this same vein, the richness of recall (measured here by the number of different political items recalled on question d) also increases with age, and again the sharp rise sets in at the 8th grade (see Table 4). The average number of political issues recalled for the whole population is 1.2. For the fourth grade it is .4 and for the 6th .7, but for the 8th it is 1.4. For the 10th and 12th grades it is 1.6 and 1.8 respectively. As one would also expect (if one takes adult political cognition as a guide) richness of political recall has a social class basis.[21] Forty-two percent of blue collar children could recall only one political issue; most children of businessmen could recall several (only 18 percent recalled just one). We thus see repeated in youth the same political pattern to which we are accustomed in adults: Higher social status is associated with higher knowledge and/or interest in politics.[22]

Age and social status also seem to affect political sophistication. When asked "What kinds of things can people do to make sure that President Kennedy is remembered?", most children felt that something should be done to commemorate him. The methods, however, varied with age and social class. Younger children tended to think in concrete, tangible terms, such as the buying of souvenirs (39 percent in 4th grade). Hardly any of the older children (2 percent) thought of this, but 23 percent suggested carrying out his policies. Only one fourth grader gave this answer. As anticipated, middle class children, especially those from upper strata, gave such political answers more frequently—twice as frequently in fact—than did blue collar children. Conceptually, there is a big gulf between buying souvenirs and seeing that policies are carried out. The former is concrete, non-manipulative; the latter is abstract and implies—at least theoretically—an awareness of political processes and manipulations. To buy souvenirs the person needs to take no interest and/or action in the political process. It is a private act. To see that policies are enacted implies surveillance of and possible intervention in the political process. Not having probed into the children's responses, we do not know whether children did indeed make these distinctions. The age and class distribution for these answers suggests, however, that some such distinction might well have been operative. Not only do few younger children make the manipulative recommendation, but also more blue collar children of all ages suggest buying souvenirs and thus give the concrete and less manipulative answer. This accords with what others have said about blue collar children.[23] Apparently we have here one more testimonial that readiness to manipulate the political environment and the ability to think about it in a non-concrete, process-oriented manner is found more typically among middle class than among working class children.

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[19] It is, of course, possible that other, less colorful Presidents would evoke less politicized an image. The findings with respect to Eisenhower (see p. 217 above) lend plausibility to this argument. Follow-up research with other Presidents is, therefore, called for.

[20] See Sigel, "An Exploration . . . ," *op. cit.*, pp. 45, 48.

[21] The only information relevant to SES available to us was father's occupation.

[22] The necessary controls on age were run but did not yield a pattern different from the one described above. Controls were undertaken for all variables but are not discussed separately unless they affected the relationships.

III. KENNEDY, THE MAN

How did Kennedy, the man, appear to children? The personal trait which seems to have impressed children the most was his kindness (83 percent of all personal responses). Compared to it all other personal characteristics fade into insignificance (family ranks second and courage third). It seems particularly significant that references to his family ("he was a good father," etc.) were made by but 5 percent. In view of the intense publicity his family had received at all times and especially during the post-assassination TV coverage and in view of the alleged popularity of his immediate family (what Greenstein calls the "respectful awareness of the Kennedy family even . . . among pre-schoolers"[24]) I find it remarkable that only 5 percent saw fit to mention this role as the one best remembered. Could it be that children think of a President first as an official or at least a public personage, and only secondarily as a private man, a family man? Studies undertaken with adults have shown that a President's personal qualities have relatively low saliency, that adults too emphasized job-relevant traits in preference to personal ones when asked what they most valued in a President.[25]

With respect to two of the frequently recalled personal characteristics, kindness and courage, it is also possible to raise the question: are these exclusively personal traits, or could they have political overtones? Do some (certainly not most) of the children think of courage as political courage and of kindness as a sense of social justice, for example? We do not know. It is, however, not inconceivable that the responses have political overtones since a faint social class pattern can be seen in them. Lower class children chose kindness more frequently than did upper middle class ones, while the latter in turn were more impressed with courage. (The difference, however, was not statistically significant.) Preference for "kind" (social welfare) governmental measures, after all, is characteristic of lower class adults. Maybe children also had governmental kindness in mind since they often talked of his kindness and helpfulness in the following fashion: "he wanted to help everyone of any race" (8th grade white girl); "he didn't really care too much about himself he cared more about other people" (8th grade girl); "he cared about people" (8th grade boy); "he always treated people equal" (8th grade girl). Maybe it is reading too much into these responses to say they have faint political overtones, but the fact remains that they were all made by lower class children.

Children also were intrigued with his approachability and his warmth: "his closeness to the common person, not being aloof"; "he was accessible to people"; "he didn't hate no one." Frequent references also were made to the fact that he seemed to derive happiness and joy from life.

His speeches and the way he handled himself on TV and during press conferences were also mentioned. Many a child recited the famous lines from his Inaugural Speech, "Ask not. . ." A thirteen year old girl poetically, although ungrammatically, wrote "He made good speeches and it went right to my heart."

Equally noteworthy is what children tended to ignore. Only infrequently did they mention any of the more obvious personal traits of the late President, such as looks, wit, intelligence, energy, and athletic prowess. It is interesting that children failed to mention intelligence. In view of the fact that college students made such frequent references to his intelligence,[26] we had expected our older students, especially those from the exclusive private high schools, to do likewise. But even they ignored intelligence in favor of courage and/or kindness.

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[23] Edgar Litt, "Civic Education, Community Norms, and Political Indoctrination," *American Sociological Review*, 28 (1963), 69–75; Martin S. Lipset, *Political Man* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1963), pp. 87–182.

[24] Greenstein, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

[25] Roberta S. Sigel, "Image of the Presidency—Part II of an Exploration into Popular Views of Presidential Power," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 10 (1966), 123–137.

[26] Fred I. Greenstein, "College Student Reactions to the Assassination of President Kennedy," paper prepared for the Albert Einstein College of Medicine Conference on Children's Reactions to the Death of the President, New York City, April 3–4, 1964. Paul B. Sheatsley and Jacob J. Feldman, "The Assassination of President Kennedy: A Preliminary Report on Public Reactions and Behavior," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 28 (Summer 1964), noted, p. 205, that 80 percent of adults were impressed with Kennedy's intelligence.

Adults, like college youth, seem to consider intelligence as a crucial presidential qualification (in one study it ranked second to honesty) while they showed scant concern for kindness.[27]

This general preference for kindness notwithstanding, it must be pointed out that there were great variations in the Kennedy image, some of which clearly were related to social class position. Thus at least two Kennedy images appeared: Kennedy the kind, warm man who "was concerned with other people," and Kennedy the cool, crisp, efficient man of courage who got things done. Upper middle class children often tended to see him in this latter fashion: as one such youngster (10th grade prepschool) put it, "I liked his get-up and go, his determination." An 8th grade prepschool boy characterized him as "a determined young man who got things done." The frequent kindness references so prevalent among lower class youth were references to his kindness towards all people or towards groups such as the Negroes and the poor ("he ben kand to us Negroes," 9 year old working class boy).

The relatively large group of children who talked of the President's desire to be helpful did not refer to individual children or even adults but to his desire to help groups ("that he tried to help us Negroes most of all," 11 year old girl). The answers seem to imply that children felt quite peripheral to the President's concerns. We were very struck with this observation because it held for all other questions as well. We found no traces of manifest egocentrism or child-centeredness in their attitudes toward the President. Contrary to what the literature might have led us to expect, we found no references to the President as the child's best friend who wants to help him, who protects him, cares what he writes in letters to the White House, etc.[28] We encountered no comments to the effect that he liked children, cared for youth, would want to help a youngster if he asked for help, etc. Children did not remember him for what he did for a sick child or a Peace Corps youth; rather they remembered him for what he did for the country, for other countries, for specific groups, for the peace of the world, etc. Or, if they liked him for himself, it was because he was an attractive person, had done interesting or exciting things, etc. They saw him as an important actor on the political stage, and it is quite clear that the children seldom confused this stage with the one on which they themselves performed. In fact, the protocols suggest that he was seen as quite aloof from their daily world and its problems. Images such as these cannot be characterized as child-centered, let alone egocentric. And it is the very absence of child-centered responses which makes us doubt that the President is viewed as a nurturant father surrogate or as part of a reciprocal relationship with the child, an idea frequently advanced in the literature.

We had not anticipated this distance and lack of child-centeredness in their attitudes toward the President, and so did not probe sufficiently to explore it further. We did, however, follow it up in a later study and found that children reject outright the idea that the President would want (or even has the power) to interfere in their personal problems or those of their parents.[29] These findings in no way contradict those of Greenstein and others who hold that children see him as the "benevolent leader." They do describe the boundaries of the area in which children see his benevolence as being operative. As far as they are concerned, his "benevolence" is exercised in important matters of statecraft.

This special type of benevolence is probably much closer to the image adults have of the Presidency. The evidence accumulated over the years seems to indicate that Americans have a remarkable amount of trust in the basic good will and competence of their top officials. The public may disagree with a President on specific policies and issue and still not "lack . . . faith in the President's dedication to the public interest,"[30] but neither does it look upon him as the source of all strength and wisdom. Children apparently react in much the same way.

IV. ROLE AND PERSON

We have seen, then, that children do have considerable political awareness. Previous studies, notably those by Greenstein and by Hess and Easton, also had shown this. Their evidence has suggested that the President has great visibility for children. Our findings tend to confirm theirs. And I would add that such visibility entails knowledge of political issues, policies, and conflicts associated with a specific President—a fact heretofore not stressed by the literature.

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[27] Sigel, "Image of the Presidency . . . ," *op. cit.*, p. 126.

[28] See especially the writings of Easton and Hess cited above.

[29] Roberta S. Sigel, "Political Socialization—Some Reactions to Current Approaches and Conceptualizations," paper prepared for delivery at the 1966 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in New York City.

[30] Sigel, "Image of the Presidency . . . ," *op. cit.*, p. 127.

Most current research also finds that youth has some, albeit hazy, understanding of the tasks and scope of the office and of the great power held by its occupant. By inference, however, these findings suggest that children respond to the Presidency and take next to no notice of the politics espoused by the individual President—in short, that children do not discriminate between the office and the occupant of the office. Our findings lead me to say that this interpretation does not give children adequate credit for political cognition. We found very few children who were so office-oriented that they gave us role-descriptive responses.[31] ("He made the laws, He kept our country going," 9 year old boy). Much of what children said about Kennedy could apply to Kennedy and Kennedy only and was not characteristic of the Presidency *per se*. Most of their answers, as we have seen, centered around political issues. Children thus brought to their evaluation of the late President more than what they had learned in civics textbooks about the Presidential office.

One may, of course, argue that this high issue awareness was merely a function of the TV coverage during the tragic weekend. We know that children, like adults, spent a great deal of their time in front of the television screen during those days.[32] But it must also be remembered that TV coverage over that weekend by no means concentrated exclusively, or even preponderantly, on the policies of his administration. Children had ample opportunity to pick up other cues from TV—his childhood, his Navy career, his family, the manner of his death, his ceremonial functions, etc. The fact that they recalled political issues more than office-related or personal events would seem to lend credence to the conclusion that political issues are more salient to children than we had believed up to now. To be sure, the very drama of the issues which transpired during Kennedy's administration and the manner of his death may have heightened children's issue awareness and may represent the outer limits of what we can expect of them. Nonetheless, our results suggest that a President is seen more as a political actor than as a father, friend, celebrity, or symbol of the nation. Though he may be liked personally, it is not his personality but his politics which has salience for them (see Table 5). If these findings are replicated under different circumstances, they will require us to restructure some of our thinking about youth and politics.

TABLE 5. COMPARISON OF RESPONSES TO WHAT I REMEMBER ABOUT PRESIDENT KENNEDY WITH RESPONSES TO WHAT I LIKED ABOUT PRESIDENT KENNEDY

Type of Response	Remembered Kennedy	Liked Kennedy
Recall of Personal Traits	55%	72%
Kindness	(42	(56
Courage	6	10
Love of his family	7)	5)*
Recall of Political Acts	32	20
Miscellaneous	10	4
No Answer	3	4
	100%	100%
	n = 1,349	n = 1,349

* Due to rounding-off, the three figures in parentheses do not add up to 72%.

V. SUMMARY

The Kennedy image was rich, specific, and considerably more politicized than we had anticipated. He was particularly well remembered for his efforts on behalf of peace and civil rights. One cannot help feeling that children thought that if it had not been for President Kennedy we might well have gone to war with Russia and Cuba. The imminence of war and its avoidance during the missile crisis seem to have left a deep impression on children. As a result they are also impressed with subsequent efforts to "encourage good foreign relations" (8th grader). On the civil rights issue they recalled him for his efforts to end segregation (especially in schools), to have the Civil Rights Bill passed, and to improve the lot of Negroes. Both White and Negro children saw him as the defender of the Negro cause and the champion of equal treatment for all men. They disagreed about how successful his efforts had been, but few (mostly children from white working class schools) quarrelled with the goal. His concern for the poor and the unemployed, especially his desire to create jobs, was another vital component of the political image.

In summary, then, the Kennedy political profile looked something like this (although not all highschoolers, let alone younger children, would be able to write such a complete sketch as this 12th grader)

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[31] Even very few of the 4th graders restricted themselves to office-related responses.

[32] Sigel, "Television and the Reaction . . . ," *op. cit.*, pp. 199–219.

> President Kennedy began the Peace Corps, the Alliance for Progress in South America, an active Civil Rights Bill, a bill for lower income tax, he gave other leaders of the world a faith and confidence in the United States and the people of America. He especially eased tension with the Soviet Union. He brought action instead of talk.

Kennedy the man, as distinct from Kennedy the President, was liked and remembered for his kindness and courage. For most children it was the Kennedy warmth, not his competence, which stood out. They liked him for his liking of others, his ability to care and to respond. Quite often a child expressed gratitude and astonishment that a millionaire could have been so little stand-offish and so devoted to people. The Kennedy traits most noticeable to adults—intelligence, competence, immense drive and self-confidence—escaped many children.

To conclude: Detroit school children were by no means ignorant of their political environment; they seem to have known the centrally important issues of their time and what transpired during the President's term of office. To be sure, their image lacked depth and detail as well as sophistication, but the same can well be said of most adults. They too responded only to the most dramatic in politics and then only in highly general terms, "revealing an important informational gap."[33] This being the case, the gap which separates children from adults in political sophistication may well be smaller than generally believed.

Nothing, however, seems to me quite as significant as the fact that children saw the President as a political figure and not merely as a symbol. They may have been attached to him, but not solely as a father figure, or as the benevolent leader, or as a symbol of national unity. They were also attached to him because he was a political actor associated with vital political issues. He may have been their leader, but he was a leader with a political cause. Future research should explore in depth the nature of children's perceptions of leadership before we accept unquestioningly the notion that children relate to the President in primarily affective and symbolic ways.

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[33] Robert E. Lane and David O. Sears, *Public Opinion* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 61.

COMMUNICATIONS

To the Editor:

In an article in this Review ("Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government," June, 1966) we compared the population characteristics of cities with various alternative political institutions (mayor or manager; partisan or nonpartisan ballot; councilmen elected from wards or at large) in an attempt to test a theory formulated and promoted most conspicuously by Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson in *City Politics* (Cambridge, 1963). This "ethos theory" attributed a bundle of "private-regarding" preferences (for mayors, partisan ballots, and ward-elected councilmen, among other things) to persons of foreign stock and an opposite syndrome to old Americans. Previous research relating municipal institutions and populations seemed to confirm the ethos theory and was so accepted by Banfield and Wilson. At the nationwide level our findings did too, but when we analyzed our data within each of the country's regions, these relationships vanished. In reply (this Review, December, 1966), Banfield and Wilson asserted that they had never really meant to suggest that such gross and unrefined categories as generation or residence in the United States had any predictive value with respect to their theory, or even any descriptive validity. This disavowal, while improving the ethos theory's credibility, reduced its clarity, for Banfield and Wilson did not reformulate their position on just who was supposed to be "private-" and/or "public-regarding," except to nominate for "private regardingness" several hundred thousand voters of Czech and Polish extraction in Cleveland and Chicago (on the basis, however, of their votes on bond issues, not governmental forms).

Now Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler have launched a new attack on our methods and conclusions ("Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," this Review, September, 1967), chiefly by ignoring and misrepresenting what we said and did. They said that we *substituted* "the gross and unrefined variable of 'region' for more refined demographic data" (p. 707). We did not. We did examine the following relationships: 1) between ethnicity and region; 2) between region and governmental institutions; 3) between ethnicity (and other demographic items) and institutions; and 4) between ethnicity and institutions within regions. This is scarcely substituting region for ethnicity as a hypothesized independent variable.

We found that not only was region a far better predictor than ethnicity without controlling for other variables, but also that ethnic differences disappear when we controlled for region. Lineberry & Fowler said that regional variations in the dependent variables are an artifact of regional variations in ethnicity. This claim ignores three important considerations: 1) Regional variations in the dependent variables are far greater than ethnic variations. 2) Ethnicity means different things in different places. 3) Outside the southern and border states, cities within each region vary enormously in their foreign stock populations (these data are summarized in our Table 9).

Furthermore, Lineberry & Fowler might have reflected that for the South, whose "reformed" cities contribute most of the national relationship between low ethnicity and "public-regarding" institutions, there might be other explanations for, say, using nonpartisan ballots. If not, they then may have come across the real explanation of southern politics: not the Civil War, the race problem, and a one-party system, but the *absence of ethnics.* Doubtless some of the late V. O. Key's students would dispute this thesis if were stated more explicitly; nevertheless, we urge Lineberry & Fowler to do so and thereby establish forever their place in the history of political science.

Next, Lineberry & Fowler misinterpreted us on another point:

> Presumably, their assumption is that there is a simple linear relationship between sheer numbers (or proportions) of, say, middle class persons and their political power: the larger the size of a group in the city's population, the easier it can enforce its choice of political forms (p. 707).

We said:

> Obviously it would be unwise to assert that there is a simple causal relationship between public attitudes toward a particular governmental feature and the likelihood that that feature will be adopted . . . [our method] does not deny the existence of other independent variables, but it does require that the ethos be of sufficient importance so that, *in the aggregate* [emphasis in original] its influence will be discernible (pp. 311–12).

Finally, they complained about "time-order: independent variables are measured with contemporary census data, while the dependent variables are results of decisions made ten to fifty years ago" (p. 707). As we pointed out, "1960 levels of ethnic populations are a fairly reliable index of each city's relative ethnicity over the past fifty years" (p. 311).[1] If Lineberry & Fowler have contradictory data on this point, they should say so; if not, their objection seems to be little more than free association. Moreover, municipal institutions are no less susceptible to change now than they were in the past; if ethnics lean in one direction and old Americans in another, why should the present generation be any less capable of changing local government to its taste?

In order to test their own propositions about how "reformed" and "unreformed" cities differ in their responsiveness to group demands, Lineberry & Fowler must resolve several conceptual and methodological questions. By explicating these questions and the authors' answers to them, we should be able to evaluate their study.

1. Is it their proposition that "reformed" cities (those with "public-regarding" institutions) are less responsive to *all* groups? Their answer clearly is "yes." This may seem to fly in the face of common sense, which suggests that different institutional arrangements might favor different interests, e.g., electing councilmen from wards would benefit residentially segregated people, while electing them at large helps dispersed groups like businessmen. Nevertheless, Lineberry & Fowler's answer can be reconciled with the ethos theory, which tells us that only *some* elements (which they call "minorities") actually make selfish demands, while other kinds of people, being "public regarding," care for the good of the community as a whole. "By muting the demands of private-regarding groups, the electoral institutions of reformed governments make public policy less responsive to the demands arising out of social conflicts in the population" (p. 716). If Lineberry & Fowler had had the opportunity to be Alexander Hamilton's ghost writers, doubtless they would have had him say, "Your people, sir, is a great public-regarding beast."

2. How does one define the stimuli to which governments respond or fail to respond? Lineberry & Fowler tackled this problem in two ways. a) Their first approach was that governmental decisions are responses to "cleavages," a term that connotes disunity, bitterness, and conflict. We find it difficult to think about measuring "responses to cleavages," for how does one learn what the cleavage wants? Does a cleavage make demands? Would the spokesman for a cleavage cry, like Shylock, "If you prick us, do we not bleed?" b) The authors' second approach avoids this problem by specifying various demographic groups which are thought to make characteristic demands on local governments.

3a. Assuming that a government can "respond to a cleavage," what are some valid indices of cleavages and what is the predicted response? Lineberry and Fowler worked with twelve indices which "represent a variety of possible social cleavages which divide urban populations . . ." (p. 703). This curious list includes a city's 1960 population, as well as its percentage of gain *or loss* since 1950; the median education and percentage of high school graduates; the percentage making less than $3000 a year *and* that earning over $10,000; the percentage in owner-occupied housing, the proportion of second-generation Americans, and so on. The authors did not explain how a city's size is a basis of social division or why they included some measures which essentially duplicate each other; nor did they seem to consider that some of these indices, e.g., foreign stock population, are far more meaningful social indicators in some parts of the country than in others. In no case did they provide evidence that these items are indices of social conflict, to say nothing of politically relevant demands. They computed multiple correlation coefficients for "reformed" and "unreformed" cities, using taxes and then expenditures as their dependent variables. They found that the coefficients were bigger for the "unreformed" cities and concluded that these cities were more "responsive to cleavages," while the "reformed" cities were governed "more on the basis of the rationalistic theory of administration" (p. 710). The meaning of these findings is vitiated by the absence of any prediction of the direction of the relationships, which is particularly puzzling since it appears that some of the independent variables are negatively related to each other (we are not told how they are interrelated); nor was there any indication in this section of how much of the variance was contributed by each of the twelve variables. One can learn something about this last point by examining the data in the next section, where simple correlation coefficients were presented for most of the independent variables combined in these multiple correlations. Such an examination reveals that one of the twelve variables, owner occupancy, accounted for more than half of the variation in four of the seven multiple correlations computed to show relationships between "cleavages" and taxation. In cities with the commission form of government, the twelve variables together accounted for 62 per cent of the variation in taxes; owner occupancy alone accounted for 53 per cent of the variation.

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[1] In a four-page passage from Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson's "The Politics of Welfare" that they cited for another purpose, Lineberry & Fowler evidently overlooked this sentence: "The rank-order correlation between the 1941 and 1960 indices [for states] of . . . per cent of foreign born or per cent with one or more foreign-born parents is .97." See Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines (eds.), *Politics in the American States* (Boston, 1965), p. 401.

3b. In the next section simple correlations were reported between "reformed" and "unreformed" cities' tax and expenditure levels on the one hand and single demographic variables on the other. The generic proposition was that "unreformed" cities would be more responsive, i.e., yield higher correlation coefficients. This requires data on the preferences of various demographic groups, so that one can predict the relationship. It seems that survey data would be the best source of this information and that distinctions should be made between different kinds of taxes and expenditures; a group's willingness to support "municipal services" might have something to do with just what kinds of services were being proposed: roads, schools, welfare, and so on. But Lineberry & Fowler did not make such distinctions, nor, with one indirect and fruitless exception, did they use survey data to ascertain various groups' preferences.

Their propositions based on correlations with income, education, and occupation were disconfirmed, both for the direction of the relationship and its greater strength in "unreformed" cities. After finding comfort in correlations using owner occupancy as an independent variable, Lineberry & Fowler came to the key independent variable in the ethos theory: ethnicity. They extracted their proposition that "ethnic and religious minorities" (Swedes, Mormons, Jews, Japanese, Italians?) prefer higher taxes *and* expenditures from Dawson and Robinson's finding of high state-by-state correlations between *welfare* expenditures and percentage of foreign-born residents.[2] This procedure poses several difficulties apparently overlooked by Lineberry & Fowler: 1) The dependent variable in these correlations is a simple measure of gross expenditures that does not reflect each state's financial capacity. Since states with more ethnics are much richer, isolating the variance contributed by ethnicity as a variable would be impossible without controlling for income, which Dawson and Robinson did not do here. 2) The ethos theory, to which Lineberry & Fowler are devoted, states that ethnics are parsimonious. 3) By interpreting the Dawson & Robinson data as evidence for the proposition that ethnics favor expenditures, the authors assumed "that the size of an ethnic population is an accurate indicator of influence of ethnic groups," an assumption which they termed "dubious" on p. 707. In fact, this same objection could be made to their basic method, which assumes that higher correlations between an index of a demographic group's proportionate size and an output variable reflect more political influence, i.e., that the proportion of a group in the municipal population reflects its proportionate political power. In their attack on us Lineberry & Fowler seemed to feel very strongly about the "difficulty of inferring configurations of political power from demographic data" (p. 707). Perhaps, having exhausted their hostility to this assumption on page 707, they found it easier to rely on it themselves on pages 710–716.

Lineberry & Fowler, while describing their study as a "starting point," ignored an earlier example of the same approach to the responsiveness of different municipal institutions. In the course of our article, we compared correlations between ethnicity and per capita city planning and urban renewal expenditures in mayor and manager cities. The ethos theory predicted negative correlations, higher in the mayor cities, because they supposedly are more vulnerable to the demands of ethnic groups, which the ethos theory deems hostile to city planning and urban renewal. Our data, controlled for size and region of cities, produced no consistent relationships in either direction. Lineberry & Fowler's failure to acknowledge this finding is understanable, for it presented them with a cruel dilemma: either our method (similar to theirs) was valid, in which case the ethos theory was contradicted; or our method (and theirs) was invalid and the ethos theory was irrelevant to our data.

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[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 398–401. A complete reading of the Dawson & Robinson article would have revealed another problem: the proportion of total state welfare expenditures contributed by local governments ranges from zero to more than a third. A glance at the relevant table (pp. 382–383) reveals pronounced regional patterns in this respect. Lineberry & Fowler alluded to the problem of expenditure allocation, but dismissed it quickly: "We think it important, however, that our independent variables explain a large proportion of the variation in municipal outputs as we measured them. No doubt one could explain an even larger proportion of the variation in measures which specify different functional responsibilities of cities" (p. 704n). On the other hand, of course, this more accurate specification might reduce rather than increase the proportion of the variance.

Lineberry & Fowler concluded that

> If they [disputes] do enter the political process, an impersonal, 'non-political' bureaucracy may take less account of the conflicting interests and pay more attention to the 'correct' decision from the point of view of the municipal planner.
>
> These conclusions are generally consistent with the ethos theory developed by Banfield and Wilson (p. 716).

Once again, Lineberry & Fowler seem to have forgotten not only their own earlier strictures, but also Banfield and Wilson's most recent characterization of the ethos theory:

> We make certain assertions about *attitudes*, [emphasis in original] not institutions. Our theory suggests that certain groups, provisionally [if unspecifically] defined along lines of income and ethnicity, have conflicting views about the nature and purpose of politics; . . . (pp. 998–999).

We end this letter on a note of puzzlement. Has the ethos theory been revised again, this time to refer to the consequences of certain institutions as well as attitudes toward them? Perhaps our letter of complaint will be accompanied by a similar one from Banfield and Wilson. Then again, perhaps they agree with this most recent revision of their theory. With the ethos theory, who can predict?

Raymond E. Wolfinger
John Osgood Field
Stanford University

To the Editor:

While we suggested several points on which we differed from Wolfinger and Field, we trust that our article was not construed as a launching pad for a wholesale attack on their methods and conclusions. Indeed, as we said (p. 706), we generally agreed with their analysis. Several points, however, merit pursuit.

1. Frankly, we do not believe that our critics dealt effectively with our argument that region as a variable was "an undifferentiated potpourri of socio-economic, attitudinal, historical and cultural variations." (p. 707) We did *not* argue that "regional variations" in the city governments "are an artifact of regional variations in ethnicity." It is thus understandable that we find all three of the considerations raised by Wolfinger and Field (plus their exegesis on Key) to be well-taken, but irrelevant to our point that when one "controls" for a variable, one should know what one is controlling for. While they discussed other of our references at length (e.g., Dawson and Robinson), they did not comment on our citation of an eminent social statistician about the pitfalls of "region" as a causal variable.

2. We also suggested that Wolfinger and Field made tenuous assumptions in what purported to be a causal analysis—specifically, the time-order problem. Granted that we are not aware of (nor apparently is Wolfinger) research correlating previous and present-day ethnic composition of cities,[1] we are not comfortable with the assumption that cities today are pretty much the same as they always were—given the ethnic assimilation, the suburban migration, etc, etc. To argue that "well, after all, groups even today could change the form of government," is to turn a possibly solid empirical hypothesis into mere conjecture.

3. We are puzzled by the query over the measurement of cleavages. It seemed to us that municipal decision-makers could respond to cues from two principal sources: (a) from the environment, i.e., "inputs" arising out of socio-economic cleavages or inter-group conflict (which we tried to measure, of necessity rather crudely); or, (b) from "withinputs," in the form of professional opinions of planners, managers and bureaucrats. Multiple correlations (which do not measure direction of relationship) suggested that socio-economic data predicted much less variation in reformed cities' policies than in unreformed cities' policies. We reasoned that if a city's policy-making took account of one side *or the other* (our data permitted us to measure this indirectly), we could say that it was "responsive" or sensitive to the cleavage. The only objection here was that we did not "predict the direction of the relationships." However, we used multiple R's *precisely because* we wanted to know how responsive institutions were to a group of popu-

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[1] Unfortunately, Dawson and Robinson's data are not much help here, since (1) states are not cities; and (2) 1940 was hardly the peak year for either the size of ethnic groups in cities, or the adoption of reforms.

lation characteristics taken together, whether their individual effect was to raise or lower spending.

Obviously, we are willing to grant that different institutions might favor different interests. Nevertheless, we tested a proposition articulated by the reformers, that reformed cities *should be* less sensitive to any group that makes a demand.[2] This implies to us that while particular decisions may well favor particular groups, policy-making in the aggregate will not show such a close relationship to indicators of political cleavage (or indicators of inter-group conflict, if Wolfinger and Field prefer).

4. At the start of the analysis we had our doubts about assuming that the size of a demographic group always and accurately represented its political power, yet it seemed equally dubious to assume that the demographic characteristics of a city were completely unrelated to distributions of power. Our main interest, it will be recalled, was whether institutional forms could influence how much variation demographic indicators could explain in city spending. Thus we were expecting to find *some* relationships. If relationships were going to be found en route to our principal interest, we felt some obligation to predict their nature with such little resources as we had at our disposal—there was little direct evidence on the subject, so we had to content ourselves with the indirect. (We too wish that we had had available survey data on attitudes of various groups, but unfortunately the resources for graduate student research at Chapel Hill simply weren't up to it.) We developed what we thought were reasonable expectations for our findings, without any intention of inferring from those findings "configurations of political power." Our article then proceeded immediately to its primary focus, which was that for whatever reason city government responded to different groups, it responded less sensitively if it were a reformed government. That is, one could infer rather confidently the *relative* size of two different relationships, it would be more difficult to be precise about the *absolute* meaning of a single relationship. By such inferential gymnastics, we hoped to escape both the Scylla of reading too much into the data and the Charybdis of being too cautious to infer anything.

5. Finally, we object to having our allegiance pigeonholed. While we think Banfield and Wilson's theory insightful (and hardly upset by Wolfinger and Field's otherwise valuable article), we are not "devoted" to it. Unlike Wolfinger and Field, we twice acknowledged (pp. 707 and 711) that the ethos theory dealt with attitudes and we carefully avoided the implication that we had "tested" the theory. Our words were that our findings were "generally consistent with the ethos theory." (p. 716)

Granted that there are always complexities in the analysis of aggregate data, we fail to see that Wolfinger and Field have vitiated the central conclusion of our research: that "the translations of social conflicts into public policy and the responsiveness of political systems to class, racial and religious cleavages differs markedly with the kind of political structure." (p. 715) It would have helped if they had offered (a) alternative methods to our own; (b) alternative explanations for our relationships; or (c) alternative evidence (other than a few simple correlations between ethnicity and some dubious data on planning expenditures and federal urban renewal grants, 'controlled' as usual by 'region.') We too think Shakespeare had the answer, in a well-worn line about protesting.

ROBERT L. LINEBERRY
EDMUND P. FOWLER

TO THE EDITOR:

What makes for relatively stable and progressive parliamentary democracy? That question was a major concern of many of the articles in the December 1967 REVIEW.

Kenneth Vines and Henry Glick find in a highly informative article, "The Impact of Universal Suffrage: A Comparison of Popular and Property Voting," pp. 1078–1087, that permitting everyone—including the poor—to vote in Louisiana today does not damage or threaten the propertied interests, that Nineteenth Century American constitutional theorists such as Chancellor James Kent who thought otherwise were wrong. But isn't it possible that social conditions in New York in 1821 and Louisiana in 1965 significantly differ, that the wealth created and distributed in America in the last 150 years removes a threat from universal suffrage that in other circumstances is real?

V. Subramaniam convincingly argues in "Representative Bureaucracy: A Reassessment," pp. 1010–1019, that not only do our so-called representative bureaucracies turn out to be more elitist and ascriptive than our democratic ideologies would have us believe, but that the ruling elites of poor and economically polarized parliamentary democracies would be threatened by bureaucracies truly representative of the disinherited masses. Seemingly objective criteria of recruitment subjectively help to keep such people out of power. Where traditional power groups are threatened in their control of the army, banks, administration, etc., they may well join and resort to a coup to remove the disquieting democratic system.

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[2] "In Child's schema, the interest group is anathema to the public interest and should be expunged from the body politic." John P. East, *Council-Manager Government: A Biographer of its Founder, Richard S. Childs* (Chapel Hill, 1965), p. 96.

According to Dean Neubauer's careful calculations in "Some Conditions of Democracy," pp. 1002–1009, Japan, West Germany and Italy are all more democratic than the USA. Was this true 25 or 50 years ago? If not, why the change? Is the development of communications networks more important than defeat in World War II which discredited and—with the help of the USA—violently destroyed or debilitated many anti-democratic groups and institutions? Is a certain amount of directed violence needed to establish the threshold conditions of democracy to which Mr. Neubauer alludes? Must that elitist administrative apparatus which Mr. Subramaniam so shrewdly discusses be crushed and recreated before it can be peacefully captured in a parliamentary manner by non-elite groups?

Glaucio Soares and Robert Hamblin ask what makes for the alienated voters who opt for the radical left in Chile in "Socio-Economic Variables and Voting for the Radical Left: Chile, 1952," pp. 1053–1065. It is a profound insight that even those who act within the electoral system are not necessarily committed to the social order it protects. Similarly, people committed to that social order do not always act within the electoral system. I look forward to Soares' and Hamblin's succeeding study of to what end Chile's elite—or others in Latin America—tolerate open radicalism. Time after time Latin American elites have moved from parliamentary democracy to military dictatorship when that democracy threatened their social positions.

We return then to Vines' and Glick's important hypothesis. What is the impact of universal suffrage and democratic standards in poor countries where it no longer seems legitimate to many of the sons of the elite that the disinherited suffer so inequitably, where it seems all should have an equal birthright to a share of the economic pot and the job plums? One result may be a tendency toward polarization between a frightened anti-democratic elite and a legitimized mass, a polarization in which the military forces of the great powers are called on to help one side or the other. As the USA helped create democracy in Germany and Japan, we cannot ignore America's role in a list of crucial variables which undermined democracy in Brazil or the Dominican Republic. Do the anti-democratic elites of such countries act heedless of how Washington will act or react?

In the real world in which we live, which may be a bit less than the best of all possible ones, it may be close to impossible to create parliamentary mobilizations which include all the people and produce rapid progress and relative stability. Only a Westphalian political scientist can afford to weigh variables making for evolutionary democracy in small and weak countries caught up in the cold war and ignore the at-times overwhelming impact of international relations, violent discontinuities and foreign military power. If American actions hinder needed revolutionary violence in a situation where the forces of parliamentary democracy are too weak to succeed, then what is the relevance of a political science which looks to secondary internal factors and ignores primary international factors and limiting historical conditions? Instead of advising the elites of poor countries as to how they should go about establishing parliamentary democracy, perhaps we should heed Voltaire's agronomical advice.

EDWARD FRIEDMAN
University of Wisconsin

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES

Beginning with the issue of September, 1968, Professor Richard F. Fenno, The University of Rochester, will succeed Professor James W. Prothro as Book Review Editor. *Beginning immediately*, however, all books intended for review should be sent to:

Richard F. Fenno, Book Review Editor
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BOOK REVIEWS

Correspondance d'Alexis de Tocqueville et de Gustave de Beaumont. TEXTE ÉTABLI, ANNOTÉ ET PRÉFACÉ PAR ANDRÉ JARDIN. (3 volumes; Paris: Gallimard, 1967. Pp. 621, 470, 644. 120 F.) Tome VIII, Oeuvres Complètes d'Alexis de Tocqueville, Edition définitive publiée sous la direction de J. P. Mayer.

Tocqueville's reputation among American political scientists has withstood many a change in fashion. When *Democracy in America* appeared well over a century ago, its reception in this country was enthusiastic, so much so that it became the first best-selling textbook on American government. Since at least half of all subsequent students of that subject have devoted themselves to capturing a position that combines so agreeably prestige and profit, it is scarcely surprising that Tocqueville's book is no longer used for that purpose. But unlike its successors, the *Democracy* was an indubitable masterpiece, which almost immediately became one of the most influential books of its century throughout the world. It still retains its original power to open minds and set them in motion along unstereotyped lines. Yet it was Tocqueville's first book, not his last, a fact that somehow has not registered on many of Tocqueville's warmest admirers among American political scientists. S. M. Lipset, for example, has recently hailed Tocqueville as one of the founders of political sociology; he has concluded further that practitioners of that discipline could improve it greatly both by a return to the problems posed by Tocqueville, and to his method, comparative analysis. Yet in *Political Man*, Professor Lipset refers to no other work of Tocqueville than *Democracy in America*. What is at issue is not the pedantic point that no part of a theorist's work may be used before all of it has been read, but rather that we may understand his original point far better after we see what he made of it after considerable practical experience and further intellectual reflection. Surely Tocqueville's use of the comparative method is best understood after reading the *Old Regime and the Revolution* in addition to *Democracy;* his view of society, after reading his *Recollections;* his treatment of the conditions of stable democracy along with that of the causes and effects of revolution.

It is one of the merits of the Tocqueville-Beaumont correspondence now made available in its entirety for the first time, that it provides reliable materials for reconstructing Tocqueville's attitudes towards his participation in politics, and indeed makes it possible to understand the effect of this participation upon the development of his abstract ideas. Although Tocqueville's *Recollections* discuss these issues, what he says there must be used with caution, for like Henry Adams in his *Education*, he presents an extraordinary vision of society, politics, and history in a style so telling that the unwarned reader is apt to accept as conclusive what is in fact an apologia for the author and his defeat in a world unworthy of him. These volumes provide us with what Tocqueville and Beaumont were saying before and during the period when they reached the climaxes of their political careers (1848–1851); the Olympian tone and the hindsight of the *Recollections*, from being nearly all that we knew about Tocqueville in this period, can now be put in perspective.

This is only one of the contributions of these three volumes, so magnificently edited by M. André Jardin, whose introduction marks a qualitative leap forward in our knowledge of Tocqueville and his political milieu. One day M. Jardin will give us the definitive political biography of Tocqueville. What he has written here supersedes everything else thus far known about Tocqueville's political career. Nor is the picture that emerges purely of historical interest, although these letters will immediately become important sources for the style of French local and national politics during the July Monarchy, a period that developed many of the patterns of political action and institutions usually attributed to the Third and Fourth Republics.

The revelation of these volumes is how much his career in politics mattered to Tocqueville. It simply is not true that in his own eyes he was essentially an analyst and writer, that he ever accepted the notion of himself prevalent today as a great theorist who happened to have been also a mediocre Deputy and sometime Foreign Minister. His entire perspective and method were affected by his commitment to political action. Henceforth it will be more difficult for interpreters of Tocqueville to treat him as a disillusioned, if penetrating observer of democracy; as the implacable critic of mass society; as the eternal aristocrat sickened by modern life in general and its politics in particular. No one who devoted himself with such single-mindedness to the politics of a free society could have held such views. Tocqueville curiously combined objectivity with engagement. His correspondence makes it clear that while writing *Democracy*, Tocqueville hoped to gain by it a reputation that would enable him to be elected to the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences, or to the French Academy itself, both of which ends he in fact achieved. Once established as a notable, he could launch his political career. Beaumont, like Tocqueville born an aristocrat, was his friend, travelling companion, and collaborator. He also thought it necessary to establish himself by a book, and although *Marie*, his novel about slavery in America was not sufficient, Beaumont's political sociology of Ireland (one of the key insights of which he owed to Tocqueville) enabled him also to become an Academician and Deputy.

Although Tocqueville deplored the effect of literary intellectuals upon French politics, he was realist enough to adapt himself to the pattern. For those who imagine that the quality of politics in a society is to any considerable extent determined by the quality of the minds and training of its political elite, the July Monarchy is a crucial test case. A startlingly high number of those prominent in its politics were writers of greater or lesser distinction. Guizot, who dominated its final years, was an important historian; in this correspondence, Tocqueville and Beaumont are to be found lamenting the fact that Thiers, ostensibly the leader of the Opposition, for several years neglected his duties so that he could complete his thirteen volume history of the Napoleonic Wars. No such charge could be made against Tocqueville himself. He did not write again until he had decided that Louis Napoleon's victory made any further participation in politics impossible. Even then, Tocqueville wrote only in desperation, so that he could distract himself. He had the greatest difficulty in isolating a topic and no less trouble in writing what is perhaps his most perfect book, *The Old Regime and the Revolution*. An incidental surprise, and an encouraging one for lesser mortals, are the proofs of how much time and torture went into the writing of an apparently effortless and elegant classic. His practical political experience in the July Monarchy, the Revolution of 1848, the Second Republic, and the rise to power of Louis Napoleon, no less than his own research and reflection led him to reconsider many of the positions he had taken in *Democracy*—his favorable views of interest groups and the political functions of religion to mention only two—and to develop much else that was embryonic or altogether unconsidered in that volume. Nevertheless the intellectual fruits of maturity meant less to Tocqueville than his brief period of high office under the Second Republic. Despite the high value he placed on political stability and peaceful change, he relished the time of troubles that began with the Revolution of 1848. The game of politics under the bourgeois king, Louis Phillipe, had bored Tocqueville. Although he had disapproved of the Revolution of 1848, both he and Beaumont rose to high office under the Second Republic. Their correspondence began to hum with excitement once Cavaignac sent Beaumont to London as Ambassador, as both friends were named to serve on the committee drawing up the new Constitution for the Second Republic, as Tocqueville became Foreign Minister and Beaumont was named French Ambassador at Vienna. Both their private and official correspondence during this exciting period are included in this edition. But after the coup d'état of 1851, the two friends found themselves out of politics never to return again. Tocqueville had never been deceived about the prospects for the Second Republic. His letters prove that he anticipated the coup, and also that he soon predicted that although the Second Empire would not be permanent, it would outlast him before it expired in a military catastrophe. Thus he did not confuse his personal political fate with that of all human societies, as did his former private secretary, the Comte de Gobineau, whose racial theory declared the world to have been irretrievably corrupted by racial miscegenation.

More than 1700 pages cannot be readily summarized in a brief review. But it will come as good news that these three volumes are equipped, not only with M. Jardin's indispensable editorial comments, but with a formidable index that demonstrates how modernization has penetrated to some previously recalcitrant areas of French life. It is more than fifteen years that this new and definitive edition in French of Tocqueville began to be published under the direction of J. P. Mayer. Some thirteen volumes have now appeared of the twenty-three projected. Since this REVIEW has not previously noticed this edition, a few comments on it may not be altogether out of place. The most recent volumes have been highly satisfactory new editions of the Tocqueville-Gobineau correspondence, of the *Souvenirs*, and most revelatory of all, Tome III, Volume I, which collects Tocqueville's speeches and writing on slavery and colonialism, including the unfinished manuscript he began on the British conquest of India. The Tocqueville-Beaumont correspondence is fully up to the standards of its immediate predecessors in this edition. But although they establish the fullest possible record of the relationship between Tocqueville and Beaumont, including hitherto unknown disagreements and even quarrels, these three volumes do not substantiate one of the original claims made to justify the need for a new edition. For it was said that all previous work on Tocqueville must be called into question since it relied on the nine volume edition published by Beaumont, who not only was guilty of deceptive and over-selective editorial practices, but falsified Tocqueville's actual opinions and positions. M. Jardin, in his introduction, concludes that such a verdict is not justified. In his own view, and no one is better qualified to judge than M. Jardin, Beaumont made a sincere and not altogether unsuccessful effort to present Tocqueville's political life and thought. The publication of the Tocqueville-Beaumont correspondence is to be welcomed, not because it corrects the allegedly fatal defects of Beaumont's edition, but simply because, like the rest of this new edition, it rounds out the complete picture by giving us new data in an editorial form that meets modern standards. This is justification enough, and had this been admitted from the beginning, the expectations of Tocqueville scholars might have been more moderate. The truth is that this new edition has not transformed our image of Tocqueville, but has added depth and detail to it, and, on occasion, opened some new perspectives.

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The Art of Conjecture. BY BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL; TRANSLATED BY NIKITA LARY. (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1967. Pp. x, 307. $7.50.)

This book is at once learned, important, and disappointing. The range of knowledge upon which de Jouvenel draws embraces almost all domains of inquiry. From an encyclopedic acquaintance with classical, historical, and contemporary scholarship, the author illustrates the major methodological problems involved in efforts to anticipate futures. Such erudition, however, does not diminish the work's originality, wherein lie both its importance and its disappointment for scholars.

De Jouvenel's objective is nothing less than the reorientation of modern political science. Together with a small (but, I sense, growing) coterie of political scientists on both sides of the Atlantic, de Jouvenel hopes to redirect our occupation with past and present politics to concern for future political configurations. My personal "forecast" is that the "behavioral era," characterized by its emphasis on science, theory, quantification, and social psychology, will gradually yield to a more disciplined, more integrated, less diffused, less eclectic attention to possible future states of affairs, from among which societies (through their policy-making processes) can deliberately and knowledgeably choose alternative prospects according to their dominant value orientations. Whether the label that we attach to this next stage in political theory is "social change," "policy sciences," or some other, it will concentrate on merging the often academically divorced interests in knowledge and action, in normative theories and political practices. Prerequisite to an effective policy science is an explicit, systematic orientation to the future. The contents of this book refer to the ground rules of such an orientation. Hence, the book's importance.

The author's major themes must be summarized briefly. Knowledge about the past (the traditional object of scholarship) differs fundamentally from knowledge about the future. The past is knowable, within limits to be sure, but in principle recordable, testable, and verifiable. The future is not knowable, because man can affect it in alternative ways. It is uncertain; therefore, "the expression 'knowledge of the future' is a contradiction in terms" (p. 5). But for purposes of action, "useful knowledge" relates to the future. Because the rate of social change is without precedent, much of what we know from custom or from history is irrelevant to the future.

De Jouvenel makes explicit his metaphysics; he sides with Voltaire against Maupertius. We cannot know the future as we know the past; because the future is not yet determined, knowledge of it will not yield to some extra degree of intellectual effort or to some ingenious discovery. It is within our powers to anticipate "what may happen," not "what will happen." "The result of this work [prevision or forecast] is a *fan of possible futures*, or of futures which seem likely to us. But when we have completed this work to the best or our ability, we cannot say with certainty which of the seemingly possible futures will actually come about, nor even whether the future which will actually come about is contained in our fan of possible futures" (p. 16). Thus, as the title implies, the author distinguishes *conjecture* from *knowledge* and contrasts *pro-ferences* regarding possible futures with *inferences* about past and present states of affairs. As the above quotation indicates, no assurance exists that "futuribles," systematic thinking about the future, will exhaustively enumerate possible futures. The limits on prevision are severe; the effort is justified by its necessity—nay, inevitability: ". . . for my part, I would willingly say that forecasting would be an absurd enterprise were it not inevitable. We have to make wagers about the future; we have no choice in the matter" (p. 277).

"The great problem of our age," de Jouvenel writes, "is that we want things to change more rapidly, and at the same time we want to have better knowledge of things to come" (p. 45). The reconciliation of these values is the object of "futuribles." De Jouvenel reviews the available methods of forecasting—treating the future as "pre-existing" and studying it as one studies the past, which his metaphysics rejects; assuming the "prolongation of a tendency" (i.e., extrapolation), which he easily dismisses; reasoning by analogy; assuming the repetitiveness of history; searching for social causes; relying on *a priori* assumptions; adopting dynamic systems (like Marxism); using the principles of sufficient similarity, statistical legality, the average man. Each of these is effectively disposed of. The originality lies not so much in their exposure as in their inventory.

Then follows the original thrust of the book, ways of conceiving the future. And here is where disappointment begins to stir in me. The trenchant critiques of inadequate modes of forecasting are not matched by the exposition of "futuribles" or of the "surmising forum." Indeed, references to de Jouvenel's personal and organizational efforts are consigned to footnotes. The tools, if we may call them that, to be adapted for political forecasting that receive mention include game theory, growth rates, mathematical models, short- and long-term forecasting, simulation, and surmising forums. Usually de Jouvenel comments wisely and pungently concerning each of these, but systematic exposition and criticism are wanting. The author's objective, to improve political forecasting, is lost despite his parenthetical reminder, when he allocates chapters to economic forecasting. A reader feels he has been led up a mountain, atop which he expects to overlook a beautiful valley; instead, his expectations are dashed by another series of rugged climbs beyond the mist.

The discussion of simulation, in particular, is elementary, though apt. I am disappointed also at the inattention to American efforts to establish decision seminars, to experiment with prototypes, and to generalize systems analysis. It is not, of course, that de Jouvenel is unacquainted with American scholarship; it is that his selections are spotty. A reader by Guetzkow gets a footnote, but not his substantive work. And no mention is made of Lasswell's and Pool's contributions, to name but two authors concerned with the same problems. I have recently noted in writings of Raymond Aron and Maurice Duverger similar inattention to certain kinds of American political scholarship. This kind of provincialism is as inappropriate on the Saint-Germain Boulevard as it is on North Oval Drive, Columbus.

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Scandinavian Political Studies. ED. BY PERTTI PESONEN. A Yearbook Published by the Political Science Associations in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. Vol. I. (Helsinki: Academic Bookstore, and New York: Columbia University Press, 1966. Pp. 341. $7.00.)

Empirical research and theory in sociology and political science have been among the most successful American export commodities on the intellectual world market in recent decades. In the last ten years or so deep inroads have been made even into the bastions of marxist social science; in fact in Poland (a special case) only the German occupation had effectively interrupted a long record of empirical research. In the Scandinavian countries there were hardly any sociologists or students of political behavior prior to the last world war; at the present time there are literally hundreds, and a number of them now enjoy international reputations.

A yearbook of Scandinavian political studies must be welcomed, therefore, and not only as a feedback record. This first volume does reflect primarily American influence, but it is not without original perspectives; and it is to be hoped that future editions of the yearbook will do more justice to the considerable amount of original interdisciplinary work in Scandinavia, which has involved also psychologists, philosophers, anthropologists, economists, and jurists. The present volume is unduly restricted to the academic disciplines of political science, sociology, and history. Also the extensive bibliography reflects a narrow conception of "political studies," a conception that has been predominant also in the United States but which may now be on its way out.

In fact, in the entire volume there is not a single paper addressing itself to issues concerning the objectives of politics, human needs to be served by social or political organization, or conditions for justifying the constraints of government. Much like geography or the climate, existing political institutions and behaviors are treated as given, and all the research discussed in the major papers, at any rate, seeks to describe or analyze aspects of the ongoing system. There are in these papers no attempts at normative frameworks that could make the facts and relationships more meaningful and useful; there is no vision of politics in the service of justice, in some sense, as distinct from the ongoing bargaining and electoral games of interest-group pseudo-politics. There is no apparent interest in the study of *alternatives*, or in the study of needs as distinct from expressed wants and demands. Scandinavian political scientists, like many of their American counterparts, have tended to form a sort of interest group of their own, whose saleable specialty is electoral and pressure group behavior research; a worthwhile commodity, to be sure, but hardly the whole subject matter of politics.

Within that field, this is a useful book. It contains eight papers, followed by succinct accounts of recent political—*i.e.*, mainly electoral—developments in Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Finland (the fifth Scandinavian country, Iceland, is left out this time, but will be included in subsequent volumes). Before the concluding bibliography there is also a most informative and revealing section surveying recent political research in Scandinavia; many readers will be impressed by the wide differences in the amounts of research and levels of sophistication among these four Nordic countries, within the book's framework of "political" studies.

Their rank order, to judge by these summaries, is quite clearly as follows: Norway—Finland—Sweden—Denmark. In Denmark there is as yet only a beginning toward political behavior research; in Sweden, in spite of Tingsten's early work, Gothenburg is the only research center to reckon with till now; in Finland there is wide and varied research activity; and in Norway political and related empirical research has become a major enterprise, with two of its research institutes (Oslo's Institute for Social Research and Bergen's Michelsens Institute) among the world's leading centers for political research. Stein Rokkan, undoubtedly Scandinavia's most influential political scientist, has had a hand in establishing both, and is the author of this survey article.

Why these sharp contrasts? Sociologists of science would find Scandinavia a good natural laboratory. Part of the explanation is undoubtedly in the antediluvian processes of university government in Scandinavia (and in many other countries outside North America, of course): All effective power has traditionally rested with the full professors, *i.e.*, mostly elderly gentlemen who "own" their own fields and have limited visions outside; unlike American universities, the Scandinavian ones have tended to resist change, and also to discourage research that could bring up that dangerous subject, politics. In Denmark and Sweden the old hierarchies have been more firmly established, and are only now yielding ground to a younger generation (I don't know what happened in Gothenburg); in Finland and Norway there were strong influences outside the universities to bring about winds of change—including the scars of war, perhaps, which at least in Norway drew together a core of highly determined young social science activists, most of whom were interested in politics, too, and active in radical politics, and yet were given ample funds for developing social research in their country.

Now the papers. While the first two are theoretical and methodological, the remaining six deal with either "Nominations and Elections" or with "Parties, Pressures, and Ideological Structures." Three papers are written by Finns, two by Swedes, two by Norwegians, and one by a Dane.

Jan-Magnus Jansson (U. of Helsinki) discusses conceptions of political science, pure and applied, and argues for the necessity of an explicit moral decision on the purposes to be served by applied research before one takes on this kind of work. Iikka Juhani Heiskanen (U. of Helsinki), author of the second theoretical paper, carries the same argument much further, but is less concerned with moral choice than with advancing the explanatory power of political theory; he warns against premature empirical closure as a result of (unacknowledged) concern with research applications.

Björn Molin's (U. of Gothenburg) paper on Swedish party politics is atheoretical and of interest mainly to Scandinavians. Knut Dahl Jacobsen's (U. of Oslo) paper on the role of the expert in state-supervised agricultural reform, on the other hand, is a real feat: the author's judicious choice of concepts and theory makes Norwegian historical data appear quite relevant and useful in predicting and seeking to control aspects of economic development in the third world today. Olavi Borg's (U. of Helsinki) study of Finnish party ideologies, using a factor analytical approach to content analysis, is a methodological *tour de force* whose political or theoretical significance may be considerable but is not spelled out, or even hinted at.

Henry Valen (Institute for Social Research, Oslo) contributes an entirely descriptive study of the recruitment of political nominees in Norway. Mogens N. Pedersen's (U. of Aarhus) study of Danish preferential voting, just as competently executed, is equally lacking in theoretical perspective. The same goes for the last paper, Bo Särlvik's (U. of Gothenburg) sophisticated analysis of stability and change in Swedish voting preferences. While useful enough for the intelligent campaign strategist in each country, respectively, the utility of these papers is on the level of consumer research, from the perspective of competitive sales managers; the product might have been cigarettes or soap as readily as votes. In pluralist fashion, voters become groups of decorous players of the game with all interests equally legitimate, rather than people (some privileged, some stymied, some both or neither) with a human nature and genuine needs. In Scandinavia, of all places, one would on occasions like these hope to encounter an occasional political scientist with a concern for the substance and not only the processes of politics.

The next volume needs to have one responsible editor rather than a committee, if only to ensure more careful proofreading and the elimination of many awkward Scandinavianisms. All in all, this yearbook series promises to become a valuable addition to the international political behavior literature. And the increasing international attention to what goes on in Scandinavian political research should have a beneficial influence on academic developments there, even in the most staid of the Scandinavian university faculties.

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The Western Alliance: Its Status and Prospects. Ed. by Edgar S. Furniss, Jr. (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1965. Pp. vii, 182. $4.75.)

Last Chance in Europe: Bases for a New American Policy. By Charles O. Lerche, Jr. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967. Pp. 221. $5.95.)

These two books on NATO and Europe are very different in style and content. Both, it is true, address the same questions, but not in the same time frame. Furniss's book, published in 1965, reflects a NATO approaching deep trouble. Its several contributions look at what is ahead—with varying degrees of clairvoyance. Lerche's book, published in 1967, speaks to a NATO obviously already in great disarray—such disarray that Lerche suggests a radical alteration in U.S. policy for Europe as his remedy.

It will help to examine these two books in the order of their appearance, going on then to the larger perspectives in which both should be weighed.

The eight contributions to Professor Furniss's volume represent papers originally read to audiences at Ohio State during the winter of 1965 and subsequently revised. Included are selections from Dirk Stikker, former Secretary General of NATO; Cortlandt V. R. Schuyler, former Chief of Staff at SACEUR; Richard Goold-Adams, Chairman of the British Institute for Strategic Studies; and others of equivalent backgrounds and experience from France, Germany, and Norway. The two concluding essays are by Frederick E. Nolting, former Deputy Chief, U.S. Mission to NATO; and by Professor Furniss.

As it is so frequently with books produced in this fashion, the selections are of uneven interest. Especially thoughtful are the chapters by Jens Boyesen, Evelyn Shuckburgh, and Furniss. Interesting for its information on relations between DeGaulle and the NATO Secretary General is Stikker's essay. The book succeeds well in bringing out national differences in viewpoint over strategy—compare for example Stehlin's chapter (French attitude) to that of Horst Blomeyer (on the German attitude). But when one has said all this it still remains true that there is much in this volume that has since been said at least as well elsewhere, and the passage of time alone since its publication has lessened the book's impact.

Lerche's book has an impact. This, his last book, is in many ways his best book. It has none of the impatience which often characterized his writing and sometimes diluted its effect. This book delivers a deliberate argument, and Lerche secures his logical flanks carefully before advancing each time to the attack.

His first chapter outlines the gradual postwar shift of U.S. interest away from Europe. His explanation of why it happened is interesting: he points to the residual anti-European feeling, to the increasingly apparent strategic stability there, and the formalization of relations within NATO. Finally there is the factor of increasing crisis in Asia. "What is really involved here is the old—but never resolved—question of priorities of American foreign policy" (p. 27). In addition, there is our disillusionment with our own idealization of NATO, making it "difficult for Americans generally to appreciate that European members. . . regard it as 'just another alliance'" (p. 85). Our "non-historic (or perhaps antihistoric) bias" gives us "a sublime faith in precedent" but little belief in "constant change as the norm of human experience" (p. 97). We did, in establishing NATO, what needed doing. We liked it, and we controlled it; we wanted to keep it that way. But NATO's very success changed the basic relationship.

These points of Lerche's arguments are not novel but the language and imagery he uses are provocative. The central part of his book recounts Europe's regaining of strength and the erosion of the Iron Curtain. He points to the 1956 watershed (Suez) when policies first significantly diverged between the U.S. and our major European allies—and all that this was later to imply. Lerche's adroit choice of Congressional and official U.S. statements to delineate our attitudes in the 1960's is first-rate in sketching in the assumptions which continued to guide us long after Europe no longer accepted them. His treatment of the "non-issue" of "nuclear sharing" in NATO is especially good.

Lerche proposes (in some detail, starting on p. 183) a new approach: a partnership in European-American relations. The "essence of partnership is that the United States . . . accept the fact that it is no longer a free agent." Accomplishing this change rests upon giving Europe not an equal *role* but an equal *status* in handling "those areas of interest that are common . . ." (p. 187). Consultation must be real consultation. But the "working partnership" will have to deal with problems that Europeans consider are real problems, not simply with mustering unwavering opposition to monolithic communism under U.S. leadership. The actual ways in which this would be done are sketched out in Lerche's last chapter. Almost inevitably it is here that readers who have sympathized with the analysis will likely raise the most questions, but Lerche's final suggestions are too complicated to summarize here. A basic structural change he recommends is the abandonment of an integrated military command in peacetime.

Neither book does justice to the military implications for a NATO which is now deployed in a much more confined geographical space. Neither book gives adequate attention to the somewhat mystical notion, now much discussed, of converting NATO from a "mere alliance" to some sort of economic-political instrumentality leading toward all-European union or at least detente. Neither book really gives an adequate appraisal of the critical importance of German reunification politics in the shaping of a new Europe. But then a really thorough treatment would take more space than these slim volumes command.

Perhaps these books, by their omissions and their emphases, help to suggest where attention might usefully be turned in appraising NATO's future possibilities. One reason why the European NATO nations no longer believe as fervently in the threat of Russian aggression is the obvious preoccupation of the Soviet Union with a rising political-ideological-military challenge on both flanks of her East-West axis. Lerche gives attention to the growing preoccupation of the U.S. with Asia. But the same is true in another way of the U.S.S.R. A really full treatment of NATO would have to take more account of the three-cornered, intricate relationship of the U.S., China, and Russia in Asia today.

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France, Germany, and the Western Alliance; A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics. BY KARL W. DEUTSCH, LEWIS J. EDINGER, ROY C. MACRIDIS, AND RICHARD L. MERRITT. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967. Pp. xi, 314. $6.95.)

This elaborate quantitative study poses a problem in statistical additivity: does Deutsch plus Edinger plus Macridis plus Merritt yield a whole greater than or equal to the sum of its parts. Happily, it yields both. The whole is sometimes enriched through the confluence of four particular talents, and even when only additive, the components often include valuable analyses in themselves. A product of unified research efforts in trend analysis within the European political environment, the volume includes four major parts. Merritt discusses research design, sampling, and procedural problems; Macridis French elite opinion; Edinger German elite opinion; while Deutsch compares the results and presents aggregate data from the project's other phases. Structured interviews with 147 French and 173 German elites provide the central data base for forecasting trends in European integration, arms control-disarmament problems, and domestic affairs.

Given the study's projective purposes, we might consider its methodology at the outset. The authors do not claim that their respondents represent random samples of French and German elites (only 30 per cent of those contacted were interviewed), though there is evidence that the samples are at least "analogous."

Yet, in order to forecast trends, they are compelled to generalize to the elite universe in each political system. Methodologically oriented readers and particularly those who work with relatively accessible mass opinion data may pale, but it should be emphasized that they did interview a total of 320 *national elites* and that perhaps their sampling procedures are as exacting as may be expected with national leaders in complex political systems.

Recent literature on prospects for European unity finds some observers arguing the durability of past trends in functional integration. Others however, caution that integration becomes increasingly difficult as the Six move beyond tractable economic issues. The present study offers a wealth of evidence supporting the latter expectation: the authors conclude that since 1957 movement towards structural European integration has either stopped or significantly slowed down—and Deutsch adds that for the coming decade strong nation state policy outputs are to be expected rather than growth in supranational European institutions. Evidence from elite opinion is not wholly conclusive, revealing at the same time some of the problems in multiple authorship. While Macridis and Edinger generally concur in Deutsch's interpretation of their elite findings, they are more cautious in drawing conclusions and projections from this data base. Macridis, for instance, expects French leaders to strive for greater European unity after de Gaulle, while both he and Edinger note that although elite *expectations* for European unity in the *near* future are pessimistic, there are strong elite *preferences* favoring such developments. The strongest evidence for an atrophying in European integration is derived not from elite opinion, but from other data sources—particularly the imaginative analysis of aggregate data on international transactions including trade, travel, migration, and mail. An index of relative acceptance based on trade flows, for example, demonstrates that structural integration among EEC countries during the last quarter century is actually lower than for the period 1913–1938, and has "virtually stood still since 1957." Unfortunately, given space limitations, these data as well as other sources summarized in Deutsch's section (including mass opinion data and General Inquirer content analysis of elite press), are often not presented in sufficient detail for careful evaluation by the reader.

Domestic issues afforded Macridis and Edinger an opportunity for some of the most interesting analysis in the volume. The point of departure here is a contrast between divided French elites and their consensual German counterparts. Macridis finds that French political orientations have been restructured in recent years such that party lines are no longer homologous with attitudinal and policy opinion clusters. Ideological bickering is considered a thing of the past. A majority associates many features of the present regime with de Gaulle, and the author concludes that system prospects after the General's departure are for relative instability and a return to coalition cabinets. German elites, on the other hand, express a broad consensus supporting the system, though they seem to feel it has yet to prove itself in crisis situations.

By and large, the entire project brings powerful social science research instruments to bear on data collection concerning particular policy trends. While the aggregate data base seems potentially formidable for such purposes, survey research data may ultimately prove somewhat less fecund, especially when structured around specific policy questions. As the authors repeatedly emphasize, attitude is only one component in elite behavior, which, in turn, may play a quite variegated role in policy outcomes. Moreover, questions directed to highly particular attitudinal objects out of situational contexts (e.g., NATO) may elicit opinions both ephemeral and little related to behavior patterns, in contrast to relatively stable and diffuse underlying orientations. Highly focused opinions then, may not prove strong indices in forecasting policy outcomes. For example, two recent major policy events in France and Germany (French withdrawal from NATO and the German CDU-SPD coalition) could not have been anticipated in the current study's data on the subject. The data can be utilized partially to "explain" these events *ex post facto* (French leaders did desire changes in NATO, and German leaders perceived little difference between the CDU and SPD), but the events could not have been forecast—let alone probabilistically predicted—with such opinion data. Nonetheless, the study does provide valuable information about the current state of elite opinion in France and the Federal Republic, and about crucial trends in European structural integration. More significantly perhaps, it develops valuable tools for elite and integration analysis, while whetting the appetite for more extensive theoretically oriented work of this nature.

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The Conflicted Relationship: The West and the Transformation of Asia, Africa and Latin America. By Theodore Geiger. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967. Pp. xiv, 297. $7.95.)

Trade, Aid And Development: The Rich and Poor Nations. By John Pincus. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967. Pp. xv, 396. $10.00.)

America's foreign aid program is in deeper trouble at home. The increasingly evident obstacles to successful modernization assistance are being highlighted by conscientious, scrupulous friends as well as by enemies of the concept, while the much advertised "end of the Cold War" is withering the kind of motivation that can confront these freshly recognized obstacles with a kind of "damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead" determination and perseverance. The psychologically predictable next step is a spreading conclusion that "it doesn't really matter": What happens in the underdeveloped countries won't really matter much to our well-being (most of them won't go totalitarian, and those that do will only fight each other); it doesn't really matter if they don't develop very fast (real population pressure will be localized, and we've exaggerated how much will-to-develop these peoples really have); it doesn't really matter if foreign aid doesn't grow (we haven't learned to spend it effectively anyway).

So 'tis said.

No doubt it would be unfair to Theodore Geiger and John Pincus to imply that they subscribe to most of these comforting assertions. At least Pincus still manages to convey some sense of engagement. Yet it is a mark of how far we have gone since we were called in 1961 to get the world moving in a Decade of Development that now the Chief of International Studies of the National Planning Association, Geiger, writes an Atlantic Policy Study for the Council on Foreign Relations in which the main theme is that "freed from the self-intoxication of our own rhetoric, we can see that speed is not of the essence in helping them to deal with their problems; knowledge is." Knowledge that we don't have—so time out now for research. Thus Geiger rebuffs those "ardent advocates of foreign aid [who] with the best of intentions will impatiently dismiss this conclusion, urging the 'critical' nature of the situation in Asia, Africa and Latin America and the magnitude of these countries' 'needs.'" Few scholars are likely to quarrel with the plea for more systematic empirical appraisals of foreign aid practices, as an integral part of the ongoing program. But Geiger's principal objective would be much more time-consuming. His ambition is that the primacy hitherto of economists in the study and the formation of America's development policies for Asia, Africa, and Latin America be largely superseded by the advancing wisdom of other social scientists and historians. Should we really wait for that?

How long a wait it might have to be is perhaps indicated in the weakness of Geiger's own presentation of what he thinks social science has to teach us today about the fundamental problems of Asia and Africa. His theme here is the quest for identity in transitional, particularistic, still largely traditional societies. Lucian Pye has already developed this theme more convincingly by concentrating on a few specific countries. Without some confirmation by footnotes (which are mostly omitted in Atlantic Policy Studies), I myself am not persuaded by Geiger's insistence that Africans and southern Asians are fundamentally the same, basically searching identity, although Latin Americans are quite different. Geiger comes very close to arguing at length that East is East (Asia *and* Africa) and West is West (Europe and *both* Americas) and never the twain shall meet. I find the demonstration tenuous.

But on Latin America Geiger does command attention. There one does not need footnotes (nor need always agree with him) to feel confident of his mastery of the subject. He is lucid, stimulating, provocative. The chapters on Latin America by themselves could have made a first-rate hundred-page essay. But the longer book he has given us overgeneralizes so grossly about Asia and Africa that for me it is spoiled. The claims of behavioral science to shape AID policy are not likely to be much advanced by such simplified condensation of others' complex and tentative research results.

John Pincus is of course one of those economists and development believers that Geiger is warning us against. But to my taste his Atlantic Policy Study is a better book than Geiger's, much more carefully substantiated by precise empirical data and much more cautiously qualified in its judgments and predictions. Indeed perhaps too much so to be quite as usable as it might be by policy makers. Almost all of Pincus's important propositions are explicitly shown to rest on inconclusive evidence, the best he can find but still inconclusive. Yet there is a virtue in this. The counterarguments and much of the counterevidence are there before us. We can apply our own discount factor if we wish, page by page.

My own chief regret is that Pincus refused to extend himself to a disquisition in ethical theory even though it is crucial to the engagement which animates his work. Part I to me is his most interesting section; there he reviews the possible interests that North Atlantic countries have been said to have in the economic development of the Third World and contends that none of them suffices without belief in the moral imperative of redistributing income. His rejection of the cogency of national security and economic considerations forms an impressive analysis; but then Pincus simply asserts, very briefly, his belief in international redistribution as though it were self-explanatory. "I am not prepared to exhort." Yet surely if, as he believes, the conventional Western justifications for trade and aid policies assisting development must increasingly be recognized to be so unconvincing that only inertia will maintain even the present levels of support, it is incumbent on one who favors assistance for redistribution of income to show just why this should be a moral imperative. At least it should be incumbent on him to show that he recognizes that more complex considerations than exhortation are involved. For example: Does redistribution of income, as an ethical claim, rest on a worth ascribed to individuals or to countries, to a Javanese or to Mauretania? Why? Should exercise of restraint in population growth affect the moral calculus? Why not? Pincus usually talks about the needs of countries, apparently with their present arbitrary boundaries, as though they were operationally equivalent to the needs of individuals and perhaps of groups. If one is moved by Western security or economic interests, this usage may not matter; but if redistribution must be the ultimate justification, it almost surely would matter, and the policies discussed in the rest of the book would have to be appraised accordingly. Pincus mostly ignores these analytical difficulties (and Myrdal has hardly exhausted the subject!).

In Pincus's appraisal attention is directed elsewhere. He compactly summarizes the economic literature on development since Adam Smith, adopts a tentative, eclectic stance of his own, and concentrates on a searching review of the chief economic policy issues: trade barriers, commodity marketing, aid-burden sharing, and (briefly and indifferently) private investment. He sees little hope for increased rich-poor contributions in any of these areas except farm surplus disposal, birth control, education, debt conversion, preferential tariffs, and management contracts as a substitute for private investment. Of these his heart is chiefly in tariff preferences, to be provided as an advance award to underdeveloped countries of reductions that would become generalized on the most-favored-nation principle after a fixed number of years. Pincus's relative optimism about this plan seems to me unconvincing unless important exceptions were made that would much restrict its value for the underdeveloped countries. Witness the cotton textile trade problem.

Clearly not much hope is left—except a notion that a hundred years from now we'll all be so rich it will hardly matter any longer. Geiger would add: "Then what's the rush? You yourself have shown how little we can yet be sure of about development policies." Yet Pincus remains an activist, though he doesn't fully explain why.

Let us hope that the Council on Foreign Relations can find some others to do so, soon.

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Issues of Political Development. ED. BY CHARLES W. ANDERSON, FRED R. VON DER MEHDEN AND CRAWFORD YOUNG. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967. Pp. 248. $3.95 paper.)

United States Policy and the Third World: Problems and Analysis. BY CHARLES WOLF, JR. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967. Pp. 204.)

Political development is becoming the star performer of the political science curriculum just as it passes the libido of insight, scholarly analysis and trivia. We cannot complain any more—as Anderson *et al.* allude to it—about the fact that history constantly outruns the accumulation of knowledge. Indeed, if anything, the accumulation of knowledge has far too much outpaced the ability to conceptualize and present a coherent framework of analysis. But not so, as far as the *Issues of Political Development* is concerned! If there is a complainant to the fact that little has been done in social science research to narrow the gap between the levels of "universal theory" and specific case studies drawn from the myriads of developing countries, well, then the authors of this volume managed to come up with a most satisfying example to the contrary.

The establishment and the maintenance of political order and the relationship of developmental models to political ideology are the central concerns of the authors. Creating national cohesion and identification through cultural pluralism signifies not only the activation of internal latent conflicts but also the forced realization for all that nation-building and the successful functioning of a political system depend upon the acceptance of continuous conflict within society with a concurrent search for their resolution. And quite correctly, the authors state that this notion of a competitive (but necessarily also coexistive) cultural pluralism will have to find its reconciliation with the ever tempting exclusivity of nationalism. The very fact that this conflict has not been resolved is reflected in the second part of the book where the issue of the maintenance of the political order is placed within the context of the confrontation of stability versus political violence.

It is at this point that I believe the authors have succeeded to the greatest extent in integrating case studies with a general framework of propositions for the sources of decisions to seek political solutions for violence. The discussion (and probably the very choice) of the Burman, Colombian and Congolese cases sets a pattern of search for common denominators, such as alienation and dissatisfaction with personal role, the loss of existential meaningfulness and a quest for political activity, simple indignation, the use of terror and even the proposition of "revolution as a way of life." This part, together with a section on the meaning of revolution in the developing world, makes probably for the most fascinating and challenging reading in today's profusion of academic output.

But what appears as the most compelling and attractive overall contribution of this book is the authors' commitment to heterogeneity and the acceptance of the fact that ideology is indeed an important predetermining factor in the developing world. I presume the authors are basically pluralists and, as such, view with some concern the various manifestations of authoritarianism emerging periodically in most of the developing political systems. Still, their value judgments seldom enter into the discussion when projecting the developmental effects of authoritarian features. Luckily, we are not treated to the artificial rigidity of trying to classify and analyze political systems according to differing "stages of development"—reflecting so much our ingrained socio-political values. For these authors political development is apparently a fairly openended proposition, one in which no single pattern of evolution is truly dominant *a priori*. Still one wonders if revolution might not well be viewed as a phase of development, not necessarily in its Trockyan sense, but rather as a phase of providing for institutional changes effecting the totality of the political system. What I am suggesting here *sotto voce* is the notion that maybe after all it is not political development that we are after but change on the system level—alas an embarrassing notion for many to consider.

At this vantage point it might be appropriate to suggest that much too much attention has been given to the way and method through which political legitimacy is gained by and through the mere fact that institutions function and perform their *apparent* tasks. What do we have as a consequence: enormous input, deliriously laboring systems and zero output as far as socio-political changes are concerned. It is only when the frustrated hopes of anticipation set in, that we discover that development *per se* without meaningful and far-reaching institutional changes provides only for a *mirage* of what a colleague aptly called "dynamic stagnation." Should maybe the suggestion of India, Chile, or even Uruguay sound familiar? But these are merely the digressions of a reader who has found no reason but to give unqualified praise to this excellent venture.

Some books manage to be controversial, others stimulating or maybe maddening. Charles Wolf's is all these three in one. The focus of *United States Policy and the Third World* is the inter-relationship of political, economic, and military-strategic conditions in the *Tiers Monde* and the policy instruments that are available to the United States to effect these conditions. Quite understandably, military and security considerations weigh in heavily throughout the body of the work.

The author accepts the notion that lack of internal stability, disaffection and frustration characterize the *ambiente* of most of the developing countries. Quite perceptively, it is noted that modest improvements in living conditions often create reverse effects of growing hostility and cynicism toward the system. It is at this point that the author's vision regarding the essential nature of United States policy and objectives is expressed with the greatest clarity: "The problem of maintaining and strengthening noncommunist political systems and of enhancing prospects for a progressive expansion of pluralistic and democratic institutions may be viewed as one of achieving balance among the three factors discussed above: economic development, distributional equity and the responsible use of force." This, in short suggests that preferences are highly stacked on the side of the economic developmental criteria combined with the necessity for internal security as defined through the prism of United States political goals *and* values.

The stress is on the controlled nature of change and the concurrent "responsible" use of force. On the other hand, the emphasis of this factor raises the question of how far one could anticipate such responsibility in the utilization and manipulation of force from the side of an essentially traditional, narrowly representative group of power wielders operating within the framework of an unreformed institutional structure. One wonders if "controlled change" does not imply control *without* change and the "responsible use of force" a tool to implement it?

Probably the most challenging and provocative part of this work is to be found in the section on insurgency and counter-insurgency. As the author states, the most we could expect from the governments of many underdeveloped countries is to mitigate *some* of the reasons for discontent that give rise to guerilla movements. The "winning popular support" approach has been the mainstay of arguments how to counter the ever present real or latent thrust of insurgency. Wolf's challenge to this assumption is based on the notion that such an approach is costly (with too great of an expenditure of resources and capabilities) and it has little chance of success (support gained is temporary and easily lost). Thus, the alternative proposal rests on the premise that it is not loyalties and attitudes that should be won but rather behavior to be influenced, and I presume, controlled. Increasing the cost of insurgency operations and efficiency in the uses of resources are the primary goals.

On the whole, this book leaves the reader perplexed by its imaginative reassessment of some popular *tabus* and scholarly theses, while belaboring the reader with persistency on points where the arguments end before their full exploration. There is plenty of excellent data and analysis included, but one wonders if to such a military-political analysis there isn't really more *political* than aluded to. Maybe the Pope has no divisions, but alas he might have a hell of a lot of foot-soldiers!

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Brazilian Planning: Development Politics and Administration. By ROBERT T. DALAND. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1967. Pp. viii. 231. $6.00.)

Professor Daland has capitalized on years of professional concern with governmental planning to produce an important study of Brazilian planning experience. The reasons for its importance are two: it makes an illuminating contribution to the still regrettably small English language literature on politics and administration in Brazil, and secondly, it adds substantially to the newly growing body of materials on planning in relation to development.

The argument of the book is that in Brazil (and possibly by extension, in comparable political systems—i.e., those classifiable as reconciliation systems having a transitional economy with a modern sector) the *preparation* of "a national development plan" serves the regime in power in several ways. Such a plan generates public relations benefits by asserting "that the regime knows where it is going and that it is working for the common good." Secondly, it helps to focus efforts to arrive at a consensus on policy. Thirdly, it is a *sine qua non* in bidding in the international market for foreign aid. And finally, at least in Brazil, it serves as an important part of strategies to enhance presidential powers (pp. 4, 208). But the *implementation* of "a national development plan" has negative consequences for the regime, because it comes into conflict with the more basic and non-instrumental functions of the bureaucracy. These are "(1) to provide a channel for upward mobility for the educated middle class, (2) to provide permanent incomes for that portion of the middle class which provides support for the regime, (3) to provide a low level of certain services, and (4) to provide opportunities for private entrepreneurship based on the powers attaching to certain offices" (pp. 4, 210). These functions, it is argued, are related to certain features of the political system.

In support of this argument, the author sketches the context and traces the history of planning in Brazil, beginning with the latter years of Getúlio Vargas's *Estado Novo.* Noting that "Brazil has backed slowly and haltingly into central planning. . ." Professor Daland examines the first, ineffectual, efforts under Vargas. He goes on to the better known SALTE plan initiated by President Dutra just after World War II and administered briefly by Vargas who had regained the Presidency by election in 1950. The *Programa de Metas* ("Program of Goals," or "Targets") of President Kubitschek was a more comprehensive plan, and more successful, if account is taken of its contribution to the building of national planning institutions. Then came the *Plano Trienal* prepared by Celso Furtado under President Goulart—Brazil's most sophisticated plan until then, but one which had to be significantly modified under the pressure of political forces, and which became inoperative with the overthrow of Goulart by the military in 1964. But the succeeding military regime, under President (Marshal) Castelo Branco, produced its own *Program of Action*, which turned out to be very similar to the Furtado plan, "with some shift of emphasis" in goals (p. 69).

A chapter on "The Substance and Process of Planning" compares the scope and the goals of successive plans, showing how they have evolved from lists of proposed public works to take into account, first, key sectors of the economy, then the economy as a whole, and eventually important social objectives. In the same chapter and in the following one entitled "The Administration of Planning," the author delineates the evolution of planning processes from *ad hoc* arrangements to more continuous and institutionalized activities in the form of a Ministry of Planning and an Advisory Planning Council that includes representatives of interest groups as well as governmental planners. Yet he reaches the conclusions that "If the government is successful in combatting the critics of the [Castelo Branco] Program, it is conceivable that it will prove to have been the first Brazilian plan to achieve substantial movement toward its goals" (p. 81) and that "the relation between planning and consequent development patterns is yet to be established" (p. 3).

One chapter is devoted to an intensive case study of the politics of planning in Brazil (the development and demise of Furtado's *Plano Trienal*) and the concluding chapter is entitled "Planning in an Unstable Political System." But the study is informed throughout by sensitivity to the demands and constraints of Brazilian politics and administration. Thus Daland is able to sustain the significant point that while in the U.S. plan making (policy) is usually considered a political function, and implementation a technical-administrative process, in Brazilian practice "planmaking has been technical, while implementation is patently political" (p. 212).

These are provocative, sobering, arguments and conclusions. Yet with one exception, to be noted below, there are only a few minor points on which the author leaves openings for criticism. For example, in discussing the postwar growth in the popularity of the idea of economic development (p. 26), he does not mention that some powerful groups were opposed to industrialization as a means. And on page 128 he sees the relatively rapid passage by Congress of much of Castelo Branco's program as one sign of the "strength of the alliance which sustains the revolutionary government. . . ." One needs to recall that this was a purged and cowed Congress whose acceptance of anything proposed by the government should not be given great weight. But these are relatively insignificant slips, and do not damage the principal lines of argument and citations of evidence.

One wonders, however, whether Professor Daland may have overstated his characterization of the bureaucracy's functions as noted above with reference to the preparation and implementation of plans. Surely not all agencies are as "prismatic" and ineffective as this list of functions asserts (Daland makes use of the Riggs model in seeking to understand the Brazilian bureaucracy). Roads, dams, and electric power installations have been built. Brasília was constructed in a remarkably short period of time. Admitting that these and similar accomplishments also provide numerous examples of graft, patronage, and mismanagement that can be explained by the logic of the "prismatic" model, should we ignore that indeterminate but not negligible number of bureaucrats and agencies whose competence and dedication *do* result in some important things getting done? Also, while the preparation of development plans performs latent political functions for the regime that are distinct from their manifest functions, can we write off such contributions to development as data gathering and the publication of increasingly sophisticated economic analyses, and the stimulation of managerial skills and planning perspectives in a context of national development?

These reservations by no means detract from the general quality and significance of the book, for they are ascribable to the theoretical framework adopted. The research has not yet been done that might answer the questions just raised. Professor Daland has charted a course and broken ground that as far as our knowledge of such matters in Brazil was concerned was heretofore largely unexplored. The book will be of obvious value to many Brazilian specialists, and also to the much more heterogeneous company of scholars and professionals concerned with problems of development, regardless of geographic focus.

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Organizations in Action. BY JAMES D. THOMPSON. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967. Pp. 192. $7.95.)

Methods of Organizational Research. ED. BY VICTOR H. VROOM. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967. Pp xii, 211, $3.95.)

Of the half dozen or so books very recently issued in the rapidly growing, disparate literature relevant to the study of complex organizations, these two books throw down a challenge of significant proportion to students of public administration and government. The first, Thompson's *Organizations in Action*, is a tightly written theoretical essay packed with well ordered formal propositions attempting to capture and extend a goodly portion of the sociological thinking on complex organization. It fairly shouts for empirical testing and its major variables are particularly applicable to the study of large technological-based public organizations. The second, *Methods of Organizational Research*, is a collection of four review essays summarizing, and in some cases extending, oft used methods of the behavioral sciences in the study of structure and behavior in large complex organization. These summaries are framed in ways which make them directly complementary to the first book and, if mastered, would add greatly to the rigor and usefulness of studies in public organizations. This is particularly the case for "Organizational Change and Field Experiment Methods," by Louis B. Barnes, and "The Comparative Study of Organizations," by Tom Burns. Together these books suggest a set of concepts and variables and methods of examining them which could be of great aid to political scientists interested in moving the study of public organizations off the conceptual "dead center" we now seem to be inhabiting.

Organizations in Action begins and ends with the behavior of organizations; "behavior within organizations is considered only to the extent that it helps us understand organization in the round" (p. ix). Its focus is "limited to instrumental organizations which induce or coerce participation," (p. viii) although much of the work can also be applied to voluntary organizations, including political ones.

For Thompson, uncertainty is the central fact of organizational life and virtually all organizational actions are responses to uncertainty and the need to reduce it. The primary sources of uncertainty are, as we might expect, the organization's surrounding environment and its internal technology. Fixation on reducing internal uncertainty produces the "closed-system strategy" typified by earlier traditions in administrative studies and employs the rational model of organizational behavior. On the other hand, the "natural system" tradition emphasizes the social interdependence of the organization upon its environment and leads the theorist to the expectation of uncertainty and factors which are not under organizational control. Attempting to integate these two traditions, Thompson conceives of the "complex organization as open systems, hence indeterminant and faced with uncertainty, but at the same time as subject to criteria of rationality, and hence determinantness and certainty" (p. 10). In essence, organization is the search for certainty in an uncertain world.

The rest of the essay builds upon the notion that organizations must develop mechanisms and sectors for coping with uncertainty in the environment, "protecting" other sectors to carry on the relatively predictable technical activities necessary to the work of the organization. The type of technology employed by the organization is largely the determinant of what is considered salient uncertainty in the environment, and Thompson has an intriguing discussion of variations in technologies which is the basis for most of the remaining development. Given the type of technology, i.e., "long-linked, mediating, or intensive," and their mixtures within the organization, a number of other things follow; for example, the character of the "buffering units" needed to reduce variation and fluctuation of the important segments of the environment; the "domains" in the task environment that require control or dominance, etc.

Power and dependence of the organization is based on the degree to which it has the capacity to meet the needs of another organization and its relative monopoly over that capacity. This way of approaching power and dependence is central to the second part of the book dealing with behavior within the organization. Furthermore, it orders a number of concepts current in the literature, e.g., competition, cooperation, cooptation. The type of technology employed by the organization and its relative power over elements in the environment are also crucial to the structure of the organization, its degree of hierarchy, departmentalization, the problems of assessment and organizational goals.

The last sections attempt to describe individual behavior in relation to the prior conceptual development, and include many of the predictable topics in this literature, e.g., decision-making, administrative discretion, organizational control, etc. Its concluding thrust celebrates the notion of organizational rationality, and the "basic administrative functions of co-alignment." "Survival (of the organization) rests on the co-alignment of technology, task environment with viable domain, and of organizational design and structure appropriate to that domain" (p. 147). Not a startling statement as such, but it is set within an ordered and sometimes fresh combination of concepts and variables which adds greatly to its theoretical vitality.

Its major weakness is also one of its moderate strengths. It is unclustered by biquitous references to massive literature, but occasionally needs more persuasive use of them than is apparent. The book's thrust is engaging and its integration of variables in organizational literature is potentially useful in giving us a level of better categories and prediction in understanding the behavior of large complex public organizations.

Methods of Organizational Research is the product of the final seminars in the Social Science of Organization series held under the auspices of the University of Pittsburgh and supported by the Ford Foundation. It presents some of the alternative points of view in methodological and conceptual approaches to the study of organization. The four papers deal with field experiments (Barnes) and a broad attempt to develop a general typology of comparative organization (Burns), in the two papers noted above, Karl Wieck's paper on experimental laboratory methods and Thornton Roby's paper on computer simulation models. Each paper, while meant to review and familiarize other students of organization, is so spare a summary of a large area that inevitably the reader feels he could have gained a good deal more if he were already familiar with the literature being reviewed.

Students of public administration will feel most comfortable with the Burns paper, a bit less so with Barnes on change and experimental field studies. Those interested in mathematical models obviously will turn first to the Roby piece. Taken together the concepts and methods encouraged here provide the kinds of operational detail and methodological pathway lacking in the Thompson book. Burns suggests guides for a typology including technology and the surrounding environment as well as other variables closely related to Thompson. The other authors spell out many of the possibilities and problems associated with potentially rich means of testing and examining many of the Thompson propositions as well as the hundreds of "ad hoc" hypotheses we seem condemned to include in the study of public organization.

These two books, whose bibliographies are almost devoid of political scientists, highlight the painfully apparent conclusion that political scientists and students of public administration are largely absent from the recent contributions to refined conceptual understanding of complex organizations. This at a time when government organizations are massively complex, based largely on sophisticated technologies and a characteristic political phenomenon of the present. Serious examination of materials such as these could bring our contributions into more appropriate proportion.

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New Dimensions of Political Economy. By Walter W. Heller. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1966. Pp. viii, 203. $3.50.)

When a man has, like the author of these Godkin lectures, had a leading share in educating two presidents in the merits and policy implications of the "new economics," raised to an unprecedented height the status and utility of a central institution of government that depends on status and utility for its influence, and seen crowned with success the major innovation in fiscal policy associated with his name, the tax cut of 1964—when he has accomplishments of this order to show for four strenuous years in office and comes away still on his feet, at the top of his reputation, he is entitled to crow a little. A roosterish note comes through now and then in this book, along with due acknowledgment of the importance of luck. But the dominant theme is a confident, articulate and incisive exposition of the potentialities of modern economics for social good—"replacing emotion with reason" (p. 9). Limiting conditions are noticed—Vietnam is mentioned again and again—but not elaborated. And with minor and harmless exceptions Heller avoids inside gossip or personal revelations.

The book is in three chapters. The first deals with the place of economic advice and the role of the Council of Economic Advisers; the second, with the basic concepts the Council applied and popularized during Heller's chairmanship and the record it made; and the third, with his departing dream for the post-Vietnam future when mounting federal surpluses will make large "fiscal dividends" imperative if full employment is to be maintained and when massive block grants to the states, rather than tax cuts, can at once solve that problem and enable state and local governments to cope better with their staggering social responsibilities, and so restore a more viable federalism. It is easier for a political scientist to share his enthusiasm than to pass so lightly over the difficulties in all three topics.

As to the first, the strength and the weakness of the CEA (assuming its professional expertise) is its position, unique among western governments, suspended above the departmental structure—its identification with the incumbent president. It is plain that Heller's CEA enjoyed the advantages of an extraordinary combination of favorable circumstances under both Kennedy and Johnson and exploited these advantages to achieve real breakthroughs in policy, style and techniques. But it is implicit in what he says generally about the role of economic advice that the new-model CEA, once demonstrated, will become the stock model of the future. Two activist presidents in a row, even two as different as these two, do not ensure that the CEA's recent good fortune will continue.

As with the institution, so with the policy. The unorthodox 1964 tax cut, in a time of rising prosperity, which promised accelerated growth in return for making an existing deficit temporarily larger, was impressively vindicated by the event: the growth absorbed the deficit. But in 1967, with an even larger deficit and an upward wage-price movement in progress, when the doctrine apparently called for a tax increase, its logic was not politically so compelling. It is not enough that the President be convinced; fiscal policy is the province also of the House Democratic Committee on Committees, i.e., the Ways and Means majority members. If they follow Heller, it is as yet a coincidence.

The proposal for block grants to the states—or the "per capita revenue-sharing" he prefers—as the best way of offsetting the "fiscal drag" in the tax structure as the economy grows, is worked out in a good deal of detail and makes a strong case. But, to paraphrase Heller's terminology, while it is good macro-economics it is bad micro-politics, at least in the foreseeable near term. Against it run both the vertical functional alliances of bureaucracies and interest groups in health, housing, education, etc., which oppose broader budgetary discretion for governors, and the partisan alliances of mayors, congressmen and Democratic presidents who see no pay-off in rescuing Republican and Dixiecrat governors from their fiscal anxieties. Heller puts his faith in the coming reform in the social outlook of state governments, and acknowledges that Vietnam has postponed practical consideration of other fiscal dividends. His proposal is imaginative and he thinks "we have no time to lose in putting our minds to it" (p. 121). So do Republican governors. But the last time that federal authorities had to worry about what to do with surplus revenues (as he notes) was in 1837, and a depression then promptly made the issue moot. If the new economics can reverse the hitherto inexorably nationalizing trends in federalism since that event, it has constitutional implications too.

HARVEY C. MANSFIELD
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Psychiatry and Public Affairs. Reports and Symposia of the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry. (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1966. Pp. xi, 465. $8.95.)

Many of the most able psychiatrists in the United States came back from World War II with a renewed determination to make psychiatry more effective as a method of treatment and as a factor in transforming society. The Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry (GAP), organized in 1946, operated through panels and symposia which led to a stream of published reports many of which were intended to contribute to the formation of public policy. The current volume is a selection from among these outputs, and affords us an unusual opportunity to consider the past and prospective role of psychiatry and psychiatrists as participants in the shaping of national, transnational and sub-national policy.

What can be expected from those who specialize in studying the mentally ill? Presumably they become aware of the constellation of factors in the social process that impair our human resources by mental illness, and hence are in a position to help devise strategies for changing the institutional practices that generate illness. Perhaps GAP members take most pride in their analysis of the "Psychiatric Aspects of School Desegregation" (May, 1957) which examines the consequences of desegregation for both castes, and came to the attention of influential figures in the Court, the Congress and general opinion.

GAP has been ambitious to make itself effective in the arena of international affairs. Hence GAP members have applied psychiatric insights to cross-cultural communication, to the person who works abroad, to the problem of coping with the use of nuclear energy, and to the prevention of nuclear war. In the Chinese Revolution and the Korean War the nation was astonished and alarmed by the alleged success of coercive indoctrination. GAP papers were prepared for the purpose of putting these strategies in an intelligible frame of reference.

Psychiatrists are accustomed to operate in a one-to-one situation or as small group leaders. Hence they are aware of the possible role of the psychiatrist as a tension-reducing agent in diplomatic negotiation, and in other decision contexts. A statement made in 1950 (reprinted page 111 *ff.*) tries to show the full range of the opportunity open to the psychiatric profession in the field of international relations.

What can be said about the initiatives thus far taken by the policy science wing of this branch of the medical profession? Clearly the reports are most convincing when they deal with information that is new to the layman and bears directly on action problems. In connection with "forceful indoctrination," for example, we are presented with admirably succinct summaries of the effects of "physical and social isolation," "sleep deprivation," "brain injury," "semi-starvation," and "pain."

The reports are less convincing when the perspectives and operations of large groups are referred to. The psychiatrist now testifies as an expert witness who has obtained certain impressions from his practice. He would be far more trustworthy if he organized a central data service and summarized salient social characteristics and attitudes of each patient or subject. In the past, initiatives of this kind have often been taken and have as often failed, partly because psychiatrists did not realize or care that every case is important for the study of trends in the distribution of attitudes by culture, class, interest, personality and level of crisis. I know of data gathering and processing initiatives that failed in the middle thirties, during World War II and since.

Thanks to the numerical growth of the profession and to its improved exposure to the social and behavioral sciences, it is highly probable that more psychiatrists will be motivated to utilize their remarkable opportunities to improve their contribution to the description, analysis and modification of dangerous collective situations.

HAROLD D. LASSWELL

Yale University

NOTES

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

Sociological Analysis and Politics: The Theories of Talcott Parsons. BY WILLIAM C. MITCHELL. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967. Pp. xiv, 222. $5.95.)

Talcott Parsons is one of the major social theorists in the social sciences. Some of the key ideas of his framework of analysis have influenced the conceptual work of political scientists during the past decade or more. William C. Mitchell, in *Sociological Analysis and Politics: the Theories of Talcott Parsons*, argues that the scope of Parsons' influence on political scientists has been less than it should have been. In part, this is because Parsons has only recently begun to write systematically on the polity. A second possible reason for his failure to have more influence on political scientists is a writing style that makes his works extremely difficult to read. Professor Mitchell says that he has taken the role of a friendly critic in order to be able to bring together and clarify those aspects of Parsons' theory that are relevant to understanding the polity. Professor Mitchell succinctly states his purpose in writing the book—"The interpretation is that of a political scientist who has found Parsons interesting, useful, and important in his own work. My purpose is to convince others of the value of his work."

There are many ways in which this is a very helpful book. Professor Mitchell has done a remarkably thorough job of canvassing the Parsonian bibliography for politically relevant material. The basic framework for interpreting social systems is readily available and many political scientists are familiar with it. But writings relating this specifically to the polity are scattered in a variety of places over a rather long period of time. All of these writings have been integrated into a coherent statement of what Parsons has had to say about the polity.

The book is effectively organized. It begins with a chapter on Parsons as an "incurable theorist" in which many of his intellectual commitments are outlined. There is a chapter outlining the early general theory of action in which he concentrated on the individual actor. The next chapter covers the change of emphasis after 1945 in which the social system becomes the primary object of analysis. The general framework of analysis of social systems is presented in this chapter. The chapter on boundary exchanges is intriguing but disappointing. It points to what is a central problem for any systemic approach, but it treats the subject so generally that it is little help beyond pointing to the general problem. Chapters on the institutional structure of the polity and political process in their social setting follow. The most interesting chapter in the book is the chapter on change. One of the major criticisms of Parsons has been his lack of attention to change, and this chapter outlines the recent work in which Parsons writes on social change. The final chapter discusses the policy proposals that Parsons has made and the way in which they are related to his basic theoretical and intellectual commitments.

The book is well written and effectively organized. It will serve as a good introduction for those who are unfamiliar with the writing of Parsons. However, the scarcity of Parsonian writing on the polity and the modest size of the book (192 pages) combine to curtail any detailed examination of Parsons' thought. One would hope that the book would call attention to the need for a more detailed examination of Parsons' thought on the polity, and, by indicating the nature of the gaps in Parsons' writing on the polity, would influence Professor Parsons to turn more of his attention to these problems.—GEORGE R. BOYNTON, *University of Iowa.*

Survey Research in the Social Sciences. ED. BY CHARLES Y. GLOCK. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1967. Pp. xxi, 543. $9.00.)

Professor Glock's aim in compiling this volume is "to make explicit the characteristics which distinguish survey research from other modes of inquiry," and to "communicate the elementary logic of survey design and analysis, and provide, for each discipline, an evaluation of how survey research has been used and conceivably might be used to deal with the central problems in each field."

The book is not a "cookbook"—it provides little technical guidance on such problems as sampling, questionnaire construction or interviewing. Nor do the authors deal, in any detail, with problems of inference or theoretical linkage in the tradition, for example, of Herbert Hyman's earlier work. What is attempted instead is a brief discussion of some of the uses to which survey methods have been put, and some of the analytical problems encountered, in each of eight fields: sociology, political science, psychology, economics, anthropology, education, social work, and public health. In those disciplines where resistance to survey methods has been prevalent (notably in anthropology and economics), considerable attention is also devoted to the historical development of alternative research techniques in the discipline.

The compilation is interesting from a number of perspectives. It provides, as promised, several telling glimpses of "the other fellow's back yard"—and we find, while peering over fences, some appreciation not only of our differences but of the surprising number of common dilemmas. Survey research has not flourished in economics, says James N. Morgan, because of the economist's traditional interest in questions of change at the macro level (economic growth, full employment, and the like), where information on individual behavior has not seemed relevant or interesting. Economists, in addition, have assumed "rationality," and have seen no need to modify the model. Theoretical development has been bypassed for indices that "work" in a predictive sense, without leading to an explanation of individual consumer choices. (Shades of the early voting studies!) At the other end of the aggregate behavior–individual behavior continuum, most psychologists who have utilized survey techniques show strong traces of their experimental training. Daniel Katz points out that "the experimentalist bias," or the idea that "a subject is a subject, is a subject—is still the dominant tradition, even when the experimentalists leave their laboratories"—leading not only to careless sampling techniques but, more crucially, to faulty inferences from limited data.

Katz's plea for a marriage of laboratory and field techniques in the building of tested generalizations is paralleled by other authors: John Bennett and Gustav Thiess, for example, are quite hopeful about the future benefits of collaboration between those who conduct holistic anthropological studies and those who prefer more rigorous techniques but who have thus far worked on a relatively narrow range of problems. Robert McClosky and Charles Glock stress the need for political and sociological theory which can guide research combining a variety of techniques.

The limitations of the volume become evident, however, when the discussion of substantive interests and analytical problems in the several disciplines is concluded. Several authors ask for more extensive use of longitudinal or panel studies; several stress the importance of social and institutional contexts in understanding individual behavior—and many of the contributors are highly experienced in such undertakings. Yet very little of this present concern or past work is brought to bear *in depth* on the linkage problems discussed. Most authors urge boldness in both research design and interpretation of findings, but few new guidelines are laid down beyond the initial caveats.

There have been past pleas, from scholars in several disciplines, for the development of theory which would unite individual and institutional behavior, and for research designs which might combine e.g., individual, aggregate, and sociometric data. What is needed, it has been argued, is a method for dealing with individual behavior in a social and/or political context. Most of the nine authors of the present work underline this need—yet little is added that is new or helpful in solving the theoretical and empirical problems.

Perhaps such an undertaking is too much to expect from a collection of this nature (no essay exceeds 100 pages, and most are shorter), and the ground which has been covered certainly can serve as an introduction to several disciplines. Even in this respect, however, several essays appear curiously dated. It is surprising, for example, that the essay on political science does not mention Eldersveld's study of political parties (where several kinds of data were used to supplement survey results) or Agger, Goldrich, and Swanson's volume on community power, where considerable effort was made to introduce a dynamic element into survey analysis.

Survey Research in the Social Sciences should be a useful reference for graduate students and for those who want to keep abreast of several fields. The editor has done an excellent job in avoiding repetition among the several essays—and in addition, there is an admirable lack of jargon unique to specific disciplines. This in itself is no mean feat in a volume attempting to cover eight fields.—BETTY H. ZISK, *Boston University*.

Soviet Sociology: Historical Antecedents and Current Appraisals. EDITED WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY ALEX SIMIRENKO. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966. Pp. 384. $7.95.)

The evaluation of present day Soviet sociology can often lead to two temptations. One is to greet it as a dramatic breakthrough signifying the end of totalitarian obscurantism and dogmatism. The other is to dismiss it as mere ideological window dressing. The editor of this volume has avoided both extremes. His judgments about Soviet sociology are generally sophisticated and balanced. On a few occasions only does he display a slight temptation to overestimate its progress and the extent to which its development has paralleled that of Western sociology.

While the emergence of Soviet sociology over the last decade is significant both from the intellectual and political points of view, its substantive results in themselves are of relatively limited interest to most political scientists. Political sociology as we know it in the U.S. and elsewhere does not exist in the Soviet Union nor would it be reasonable to expect to see it flourishing. The concern with power in Soviet society is not an academic matter. Soviet sociologists concentrate their attention on industrial sociology and on what American sociologists call "social problems": the human aspects of efficient production, juvenile deliquency, family instability, alcoholism, rural underdevelopment, the survivals of religion, the choice of occupations and the like.

The present volume is primarily a collection of articles evaluating rather than presenting Soviet sociology and its remote antecedents. Most of its contents (18 articles or excerpts) come from Western or pre-Soviet Russian sources and only three items were written by contemporary Soviet sociologists. Though in many ways a useful and interesting compendium, it will disappoint those who define sociology more narrowly (and this probably applies to the majority of sociologists in this country) than the editor. It will also fall short of the expectations of readers whose primary interest is *current* Soviet sociology and its actual products. In his effort to sketch the broadest and furthest possible background of present day Soviet sociology, Professor Simirenko has strayed from the field of sociology proper. In describing the precursors of Soviet sociology hardly any Russian thinker interested in matters social could avoid being mentioned or discussed. True enough, for the historian of ideas the dividing line between social thought, social philosophy and sociology may be an arbitrary one. Yet over the last half century at least these lines have crystallized and have enabled us to separate these pursuits. It might have been, therefore, more appropriate to present this volume as a reader on the evolution of Russian-Soviet social thought rather than one dealing with Soviet sociology. Of a total of twenty selections, nine have only a marginal and remote connection with Soviet sociology, addressing themselves either to various prerevolutionary thinkers (important in their own right) or to the theory of Marxism-Leninism. Of the other 11, 8 are Western commentaries (written by Lewis Feuer, George Fisher, Leopold Labedz and others) on Soviet sociology and only three are written by Soviet authors. More specifically, the sections pertaining to what preceded current Soviet sociology ("The Russian Empire" and "The Stalin Era") take up more than half of the volume. This plus the editor's lucid introduction will still provide the reader with insights into contemporary Soviet sociology, but less than one would expect from a volume of this kind.

Thus the organizing principles of the volume invite further questioning. Is it really necessary for understanding present-day Soviet sociology to know something about the theories of Kovalevsky, Mikhailovsky or Plekhanov? This is not to deny the sociological relevance of all reflections on society, philosophy, history, and economy or to confuse oblivion with insignificance. Yet in the final analysis there is no meaningful continuity except in the most general and generous sense between these thinkers and the work of contemporary Soviet sociologists. It is just as questionable in what sense can we consider Stalin, Trotsky, or Bukharin sociologists, or even if we do so, what influence they exerted on current sociological activities in the Soviet Union. Welcome as it is for general intellectual edification, the historical perspective adds little to our understanding of present-day Soviet sociology, unless it is the general insight that people have for a long time been pondering the nature of the social world in Russia as they have elsewhere.

Soviet sociology appeared rather abruptly in the late 1950's, taking no discernible account of those whom Professor Simirenko considers to be its precursors. Moreover, if one separates ritualistic affirmations of faith in Marxism-Leninism from actual research, even the real influence of ideology can be questioned. Soviet empirical research is above all highly utilitarian and applied and it had two tangible inspirations: the practical needs of the regime and society and Western quantitative techniques. Marxism-Leninism in itself was impotent as an inspiration of sociological inquiry until political conditions permitted such undertakings. If Marxism has been relevant to what goes on in Soviet sociology today it has been so not in relation to its substantive content and accomplishments but rather in explaining its limitations. Instead of providing genuine intellectual inspiration, ideology has performed the function of defining the boundaries of legitimate inquiry and interpretation. Marxism, by its very nature a form of militant social criticism, could hardly motivate social scientists after it had been converted into a secular religion and an instrument for the legitimation of the existing social order. This, of course, does not apply to the Soviet criticism of Western sociology and societies where ideology is very much in evidence.

As parts of this volume show, Soviet sociology *in itself* is as unlikely to produce a new era of intellectual enlightenment and political reform as any other sociology. Even if allowances are made for the fact that in the Soviet setting ideas are more explosive than elsewhere, Soviet sociology rather than altering Soviet society will continue to reflect and register the changes which have been initiated in other realms. In doing so, however, it might leave in its wake a greater sense of reality and insights that will benefit not only the decision making elite but also the ordinary citizen.—PAUL HOLLANDER, *Harvard University*

Antonio Gramsci and the Origins of Italian Communism. BY JOHN M. CAMMETT. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967. Pp. xiv, 306. $8.50.)

A neglected figure in Western studies of Marxism-Leninism is Antonio Gramsci, one of the founders of the Italian Communist Party in 1921 and, unlike his successor Togliatti, a first-rate theoretician. His obscurity outside of Italy is due in part to his long imprisonment and early death, and in part to non-marxist perplexity that a marxist thinker who toed the Comintern line after 1921 might also claim theoretical orginality. Gramsci is also discomfiting because most of his extant writings are Leninist, while the party he helped to found was to become the most liberal force in world Communism. Part of his secret was imprisonment, which led him to contemplate the havoc wrought on Italian Communism by the Third International. Having begun as a Leninist, he thus came to adopt a new Communist strategy more closely attuned to Western conditions.

John Cammett has chosen a flamboyant and difficult figure to study in this new book. From his bleak origins in Sardinia and student activism in Turin to his role in the breakaway of the Communists from the Socialist Party in 1921 and his imprisonment and death, Gramsci was caught up in the tumultuous history of Italy in the first part of this century. He was a quiet, crippled intellectual who yet could fire the workers of his factory councils in Turin, out-talk some of Italy's most talented intellectuals, and wheel and deal with the international mafia of the Comintern.

However, Cammett has a tendency to celebrate his hero to an extent that will not be appreciated by more impartial readers. The description of Gramsci's early years in Sardinia and Turin is particularly ponderous, and most readers will weary of being lectured on how miserable life could be on a backward Mediterranean island. By the time we reach the critical years when Fascism overtook the new Communist Party, our senses are dulled.

The best part of the narrative catches the mood of the period after the First World War when domestic unrest coincided with international revolution and the old Socialist movement fell apart from the strain. All this is told with care, detail (too much detail) and fascination. Cammett labors valiantly to silhouette Gramsci's role in the complex proceedings, erring perhaps on the side of clarity, for it appears that his hero was not entirely consistent in his relations with either the Comintern, his own associates in Turin, or the majority of the secessionist Socialists in Naples headed by Amadeo Bordiga.

On the historical side, it is never made clear whether Gramsci rose to leadership of the new party through the force of his intellect, which was formidable, or if he was simply muscled in by Lenin's bureaucrats against the strident and unmalleable Bordiga. What is clear is that Gramsci's own policy line underwent sweeping changes between 1919 and 1926, not coincidentally in the wake of shifting Comintern tactics. For example, his creative factory councils of Turin were never heard of again after Gramsci affiliated with the International and the party was bolshevized. Moreover, although Cammett maintains that Gramsci's advocacy of a broad alliance strategy from 1921 onward was a logical follow-up of earlier writings, most of these early writings had been oriented towards proletarian hegemony, while the new strategy fulfilled the Comintern's popular front idea. The alliance strategy distinctly did not follow logically from Gramsci's stern opposition to other groups on the extreme left in 1921 and 1922.

Part of the difficulty arises from Cammett's technique of dealing with Gramsci's writings and political activities in short and alternate packages, seldom distinguishing between theoretical writings and articles that Gramsci intended for use in the day-to-day political struggle. Thus Gramsci's enthusiasm for the new Catholic Popular Party in 1920, actually only a tactical maneuver, is interpreted as a theoretical preface to Togliatti's post-1945 liberal strategy. Gramsci had welcomed the "popolari" because they were organizing masses of peasants who were immune to organization by the left. He hardly sought what Cammett calls "a system of equilibrium with the spiritual force of the Church," but merely a fertile recruiting ground for party cadres.

A second, and more important, problem involves the question of democracy in Gramsci's writings. The post-1945 Communist Party has claimed Gramsci as a good liberal. Cammett steers clear of this questionable interpretation (only possible in Italy because so few leftists actually read Gramsci's early writings), although he does try to see Gramsci as the embodiment of "the Mazzinian tradition in Socialist terms." But Gramsci, who contrasted a "voluntary" association like the political party to a "representative" organ like the factory council, would not have shared Mazzini's spontaneous republicanism. And it is doubtful whether Mazzini would have approved of Gramsci's conviction that, in organizing the proletariat, the party "expropriates the first machine, the working class itself." Liberalism should start at home, or so it would seem.

Gramsci was a great Leninist. It is true, as Cammett tells us, that he was steeped in Croce and other Italian idealists, but he got from Croce what he might have gotten from Hegel, via Marx: an appreciation of the importance of will and intellect in history and a revulsion against the mechanical determinism that infected the Italian left of his day. Thus Gramsci struck out, as had Lenin, against determinism of the right—economism—and determinism of the left—sectarianism. He recognized the importance of the historical conditions of the moment and of acting upon them decisively through a disciplined party, just as Lenin had.

What Gramsci had not learned, however, was that Lenin's strategy, designed for the backward conditions of Russia in 1917, would not do in the modern conditions of Italy in 1921. His support for the Communist split from the Socialists in that year was based on a mechanical fidelity to Lenin in the face of radically different historical conditions. The result was a tragic loss of support for the entire left in the face of rightist violence followed by Mussolini's coup. In other words, Gramsci followed the dictates of the International in 1921 at the cost of his party, his country, and ultimately his own life.

This is why it is so difficult to share Cammett's enthusiasm for Gramsci's role in the origin of Italian Communism. It is true that Gramsci gave the party a theoretical strength from which it was to profit (not without contradictions) after World War II. It is also true that his writings before 1921 were pregnant with incisive interpretations of Italian society, while his political activities—particularly in the Turin factory councils—were extremely creative. But the real lesson of the first few years of Italian Communism was that Gramsci led the party into a historical trap by his failure to re-adapt to the West a Western doctrine—marxism—which had been radically and successfully adapted to the conditions of a non-Western country by Lenin.

It is this tragic failure that makes Gramsci's *later* writings in prison so valuable, for it was only during his long imprisonment that Gramsci developed an independent line based on his bitter experiences before and after the rise of Fascism. It was then that he arrived at the concept of the party as educator, as well as his trenchant analysis of the Italian Risorgimento and his treatment of the role of the intellectuals in Italian life. How unfortunate, then, that these years of ripe intellectual productivity should be treated by Cammett in so brief and schematic a way. How unfortunate also that he should concentrate on the relatively simple writings on the intellectuals and the Risorgimento, skimming over the complex and aesopian writings on the nature of the party and Gramsci's plans for Communist strategy after the anticipated fall of Fascism. It is in these later writings that Gramsci is linked to Togliatti and to the post-1945 Communist strategy. He is revealed as a Leninist who has learned the hard way that Leninism in a highly advanced industrial society must be radically revised if the party is to have a chance at power.

Yet despite its faults, John Cammett's *Antonio Gramsci and the Origins of Italian Communism* brings a wealth of documentation and sensitivity to bear on a fascinating political movement and its founding. It is also one of the first attempts in English to examine the life and thought of this original Marxist leader, and, if for no other reason, it merits the attention of historians and political scientists alike.—SIDNEY G. TARROW, *Yale University*.

Catholic Action in Italy: The Sociology of a Sponsored Organization. BY GIANFRANCO POGGI. (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1967. Pp. xv, 280. $8.00.)

In many respects this is a very good book. It is well written, objective, informative, and instructive in the application of certain notions of organizational theory. Dealing primarily with the period 1945–1958, Poggi focuses on the problems caused by the relationship of Italian Catholic Action (ACI) with the Church on the one hand, and with society on the other. Expertly drawing from Selznick's model of the "competent organization," the author seeks to demonstrate that ACI's sponsored relationship to the Church "critically limits the chances of its serving the very task for which the Church sponsored it." In more technical language, "the sponsorship relation has a series of dysfunctional consequences for Catholic Action." Basically they issue from the Church's insistence that ACI conduct itself always as "an instrument in the hands of the hierarchy." This is "the requirement of control." Integral to it are two "imperatives." One enjoins lay leaders not to confront the priesthood on an equal footing. The other forbids all "strategies of independence" which would lead lay leaders to self-sustaining control over the operations of the organization. Many difficulties ensue. One is especially severe: ACI lacks enough "functional space" for the emergence of what Selznick calls "institutional leadership."

Poggi's argument is organized into four parts. The first states the theoretical problem, in addition to briefly describing ACI and discussing the Church's dilemma with respect to the challenge of rampant secularization in the world. Part II discusses ACI's authority structure and the impact of the requirement of control on it. In Part III the focus is on the cultural aspect of the sponsorship relation, specifically on ACI's ideology, "where the requirement of faithfulness is paramount" Included here is an excellent discussion of: ACI's "ideological creed"; the manner in which ACI's youth branches are taught to cope with the "every-day values" of education, politics, sex, love, and the like; and "the ambiguity of ACI's goal." Part IV deals with aspects of ACI's policy in the period 1945–1958, including "organizational expansion," "organizational centralization," political action, attempts at bringing back into the fold secularized Catholics, and what appear to be some afterthoughts by the author concerning the real goals of the Church and functions of ACI.

The book merits a number of criticisms. First, it is heavily strewn with Parsonianisms which are theoretically sterile and capable of diverting attention from the essential procedures of scientific explanation. You will find an endless procession of such brass jewels as "vital functions," "imperatives," "functional requirements," "dysfunctional consequences," and all sorts of things that may be found "at a relatively high level of generality." It is a pity. Of what possible value is it to state that phenomenon X results in "dysfunctional consequences" for Y? How *dysfunctional* is the consequence? It is sheer medieval thinking not to realize that a given phenomenon may represent a given *degree of success* with respect to a given goal, *never* merely a "eufunction" or "dysfunction," except in purely syntactical terms. Poggi does seem to appreciate the importance of relations of variation in science when he suggests that organizational "competence" is "a variable, admitting of degrees ranging from a minimum to a maximum." In this sense, ACI is "relatively incompetent" but "does possess some apostolic effectiveness." Unfortunately, this admission takes all of one paragraph, flung at us *en passant* after a potentially good analysis has been squandered in meaningless qualitative terminology.

A simple example will clarify my point. The requirement of control allegedly rests on the two imperatives of (1) no "strategies of independence" on the part of lay leaders, and (2) no equality of relationship between them and the hierarchy. My question is this: what happens if some strategies of independence do indeed develop? Is control by the Church then lost entirely? Science would naturally raise questions concerning problems of *relative* control and *relative* independence, because that is how the world really is. A primitive functionalism leads Poggi to see phenomena either as functional or as dysfunctional or at the most as being "met only half way." Imagine a physician examining an incapacitated patient and declaring that he is ill!

The point can be made in still another way. Finding "ambiguity in the definition of ACI's goal," Poggi proceeds to argue that this "affects ACI negatively," preventing the pursuit of well-directed action and perpetuating "internal disagreements and contrasts." This is banal. It goes without saying that an association with a brainless charter, but a strong sense of mission, will flounder in errors, frustrations, helplessness, and strains. The role of scientists is to seek to determine the precise nature and degree of these problems. In the absense of this sort of sensitivity to the scientific quest, Poggi's book is not only bad sociology; it is also irrelevant because it fails to illustrate a sociological problem. It sounds like a sponsored report intended to reveal at a *low level of specificity* the difficulties afflicting an organization.

One last point: The bulk of the author's analysis proceeds on the assumption that ACI is a lay arm of the Church organized to pursue some specific goal. It is in this sense that he can compare ACI to Selznick's model of the "competent organization." In fact, however, it develops that ACI "seems to afford no reasonably clear, meaningful, and shared definition of a goal." Now, if the goal of the organization is elusive, it is hard to see why one would spend so much time demonstrating ACI's incompetence. Incompetent with respect to what? Many years ago, a fellow countryman of Poggi, Vilfredo Pareto, argued that "if we intend to reason at all strictly, our first obligation is to fix upon the state in which we are choosing to consider" a social system. More recently, philosophers of science like Nagel have solicitously warned functionalists never to neglect to specify the state G in which a social system is analyzed. The lesson still remains unheeded. And we sociologists are having such fun developing our discipline retrogressively.—JOSEPH LOPREATO, *University of Texas.*

Danilevsky: A Russian Totalitarian Philosopher. BY ROBERT E. MACMASTER. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967. Pp. xi, 368. $7.95.)

Professor MacMaster's book is the first comprehensive study of the life and thought of N. I. Danilevsky (1822–1885), who is known in the West primarily as a major theoretician of Panslavism and as a Russian forerunner of Spengler and Toynbee. In a fascinating, though at points methodologically and conceptually questionable analysis, Professor MacMaster takes issue with previous interpretations and argues that Danilevsky "is best seen not as a typical Panslavist or as a forerunner of Spengler but as a would-be political prophet whose thought has some striking and interesting if only general similarities to Bolshevism."

The first part of the book is devoted to a discussion of totalitarianism and includes a suggestive comparison of two different species: Western European totalitarianism and Russian totalitarianism. Danilevsky's historical significance, according to the author, lies in the fact that he was a totalitarian philosopher of the Russian variety. On the basis of the fragmentary data available, Professor MacMaster reconstructs the story of Danilevsky's life, his scientific, literary and political activities, paying close attention to his developmental period. Danilevsky's life and evolving philosophy are skillfully related to the important issues and problems of mid-nineteenth century Russia, in particular the problem of modernization. A major part of the book is devoted to an intensive examination of *Russia and Europe*, Danilevsky's most important and best known work. After a searching analysis of Danilevsky's Panslavism, his theory of civilizations, and his view of Russia's relationship to Europe, MacMaster concludes that in his major intellectual work Danilevsky sought "to call men [and more specifically *Russian* or *Slavic* men] to undertake the solution of the problem of spiritual alienation and salvation, a bridging of the gaps between man and God, man and nature, man and man, man and himself—and that through the employment of the apparatus of the modern state, through violence, war, a liturgy of destruction."

De-emphasizing the significance of Panslavism and speculative philosophy in Danilevsky's thought, MacMaster argues that Danilevsky is best classified with revolutionary Slavophilism or Populism. "His attitude toward Russia and the modern age, his naturalism, his political activism, his Russian socialism connect him typologically with Herzen, Bakunin, and the Populists." Danilevsky himself mentioned only Tiutchev, Khomiakov, and some other Slavophiles among his precursors, not Alexander Herzen with whom he disagreed on domestic political issues and in religious matters. Nevertheless, it is indeed Herzen who above all must be considered as having prepared the ground for Danilevsky's Panslavism. In Herzen the ideas of Panslavism were still scattered and unsystematic. Danilevsky unified and systematized them, taking additional ideas from Tiutchev and Khomiakov. The author's suggested classification of Danilevsky, however, is not very useful in view of the fact that neither Slavophilism nor Populism (*narodnichestvo*) constitute clear and precise categories. Moreover, Danilevsky's "typological connection" with Herzen is precisely in the realm of Panslavic ideas, not in the realm of totalitarian philosophy. The author himself admits that if Danilevsky's totalitarianism is not omitted from consideration "his distance from . . . Herzen is truly stupendous." In view of the author's emphasis of Danilevsky's totalitarianism it seems curious and inconsistent to speak of a "typological connection" with Herzen and, indeed, the main tradition of Russian socialism and radicalism. Classification of Danilevsky with the tradition of revolutionary Slavophilism and Populism as well as his "typological connection" with Herzen, furthermore, clearly call for an elaborate analysis of the affinities between Herzen (and more generally revolutionary Slavophilism and Populism) and Danilevsky. Such an analysis, however, is conspicuously absent in the present volume.

Danilevsky emerges from MacMaster's study as a kind of Dr. Jeckyll and Mr. Hyde. He is portrayed as an intellectual in search of truth, an incipient social scientist and scientific philosopher, and at the same time as an activist, a fanatic, a totalitarian philosopher, and a "dangerously committed man." Although the central thesis of MacMaster's study is persuasively argued, this writer finds it difficult to believe that the key to Danilevsky's thought is his totalitarianism. Undoubtedly, there are totalitarian strains in Danilevsky. However, as the author himself points out, many elements of Danilevsky's thought are difficult to square with his designation as a totalitarian philosopher. Moreover, some of Danilevsky's key concepts are surprisingly pluralistic—for example, his concept of culture and his idea of progress (cf. *Rossiia i Evropa*, 1871 ed., p. 90). It seems equally difficult to view Danilevsky as a "scientific" thinker in the realm of politics and philosophy. He was much too committed. The claim to the exclusive possession of "an absolute religious faith in its true and pure form" [i.e., Russian Orthodoxy] for a people or an ethnic group clearly goes beyond the framework of, and in fact negates, a scientific theory of cultures and history.

Professor MacMaster's thesis is instructive because it elucidates aspects of Danilevsky's thought which have received insufficient attention. However, it is ultimately tenable only if one makes certain assumptions about the "integrity" of the human spirit and, more specifically, if one assumes that Danilevsky was incapable of believing in two logically contradictory and essentially different systems of ideas, that there must be an underlying explanation and common denominator for the various aspects of Danilevsky's thought—a proposition *quod esset demonstrandum*.—ROLF H. W. THEEN, *Iowa State University*.

Le Socialisme Démocratique, 1864–1960. BY JAQUES DROZ. (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1966. Pp. 360. F. 2800.)

This brief survey of democratic socialism in the last hundred years addresses itself to the beginner in the field. However, even more advanced students of modern political ideas and movements who are familiar with major works, such as G. D. H. Cole's *History of Socialist Thought* or Carl Landauer's *European Socialism*, may find the present volume of some interest. In the first place, Professor Droz writes from the perspective of French history and politics—a perspective which is significantly different from that of a Cole or Landauer, and which is particularly useful in the author's discussions of the rise and decline of French socialism. Secondly, Professor Droz possesses the gift of so many French scholars of *haute vulgarisation* to a considerable extent, and the very brevity of his work compels him to concentrate on essentials. In his remarkably lucid and logical organization of the book, the author manages to present the high points of democratic socialism, and in addition, he is able to include in each chapter some interesting documents, such as party programs, the texts of famous intraparty controversies and disputations, and different views of a more biographical nature on some leading representatives of democratic socialism. Each chapter also includes a bibliography, with an emphasis on studies in French and English and occasional references to works in other languages such as German and Italian.

In the history of democratic socialism, the period of 1864–1960 seems to the author to be the crucial one. The beginning of this period saw the emergence of socialism as an organized political force. The end of the period is, in the eyes of the author, a natural end of an epoch, since, in the decade of the 1950's, socialist parties finally got rid of the last shreds of Marxist or quasi-Marxist tenets, abandoning the doctrine of nationalization of all productive property, defending private property, rejecting excessive planning, and discovering, or re-discovering, some of the advantages of the free market. In terms of geography, the author confines himself to some countries of "old Europe," since in his view only Europe enjoyed, in the nineteenth century, the constitutional framework within which democratic socialism could emerge and prosper. For this reason, he limits himself, in the discussion of Russia, to socialist movements prior to 1914, since he feels that communist Russia hardly fits into a history of democratic socialism. Marx himself was both perspicacious and honest enough to discern the difference between communism and socialism, and he entitled his most famous piece of writing *Communist Manifesto* and not, *Socialist Manifesto*. However, present-day communists like to use these two terms interchangeably, and they speak of communist states as socialist states in order to make communism appear more respectable, just as ultraconservatives in non-communist states use socialism and communism interchangeably in order to make socialism less respectable.

While the author is undoubtedly right in stressing the importance of Europe in the development and current condition of socialism, some non-European countries at least might have deserved some mention. For example, the fate of democratic socialism in Canada and South Africa might have thrown some further light on the relations of socialism and the problems of race and nationality—a problem that he discusses so skillfully in his analysis of socialism in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.

Looking at the future prospects of democratic socialism, the author is in sympathy with more recent socialist writers who see liberty rather than property as the ultimate issue of socialism. He notes that the rise of corporate capitalism, run by professional managers rather than by bankers or governmental administrators, poses the threat of authoritarian government to the established parliamentary systems. However, the author is by no means sure that modern man in general, and the socialist clientele in particular, will put liberty above security. In this broad perspective, the problem of democratic socialism essentially becomes the dilemma of democracy.—WILLIAM EBENSTEIN, *University of California, Santa Barbara.*

Towards a Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition. BY ALI A. MAZRUI. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967. Pp. xi, 287. $5.95.)

Professor Mazrui in this book does for Africa what Professor Louis Hartz did for *The Liberal Tradition in America.* That is the highest praise this reviewer can give to any work on political philosophy. I make the judgment fully aware of the dangers that always lurk behind false or misleading analogies in both the "real" and the academic worlds.

It is, of course, a much harder task to analyze "African 'political theory' "—the double inverted commas are intentional: which political theory is *African*? is it genuine political *theory*?—than to analyze American political theory, for very simple reasons. Americans have been theorizing about politics for more than two centuries, more self-consciously and more literately, than Africans for a much shorter time span. Moreover, American scholars like Professor Hartz could avail themselves of the critical works of a whole series of distinguished foreign observers of American political thought and practice—from de Tocqueville, a citation of whom appears on the frontispiece of *The Liberal Tradition in America,* through Bryce, to Laski. Even what little African political thought is available in the literature today has unfortunately received the attention of non-African observers of much lower perspicacity.

There is also the problem of relative temporal distance. While Professor Mazrui is quite as African as Professor Hartz is American, he is, almost necessarily, much more involved in the contemporary struggles of his fellow Africans than an American scholar in the more than two centuries of conflict and consensus in his part of North America. It seems all the more remarkable that Professor Mazrui maintains throughout his book an attitude that is simultaneously critical yet *engagé.* For this reason, the book is likely to be valued not only by political scientists, but also by African politicians.

In Africa, neither states nor individuals were born free and equal. Indeed, most of the states had not been born at all before 1960, and some are still undergoing their birth pangs. The separate African states were brought to life in an international environment that was none of their making, burdened with the political values and a political vocabulary belonging to that environment and to the generally hostile powers dominating it. Although racial, regional, and continental consciousness had arisen prior to "national" consciousness, Africans could achieve independence as states only—or at least most quickly —by demanding their rights in the conventional "Idiom of Self-Determination" (the title of the book's first chapter). This idiom suited the circumstances and served its immediate purpose, but it has complicated both the articulation and the achievement of "racial sovereignty" and "continental jurisdiction," two "principles" to which Professor Mazrui devotes chapters. The burden of this obsolete vocabulary has also contributed to three dilemmas he discusses: "Peace versus Human Rights," "Nonalignment and the Residuum of 'Pax Brittanica,' " and "Pan-Africanism versus Nonalignment."

The thesis of the book is stated in its title, which Professor Mazrui introduces as:

> that concept in the rhetoric of general pacification which, to establish historical continuity, we have called *Pax Africana.* But the political ambition implied by this concept is not to impose an African peace on *others*—that would indeed be ambitious. The word 'Africana' in this concept describes both the nationality of the peace-makers and the continental limits of their jurisdiction. For *Pax Africana* asserts that the peace of *Africa* is to be assured by the exertions of *Africans* themselves. The idea of a 'Pax Africana' is the specifically military aspect of the principle of continental jurisdiction.

Pax Africana has obvious implications far beyond Africa. Especially when combined with the "principle of racial sovereignty," it is, for example, of relevance to contemporary racial strife in the United States. In 1960, Professor Clinton Rossiter called American Negroes—many of whom today prefer to be styled "Afro-Americans"—the most American of all Americans, because, unlike other hyphenated-Americans, they had no culture, language, religion, or ideology of the Old World to identify themselves with or to fall back upon. By now, the impetus of the movement toward a Pax Africana has gone some way toward overcoming this relative disadvantage, with consequences that are being subjected to analysis with only indifferent success so far. In a later generation—if our descendants live that long—another brilliant political scientist may want to address himself to the task of studying the confluence of the American Liberal Tradition and Pax Africana.—HERBERT J. SPIRO, *University of Pennsylvania.*

The Twentieth Century Mind. By DONALD ATWELL ZOLL. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967. Pp. vi, 152. $5.00.)

Professor Donald A. Zoll's little book, *The Twentieth Century Mind,* is composed of a set of essays covering widely diverse topics which range from a consideration of the role of the artist in the academic community, through an indictment of positivistic political science and a prophesied collapse of the American democracy, to a short analytical history of ideas in the twentieth century. Perhaps it is the breadth of this undertaking that accounts for the wide variation in the quality of the essays. Surprisingly, those essays which are most impressive deal with topics of lesser professional interest to practicing political scientists. This comment is particularly true of Zoll's suggestive and well-written discussion of "The Artist as Academician" and of his title essay, which is generally provocative and thoughtful (whether one agrees with some of his conclusions or not). However, when the author turns to more narrowly "political" topics, the quality of his efforts seems to fall off markedly, at points to no more than the level of haughty polemic. (One exception here is Zoll's engrossing treatment of "Conscience, Law, and Civil Disobedience"; yet compared to what remains, this is a lonely instance.)

Illustrative of this decline is the author's discussion of "the blunderings of the behavioralists in political science" (as the dustjacket describes it). Here, the majority of Professor Zoll's arguments will not appear new to those readers who have paid attention to the overly long-standing polemical dialogue between the behavioralists and their opponents within the discipline. In some cases, however, Zoll's contentions about behavioralist efforts are blatantly misleading, inaccurate, and polemical. For example, he chides them for not giving more thorough attention to the dynamic psychologies of Freud and Jung, preferring on their own part to ruminate in "the obsolescences of academic psychology" and to "hail with gusto the behavior studies of pigeons, the surveys of the repetition of word usage among female factory employees, the interpersonal attitudes of postmen, and the 'objective' testing of school children." This hardly seems an adequate assessment of the situation. Nor do we have any evidence that Zoll's zeal for a more serious consideration of such concepts as "the collective unconscious" and the "primal memory" (or, for that matter, such Jungian contributions as the "shadow" or the "imago") reflects any widespread consensual judgment by American psychologists as to the pay-off value of such an enterprise. Certainly, the behavioralists are not at odds on this point with any large proportion of their colleagues in that sister discipline of the social sciences.

One novel argument that is advanced in this essay is Zoll's contention that the behavioralists have intentionally ignored "central problems" in ontology, philosophy of science, and psychology because of their adherence to a latent value system based on an "uncompromising defense of egalitarianism, meliorism, and social atomism" that is rooted in a near-pathological hysteria over the possible resurgence of authoritarianism. At least now the behavioralist has a ready justification for the cost of his visits to the analyst.

Zoll's discussion of "The Failure of American Conservatism" is even less convincing than his treatment of the complexes of the behavioralists. The essay centers around a discussion of the causes and implications of the Goldwater defeat. I seriously doubt that Zoll's analysis of that event will send Angus Campbell and his cohorts scurrying to re-analyze their own data on it. The central contention seems to be that the election should not be interpreted as a rejection of conservatism by the American electorate because Mr Goldwater was not a conservative to begin with, and was a poor campaigner to boot. Nevertheless, we are given the impression in the essay that Goldwater was correct about one thing: there does exist a latent conservative vote. One is then left to quibble over what kind of "true conservative" candidate is needed to capture that vote. Zoll provides a profile of this mythical candidate that seems to suit his liking and which bears a strong resemblance to John Galt. I must admit, however, that if one is forced to choose among romantic heroes of this kind, I prefer Byron's Manfred: he has more "character."

The prophesied collapse of American democracy provides the nadir of this little book. Here Zoll's analysis often drops off to a haughty polemic reminiscent of some contemporary conservative political columnists. It would seem that a serious and meaningful critique of the contemporary American political culture (which I am certain Professor Zoll means this essay to be) can well afford to eliminate references to the common man as the "*profanum vulgus,*" or sweeping descriptions of the contemporary American scene phrased in the following manner:

> The tawdry figure of Lyndon Baines Johnson as chief representative of this majestic and honorable nation . . . vaudevillians in the U. S. Senate . . . slow-witted ideologues in the United Nations . . . courthouse barristers on the Supreme Court . . . well-washed, Brooks Brothers-draped brigands at the control of industrial combines. . . .
>
> (elipses in orginal text) (p. 13)

Comments like these detract from Professor Zoll's arguments, and he demonstrates elsewhere in his essay that he does not need their emotional assistance. It is unfortunate that one who argues so strongly for moderation elsewhere should not have heeded his own advice. Indeed, this comment provides a good summary of the weaknesses of the book. When Zoll discards this polemical vein he generally provides meaty, interesting arguments. The problem is that he does not discard it often enough.—J. PAUL JOHNSTON, *University of Alberta.*

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Kennedy. THEODORE C. SORENSON. (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1965. Pp. 783. $10.00.)

As I write this review it is almost two years since Theodore Sorenson's *Kennedy* was published. I read the book in 1965, I have just reread it, and I must report that my reactions are no longer those of '65. Then I would have said that for some time to come Sorenson's work would be the indispensable source for Kennedy's thousand days, for the book was written by the man who had the most first-hand knowledge of how the Kennedy presidency worked, what the President thought, and how the chief executive made his decisions. With the exception of the Bay of Pigs adventure, which Sorenson learned about later in the deepest detail from the President, the author had a part in just about all the action at the White House. In 1965 I would have given primacy to Sorenson over Arthur Schlesinger (whose book, *A Thousand Days*, was published almost simultaneously) because the Harvard historian's work is mostly a reconstruction of events from Kennedy sources or from Democratic White House aides. After the Bay of Pigs Schlesinger was no longer within the inner presidential circles and remained in the Ladies Wing of the White House. Though Schlesinger's portrait of Kennedy is a sparkling and well-informed piece of work, few chapters contain significant material.

On rereading *Kennedy* I am struck with how less important and more fatiguing a book it is than I hitherto felt. The author devotes more than two hundred pages of his almost eight hundred page book to Kennedy before he became President. Kennedy as a person, senator, politician, presidential contender, and presidential candidate are all examined. These chapters are perhaps the most warm and human in the book. Sorenson either has total recall of all of Kennedy's wry remarks and funny quips or else he kept notes on everything. The engaging Kennedy brightens the pages, but we all know that historians will inevitably dim this memory when they delve into this early history. Despite the best possible light thrown on these years by Sorenson, it is clear (and has been for some time) that a more balanced view is needed. Kennedy stepped over Massachusetts in his scramble for the presidency and was an undistinguished United States Senator. Further, his primary contests, while building up to a crescendo of victory, were less spotless and more expensive than his aides would admit.

The heart of Sorenson's book is concerned with the Kennedy team and the presidency. We can agree that the President chose his cabinet well, by-and-large, and adduce that McNamara was the star and strong-man of the team. But Sorenson barely alludes to McNamara's real imprint on the Kennedy administration. The aggressive Secretary of Defense put his mark not only on the Defense Department, whose business he reorganized and rationalized, but also on international and even domestic affairs. We learn more from Roger Hilsman's book, *To Move A Nation,* about how McNamara's personality and his reshaping and enlarging of the military machine affected foreign policy than we do from Sorenson. McNamara, brilliant, daring, supremely confident, master of detail, gave John Kennedy the means to promote a strong foreign policy and, as long as the President lived and was his own Secretary of State, the nation at least avoided war. Cuban adventures, a missile crisis, Soviet provocations, and communist probes around the world Kennedy usually handled dextrously. Only when the President left policy to the CIA as in the Bay of Pigs fiasco, or gave foreign policy a military dimension as in Vietnam, did crisis slide into disaster.

While Sorenson's picture of McNamara lacks the bold colors such an expansive and dynamic person demands, the author's profile of Dean Rusk is even more disappointing. From other sources like Roger Hilsman, and to an extent Arthur Schlesinger, we know that the Secretary of State preferred to be a summarizer of options in foreign policy rather than an advocate of his Department's views. As a result the diplomatic arts of peace became stepchildren to military solutions of problems. Kennedy was unhappy with his selection of Rusk but unwilling to broadcast his own failing, so the President fired Bowles and not the Secretary. For three years Kennedy tolerated an unsatisfactory first minister, depended on his own foreign policy staff, and gave diplomacy a disproportionate share of his time.

Much of this Sorenson overlooks. Rather, he concentrates on a narrative of happenings. But even these chronicles of foreign affairs lack some essential qualities for good history. The writer fails to give us the parry and thrust, the keen judgments on personalities, and the mutual affect of men and events on each other which history demands. We seldom know who is advocating what policy in strategy sessions or who holds what view in free-wheeling discussions. Sorenson has created a giant cross-word puzzle for us to work in names to fit statements and quotations. Moreover, there is a repetitiveness in some chapters—like the one on the missile crisis—which mars the flow of action.

There is no space here to tell of all the other subjects with which Sorenson deals—the fights against inflation and recession and the forming of an economic strategy for economic growth, the civil rights issues, presidential visits abroad, foreign crises, legislation passed and stalled etc. Yet certain themes about the Kennedy presidency and about Kennedy suggest themselves. First, Kennedy began a new arms race by pumping seventeen billion dollars into defense spending, despite the fact that he found no missile gap on taking office. (We even have McNamara's recent admission of this new arms spiral.) That such a large sum of money also helped a lagging economy was not lost on the President. Related to this arms buildup is the question of whether the Cuban missile crisis was necessary. Kennedy suffered a series of affronts—at Vienna, the Bay of Pigs, the building of the Berlin Wall, and was determined to stop the adverse tilt of the world. The President took his stand in October 1962 despite the facts that: no warheads were yet seen in Cuba, the difference between offensive and defensive missiles was distance, and the missiles in place and to come in no way changed the strategic balance of power between the United States and Russia. The positioning of missiles in Cuba gave a *seeming* change in the balance of power. For matters of prestige and psychology we faced Armageddon. Second, Kennedy also had what this reviewer can only call "Berlinitis." The President constantly expected a confrontation with the Soviets over that divided city. All of Russia's foreign policy, signalled at Vienna and sealed at the Cuban missile crisis, Kennedy thought had Berlin overtones. Third, Kennedy was so prestige conscious (he had raised the issue of the nation's slipping prestige in his campaign) that he initiated the moon space program to raise the world's opinion of America. He readily consented to the spending of twenty billion dollars on such a project—money sorely needed for domestic reform, stilled since 1937. (Once again the President was aware of what such a large injection of money into the economy over a few years would do to fight recession.) Fourth, no President in a long time had basically done more for business than Kennedy—and we have Douglas Dillon's word for this (p. 464). Fifth, Kennedy, who created a crisis situation after the Vienna conference in order to get a military buildup and a larger and reorganized Army, would not use the same shock tactic to get action to aid the cities and the inhabitants of the squalid ghettoes.

Sorenson would probably not agree that my themes can be found in his book anymore than he would agree with my assessment of Kennedy's career. He designed his book to be a substitute for the book the President intended to write and so he has no particular viewpoint aside from a belief that his chief was a great President. Sorenson has made *Kennedy* too gentlemanly an account of events. He has written a narrative history with little analysis and no underlying thematic structure. He chose, further, not to write of full-blooded individuals arguing and making decisions and the absence of personalities in many important chapters accentuates the gray, governmental-style prose which weights the book. It is a great pity that the author seldom rises above his major source—his own files. In sum Sorenson refused to give his book a personality, a striking view, a bold thesis. His writer's notion is too much like his advisor's role —he is the gray figure in the background.—AIDA DIPACE DONALD, *Baltimore, Maryland.*

Springboard to the White House: Presidential Primaries: How They Are Fought and Won. JAMES D. DAVIS. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1967. Pp. xii, 324. $5.95.)

Good studies don't always make good books, and rather bad studies sometimes make quite good books. James D. Davis' *Springboard to the White House* is a good book which is based on a less than excellent study.

Springboard makes good reading. Most of it is well-written and all of it is crisply edited. One finds well-told stories sandwiched between nicely phrased speculations. Most of us can be accused of bookish pedantry, but Davis escapes the charge. His book is quick-moving and his tales are concrete. No chapter is without some topically interesting paragraphs, and few paragraphs are without interesting sentences. Some passages offer almost the same sense of immediacy one expects from writers like White or Styron; one feels that something is happening. The book opens, for example, with this journalistic lead:

> The time was 3:00 A.M. in the lobby of the Kanawha Hotel in Charleston, West Virginia. The date was May 11, 1960. Senator John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts had just thanked the happy milling throng of West Virginians for their support in pushing him to an uphill victory. . . .

Occasionally, of course, Davis accepts a trite device to produce a fatuous sense of the concrete. We are told, for example, that "Coolidge tidied up the ship of state" after Harding's death (but perhaps I'm being unfair: what witticism would Coolidge himself have chosen?). In any event, the general absence of pedantry compensates for an occasional trite phrase.

Springboard is the kind of book one reads comfortably at home over a long evening. And it is no doubt a good supplementary text for an undergraduate course in American politics and parties. The students will enjoy this book more than many which make a more serious contribution to political science. And they will get more "feel" for presidential politics from it than from more systematic and elegant accounts.

I cannot, however, say that *Springboard* adds very much to our systematic knowledge of politics. If anything, it presents some useful and carefully compiled data—such as the state-by-state outcomes of presidential primaries since 1912 (pp. 278–305). But the study's common-sense formulation of problems, the Whig historian's methodology, and the undisciplined findings combine to limit Davis' effective contribution to political science.

Davis' main thesis is that presidential primaries have become more important than they once were, and that this trend has been accelerated since World War II, partly by intense television coverage in each state's primary (new medium; new message). In my viscera, I am quite sure Davis is right; but the evidence arrayed here does little to satisfy more cerebral requirements of verification. His thesis is plausible and well stated, but the study does nothing important to demonstrate its truth.

Too often, Davis offers generalizations which appear either false or tautological. For example, he suggests that, "By 1916 primary laws had been passed in 26 states—those dominated by Progressive forces (p. 28)." The second phrase is either a tautology—Progressive domination being measured by the enactment of primary laws—or it is empirically incorrect: no more general test seems to indicate that the Progressives ever 'dominated' twenty-six states. And there is a note which suggests that national candidates must by definition have demonstrated their possession of charismatic leadership qualities (p. 43n). Max Weber would find this assertion surprising, especially if he had lived to watch the likes of Alf Landon and Calvin Coolidge become 'national candidates.' Either Davis is empirically incorrect, or he has redefined charisma to mean something close to its original opposite. These assertions are not, in any event very helpful.

Other, more substantial claims are simply too much for the analyses to sustain. Consider Chapter Four, "Impact of Primaries on Delegate and Public Opinion Polls." Here, the author presents a number of tables, showing polls taken before and after various primaries. They show that the popularity of the primary winner is apt to go up. But not even the most rudimentary correlational technique is employed, and the fact that most candidates (including primary losers) obtain increasing delegate support as the campaign goes forward is not used to discount the hypothesis. From this analysis, Davis draws this conclusion:

> The preponderance of data in this chapter shows that there is a direct causal relation between a candidate's performance in the primaries and the number of delegates listed as pledged or favorable to him in the Associated Press pre-convention delegate polls (p. 97).

Data alone don't show causal relations; careful analytical inferences do, and those offered here are not careful enough. I am quite sure Davis is right, but I am no surer for having seen his analysis.

These specific analyses, good and bad, are not conceptually integrated under a theoretical system—unless one counts those offered by common sense and the institutions themselves. Admittedly, all the chapters are about presidential primaries, but their connection with each other is less clear. In any event, the absence of a theory explains Davis' failure to bring off his effort at comparison: he has no theoretical guides which allow him to find connections which are not defined in parochially American (or German or Canadian) terms (see Chapter 2).

Let me sum up. *Springboard* is a book worth reading, and I will value my copy of it. Its value is its author's rapport with politics, and his interesting writing. But the study of presidential primaries on which it reports is not a very exciting piece of scholarship.—DOUGLAS W. RAE, *Yale University.*

The Congressional Process: Strategies, Rules and Procedures. BY LEWIS A. FROMAN JR. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967. Pp. 217.)

The publication of Lewis A. Froman Jr.'s *The Congressional Process* should be noted in this journal for at least two reasons. First, it provides students of Congress with the first systematic attempt to explicate the relationship between the formal and informal rule structure of the two chambers of the Congress and the decisions that flow as outputs from those bodies. Second, the book is the first publication under the Study of Congress project financed by the Carnegie Corporation and administered by the American Political Science Association.

Froman's contribution is welcome because it addresses itself to a number of variables internal to the operations of Congress that have not been explored before. The rules and procedures justify attention because as Froman reminds us " . . . *how* things are done . . . may affect *what* is done."

The book catalogues salient differences between the structure of the House and Senate and treats in detail the procedural maze through which legislation must pass in both chambers. The reader is shown how and why each stage of the process opens up new alternatives, options, and possibilities for each issue on its way to decision.

The principal strength of the book is that for the first time we have a study that treats the discharge petition, legislative calendars, suspension of the rules, and questions of germaneness as variables that relate in a significant way to a continuum of decisions and bargains that are made at each stage of the process.

It is encouraging that another student of government and policy-making is taking into account the impact of the legal and institutional environment in which decision-making occurs.

Ironically, the book's major failing is a derivative of its strength. Froman innundates the reader with the number and range of procedural conditions that impinge on legislative decisions without providing, in this reader's judgement, an adequate conceptual framework for it all to make sense to the undergraduate.

Each chamber is analyzed at the pre-floor and floor stages with an additional chapter devoted to strategies of adjusting differences in House and Senate passed bills. The structure of the two chambers as formal organizations and Congressional reform are analyzed in the two concluding chapters.

Froman sees bargaining (of specified sorts) as the essential process through which majorities are built and the organization is maintained. The difficulty is that the linkages between the broad and very useful discussion of bargaining in an early chapter and the specifics of House and Senate procedure get lost in the complexity and detail of each rule and strategy that Froman discusses.

In sum, the book fills a real need in the literature and should be widely used for its many insights into a little explored but important dimension of the Congressional process.

As noted, Froman's book is the first publication of the Study of Congress project. That enterprise, being administered by Ralph K. Huitt, Assistant Secretary of Health Education and Welfare, and Robert L. Peabody of Johns Hopkins University, promises a series of books, monographs, and articles intended to "cover ground in one concerted thrust which (scholars) might inch over in a decade." Huitt and Peabody note further in the forward to *The Congressional Process* that the project is not an integrated research effort in which specific questions and hypotheses are being tested under a master research design. Rather individual scholars are receiving support to investigate areas of interest that they have been pursuing for some time.

Perhaps the state of our knowledge about Congress is so sketchy and the chances of getting several scholars to agree on what research priorities ought to be is so slim that the only strategy of inquiry is the individualistic approach. But it might have been an interesting experiment in seeking a coordinated strategy of research on an important subject to have marshalled the talents of a number of people to study a few mutually agreed upon questions. It would be interesting to know, for example, whether there is some consensus among students of Congress about what ought to be our research priorities.

As it is we can look forward to receiving a number of studies of Congress by several of the best people in the discipline who make that body their special object of inquiry, and it is my opinion that *The Congressional Process* is a good start.—EUGENE EIDENBERG, *University of Minnesota.*

Congress and the Citizen-Soldier. BY WILLIAM F. LEVANTROSSER. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1967. Pp. 267. $6.00.)

Congress and the Citizen-Soldier is a discussion of several events in the legislative development of the Federal Armed Forces Reserve. The Preface to the book provides an excellent summary of its contents.

> My approach to this area of research has combined both historical and political analyses. I have chosen six major aspects of reserve affairs, perhaps the most crucial in the evolution of the modern reserve components and the most prominent from the standpoint of Congressional participation in reserve policy-making. The list is composed of the following: (1) retirement pay for reserve personnel based on inactive reserve training as well as active duty (Army and Air Force Vitalization and Retirement Equalization Act of 1948); (2) categories of readiness for reserve forces and obligations to serve in them (Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 and the Reserve Forces Act of 1955); (3) promotion criteria for reserve officers (Reserve Officer Personnel Act of 1954); (4) retention of paid-drill strength in the Army Reserve (Defense Appropriations Acts for Fiscal Years 1959–61); (5) officer recruitment on the college campus (ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964); and (6) realignment and reduction in strength of units in the Army reserve components (proposal to merge units of the Army Reserve into the National Guard in 1965).

Conclusions from this study have clustered around four major themes.

> First, Congressional primacy of interest in reserve affairs has been exceptional in comparison with the ascendancy of the executive branch in national defense policy-making. The maintenance of a relatively large number of drill-pay units and positions can be attributed in large measure to the support Congress has given to the citizen-soldier. Second, the Reserve Officers Association has emerged as an extremely effective interest group in sustaining programs for federal reservists in all components despite changes in defense strategy and military technology. In close liaison with Congressional leaders, it has been remarkably influential in building the federal military reserve. Third, elements of the legislative policy-making process have blurred the exercise of civilian control of the military. The political activities of citizen-soldiers have often encouraged professional military leaders to circumvent the policy proposed by civilian superiors. Fourth, the concept of the citizen-soldier has exhibited great durability by retaining its luster in the nuclear age. The reservist of today has been assigned greater responsibilities, but he has also been awarded some impressive benefits.

Those who are interested in any of these topics may wish to consult the text. However, two reservations seem in order: (1) the six "aspects of reserve affairs" are discussed in outline only with very little factual detail or insight, which often makes case studies interesting; and (2) the conclusions already cited in the Preface are simply reasserted from time to time with no attempt to tie them in with data.—LEWIS A. FROMAN, JR., *University of California, Irvine.*

Overcharge. BY LEE METCALF AND VIC REINEMER. (New York: David McKay Company, 1967. Pp. xii, 338. $5.95.)

APSA Congressional Fellowship Programs have always included recipients from law and journalism as well as political science. *Overcharge*, whose preparation was facilitated by an APSA fellowship, represents a handsome payoff from this professional courtesy. For this book by Senator Metcalf, a lawyer, and his executive secretary, Vic Reinemer, a journalist, substantially enriches our literature.

With a pun, the title indicates the main thesis of the study: because of inadequacies in the regulatory process, the privately owned electric power industry is not passing along to its customers in reduced prices the decreasing cost per unit resulting from technological advances and from rapidly growing mass production. Instead, the major private power companies have been pushing their rate of return far above that allowed by the regulatory agencies and engaging in a massive propaganda campaign that misrepresents their situation and helps support a number of right-wing organizations.

The $70 billion electric power industry is dominated by the investor-owned utilities (dubbed "I.O.U.s" by the authors). About 480 I.O.U.s serve 79% of the consumers of electricity in this country. Responsibility for regulating the I.O.U.s rests mainly with the states. However, most state regulatory commissions are woefully inadequate to the task because of lack of resources and sometimes of desire. In 1963, all the state commissions together had less than 500 accountants, 10% of whom were C.P.A.s, and 40% of whom worked for the commissions in only three states—California, New York, and Pennsylvania. Moreover, state commissions are responsible for regulating an average of ten other types of public utilities besides electric, with usually hundreds of companies under their jurisdiction. In 1965, even the Federal Power Commission with just 38 field auditors could plan to audit the books of electric and gas utilities only "every seven to ten years."

Most regulatory bodies have allowed electric utilities about 6% as a reasonable rate of return on their investment. Increasingly since 1957, this standard has been breached. In 1964, the net profit of I.O.U.s averaged 11.1% of their invested capital. Also, I.O.U.s have shifted to their customers the costs of extensive political propagandizing by classifying them as operating expenses. Much of this propaganda campaign has been waged by right-wing organizations, such as the Foundation for Economic Education, with which the I.O.U.s have an intricate nexus of relations involving heavy financial support and interlocking directorates.

According to the authors, if present trends continue, by 1980 the "overcharge" by the I.O.U.s will average $11 billion annually, and their regulation will be rendered even less effective. To cope with this problem, which they have analyzed so incisively, the authors make a number of very sensible recommendations.

Though it deals with a complicated subject and is heavily documented, this study is eminently readable. Employing a sprightly style, the authors explain the most technical matters lucidly and interestingly. Because it is relevant to many matters of growing public concern (e.g., consumer protection, lobbying, and federalism), *Overcharge* should prove valuable to any student of the American political scene.—KENNETH KOFMEHL, *Purdue University*.

Perspectives on the Court. BY MAX FREEDMAN, WILLIAM M. BEANEY, AND EUGENE V. ROSTOW. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967. Pp. xii, 120. $3.50.)

Perhaps no institution has been the focal point of so many published lectures as the United States Supreme Court. This book, comprising the 1965 Rosenthal Lectures at the Northwestern University Law School, is the latest entry in the parade. The authors approach the Court from their own professional perspective, journalism, political science, and legal scholarship respectively (although Freedman's views are expressed more as a long-time confidant of Justice Frankfurter than as a journalist).

It is ungenerous to anticipate that all such contributions will be as insightful as Justice Jackson's (undelivered) Godkin Lectures, or as provocative as Learned Hand's address on the Bill of Rights or Herbert Wechsler's exposition of "neutral principles." Nonetheless, there should be greater warrant for publication than the mere participation in an endowed lecture series. We can reasonably ask for an innovative or thoughtful perspective on things judicial or, at least, a well developed and articulated central point. Only Dean Rostow's lecture approaches these qualities; the Freedman and Beaney lectures resemble more a professor's hasty compilation of scattered notes in preparation for an undergraduate class. And even Rostow's presentation makes only a marginal contribution to his selected topic: the well-worn area of the Negro and the Fourteenth Amendment.

Freedman, in an admitted *apologia* for Frankfurter, briefly discusses the rationales behind some of Frankfurter's more controversial opinions, *e.g.*, his dissents in the *Flag Salute Case* and *Baker v. Carr*, and his concurring opinion in the *Little Rock Desegregation Case*. In the latter case, for instance, Frankfurter has been criticized for writing a separate opinion in the face of an Opinion of the Court signed by all nine justices. This Opinion was one of the rarest displays of unanimity in the history of the Court and had as its object the quieting of public speculation about the Justices' attitudinal differences toward desegregation. But Frankfurter, we are told, was appealing to the "judgment and conscience of thoughtful and responsible members of the Southern bar," and his plea, "deserves something more than negligible honor among the many influences molding a better tradition on racial problems." Freedman also attempts to dispel accounts of personal animosity between Frankfurter and Black by revealing a confidential Frankfurter memo praising Black's liberal spirit and noting his capacity for developing judicial craftsmanship. The memo is dated 1938, however, and tells us little of subsequent Frankfurter-Black relations.

Professor Beaney gives a rather loose treatment to a variety of subjects: what political scientists are doing vis-à-vis the Court, what they should be doing, why they are so enamored of the Warren Court (which he leaves largely unanswered), and whether the Taft Court was the precursor to the Roosevelt Court's civil libertarian activism (it was). Most noteworthy is his listing of four approaches of political scientists to the study of the Court: the historical, the philosophical, the analysis of doctrine and precedent, and the behavioral. While Beaney's delineation is casual and almost unstructured, it provides an interesting contrast to Schubert's considerably more systematic categorizations. For instance, the latter ignores the philosophical approach. (Indeed, the most recent work Beaney cites in this *genre* is dated 1908.) By contrast, Beaney's view of the behavioral approach is somewhat distended, encompassing not only what Schubert would place under that label, but Schubert's "conventional" category as well.

Evaluatively, Beaney formally opts for a "tolerant eclecticism," but it is clear that his heart does not lie with the behavioral approach. He concedes that the more quantitative analyses of Court voting behavior have "led to some enlightenment," but opines that the illumination has been dimmed by the "dispute as to the reliability or value of such studies." His lecture is punctuated by laments over the increasing disfavor with which "modern" political scientists view the non-behavioral approaches and hints of the danger inherent in the discipline's abandoning the philosophical criticism and doctrinal analysis functions to a bar which is largely hostile to the values found in the decisions of the Warren Court.

The main point of Rostow's lecture is that the relationship between law and the flow of history is not a one-way street. The currents of the day affect the sinews of judicial interpretation, it is true. But Rostow is no positivist. Law, especially fundamental law, has a "moral component," an appeal to conscience, which eventually shapes the currents of tomorrow. To illustrate this point, he discusses the treatment of the Negro at the hands of the Supreme Court.

Although imbued with some well-turned phrases and an undeniable righteous fervor, Rostow's discussion is neither informative nor particularly provocative. Rather, it is uneven, occasionally irrelevant, and shows little sophistication in linking currents of history with judicial output and vice-versa. Underlying his discussion is an implicit premise that, morally at least, there is but one correct interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, one which guarantees the Negro the legal equivalent of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. Even so, Rostow offers little in the way of new insights or interpretations concerning the Amendment's checkered judicial history. The *Slaughter House Cases* opinion, for instance, is analyzed in a very traditional manner at great length, including one direct quotation which spans four pages, and the *Civil Rights Cases* receive only slightly less elongated treatment.

Rostow concludes by stating that the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965 "are the final skirmishes in our Hundred Years' War for Liberty and Equality." Advocates of national open-housing legislation will surely shake their heads in doubt and dismay upon reading this. At any rate, liberty and equality before the law is but one front in this war. After Detroit, Newark and lesser uprisings, it is almost superfluous to remind a nation that Fraternity is yet to be achieved. And neither Rostow nor anyone else has done much to clarify whether and how Supreme Court reinterpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment will materially aid the attainment of this goal.—Bradley C. Canon, *University of Kentucky.*

Movies, Censorship and the Law. By Ira H. Carmen. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1966. Pp. x, 339. $7.95.)

Professor Carmen's book is an important addition to that growing body of literature which is making us aware of the fact that the decisions of the Supreme Court on constitutional matters are not self-executing. His study of the impact of the Court's decisions in the field of movie censorship is the product of interviews with officials from every state and local agency involved in the prior censorship of movies which was willing to cooperate. It is a body of material which, for the first time, gives us some basis for making a judgment on the various hypotheses which have been advanced concerning the actual consequences on the community level of the Court's decisions in this area.

The interview data, set out at length in the Appendix, fully documents Carmen's conclusion that motion picture censorship " . . . flouts the supreme law of the land day after day and year after year" wherever it is put into operation. In general, the practice as shown here, is simply to snip out any particular scene which the censors find offensive, with no apparent regard for the integrity of the work or its artistic merit.

While Carmen has done considerable service in bringing this raw material before us, his further development of it in the text of the book is disappointing. Central to his discussion of the reasons behind the striking ineffectiveness of the Court's work in this field, is his conclusion that it is the prior restraint mechanism in itself which is mainly to blame. Although he does make something of a case for this view on the basis of the data, it is a case which really cannot be made effectively without a comparison of prior restraint and the major alternative means for the suppression of obscenity—subsequent punishment. His decision to concentrate solely on agencies of prior restraint has put such an essential comparison beyond the scope of the work.

In addition, there is the question of whether Carmen might not have looked more carefully at the Supreme Court's standards for obscenity themselves and the reasoning behind them in his quest for the causes of their inefficacy. This is an area in which the Court's work has not been notably coherent, and it seems plausible to assume that its lack of practical impact might in large measure be due to this fact. More specifically, this ineffectiveness might be connected with a fundamental contradiction in the logic of the Court's position. The exclusion of obscenity from the protection of the First Amendment is justified by the Court not so much by a course of reasoning from the meaning of the amendment, as by its sense that there exists a "universal judgment" that such material ought to be suppressed. The exception thus has its roots largely in community sentiment. But, as Carmen's interview material makes clear, the standards which the Court uses in defining obscenity deviate significantly from the standards of the community as reflected in the judgments of censorship officials. Perhaps the problem arises from the contradiction inherent in the Court's attempt to give deference to community sentiment while at the same time attempting to keep that sentiment within limits of its own making. Perhaps it is this which leads the censors to feel that they are being subjected to limitations which are inconsistent with their basic mandate, a mandate which has been given considerable legitimacy by the Court.

Another direction in which the material might have been developed would have involved further generalization about the standards applied by the censors. A thoughtful consideration of the interview material in relation to the literature would surely yield some significant insights. One possibility immediately suggests itself: Professor Henkin has suggested that obscenity is really not a crime but a sin that it is suppressed, not so much for the protection of individuals from injury as, " . . . for the purity of the community and for the salvation and welfare of the consumer." Does the interview material bear this out? It seems in fact to do so. Surely such a finding should have considerable impact on our thought about the obscenity doctrine.

Finally, it must be said that the quality of the editorial work evidenced here is hardly up to the standard one has the right to expect from a great university press. Errors in legal usage as well as basic syntax abound, at times obscuring the meaning of significant passages. Comments on style may seem out of place in the discussion of a work which is basically the presentation of a piece of social science research. But, as Robert G. McCloskey has noted, style is more than " . . . a mere cosmetic, prettifying an intellectual performance but not really enhancing it." In this case, lack of style has to some degree obscured the very real contributions which Professor Carmen has made to our knowledge of movie censorship.—ROBERT S. GERSTEIN, *University of California, Los Angeles.*

Anatomy of the State Department. By SMITH SIMPSON. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967. Pp. x, 285. $5.95.)

The author resigned from the State Department to write this book. Whether the Department suffered as a consequence is unclear; that the reader will is a certainty. This book is so embarrassing theoretically, empirically vacuous, and normatively mindless, that one completes it with both relief and alarm.

The contradictory thesis of this book is that bureaupathology in the State Department's "pyramidal mass" has undermined the "integration, coordination, mobilization and consensus" (p. 58) that a "pluralist" society requires if it is going to be up to fighting the Cold War. The book is uninformed by *any* of the literature on pluralism, and no admission is raised of the problem of reconciling integrated national policies with genuinely pluralistic polities. As Braybrooke, Lindblom, and Wildavsky have shown, fragmented and incremental decision-making is a style of choice consistent with pluralism, rationality, and, perhaps, some measure of democracy. Not everyone, after all, shares Mr. Simpson's nationalistic pieties, dedication to the Cold War, faith in American benevolence, or his reading of post-war international politics. He misses the irony in suggesting that we "stand in the position of ancient Athens" (p. 70).

Some of the author's "reformist" proposals are frightening. He admires the success of interest groups in Congress and suggests that the State Department follow the same tactics. One recommendation: the Department should "prepare material for a Congressman's constituents, visit his district, sound out the people and work at the grassroots for the support the Department needs from that Congressman and his constituents" (p. 183). This, one gathers, is what is meant by the consent of the governed. But there is more. Mr. Simpson is awed by the way the military has insinuated itself into virtually every interstice of the social order, and the State Department is advised to emulate such practices. If this book represents the thought processes of ranking bureaucrats, Lasswell must be judged as correct in his developmental thesis concerning the rise of the garrison state.

The level of knowledge of society is revealed in the following items selected at random: "the general public demands to be kept as well informed as possible of current world developments" (p. 191); "the military mind is a practical mind—systematic, alert, trained to examine every allied or hostile organization" (p. 85); "almost from the beginning of our Republic to the eve of World War II, our nation sought to avoid profound entanglements in diplomacy" (p. 1); "political power does not accrue to any group of men according to logic, but only according to that group's capacity to assume responsibility" (p. 49). Chapter 9 is a typical chapter and deals with State Department-Congressional relations. It is most memorable for its failure to consider James Robinson's definitive work in the area, or, for that matter, any of the other empirical materials easily available. Mr. Simpson seems to suggest that he has gazed upon *terra incognita;* as a result, his propositions, when they are not downright silly, are more often wrong than right.

But most of the author's ire is directed against the staffing and administrative policies of the State Department, a worthy topic in itself. Here too, however, the peculiar myopia of this "study" is disconcerting; we are led to believe that we should be surprised by what the author alleges (actually fails) to have substantiated. Is it possible to engage in what is claimed to be a serious analysis of an organization without one reference to Blau, Selznick, Merton, Thompson, Presthus, Simon, Argyris, or *anyone* else who has dealt systematically with such matters (especially Argyris, who has himself recently completed a study of the State Department)? Instead every cliche in the archaic administrative literature is reiterated. If social scientists ever hoped that the relevance of their work would penetrate beyond academe, here is pause for reflection. To Mr. Simpson, the careerism and dilettantism in the State Department proceed from poor training, frequent rotation, invidious efficiency reports, the lack of a general administrative manager, and the like, and not, apparently, from the distribution of power and cultural values in the broader society. Things are so serious that our failure in Vietnam is laid to such factors. That the failure is one of ideology and not of management, of a counter-revolutionary power in a revolutionary world and not of technique, is a point that the author does not, perhaps cannot, raise. Nor is it clear, as he alleges, that the State Department lacks an overall plan, a grand strategy, in world affairs. A plausible case can be made that there is such a plan, derived from an anti-Communist consensus, a quasi-religious doctrine of a Great Conspiracy, that unites all the power centers of American society from the radical right to the "pragmatic, hard-headed" liberals of whom one hears so much. And so it goes, one unexamined proposition after another, too many by far to touch upon here.

This book is a polemic, a genre of rare social importance when properly exploited. A polemic uninformed by knowledge, however, can be a positive danger to the extent that it misinforms, misleads, perpetuates myths, and fails to examine its own premises. There is no good reason why anyone should read this book, just as there is no good reason why the editors at Houghton Mifflin chose to think otherwise.—L. L. WADE, *Purdue University*.

The Invention of the American Political Parties. BY ROY F. NICHOLS. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967. Pp. xi, 416. $8.95.)

The achievement of system in the conduct of competitive electoral politics makes the eighteen-fifties a landmark in American national development. This is the decade that is thought to have seen the establishment of the modern party system: dominance of national nominations and elections by two contending groups, each interregional in its following, cohering around a formally adopted platform, governed by agreed-upon rules and legitimated leaders, and served by an enduring organizational apparatus.

Here, too, culminated what Roy F. Nichols asserts to be "a long and devious evolution" reaching deep into the old world past. To retrieve the threads of the evolution that eventuated in the party system of the eighteen-fifties is the task he undertakes in this book.

The result is an engaging, well-written traditional political history having all the virtues of its genre. There are no methodological paraphernalia to obtrude upon the text, less than a dozen footnotes to clutter it, no surfeit of hypotheses to smother the subject. Analytic points are cleanly segregated in brief, rare paragraphs, leaving little to stand between the reader and history. And there is sufficient distance from "behavioralism" to remove that obstacle to felicitous prose.

Three main premises underlie the book: that political parties are electoral in origin and function; that the order they bring to a potentially chaotic competition for office is essential to the maintenance of elective government; and that parties, in one or another form, are at least as old as elections in western civilization.

The main concern of the book seems to be to show how the necessary functions of the party were served before modern parties were invented—"invented," in Nichols' sense, meaning instituted by custom rather than by law or constitution. On the proposition that the party is a "folk construct" having behavioral elements that are "both ancient and not indigenous to the United States," the first two-fifths of the book are devoted to carrying the reader from the overthrow of Cynewulf in 757, through English and colonial history, to the first election of George Washington. Thence the book settles into a more conventional narrative of nominating and electoral politics from caucus to convention, on the community, state, and national levels.

This is an edifying excursion, especially in the chapters on party development in the American colonies, which makes the book a lively successor to Dallinger's history of nominations. But there are disappointments.

The profusion of happenings, locales, personalities, and pasts embraced in the book fails to cohere as an evolutionary sequence which yielded, and therefore helps explain, the party developments of the eighteen-fifties. The modern party system springs as suddenly upon the historical horizon as ever, no more predictably, and still more in contrast than in continuity with the pre-institutional politics that apparently preceded it. The reader will judge for himself whether the book's failure to elicit an evolutionary process disproves its premise that the modern American national parties evolved from electoral and non-American origins, or whether this failure arises from the absence of an analytic framework that is salient to the processes of evolution and institutionalization. The result in any case is to make the book less useful as a study of party development than as a history of efforts to influence electoral outcomes.

Another disappointment is that the book's major premise, by acknowledging only an electoral origin and function for parties, tends to preclude consideration of their intragovernmental origins and functions. Despite the fact that governing persons are heavily implicated in the author's treatment of national electoral politics, the possibility that the structure, values, and problems of governing groups at Washington and in the state capitals had as much to do with American party formation as, for example, the politics of prenational New England, is never analytically confronted. Thus is lost an opportunity to explore, in a period of history which especially invites it, a most promising frontier for students of party development: the relationship between the electoral and the governmental functions of the national parties.

Essential knowledge of the political characteristics and problems of an era which culminated in the institutionalization of national electoral parties and—almost simultaneously—in the collapse of national government thus continues to lie beyond reach. Whether political science is sufficiently interested and innovative to retrieve it remains to be seen.—JAMES S. YOUNG, *Columbia University*.

Interstate Compacts in the Political Process. BY WELDON V. BARTON. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1967. Pp. 197. $5.00.)

The interstate compact is a unique device in our system of government, which attempts to solve a mutual problem between the contracting parties (state governments and often the national government) or establish a separate agency or district to attempt the solving. When such an agency or district is established, a new level or style of government is created which lies somewhere between state, national, and local government. Observers often see these compacts and their organizations as nothing more than vehicles set up by state administrators to work with a particular area of mutual concern in some nonpolitical manner.

This is a lively myth—that by placing a governmental function or problem somewhat outside our traditional three-level hierarchy of government in a special district or separate agency, it is thereby removed from the political system, with all its attendant vagaries. These districts and agencies supposedly divorce politics and administration, allowing for economy and efficiency of operation within their special charge.

Weldon Barton analyzes the political rather than the structural and legal aspects of compacts in various areas, and mostly succeeds in dispelling this myth of non-politics in interstate compacts. For example, a compact agency established to regulate an industry of interstate nature becomes part of that industry's elaborate political paraphernalia used to protect and further its interests in the government market place. An organization established to handle a particular metropolitan concern, such as transportation or port facilities, optimizes its chances of success and survival by choosing the least costly and controversial avenue, no matter what other demands or possibilities are asked of it by the original charter or other governmental bodies—even its parents. An interstate agency providing jointly for a state service becomes a semi-haven of professionalism working against any political or general governmental control. This does not depreciate their efforts, but points out their basic political nature, and the fact that politics follows the allocation of resources, no matter what the organization may be.

You can quibble with certain of Barton's facts and interpretations, for example, in the state service compacts chapter, and ask for more information and analysis in the discussion of the internal workings of the compact agencies. But the overall impact is inescapable—interstate compacts are a part of the political process and in fact are just one particular outcome among the many possible. "After all, the compact device is essentially a tool of the state and interests that make claims on society through the state governments" (p. 187). And he makes the point that the agency is less the representative of the party states than the permanent executive director and his staff, with their view of what the role of the agency is and what must be done.

At the time in our governmental history when the states are turning to interstate compacts more than ever before, analysts and reformers both are beginning to understand that such agencies and districts may actually hamper our system's ability to operate effectively and in some cases can even have exactly the opposite effect as intended when established. For the politics of these agencies is often one of separateness, of protectionism against the general governmental and political system which begat them.—THAD L. BEYLE, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.*

And Promises to Keep: The Southern Conference for Human Welfare, 1938–1948. BY THOMAS A. KRUEGER. (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1967. Pp. xi, 218. $6.50.)

A complex of Southern problems—social and economic, the region's natural resources, and the potential of its folk have proved irresistable stimulants to a variety of reformers. Single-objective groups have formed around such issues as lynching, poll tax, freight rates, and reapportionment. Other efforts have aimed at broader economic reforms in agriculture and industry. And then there have been those who dreamed of a reformation of the whole. Movements have come and gone and come again. The region has changed. The assessment of the relation between reform movements and change is difficult and rarely attempted.

And Promises to Keep tells the story of one of the most publicized and controversial attempts to establish and maintain a Southwide reform movement. The Southern Conference for Human Welfare sought to weld into one organization the reforming urges that had coalesced around a number of differing interests generally accepted as being associated with the problems of the South. The Conference's successes and failures were closely tied to this diversity of interest and to the events of the period—from late New Deal to early post World War II. The impetus of New Deal activity and the interest of the Roosevelts in the organization were important to its origins; the nation's involvement in the war provided a patriotic cover which facilitated united action. Unity was never complete, however; internal dissensions developed over the Conference's posture towards U.S. foreign policies. The disagreements were exacerbated by the vagaries of Soviet-Nazi relations.

What Thomas Krueger has done in this book is to assemble a large variety of details of organizational life, placed them somewhat loosely into the social framework of the period, and drawn conclusions about the effectiveness of the organization, the causes and impact of its internal disputes, and evaluated some of the actors—individual and organizational. In doing so he has performed several important services. The fact story, from extant records and latter day interviews, is quite useful and unique in its breadth of coverage. Its relevance extends beyond persons with special interest in the Southern Conference for Human Welfare. It touches events related to the development of the labor movement in the region, to New Deal politics, and to social action movements in the South.

Although the author qualifies statements about the organization's effectiveness, he hardly lays the ground for the harshness of his final evaluation: that pragmatically it was "almost without importance" and that "the balance sheet shows the Conference an over-all failure" (pp. 192–193). I think in this he has been at once realistic in judging the Conference's impact on the affairs of the region and unrealistic in the yardstick employed. Professor Krueger seems to recognize this when he concludes that the Conference's importance was derived from making the effort to promote constructive ideas and not from measurable results. In general, he does not make the mistake of applying today's standards to yesterday's effort, but his judgment of events is uneven. It is difficult, for instance, to accept, after his own description, that the Conference almost became the leader of all Southern reform organizations (p. 111). Similarly, his explanation of the demise of crucial C.I.O. support seems insufficient for an event so important to the organization's fiscal and political health.

Professor Krueger tackles the tangled web of relations that revolved around the allegations that the organization was significantly dominated or subverted by Communists or their sympathizers. His conclusion is that the Communists were loyal Conference participants and in fact less subversive of its goals than other groups which sought to bend it to their own purposes. He denies that some of those chiefly alleged to be Communists were vulnerable to the charge and shows them in the main to have been organizational loyalists. Although he has instructive things to say at this point, and his judgment should be welcomed as the end result of a careful investigation, he has drawn the issues too simply. His judgment could be correct, but it is not supported by the kind of fact which either doubters or objective analysts will find conclusive. It is doubtful that a fact case can be made which would show with finality significant Communist domination or refute it.

The author's main contribution in the discussion of the Communist role is (1) to remind us that the Conference, as an agency for constructive purposes, was more than a battleground for ideologies; and (2) to show the debilitating effects of internal strife where suspicion either begets or is begat by conspiracy. Where a larger community is important to the organization and the battle extends to it, survival itself becomes difficult.

Despite some weaknesses of interpretation of specific events, and the probability of disagreement with portions of his main themes, Professor Krueger's book should be accepted as a worthwhile study of earlier-day social action in the South. There is in this book material worth pondering for those seeking reform today.—Emory F. Via, *University of Wisconsin.*

FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS

The Outlawed Party: Social Democracy in Germany, 1878–1890. By Vernon L. Lidtke. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966. Pp. vii, 365. $10.00.)

Albert Ballin: Business and Politics in Imperial Germany, 1888–1918. By Lamar Cecil. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967. Pp. xxi, 388. $9.00.)

The political and economic reconstruction that has characterized Western Germany since 1945 has taken place under disadvantageous circumstances. The immediately preceding regime, having permeated every facet and every level of German life for twelve intensive years, was internationally discredited and was for the next generation of Germans a continual source of embarrassment and shame. Germans therefore sought to lean instead upon the traditions and cultural associations of the earlier Republic and, perhaps more importantly, upon the legacy of the German Empire. It could not have been very surprising therefore that public affairs in Western Germany after 1949 should begin to take on the outward institutions of republicanism and the inner political and ideological dynamics of Wilhelmine Germany. That at least is the view of many careful students of German politics, and that must be the basic relevance to political science of these two excellent studies of class, party, and ideology in pre-World War I Germany.

The survival and prosperity of the Social Democratic Party during its years of outlawry in Germany are the subject of the volume by Vernon L. Lidtke. During the years of the "Socialist Law," which deprived the SPD of any manifest or public activity, the party leaders hurdled the major obstacles in the way of the party's becoming a major political force in Germany. Professor Lidtke has gone to some pains to demonstrate that these years of persecution and exile enabled the party to present a common front at a time of intense factionalism; that the then official hostility of German political elites widened more or less permanently the gap between the Lassallean/Eisenacher Socialists and the bourgeois liberals; and that the estrangement of social democracy from parliamentary liberalism yielded the supremacy of the Radicals under August Bebel and a heritage of uncertainty and ambivalence toward democratic and parliamentary political principles. In the process of the historical narrative Lidtke has unearthed a considerable body of fresh information and imposed on it an intelligent and sensitive interpretation.

The major thrust comes in chapters seven and eight, which treat the problems and implications of the SPD's first significant electoral gains and the consequences for the party of its deepening parliamentary involvement. It was not so difficult for Bebel and Liebknecht to lead the party into "unanimous rejection" of Bismarck's Imperial Social Welfare Program, which after all was one easy way to control the Lassallean "State Cult" within the party. Lidtke is convinced that no self-respecting socialist could have voted for the Accident Insurance Bill of 1884 in view of the harsh repression of his party by the Imperial Chancellor. It was quite another matter, however, to sweep under the rug the whole issue of the party's growth and of its relationship to the Reichstag after the important gains made in the elections the following fall.

Of some meaning for the growth of the party in the early and middle '80's was the rapid increase in the number of *Fachvereine*, local associations of skilled craftsmen. These local bodies, while usually beginning under the banner of political neutrality, inevitably gravitated toward the SPD. The net effect was to give an unmistakable impetus to the spread of Social Democratic ideas and attitudes. During the 1880's the Radicals adopted a positive parliamentary role for the party, seeking to retain the spirit of a protest movement while absorbing the common elements of modern parliamentary parties. This intensifying involvement was most evident in Saxony, where the Radicals were in clear control of the Social Democratic delegation to the State Diet. In effect they became parliamentarians. Changes such as these appear to have been accepted grudgingly by some (e.g., Bebel and Bernstein), optimistically by others, such as Wilhelm Liebknecht, who observed, "Our party gradually puts away childish things and emerges from its years of indiscretion" (p. 237).

Acceptance of a bona fide parliamentary status meant bargaining with the bourgeois parties. Added to this potential embarrassment was the larger danger stemming from the fact that most of the election gains of '84 were registered by moderates within the party. This latter fact troubled Bebel, Bernstein, and Engels; but they all, especially Bernstein, seemed to be groping their way toward realization that the SPD ". . . was necessarily becoming a modern parliamentary party which could not avoid involvement in all phases of the legislative process" (p. 193). Still, erosion of the party's anti-parliamentarism did not in any real sense clarify its commitment to a democratic republic. This issue remained shrouded in doubt and uncertainty and, in Lidtke's judgment, accounts for the failure of the Erfurt Program in 1891 to demand a republic.

This was the important legacy of the Socialist Law. Vernon Lidtke has passed on to the reader his own careful evaluations and familiarity with the political terrain, and he has compressed a long story into a modest volume. Overall it is an orderly and highly readable book.

Lamar Cecil's rather more personal study of Albert Ballin's business and political career covers some of the same ground and touches upon some of the same events and issues discussed in the Lidtke book. *Albert Ballin: Business and Politics in Imperial Germany, 1888–1918* is primarily a political biography, incidentally being a survey of the major social and economic changes of late 19th century Germany. There is a good deal of new information, mostly gleaned from existing documents and from memoirs and personal correspondence, that throws added light on Anglo-German naval rivalry and competition between these countries in commercial shipping at the turn of the century.

Albert Ballin was, among other things, managing director for twenty years of the HAPAG, at that time the world's largest shipping company. He was also a powerful spokesman for the *haute bourgeoisie* in the counsels of the traditional centers of influence: the royal family and the agrarian Junker nobility. As such Ballin is an appropriate subject for a student of German social history who wishes to delve into the relatively unexplored area of economy and social class in Imperial Germany. It is important for the reader to know, however, that Cecil's book is specifically concerned with Ballin's political and diplomatic associations; and apart from some early and very excellent material describing Germany's industrial and economic expansion, the book is dedicated almost entirely to Ballin's labyrinthine connections with the topmost political, diplomatic and military figures of the day.

It might be some cause for dissatisfaction that the author designs one study and conducts another. Having declared in the Preface that he sought, in concentrating on one man, to explore the question of why liberalism did not accompany industrialization in Germany and to produce a study of "the interaction of business and politics, businessmen and politicians" (p. ix), he then devotes the book to Ballin's sometimes cynical, sometimes quixotic, and always interesting liaisons with the incumbent elites of that period. Maybe this book is a case study, in which case the conclusions are sensible extrapolations from Ballin's career. Then it would make sense to conclude, as Cecil does, that members of the industrial upper middle class exaggerated their political importance, that they simply co-existed with—but were never absorbed by—the Prussian aristocracy; and that they were led by their own misunderstandings to dissociate themselves from the forces for liberal reforms in Germany.

Lamar Cecil's book is a work of careful scholarship written in a stylized manner. Like Lidtke's study it reflects the author's own intimate knowledge of the personalities of the time. Both these volumes have bibliographical essays and helpful indices.—EDWARD L. PINNEY, *Washington & Lee University*.

The Nazi Seizure of Power: The Experience of a Single German Town 1930–1935. BY WILLIAM SHERIDAN ALLEN. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965. Pp. xi, 345. $2.45, paper.)

William Sheridan Allen has written an illuminating account of the Nazi take-over in the town of "Thalburg" Germany. This book well deserves the critical acclaim which it has received in the two years since its appearance. It is extremely readable, carefully documented, and involves the reader in the atmosphere and circumstances of the Nazi rise to power. It provides an excellent complement to the studies of Hitler and the power struggle in Berlin in the crucial years of the Nazi rise, also to the general statistics and the theories of the meaning of Nazism to the analytical "man in the street." Seldom have the Nazi successes seemed more "reasonable," than in this concrete and detailed case-study.

Moreover, although the historical study presents a great deal of detail on day to day events in these important years, the author does not hesitate to go beyond these to build a more general explanation and, indeed, a theory of the local seizure of power. Allen emphasizes the divided social structure of the community in the pre-Nazi years, and the preparatory effect of the middle class's nationalism, militarist sympathies, and "paranoid" anti-Socialism. The contributing role of the SPD's outworn revolutionary ideology and insistence on pure class solidarity is also suggested. Both the fear of economic disaster and the limited nature of its impact on the middle class which formed the bulk of Nazi supporters (the workers, though hardest hit, backed the Socialists to the end) are documented. The dynamics of the radicalization and politicization of local life in the period of economic fears, constant political agitation, and virtually continuous election campaigning (there were seven major elections in Thalburg in 1931 and 1932 alone) are strikingly illustrated and analyzed. Both presentation and analysis represent outstanding use of the case-study for the clarification of broader concerns, historical, humanistic, and theoretical.

One major limitation of this excellent study, at least from the point of view of a political scientist, is its failure to draw in more explicit fashion on the previous analyses of the Nazi movement. Thus, the author suggests conclusions of great interest to the students of totalitarian movements without placing them in the context of more general theory. Although all the implications of Allen's findings cannot be discussed in this short space two points are of particular interest:

(1) Thalburg's citizens gave the Nazis over 60% of the vote in the last free elections, but such support did not arise out of masses of anomic individuals, without social and group ties. The town had, apparently, a very extensive social structure, involving the individual in numerous ways in the group life of the small (10,000) community. The social structure was, however,

bifurcated along class lines, with a few exceptions, and this bifurcation seems to have reinforced class misunderstanding and fear. With only a slight oversimplification, one could say that it was not the isolation of the individual which opened him to the appeals of the Nazi movement, but rather his involvement in a context of social fragmentation and political conflict which made him available to any movement which could coalesce his anti-"Marxist" hostilities with an explanation of current problems. Thalburg is the prototype of a fragmented community, not a mass society.

(2) Students of mass movements and public opinion should not overlook the documentation of the impact of continuous political conflict and violence upon the capacity of citizens to tolerate radical, repressive, and violent solutions to political problems. The intense and radical course of political conflict prepared the way, it would seem, for the institutionalization of terror.

Without greatly weakening its numerous positive contributions, the *Nazi Seizure of Power* also underscores a general problem in the use of historical case-studies: source material limits both description and analysis, and the currents of history erase certain types of data more systematically than others. As the author admits, a major gap in the chain of analysis is the inability to account for the early Nazi organization and support, except by a few hearsay references. The processes of coordination with national party movements, of ideological adaptation to local needs, of tactical decision-making and recruitment, are all unexplored. The memories of the few ex-Nazi supporters interviewed do not seem to have assisted in the analysis of intraparty Nazi activities, except in describing a quasi-resistance movement, or at least reaction against excesses, among the upper class. The materials to consider these matters, Allen notes, were simply not available in Thalburg. Given the pitfalls of historical retrospection and the stigma of past Nazi associations, such material is likely to be absent or systematically distorted in most cases. Social scientists who would use historical sources must continually bear in mind the probability of such bias. Those who have dealt with such data cannot fail to appreciate Mr. Allen's honest recognition of the problem and his scrupulous documentation of all sources.—G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *University of California, Berkeley.*

Cultura e partecipazione sociale nella città in trasformazione. By Umberto Melotti. (Milano: Casa editrice "La Culturale," 1966. L. 4.800.)

Subtitled "sociological research on the new cultural associations (*circoli culturali*) of the periphery and on the cultural situation in Milan," this work by a young Italian sociologist reflects some of the strengths and weaknesses of contemporary Italian social science. Melotti is deeply concerned with the cultural desert that has emerged in the poorly planned and socially fragmented neighborhoods around this modern industrial metropolis. He has studied fifty-four of the *circoli culturali* established to assist the population to understand and alter the environment; these associations organize debates, discussions, films, and many other types of presentations dealing with broadly cultural as well as narrowly political issues.

The author's personal involvement with the subject is obvious throughout; as a result, the book just misses being a polemic. But despite its excessive length and other weaknesses it manages to convey the frustration, alienation, idealism, and hope of the postwar generation growing up in the city that has done most to bring about the economic "boom." The author's attitude toward postwar prosperity is ambivalent. He explicitly rejects the "happy peasant dancing in the square" view of Italian traditional society; yet he continually compares—unfavorably—life in the dormitory sections of Milan with traditional village life. Although he rightly deplores the intellectual and social poverty of much of modern life, he nowhere considers that traditional society may not have offered much better to the millions who are fleeing to the cities. And where other social scientists might talk about the consequences of industrialization, the author blames everything on "neocapitalism," which he seems to consider the cause of all of the problems that face Milan. However, the meat of the book and my major criticisms lie elsewhere.

The research is based largely on local history and, especially, participant observation. The author seems to have visited all of the associations analyzed and to have attended numerous meetings of different kinds organized by them. He knows his area well and speaks with authority of the problems faced by the associations. However, treating each of the fifty-four cultural associations as a case study makes for an unnecessarily long book, renders generalization difficult, and misses a wonderful opportunity for systematic investigation of the leaders' and members' motivations and rewards.

But an author should not be criticized for a book he did not write. This book has several positive features. One is that the sheer repetition of the description of the environment of the various associations and the recounting of the problems that they have faced have a cumulative impact. While the author does demonstrate some general relationships, the reader can provide additional ones. The importance of political parties for creating and sustaining associations and the inevitable conflicts of interest that result are apparent. Many of the associations met at cooperatives that were themselves related to parties; others used the party headquarters; only a few possessed genuine independence. Most of them attempted, nevertheless, to maintain a critical, autonomous position vis-à-vis political issues. This was true even when the leading personalities of the association were enrolled in the Communist party. The Catholic associations tended to be closer to the church than to the Christian Democratic party; however, they escaped political only to run into religious pressures. This kind of problem seems to be inevitable, for, despite some noteworthy exceptions, without some type of pre-existing organizational base such as could be provided by the church, parties, or cooperatives it was difficult to create and sustain the associations.

One of the reasons for this difficulty was the low level of sophistication of the inhabitants of these neighborhoods. With rare exceptions, the lead in promoting activities was taken by a small nucleus that usually included several individuals with some higher education; these often were deeply involved in party politics, though just as often disillusioned with their party experiences. Several associations "folded" because of conflicts with parties; others ceased to function with the loss of interest or removal of a leader. Compounding the problem of low level of sophistication was that of a conflict of generations. Mutual incomprehension was the rule, complicating relations with parties, cooperatives, and churches alike. Finally, the rapid influx of immigrants from the countryside and from the South of Italy encouraged small, poorly integrated, but aloof enclaves that did not mix with one another and that rendered difficult the growth of community spirit.

As is well known, economic development substitutes one set of problems for another, and Italy in general and Milan in particular are now beginning to face the task of building communities in areas with no tradition, few points of public interaction, ethnic (the term is used by Melotti) diversity, and political and cultural fragmentation. It is the merit of Melotti that he has studied the problem empirically and suggested policies for improving the situation. He has not merely lamented and protested.—Samuel H. Barnes, *University of Michigan.*

La Fonction Parlementaire en Belgique: Mecanismes D'Acces et Images. By Frederic Debuyst. (Brussels: Centre de Recherche et D'Information Socio-Politiques C.R.I.S.P., 1967. Pp. 447.)

Those political scientists who would rather systematically study the smaller Western European democracies than slip them into general categories on the basis of superficial data, should be delighted with Mr. Debuyst's study of Belgian legislative politics. He presents a wealth of empirical data on a country that has been neglected by students of politics. Belgium's durability alone should have attracted our attention long ago, for a whole range of fascinating theoretical issues are raised when one wonders how this tiny nation has experienced such remarkable political stability despite frequent and intense disputes between Catholics and freethinkers, Flemings and Walloons and a populace that offers, at best, half-hearted support for its political system. This study, though not directly addressed to this problem, contains the kinds of substantive materials one needs before one can make sense of this complex nation.

Using the standard tools of legislative analysis, the author describes the backgrounds, recruitment, and role orientations of Belgian Deputies and Senators. With meticulous care, he first categorizes the SES characteristics of the 387 M.P.s sitting in the 1964–'65 session according to party affiliation and linguistic community. He accounts for much of his data by referring to aspects of the legislative environment, i.e., he explains differences in M.P.s' local political activity by their parties' successes in local elections providing data to support his argument (p. 131). This section is also distinguished by the numerous cross-national comparisons that point to such interesting findings as the higher proportion of Belgian than American, French, British, or Italian legislators with blue-collar backgrounds (p. 110). Regretfully he fails adequately to explain such differences.

Employing the responses from 76 personal interviews, he then explores the legislators' role orientations concentrating on questions of political socialization, strategies of access, and functional and representative roles. Though neither the questions nor the coding procedures are identical with those used by Wahlke *et al.* in their study of American legislators, one can easily draw comparisons from the two sets of data. After a slight manipulation of coding categories, one discovers that far fewer Belgian legislators, belonging as they do to well-organized, highly disciplined parties, see themselves filling the "Trustee" representative role (pp. 336–340). The results of this section are summarized in an imaginative typology including such types as, *Le Dirigeant*, *Le Sage*, *L'Electoriste* (pp. 396–400).

Unfortunately, the author's small sample leads him to generalize about the M.P.s of one party on the basis of only nine interviews. Furthermore, in reporting his findings, he relies far too heavily on illustrative quotes and far too little on tables. Consequently, the reader often feels he is coding the author's interviews rather than reading his results.

By referring to the parties' rules, available statistical data, and numerous case-studies, Mr. Debuyst clearly and expertly depicts how the Belgian parties permit their members to participate in the selection of legislative candidates through an intra-party election called the poll. A provincial view of the political universe, however, prevents him from exploiting the full theoretical richness of his material. Virtually ignoring the extensive literature on recruitment processes relevant to his subject, he explains such potentially provocative findings as differences in turnout for the poll among and within constituencies by vaguely alluding to members' interest and the presence of popular local figures without presenting any supportive data (pp. 262–266). Moreover, apparently not appreciating the uniqueness of the poll, he fails to ask why only Belgian and not British, French, or German parties willingly organize an intra-party election to choose their candidates.

He argues that the complex rules governing the poll tend to stabilize and institutionalize the recruitment process (p. 197). But evidence presented in the case studies suggests that, if the poll itself does not produce difficulties, it at least reflects already existing problems by bringing rival factions out from behind closed doors into the public eye. The poll may even aggravate delicate situations by provoking disputes over candidates' questionable behavior in soliciting members' votes and the application of its complex rules. He also claims that the poll responds to the six criteria used by the party to select their candidates (it is not made clear how he derived these criteria). But he fails to explain why the parties could not find representative candidates more easily, for example, by entrusting selection duties to a small group of party leaders.

A general and more serious difficulty with the study is the absence of any argument, thesis and/or theoretical model uniting the work's three sections. Each section stands as a separate unit independent of the others. No effort is made systematically to explore the possible relations between M.P.s' backgrounds and their role orientations or their backgrounds and how they are recruited.

The most intriguing hypothesis stated by the author is that Belgian political institutions do not satisfy politicians' power aspirations (p. 33). But in concluding he argues only that the Parliament fails to quench M.P.s' thirst for power. He supports this notion by stating that a number of M.P.s find greater satisfaction in their local than in their national positions (p. 406). But only 13 of 40 M.P.s accorded more *interest* to their local than to their national office (p. 352). This is far from convincing evidence.

These criticisms should not hide the fact that this is one of the first studies to present more than a polemical or legalistic account of Belgian legislative politics. For this reason alone, it is an important study for students of comparative politics and legislative behavior.—Jeffrey L. Obler, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.*

Teachers and Politics in France: A Pressure Group Study of the Fédération de l'Education Nationale. By James M. Clark. (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1967. Pp. xv, 197. $6.50.)

As all commentators on France are aware, trade unions in Gaul are divided into three parts: a Communist-led *Confédération Générale du Travail*, a pro-Christian Democratic *Confédération Démocratique du Travail* (itself further divided by the reluctance of old faithfuls to abandon the good ship CFTC), and a Socialist oriented *Force Ouvrière*. Working class disunity in France necessarily drives the political balance to the Right, makes effective action on behalf of labor exceedingly difficult, and thus reinforces the historic alienation of a large part of the nation from parliamentary institutions. The ideological fragmentation of the working class has a parallel in other major social groups. Farmers, businessmen, and such groups as veterans are also generally split among separate organizations with radically different political orientations.

Yet there are some exceptions to the rule of ideological fragmentation. A few groups have gone against the trend and are relatively independent of political parties. The major "autonomous" union in France is the Teachers Union (*Fédération de l'Education Nationale*—or FEN), with some 281,000 members as of 1961. Another unusual feature of this union is its ability to organize virtually the entire occupational category; well over 90 per cent of all teachers and other employees within the educational system are dues-paying members of the FEN. How has this happened? How successful is the FEN in maintaining its autonomy in view of the ideological divisions within the working class? Professor James M. Clark addresses himself to these questions and also undertakes a general analysis of the role of the FEN within the political system, in this well-researched and able monograph.

The present FEN was created in 1946 as a member union of the CGT. In December 1947 anti-communist elements within the CGT withdrew from that organization and created the *Force Ouvrière*. At this critical moment the leaders of the FEN also withdrew from the CGT. But they decided to refrain from entering the FO and instead to maintain "autonomy" from all political parties. This decision was ratified in a referendum of the membership by a margin of more than two to one. Professor Clark rightly emphasizes the unique elements of cohesion that permit the FEN to remain autonomous: an ideology of militant *laïcité* that affords divergent elements a satisfactory rallying point; a flexible structure which enables the opposing forces to be represented and to express their views within the union; and a record of effective collective bargaining on material conditions with the highly centralized Ministry of Education.

Nevertheless, the deep ideological divisions of the country are not entirely avoided. Teachers in the Catholic schools have their own union, whose membership, however, is small. Both the CGT and FO created rival teachers unions after the schism of 1948, though they failed to attract significant support. More important, the rivalry of communist and socialist groups within the FEN has persisted. On the basis of an analysis of votes on motions of general policy, Professor Clark estimates the pro-CGT group at about 25 per cent of the membership, the pro-FO at 10 per cent, and the revolutionary syndicalists at 5 per cent. Perhaps the key factor in the evolution of the FEN has been the keen determination of the leadership to stay out of a communist-dominated CGT and to prevent the Communists from taking over the FEN. The "autonomy" of the FEN is a bit misleading, then, since most of the leaders support the parties of the non-Communist Left, while perhaps one fourth of the members sympathize with the Communists.

In order to judge the effectiveness of the FEN as a pressure group, Clark offers case studies of the school laws of 1951 (*loi Barangé*) and 1959 (*loi Debré*). In both cases legislation providing for state subsidies to religious schools was passed over the opposition of the teachers. This failure is cited by the author as pointing up "some limitations on the effectiveness of pressure groups." But what about Catholic pressure groups, particularly the *Secrétariat* headed by Edouard Lizop? These pressure groups turned out to be highly effective. Clark's analysis of the *loi Barangé* is generally more detailed and more satisfactory than his treatment of the *loi Debré*. There is no mention in his account of the 1959 law of the role of General de Gaulle, though from other sources (for example, the study by Aline Coutrot) it is evident that he exerted considerable pressure. But my criticism is only an aside. This book is a well-written, model case study of a major French interest group.—Bernard E. Brown, *Brooklyn College of the City University of New York.*

Soviet Political Schools: The Communist Party Adult Instruction System. By Ellen Propper Mickiewicz. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967. Pp. vi, 190. $6.50.)

In the Soviet Union civics courses never seem to end. From the time he enters school until the time he dies, the Soviet citizen is systematically exposed to a comprehensive political belief system. The communication network that transmits and attempts to internalize such beliefs is indeed formidable. It includes the mass media, the arts, the educational system, and various "transmission belts" in the form of associational groupings. As if that were not enough, the regime also organizes explicit political learning through adult political schools. It is the latter which constitutes the focus of the present study.

The author has carefully examined every component part of this political instructional program. Her estimates of the program's success seem to this reviewer both reasonable and justified by the evidence. In this sense, she has filled an important gap in our knowledge of the Soviet political system.

In other respects, however, the book is less than satisfactory. Mrs. Mickiewicz asserts, for example, that Soviet political schools present the Western analyst with "a fascinating opportunity to explore the process of overt socialization." I agree wholeheartedly but the reader will search in vain for the author's exploitation of this opportunity. For neither explicitly nor implicitly does she use socialization theory to illuminate and evaluate the program she has chosen to study. This omission leads to some serious flaws in her analysis.

Mrs. Mickiewicz generally concludes that adult political schools are not very successful. Among the explanations for this failure, however, she nowhere suggests that the very overt and deliberate nature of the socialization program might be at fault. Yet the increasing literature of political socialization seems to agree that the process is most successful precisely when attitudes and beliefs are acquired unconsciously and unwittingly. Since Soviet political schools are distinguished by the absence of these qualities, one would expect that obvious difference to be raised when speculating about the probable causes for the program's failure.

The author's conclusions likewise leave doubts in this reviewer's mind. She argues that the program continues to exist despite its shortcomings because it eliminates some amount of leisure time, thereby enhancing the state's monopolization of the forces of socialization. This is tantamount to saying that the schools, the media, the "transmission belts," and other socializing agencies have been ineffective in their efforts to produce citizens with reliable political belief systems. Thus the regime is concerned lest its citizens spend too much time among themselves. Mrs. Mickiewicz may be correct, but a claim of this nature requires evidence. At a minimum the reader expects an elaboration of the argument. Nevertheless, the author avoids this necessity by reminding us that "the political instruction system is only one of many different influences that operate on the Soviet adult and it is not within the purview of this study to discuss the full environment of Soviet adulthood."

Personally, I do not share the view that the imposing array of socializing agencies has been ineffective. Even if that were the situation, it is hard to believe that the regime expects to achieve with a problem-plagued political instructional system what it has failed to achieve through the schools and other agencies of socialization firmly under its control.

Nor can I agree that the persisting rationale for the instructional system lies in "the advantages that can accrue to the setting in which group oral agitation takes place." No doubt the officials responsible for the schools cite such advantages as justification for the program. One suspects, however, that a more reasonable explanation might be found in the works of Robert Michels. After reading this book, I cannot help but feel that Soviet political schools represent a classic example of Michel's thesis. The maintenance and perpetuation of a bureaucratic organization has replaced the objectives for which that organization was originally established.—JOEL J. SCHWARTZ, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.*

The Social Democratic Movement in Prewar Japan. BY GEORGE OAKLEY TOTTEN III. [Studies on Japan's Social Democratic Parties, Vol. I] (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966. Pp. xv, 455. $12.50.)

Socialist Parties in Postwar Japan. BY ALLAN B. COLE, GEORGE O. TOTTEN, AND CECIL H. UYEHARA (with a chapter by Ronald P. Dore). [Studies on Japan's Social Democratic Parties, Vol. II] (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966. Pp. xvii, 490. $12.50.)

There have been repeated predictions (made by both Japanese and outsiders) that the Social Democratic Party would assume power in Japan by obtaining a majority, after a few more elections. Even Socialist activists' hopes have, however, been dashed as the opposition reached but has never surpassed the so-called "barrier of one third," reflected by the number of seats in the Diet. Conservatives have continued to roll up sizeable (if slightly decreasing) majorities. This pair of volumes goes into considerable detail to explain the obstacles faced by the opposition, specifically the non-communist Left, in Japan.

Both volumes will prove to be most useful to specialists on Japan. The second, on postwar socialism, will be more interesting to the political scientist who is a non-specialist so far as Japan is concerned. Despite Professor Totten's hopes (expressed in Vol. I) to identify "behavioral characteristics important for the comparative study of politics" and simultaneously to illuminate "the process of modernization in Japan," he uses primarily a historical approach. The author assumes considerable familiarity with the history of modern Japan on the part of his readers. His study of prewar social democracy is handled as historically significant in and for itself, and not simply as important for understanding the main opposition in Japanese politics today.

Nevertheless, there is an important tie between the movements, prewar and postwar, and Professor Totten's long analysis establishes the background for the collaborative study (in Vol. II). From the beginning, as the author explains, socialism in Japan displayed the usual Leftist features of factionalism which were overlaid on already divisive tendencies in a modernizing Japanese society.

Added to early and continued factionalism were the hostile environment in Japan, differences of opinion on what the functions of a "proletarian" or "progressive" party were to be, and poorly organized support for socialists among labor, peasants, women, and minority groups. These data are liberally illustrated by the author in numerous graphs and tables.

Perhaps most important in the postwar period, as the authors (of Vol. II) point out, are the profound changes—especially since 1957–59—which have affected Japan's industrial relations, the environment of proletarian politics. These include a spectacular economic growth; technological innovations with shifts in industry and in utilization of labor force; modernization of labor-management relations; increased productivity of labor; an improvement in income, consumption level, and welfare of most Japanese workers.

In socialist thinking about modern, industrialized societies, there have been two systems: one, operative in Japan and hence capable of concrete evaluation; the other, known to Japanese only in theory and from the experience of certain other countries. In the post-treaty period, while Japan has enjoyed rapid rates of growth, two leading "socialist" countries were experiencing serious difficulties. Japanese non-communist Marxists thus continued to underestimate the efficacy of monetary and fiscal measures by which "capitalist" governments have succeeded in limiting cyclical troughs to recessions instead of depressions.

Moreover, there has usually been a gap between more theoretically oriented Japanese politicians and intellectuals, on the one hand, and the common people, on the other. This gap is also reflected in two main concepts of the Social Democratic Party's nature, obvious since the first (postwar) convention in 1945: the first holds that it should be based on the working—especially industrial labor—class; the second, that it should reflect the interests of *all* revisionist strata. Socialists claim they recognize the importance of support by voters who belong neither to Japan's potent elite nor to the industrial working class (this middle strata constitutes 60–70 percent of the population). In fact, as the authors explain in almost agonizing detail, the SDP leans heavily on highly organized labor, particularly on the giant labor federation, *Sōhyo*; its leadership continues to be deeply factionalized; and it has exceedingly shallow roots, that is, it lacks a nation-wide organization.

To try to explain Socialist frustrations, the authors (of Vol. II) have combined a historical method with political description and analysis. Thus two opening chapters provide a retrospective summary (of what Professor Totten had covered in Vol. I), geared to phases of Party development. Five chapters on "Theories, Tactics and Policies" follow. Although Socialists have more often emphasized and split over foreign policy issues (Chap. 7), the validity and competence of economic proposals are given ample attention (Chaps. 5,6). In this analysis the authors enlisted the support of the Kokumin Keizai Kenkyū Kyōkai (National Economic Research Institute). Two chapters (Chaps. 8,9) on "Organization and Leadership" have been distilled from considerably longer manuscript treatments prepared by the team. One section (Chaps. 10,11,12) deals with "Electoral and Organized Support" (this parallels Part IV of Totten's companion volume). Ronald P. Dore prepared the excellent essay (Chap. 11) on the "Socialist Party and the Farmers." The "Conclusion" (Chap. 12) handles "Prospects and Problems." The study of postwar socialism too is greatly enhanced by graphic charts on chronology, organization, leadership factions, labor federation lineages, and farmers' union lineages; and by five tables.

It is plain from the authors' conclusion that Socialist criticism of "capitalism," "feudalistic survivals," and "authoritarianism"—these have less relevance to the real, contemporary world of Japan. On the other hand, emphasis on peace, collective security through the U.N. and other world agencies, a ban on nuclear testing—these have increased in relevance and carry wide appeal to the Japanese public. Socialists have had, and can continue to exert, an influence on ruling conservative policies.

These volumes are actually only two products of a joint research project, "Studies on Japan's Social Democratic Parties," in which Allan B. Cole, George Totten, Cecil Uyehara and others (including Japanese) have collaborated. Their research had earlier resulted in articles, annotated bibliographies, and monographs. As to the authors, Dr. Cole has written numerous volumes on China and Japan; he is Professor of East Asian Affairs at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Dr. Totten is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Southern California. Mr. Uyehara, who compiled *Left-Wing Social Movements in Japan: An Annotated Bibliography*, is now attached to the U.S. Bureau of the Budget.—ARDATH W. BURKS, *Rutgers—The State University.*

Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure. BY F. C. ENGELMANN AND M. A. SCHWARTZ. (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., 1967. Pp. 277, index and bibliography. $3.75 paper.)

The American scholar interested in the Canadian political scene has long complained of the dearth of literature on the party system of his northern neighbor. There are books of readings, chapters in textbooks designed for secondary schools or freshmen classes, and occasional books dealing with specific parties, leaders, or elections. There has been no serious analytic work on the party system. Political scientists should be grateful to Engelmann and Schwartz for having made the first move in this direction.

Unfortunately, perhaps because it is a seminal work, there are many significant weaknesses, particularly with regard to the theoretical and legal aspects.

The social milieu in which the Canadian political system must operate is a peculiar hybrid. The British parliamentary system is transplanted onto a bi-ethnic culture and a federal structure in which loyalties are frequently more provincial or linguistic than national. Compounding the situation is the omnipresence of the gargantuan neighbor to the south whose influence, via the media of mass communications, is pervasive. The book merely scratches the surface of these factors—particularly the last—which have created the uniquely Canadian political situation.

A few of the book's more obvious weaknesses involve influence groups, choice of leadership, and ecclesiastic influence. The weakest section deals with interest groups in the Canadian setting; and this is attributable to the lack of literature in the field. To the authors' credit they do not accept the longheld Canadian myth that interest groups are virtually non-existant there. They recognize the existence of these groups and concede that "the impact of interest groups on [Canadian] parties makes it possible to have day-to-day opinion affect policy decisions" and that such decisions are "influenced strongly by demands stemming from interest groups." Moreover they note the impact of interest groups on the bureaucracy and royal commissions. But the discussion of pressure groups in the Canadian political system lacks depth and ignores almost completely the legal position of groups, particularly professional associations. This is a serious flaw, for professional interest groups in Canada, unlike their counterparts in the United States, have semi-official status. Thus professional associations in most Canadian provinces have licensing power which is reserved to the state governments in the United States. The result of such legal power can be seen in the difficulty Asian doctors find when they attempt to practice in Ontario, or which osteopaths encounter when they seek legal status in some provinces, or which confront governments seeking to implement policies opposed by such associations. A well-documented literature demonstrating this power exists in the various studies of the Saskatchewan Medicare crisis of 1962. The role of the College of Physicians and Surgeons (Saskatchewan's medical society), in thwarting universal medical insurance in that province for almost ten years and finally forcing modifications in it which weakened it perceptibly, should have been examined to emphasize the legal power of the professional interest groups.

Besides being rather thin, the discussion of the choice of party leader was also outdated before it was published. The removal of Diefenbaker as leader of the Progressive Conservative Party—which occurred after the book was written but before it was published—belied the authors' thesis that the "tenure of a Canadian party leader extends to his death, retirement, or resignation." Although this may have been the case previously, it is no longer true; the tenure of the leader of an opposition party is no longer at his pleasure. Moreover, the book does not consider the underlying pressures which are vital in the choice of a new party leader. Neither is the convention system analyzed except from an institutional point of view.

On the issue of the role of religion in Canadian politics the authors again make assertions which are open to question. For example, Engelmann and Schwartz claim that "the pervasiveness of the Catholic Church [in Quebec politics] shows signs of weakening." No proof is presented for this statement and a serious study of the 1966 provincial election might well indicate that opposition by clergy to the proposed secularization of the educational system was a deciding factor in the defeat of the Liberal government by the *Union Nationale.*

A minor weakness which ought also to be mentioned is the inaccuracy of the index: Major C. H. Douglas, the British founder of Social Credit, is several times mistaken for T. C. Douglas, leader of the New Democratic Party.

There is one strong point to the book; its discussion of the relation of provincial to national parties. A provincial party and the national party may have little in common on policy issues, as Engelmann and Schwartz point out. Yet, as the authors make clear, the provincial and national parties cannot ignore each other. The provincial parties influence the choice of national leadership and provincial premiers do, at times, come from the ranks of members of the federal Parliament.

By far the most serious criticism of the book must be its failure to answer the most critical questions now facing Canadian politics: Will Canada's political system remain viable in view of the development of provincial particularism and ethnic difference? Is the modified two party system to remain unimpaired or, assuming that the semi-Socialist New Democratic Party emerges as a major force, will the Progressive Conservatives and Liberals follow the example of the Country and Liberal Parties of Australia and form an electoral alliance to prevent an NDP victory?

Despite omissions and weaknesses this book is an important contribution to the literature of Canadian politics primarily because it opens the path to further work in the field.—BERNARD K. JOHNPOLL, *State University of New York at Albany.*

Latin American Christian Democratic Parties. BY EDWARD J. WILLIAMS. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1967. Pp. x, 305. $7.50.)

Two or three years ago, in a rather extended correspondence this reviewer had with a Catholic bishop in Latin America, who need not be named, he (the bishop) ventured the opinion that Latin America had only two generic political parties that were aware of the plight of the masses and were advancing programs to do something about it: the Communist and the Christian Democratic. He did not, interestingly, include the left-of-center democratic parties, which may be said to be generically related. Considering the credentials of the author of the comment, inclusion of the first is quite unusual, of the second entirely natural.

Latin American Communists have been extensively and effectively analyzed, notably in the volumes by Alexander and Poppino. The family of Christian Democratic parties receives really its first due—and a very good treatment it is—in Professor Williams' volume. Probably the author himself would be the first to admit that his study is not definitive, that much more plowing could profitably be done. Nonetheless, the present book is an excellent, thoughtful, and comprehensive introduction to the subject.

In three introductory chapters Williams sets the "backdrop" for the movement in Latin America. Six additional chapters consider such aspects as the parties'general characteristics and organization, their domestic, economic, and international policies and programs, and their relations with the military, the Catholic Church, and other "political forces." Two concluding chapters provide as assessment, conveniently divided into minuses and pluses.

Election of Eduardo Frei as president of Chile in 1964 seemed to climax a meteoric rise of Christian Democracy in Latin America—essentially a post-World-War-II phenomenon—and to mark the advent of a permanent and major new force on the Latin American political scene; some of its more perfervid friends were calling it the wave of Latin America's political future. By now, even Chile's Christian Democratic party, easily Latin America's best organized and most successful, has demonstrated that it is subject to the schisms and frailties that are unfortunately so characteristic of virtually all Latin American parties. But granting their weaknesses, we still must reckon these parties to be a highly significant addition to the general party spectrum in Latin America.

Williams' study is based primarily on secondary materials available in the United States and Venezuela. It would have been improved had the author had an opportunity to observe at first hand the campaigning and elections, the conventions and candidates in Chile and other countries where Christian Democracy is active. That can wait on other students who will till the same field. And it cannot detract from a pioneering venture of outstanding merit.—RUSSELL H. FITZGIBBON, *University of California, Santa Barabara.*

Comparative Political Development: The Precedent of the West. BY G. LOWELL FIELD. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967. Pp. xi, 242. $6.76.)

The application of empirical theory to the rich resources of Western historical scholarship is the task to which Professor Field's book addresses itself. His endeavor is inherently as interesting as it is ambitious: to classify types of political regimes and to postulate a series of transformation laws which govern the process of political change. The focus of his study is upon European and Europeanized nation-states, but, as the subtitle suggests, he views his study as having general relevance for students of political development.

Professor Field begins his analysis by developing a typology of political regimes and levels of socio-economic development. While he suggests a number of empirical classification criteria, his categories are based essentially upon types of political orientations held by various elite and mass participants in the political system. The author then utilizes his framework in a panoramic analysis of the recent history of Western "polities." He concludes that Western nations have experienced remarkable continuities of regime types, and that most apparent political change has involved only the evolution of specific sub-types. Field continues with a presentation of his formal theory which explains these historical regularities in terms of polar political orientations which he labels "status-assertion" and "management." As societies become bureaucratized, he argues, the first of these orientations gives way to the second—a process which changes the range of alternative approaches to political activity which the elite may effectively employ. He then offers a list of hypotheses to explain the rules governing both viable persistence and transformation of regimes. The concluding chapters deal with the implications of Field's theory for both non-Western societies and highly developed Western nations.

One of the first things to strike the reader about Professor Field's theoretical summary of the developmental process is that, by restricting his analysis almost entirely to the effects of bureaucratization upon elite and mass attitudes, he has taken for granted much of what other theorists have regarded as fascinating material for empirical investigation. Such other development theorists as Gabriel Almond, David Apter, Lucian Pye, and, recently, Robert Holt and John Turner have all been concerned, for example, with the way political systems reach accommodation with the cultural, social, and material setting. Field explicitly rejects this approach and admits that his book ". . . fails almost entirely to make contact with most extant writings on the subject" (p. 218). He feels that much of the literature aims at finding ways in which ". . . a governable territorial political entity of greater than tribal scope may be created" while his own approach assumes ". . . a territorial political entity capable of being governed" and asks by what methods it can be ruled (p. 218). The reader may regret that, by neglecting the main body of scholarship in this field, the author has deprived his theoretical formulation of that infrastructure of theory and empirical research which political scientists have painfully accumulated in recent decades. Indeed, it is remarkable that not even the considerable body of data on mass political attitudes—a matter of some importance to Field's theory—has found its way onto the pages of his work.

While the theoretical system offered by Professor Field raises many perplexing questions, one of its most basic difficulties stems from its lack of mutually exclusive criteria for the classification of political regimes. Field identifies three main categories of regimes on the basis of ". . . the stereotypes through which political activity is perceived by participants" (p. 15). Two of these, the "consensual" and "main-stem" types, are based respectively upon the degree of value consensus or dissensus among the governing elite. With no apparent consistency, the third category, "utopian regimes," is identified by the fact that its elite professes a single ideology. Such a criterion, of course, leaves open the possibility that utopian elites may also perceive a basic consensus or dissensus of values among themselves. Since an elite may possess more than one of the classifying characteristics, the validity of these criteria as instruments of classification is seriously compromised.

Typical of other problems arising from Field's treatment are the ambiguities created by his frequent use of what might be called quasi-definitions. In setting out the empirical criteria intended to make the theory operational, for example, he has chosen to employ words and phrases that have no precise operational meaning. Hence, we are told that this or that criterion applies when ". . . the regime obviously accepts a practical subordination . . ." (p. 28), or when ". . . a reasonably well-informed participant would regard such events as within the range of practical politics" (p. 31). The ample stock of such quasi-definitions contained in the first two chapters deprives Field's theoretical statement of much of the significance which it might otherwise have attained.

In spite of the obvious difficulties it raises, Field's theoretical analysis does succeed in bringing a freshness of approach to many familiar concepts. He gives a new perspective, for example, to the difference between ideological and non-ideological styles of politics, and he imparts a new coloration to the old polarity between the political right and left. One's reading of Western history certainly must be altered by the insights that he provides. It may well be that a fuller explication of the interesting conceptualizations which he offers would remove many of their ambiguities and establish them as genuine contributions. It is, in fact, as a preliminary statement of his theoretical position that Professor Field's work is likely to be received and commented upon by students of political development.—WARREN L. MASON, *Miami University* (*Ohio*).

Politics in Brazil, 1930–1964. BY THOMAS E. SKIDMORE. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967. Pp. xviii, 446. $8.75.)

Perspectives of Brazilian History. ED. BY E. BRADFORD BURNS. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. Pp. x, 234. $7.50.)

Brazil projects the image of a stumbling groping young giant unable to master the art of political stability, attain economic prosperity, or provide social justice for its citizens. Two crucial questions exist. First, can Brazil develop a political system which will answer the demands of the majority without a bloodbath? Second, can the United States and Brazil live together as allies or must the two nations face each other as dangerous enemies in the years ahead. Tied in with this last question is the nagging query of how much responsibility must the United States assume for Brazil's internal failures. Professor Thomas Skidmore provides some valuable clues for answering these questions by describing and probing Brazil's political history from 1930 to 1964.

The major point of view of Professor Skidmore is that since 1930 the pace of Brazilian politics has dangerously quickened as populist leaders have appeared. A populist leader, according to Skidmore, is one who appeals to the urban mass electorate and relies on a direct emotional appeal based on economic issues. Men who fit this description are Vargas, Kubitschek, Quadros and Goulart. The book claims a deadlock exists as a result of the populist challenge to the traditional elite, the power brokers, and the old political establishment. When the last of the populists, Goulart, turned out to be so inept and incompetent that he turned too far left without accurately assessing how little real strength there existed in the popular forces, his government collapsed in shambles and the military stepped into the power vaccum.

Another yet unstated major theme which runs through Mr. Skidmore's book concerns the role of the military in the political affairs of the nation. Throughout the fact-crammed eight chapters and the epilogue, the military are constantly singled out for mention. According to the author, when Goulart's administration fell in March, 1964, it demonstrated that the Brazilian army was for the first time united in an ideological stance against populism. This reviewer feels the case is over stated and that the army was not making a negative move against populism as much as it was taking positive action to prevent the complete destruction of an economic and political structure which had successfully evolved after four hundred years of trial and error. What did shake the electorate and the civilian political establishment was the army's refusal to return to their barracks after the golpe.

Former President Jânio Quadros is let off too easily by Mr. Skidmore. Though Quadros only governed seven months, his election victory in 1960 meant so much to the average Brazilian that his criminal flight from the responsibilities of the Executive Office killed the voters' self-confidence in democratic government. If there is any villain in Brazilian politics from 1930 to 1964 it is Jânio Quadros. And he was not forced out of office by the military. The problem of governing the nation from the isolation of Brasília is clearly brought out.

Mr. Skidmore feels that Goulart's overthrow brought an end to democratic politics. But Brazilian politicians, military and civilian, are very pragmatic. There is always a political bargain to be reached, a compromise to be worked out which covers an amazingly broad spectrum of the population. The book should enlighten many as to the murky course of Brazilian affairs. There is an excellent and comprehensive bibliography.

Professor E. Bradford Burns has brought together nine penetrating essays on Brazilian historiography that will give the North American reader an opportunity to sample the breath, subtlety, and incredible diversity of Brazil's past.

Although each author focuses on a different aspect of Brazil's historical past there seems to be an almost overly self-conscious probing and analysis in an attempt to bring some form and special meaning into the events of the past four hundred years. The various essays also give the impression that one is being let in on a family quarrel concerning how the nation's history should be written. Some sound like a Brazilian version of the Beard-Parrington-Brown type of polemic. The criteria used by editor Burns for the selection of the essays were based on whether they probed Brazil's past, provided wider perspective, served as critical selective guides to the historical literature, and provided some discussion of the major problems posed by the study of the evolution of Brazil. A big order.

With the exception of Karl Friedrich Philipp von Martius and Bradford Burns, all the contributors are Brazilians. The best are those by José Honório Rodrigues who contributed "The Periodization of Brazilian History," "Problems in Brazilian History and Historiography," and "Capistrano de Abreu and Brazilian Historiography." Caio Prado Junior discusses the Second Empire of Dom Pedro II, 1841 to 1889 while Sérgio Buarque de Holanda deftly handles historical thought in twentieth century Brazil. Books on Brazil's recent past according to Buarque de Holanda have simultaneously clarified and distorted facts by characterizing them in a particularly nationalistic manner. To this the author of this review can add a hearty amen. There are also articles by Pedro Moacyre Campos, Oiliam José, and a famous critique of Francisco Adolfo de Varnhagen by Capistrano de Abreu. The interesting quarrel concerning the status of Varnhagen (1816–1878), who is considered the father of Brazilian historiography because of his *História Geral* published in the years 1854 to 1857 is well aired. Nearly every essayist takes a position on Varnhagen, either to damn the man, praise him or do both. The major charges brought against historian Varnhagen are that he standardized the nation's past, demolished its distinctive features, and in the resulting history the Brazilian colors faded.

In contrast, Capistrano de Abreu, (1854–1927), acknowledged as Brazil's best historian as the result of his *Os Capítulos de História Colonial* (*1500–1800*) which appeared in 1907 is considered the "most perfect synthesis ever achieved in Brazilian historiography." An earlier work *Os Caminhos Antiguas e o Povoamento do Brasil* published in 1889 defined the major themes of the colonial period. Abreu insisted that only by a study of Brazil's backlands and the trails that led into it could one really understand the nation's past. The impact of this book on Brazilian historiography is what Frederick Jackson Turner's frontier thesis was for American historiography.—JORDAN M. YOUNG, *Pace College.*

The Brazilian Revolution of 1930 and the Aftermath. BY JORDAN M. YOUNG. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1967. Pp. xi, 156. $6.00.)

Students of Brazil will inevitably compare Young's book with Thomas Skidmore's more intensive study covering the same period and published about the same time. The two are complementary in the sense that Young concentrates on the Vargas period and especially the events leading to the 1930 revolution itself, while Skidmore's main emphasis is on the post-Vargas period. Young's discussion of the "revolution" is more skillfully done that that of the "aftermath."

The account is predominantly factual and while much of it is based on secondary sources, a rich increment was obtained from interviews with such key figures as Osvaldo Aranha and General Góes Monteiro among others. Vargas himself invited the author for an interview in 1950, but the U.S. Department of State unfortunately succeeded in convincing the author not to accept.

Despite the author's cautious interpretations, the brevity of the study inevitably magnifies interpretation through the selection of subjects for comment. The book is optimistic with reference to Brazil's prospects for democratic political development, though somewhat unconvincingly. Considerable emphasis is given to political party activity which is a poor indicator of interest aggregation in Brazil, even during the periods of relatively free party activity.

Vargas' strategies in dealing with elements to the left and with the military and economic elites are carefully described. The implications of these moves are left to the reader's imagination, and properly so in view of the plethora of unanswered questions. It might have been useful, however, to pose such questions as why Vargas felt he could (or had to) neutralize the military by encouraging the left (e.g., the release of Prestes from prison in 1945); why Vargas feared elections while cultivating a mass political base and decisively proving his electoral appeal in 1950; why Vargas did not choose to continue to rely on his apparently secure military base and his close relationship with Góes Monteiro? These continue to be some of the tough questions.

Young's book is a fine contribution to the burgeoning literature in English on Brazil. One can raise some questions of emphasis or omission, however, which seem important to this reviewer. Why was there no mention of the role of Vargas in the formation of the PSD and PTB parties? Why was *administrative* chaos stressed during the Goulart regime when it may be argued that administrative continuity was the only thing that held the country together (in another sense administrative chaos has been endemic since the monarchy)? Goulart's forte was *political* chaos. Why was the breaking of the hold of São Paulo on Brazilian politics a good thing for the country in view of the alternatives?

Finally, the dominance of executive government in Brazil may be more apparent than real. Brazilian presidents have spent considerable effort in simply assembling the power to govern. It may be a defect of this and most other books on Brazilian politics that there is no discussion of bureaucratic power and the hiatus between president and bureaucracy. The manifest political action of the military has obscured the less decisive but perhaps more continuous power exercised by the civilian bureaucracy, especially since the growth of new state activities which began in the Vargas era.—ROBERT T. DALAND, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.*

Boston University Papers on Africa, Transition in African Politics. ED. BY JEFFREY BUTLER AND A. A. CASTAGNO. (Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Public Affairs, Frederick A. Praeger, New York: 1967. Pp. ix, 342. $15.00.)

This edited volume consists of twelve papers delivered at a Boston University Seminar on African Politics in the years 1963–1965. In their brief introduction to the work, the editors note that a persistent problem with edited studies is the "time lapse between presentation of the manuscripts and publication," but they argue that the

> value of such volumes exists not so much in whether they keep us informed of the most recent events but whether they add to our understanding of political phenomena in Africa.

And, judged by the intuitively more difficult (but empirically, more vague) standard of "adding to our understanding," the majority of the papers in the book achieve considerable and significant success.

Victor C. Ferkiss, in a "Prolegomenon" to "Religion and Politics in Independent African States," has taken the very necessary and useful first step of viewing religious affiliation as "an important variable in the African political process." Frequently the African studies community has tended to dismiss externally imposed and supported religions as vestiges of the colonial period, while at the same time admitting that religious groups have an extraordinary degree of control over educational policies in many parts of independent Africa. Ferkiss reasons forcefully that the origins of religious affiliation are not as important as the behavioral consequences of that affiliation, and that it would be a major error to regard a Christian affiliation as a recent acquisition of little import. At the conclusion of his paper he presents in table form what scant data exists on religious affiliations in independent African states and offers a series of headings for future research.

Dorothy Nelkin's "Pan-African Trade-Union Organization" is the only other paper of the twelve with a continent-wide focus, as the remaining contributions deal with events and issues in individual states. Of these articles, five concentrate on the East African states of Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. William H. Friedland, for example, offers a valuable and detailed case study of relations between the Tanzanian nationalist party and the trade union movement before and after independence in his "Cooperation, Conflict and Conscription: TANU-TFL Relations, 1955–1964." Friedland's description of Tanzanian events could serve as a model of how African trade unions in the more mobilized independent states lost their freedom of independent action and decision. Friedland relates the cautious alliance between party and union in the pre-independence period, notes the borrowing and further politicization of the more astute union leaders by the party, and discusses the eventual breakdown of rapport in the independence period and the inevitable "conscription" of the union organization to Governmental demands. Friedland neatly summarizes the entirety of the issue by concluding that the

> TFL (Tanganyika Federation of Labor) was seen to represent the special interests of a minority of the population seeking to extract maximum concessions for its members at the cost of economic development of the nation.

Of special interest to the student of Tanzanian events is Friedland's discussion of the unions' role in the abortive mutiny of January, 1964. The central Government recovered rapidly after an initial and almost total collapse, and utilized the crisis period to jail close to 200 union leaders, though their role in the essentially military uprising was questionable. Though Tanzania has experienced significant labor problems since that date, the detention of the experienced and vocal union leadership effectively ended the trade union movement as an independent and competitive force in Tanzanian political affairs.

Harvey Glickman's contribution, "Dilemmas of Political Theory in an African Context: The Ideology of Julius Nyerere," is a balanced and practical assessment of the political thought of the Tanzanian President that avoids what Ali Mazrui has recently termed as "Tanzaphilia"—an effusive and perhaps excessive admiration for any or all pronouncements of the—admittedly—intellectually attractive Nyerere. Further, Glickman is sufficiently wise so as to avoid a characterization of Nyerere as either a complete product of his situation, or as its ultimate producer, and by so doing, he profitably ignores a lengthy discourse on the essential meaning of ideology. Glickman asserts that Nyerere's view of the past and his hope for the future is based on a "solidaristic" conception of society; i.e., Nyerere views African society as both communal and egalitarian. It may not be useful to coin a new term to cover a series of phenomena which (as Glickman notes) Nyerere himself describes as "socialism," especially in light of events in Tanzania since February, 1967, but this is not a major point. What matters is that Glickman has constructed a lucid arrangement and interpretation of the most important statements of Julius Nyerere, and—with skillful simplicity—has placed these statements in the total Tanzanian and African political context. In combination with the recently published edition of Nyerere's major writings and speeches, Glickman's piece will undoubtedly become required reading in the political thought sections of African politics' seminars.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr. has contributed a most interesting chapter on an insufficiently studied subject in his "TANU and UPC: The Impact of Independence on Two African Nationalist Parties." Nye begins by giving brief, but fairly complete and very useful outlines of the past and present organizations of both the Tanzanian and the Ugandan parties, and notes that independence led TANU to concern itself with a maintenance of a strong position, while Ugandan independence led the UPC to attempt to improve a rather tenuous position. Nye's conclusions are cautious and non-predictive for he admits that many uninvestigated variables are involved, as well as brevity of time elapsed since independence, and these two factors make for an imperfect assessment of the impact of independence on the organization of the two movements. Nye concludes:

> . . . the difference in the impact of independence on the two parties is attributable to the importance of the old colonial government machinery in a condition of scarcity of skilled administrators. In Tanganyika, the government competed with a bureaucratized party for this scarce resource and in doing so weakened the party; in Uganda the government served as a substitute for a non-bureaucratized party and in building up this scarce resource, strengthened the party.

Other contributors to this volume include Arnold Zack, Leslie Rubin, Robert H. Edwards—whose "Political and Constitutional Change in the Bechuanaland Protectorate" provides some very necessary background information on the young nation of Botswana,—George Jenkins, Terrence K. Hopkins, Donald Rothchild and Lucy Behrman. Though the editors have anticipated the standard criticisms of edited volumes—that some papers are out of date and that the contributions are of "uneven quality"—this compilation, as all others, is subject to the same statements. Given these shortcomings, the work as a tenuous whole emerges a cut well above the average, and both the instructor and the researcher will find much of the volume of both interest and utility. FRED G. BURKE AND JOHN R. NELLIS, *Syracuse University*.

Patterns of African Development. ED. BY HERBERT J. SPIRO. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967. Pp. 144. $4.95.)

This book, a collection of essays delivered at the 1965 African Studies Association meeting, illustrates several trends characterizing the study of nations. First is the focus on "development." With their diverse, often conflicting interpretations of development, these five essays reflect the current ambiguous status of this concept. Drawing upon his rich knowledge of constitutional history, Carl Friedrich focuses on development as a legal process. Ibrahim Abu-Lughod and Ali Mazrui consider the cultural, i.e., ideological, aspects of national development. Influenced by the ideas of Samuel Huntington, Claude Welch views modernization as the development of political institutions. In a concluding essay, Herbert Spiro contends that Africa is now experiencing the "development of politics," the meaning of which he never makes fully clear.

A second trend revolves around the attempt to discover empirical similarities in the political development of all nations. These essays do not reveal a geographic provincialism. Rather, the authors seek to understand Africa in light of the political development of other parts of the world, namely, Western Europe, Japan, the rest of Asia, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Thus, a truly comparative perspective emerges in this book. Most of the authors stress the differences between nationalism in sub-Saharan Africa and in the other developing areas. R. P. Dore has previously compared Japan with Latin America. Here Welch makes a similar comparison between Japan and Africa. Again, in terms of prospects for modernization, Japan emerges as a rather atypical state. Likewise, Friedrich does not feel optimistic about the possibilities of constitutional rule taking quick root in the new African nations. Both he and Welch emphasize the special difficulties, particularly the lack of national unity, faced by most African countries. In contrast to Welch and Friedrich, Abu-Lughod voices a more positive view of African nationalism. It differs from its Asian counterpart in the quality and ideological stance of its leadership, its greater receptivity to continental organizations, and its more secular outlook. Whereas the other four authors stress the unique attributes of African nationalism, Ali Mazrui, an African himself, tends to focus on the similarities between developments in the Soviet Union and in Ghana under its former president, Kwame Nkrumah.

Third, a number of political scientists have pointed out the attempts of nationalist politicians in Africa and Asia to synthesize values dominant in Europe and the United States with values unique to their indigenous culture. Although all these essays explore the tension between "repetition" and "innovation," Ali Mazrui's discussion of "borrowed theory and original practice in African politics" most explicitly deals with this theme. Actually, rather than considering politics throughout the continent, Mazrui concentrates on four English-speaking states, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, and Tanzania. His most provocative remarks, which have already stimulated considerable discussion among African intellectuals in East Africa, concern his interpretation of President Nkrumah as a "Leninist Czar." Ironically, while the other four authors see Africa in African terms, it remains for an African to perceive Nkrumah in light of European developments. In this respect, Mazrui tends to exaggerate the effects of non-Africans on Africans and Africans on non-Africans but to minimize the effects of Africans on Africans. Is it really true to claim, as does Mazrui, that "Nkrumaism" (misspelled in the text as "Nkrumahism") was the "most important school of African Leninist thought?" Although Nkrumah, like Lenin, did stress the importance of organization, so did American party politicians in the late nineteenth century. After all, the emphasis on organization during the last century has characterized the writings of many theorists and political actors, ranging from Saint-Simon to Karl Mannheim. Moreover, it seems rather far-fetched to argue, as does Mazrui, that Nkrumah held greater significance for militant Afro-Americans than for Africans themselves.

The essays in this collection possess a coherence not usually found in volumes of this type. The authors write clearly. Their scholarship extends beyond Africa to encompass other parts of the world. By placing African events in a truly comparative context, these authors have successfully fulfilled the tasks posed for general studies of the developing areas. They have added to our knowledge of the developmental process, examined the empirical similarities, as well as differences, between Africa's development and development in other regions, and clarified the nature of the ideological synthesis. From this perspective, the book has relevance not merely for Africanists but also for those interested in the new nations generally.—Charles F. Andrain, *San Diego State College.*

The Myth of Mau Mau: Nationalism in Kenya. By Carl H. Rosberg, Jr. and John Nottingham. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. xviii, 427. $7.50.)

Rosberg and Nottingham's well-written study of "nationalism" in preindependent Kenya fills an important gap in the literature on African political development—although perhaps a different gap than expected. *The Myth of Mau Mau* is an excellent political history. The authors draw from diverse primary sources as they trace chronologically "the development of African politics in Kenya" (p. vii). The major themes emphasized are the difficulty of bringing and holding together a disciplined country-wide political organization and the problem of articulating a common nationalist ideology in a situation in which the colonial goal was a multi-racial state and in which from the outset there were among Africans themselves diverse interests and centrifugal tendencies. These tendencies were manifest as early as the 1920s in conflicts between urban (Nairobi) and rural organizations and between "moderate" and "militant" leaders.

The focus is upon two different, but nonetheless inseparable, issues: Kikuyu "nationalism" and Kenyan "nationalism." The authors seek to explain and analyze the former and, as their title suggests, to refute the myth "that 'Mau Mau' was an atavistic flight from reason and the processes of modernization" (p. 320). It is demonstrated how, even more so than other tribes, the Kikuyu, given their geographical position and their grievances over land, encountered problems in asserting themselves. The authors' key question, "Did what occurred in central Kenya—culminating in violence in the early 1950s—constitute nationalism?" (p. 351), is answered affirmatively. It is only regretted that Kenyatta's role vis-à-vis "Mau Mau" is not discussed at greater length, for this remains a highly controverted issue about which there has been intense speculation but little scholarly work.

In developing their main argument, the authors necessarily are led to a more extensive study of a second issue, Kenyan "nationalism." Significantly, only the subtitle, "Nationalism in Kenya" uses the term. Proper stress is given here to the "parochial and fragmented character of African politics" and to the "differential African political response to European domination" (p. 71). The authors recognize the acute problem of distinguishing between Kikuyu nationalism and a wider sense of nationalism within Kenya. The former, with its "issues, slogans, songs, symbols, and values . . . had limited meaning elsewhere" (p. 220). Other tribal "nationalisms" were compatible and complementary with Kikuyu nationalism insofar as their objectives centered on the demand for African rule and, with it, security of land. But in many instances Kenyan nationalism remained disorganized and devoid of a common unifying purpose. Indeed, in present-day Kenya "the complex problems and issues of national integration will long endure" (p. 354).

The authors, correctly, refrain from rewriting Kenya's history to suggest the inevitability of the emergence of a dominant or single party, whether or not led by the Kikuyu. They integrate into their text an unusually broad coverage of relevant material and their treatment is not superficial. However, at times the breadth compromises the depth of their argumentation. There is mention of such groups as veterans, labor unions and urban tribal associations but their respective causal and organizational relationships with Kenya's "nationalisms" remain unexamined. The absence of tables and statistics regarding economic development, employment and education needs to be noted for they would have provided data not only on the commonplace European/African disparities but also on less obvious differences between and within tribal groups. More regrettable is the omission of a chapter on developments after the end of the Emergency. This might have tied together more explicitly the similarities and contradictions of Kikuyu and Kenya nationalism at this critical juncture in Kenya's history.

Rosberg and Nottingham, no doubt consciously, employ no theoretical or systematic framework for their analysis. They do not construct, apply, or prove any particular theory—barring the alternative explanation of "Mau Mau." Nor do they indicate possible qualifications to contemporary theory or suggest avenues for further research. Nonetheless, they utilize easily a number of relevant terms from the more theoretical works on nation-building. An understanding of nationalism is crucial for their purpose; they discuss its many varied aspects—African, colonial, constitutional, territorial, cultural and militant. But they do so without special rigor. They adopt "the concept of nationalism not so much as a conceptual tool but as a means of describing common processes of political and social mobilization and the search for power and dignity by Africans" (p. 349). Only in the conclusion is the concept carefully and cogently summarized with Kikuyu and Kenya experiences as points of reference.

In sum, the book provides an excellent description and analysis of the history and politics of Kikuyu nationalism including its special manifestation in "Mau Mau." It also provides a good introduction into the intricacies of nationalism in Kenya. It should not be regarded as the definitive text on Kenya. Rather, and to its credit, it should serve to encourage and to complement additional studies focusing more narrowly on specific features of Kenya's politics which it summarizes.—DAVID H. JOHNS, *San Diego State College*.

The Kremlin's Human Dilemma: Russia After Half a Century of Revolution. BY MAURICE HINDUS. (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1967. Pp. x, 395. $5.95.)

Speculation on the Soviet political future occasioned by Khrushchev's fall has centered on two main alternatives: overthrow of one-Party rule, or its liberalization and adaptation (see, e.g., *Problems of Communism* for 1966/1967). Seeking answers, many participants have combed the Soviet press; in particular, however, the political theorists have looked to their models and ideal types, kremlinologists to their charts and files, and reporters either to "authoritative sources" or to the Soviet people themselves.

One of the best of these human interest reporters is Maurice Hindus, a veritable contemporary chronicler of Soviet life writing with undiminished verve since 1923. His latest book, *The Kremlin's Human Dilemma*, records impressions he gathered during his three visits in 1962, 1963 and 1965, before and after Brezhnev's and Kosygin's takeover from Khrushchev. I myself have visited the Soviet Union five times since 1955, living twice for months at a stretch in a Soviet University. And I must say that the story Hindus builds out of conversations with people of many occupations and nationalities, anecdotes, interviews and the Soviet press reports rings as true and is as solidly backed as any accounts I have read. Certainly, one might take exception with a minor generalization or two, such as the sweeping statement that Soviet youth as a whole are indifferent to religion. Generally, however, the book is to be highly recommended, for general reader and political scientist alike, as an excellent introduction to the Soviet scene.

The "Kremlin's human dilemma" amounts to this: the rulers in the Kremlin have pushed modernization to the point of incompatibility with their outmoded dogmas and controls. They face a choice, either to retain the latter and see crucial growth plans remain unfulfilled, or to liberalize further at the expense of the role of the Party, which is supposed to be "enhanced" as modernization moves the USSR towards "communism." "'You must remember,'" a noted psychiatrist and old friend told Hindus, "'that the age of Stalin was an age of brawn: man was simply a tool of production and only his muscle counted. But the post-Stalin age . . . opened up the age of the mind: self-annulment gave way to self-awareness, and the citizen again began to feel like an individual'" (p. vii).

This "citizen" is many kinds of people in Hindus's account: town dwellers (Part I), villagers (Part II) and a variety of religious believers, youth, national minorities, intellectuals who in a variety of ways deviate from the Party's ideal of the "new Soviet man" unquestioningly accepting the Party's moral and social authority (Part III). A taxi driver sounds off on the high cost of living (meat once a week for his family) and tells about the stormy meeting on poetry where his student son and friends participated in an undaunted defense of their non-conformist poet hero against charges of "hooliganism." "Two on a Seesaw" and the twist are allowed in Krasnodar in 1963 even while, in contrast, the political screws are tightened on farms of the surrounding, once fertile Kuban—with disastrous results. Nearby, in Rostov, a young man pours out to Hindus his version of the bloody suppression of a demonstration in Novocherkassk the previous year against the price increases for meat and butter. Suddenly before Hindus's eyes a burly KGB agent attired as a waiter, evidently in league with another police agent watching from a side room, yanks the young informant bodily from his chair and hauls him away to an unknown fate.

Despite the tangible improvements in village and city conditions after Khrushchev's forced retirement, Hindus sees only half measures of reform and a persistent dilemma. For example, in the richly documented and best part of his book, "The Village," ex-farm boy Hindus concludes that the impressively improved post-Khrushchevian new dispensation for the farmer will be a mere palliative unless it allows the peasant greater participation in running his own life. But the dilemma is not only a functional one; it is also pyschological. The Soviet regime boasts that: "Thanks to the enormous educating efforts of the Party, a new man has grown up in our country, a conscious active builder of communism, a convinced collectivist, with a completely new communist psychology" (p. 353). Hindus shows how some of these "enormous educating efforts" are counter-productive or ineffectual. Baptist communities keep on growing. Attempts at forced assimilation of the Jews only increases the Jewish-consciousness of youth despite their general atheism. The reading public cannot be forced to like the works of Party-line hacks. The modernization that Soviet power has brought to national minorities "has in fact accentuated awareness of their own nationality" (pp. 284–285), expecially in the Baltic and Transcaucasian areas.

Some chapters in the book, e.g., the one on sex, fall short of others in immediacy and depth. And although Hindus makes a prediction only with great trepidation, it is questionable in the form he puts it. "Sooner or later a new palace revolution [such as that upsetting Malenkov in 1955 and Khruschchev in 1964], with or without blood, will bring to power a young and sophisticated leadership that will initiate a reformation along the lines of Yugoslavia's socialism, without of course a return to private landholding" (p. 382), which Yugoslavia allowed in 1953 and Poland in 1956. The advent of "a young and sophisticated leadership" is entirely possible—some day. But why, if the Party is still strong enough to prevent a return to private farming, should it allow as sweeping a decentralization as in Yugoslavia? There are other reasons why the Soviets may not simply follow the Yugoslavs. Yugoslavia's Westernized national minorities are much stronger numerically, politically and economically compared with the relatively conservative Serbians than are Balts, Georgians, etc., compared with the relatively conservative Russians in the ruling Soviet apparatus. The Yugoslav League of Communists is a truly federalized party, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is unitary. Yugoslavia has long been less isolated from the West and, conversely, only recently unified, compared with the Soviet Union, which is territorially close to the old Tsarist Russian empire. "It is always precarious to predict the course of future events in the Soviet Union," says Hindus (p. 382). And it is no less precarious to travel around reporting them. But at that Hindus has few equals.—PETER JUVILER, *Barnard College.*

Soviet Policy-Making: Studies of Communism in Transition. ED. BY PETER H. JUVILER AND HENRY W. MORTON. (New York: Praeger, 1967. Pp. xiv, 274.)

Variety adds spice not only to life but to reading as well. This varied collection of essays and case studies examines contemporary developments in Soviet policy in diverse spheres from politics and economics, to science, literature, and even family legislation. While the editors quite rightly emphasize that the Soviet system remains "indubitably a one-party political monopoly," the collection is designed to illuminate the new and ever-more complex problems facing Soviet policy-makers in every area of the differentiated industrial society that is emerging from the Stalin era. No longer can the Soviet rulers rely on the terror, crude propagandizing, and roughshod methods of primitive Stalinism. By trial and error and rude experience they have had to develop more refined and sophisticated means to achieve their purposes. With the passing of the terror, the professional and intellectual groupings who staff the Soviet state and society have begun to find their voice. Increasingly, the party leadership has had to refer to them for advice, reckon with their arguments, and attend to their debates in its own policy deliberations. Indeed, a not inconsequential factor in Khrushchev's downfall was his blunt and persistent disregard of the "experts" and the "professionals" in such areas as military affairs and agriculture.

However, with the exception of the ideologically sensitive area of literature, these opinion groups still operate within relatively narrow spheres of expertise and know-how. They do not yet represent a genuine movement toward political pluralism in Soviet society. Nonetheless, this development has had a significant political impact on the *modus operandi* of the party dictatorship. Occasionally, these groups have even come close to exercising a restraining, if not a veto, power over the actions of the party leadership. One remarkable recent example, noted by the editors, was the petition to the party signed by twenty-five leading scientists and artists opposing moves to rehabilitate Stalin on the eve of the 23d party congress last year. It evidently had an inhibiting effect. In brief, the party leadership has had to take as well as give in the policy-making process. It is this board development that the collection of essays investigates in detail from various vantage points. While the editors wisely warn against ruling out the possibility that a leader or faction could win power and severely curb this development, the variegated evidence presented in the articles bears out the editors' view that the model of a totalitarian monolith derived from the experience of Stalinism "no longer fits comfortably."

While a principal interest of the editors is policy-making in the context of the Soviet system as a whole, they are fully aware of the key importance of factional politics at the apex of the party hierarchy and its influence on the course of policy in every part of the system. Two articles by Henry Morton and Robert Slusser focus on the political leadership and appropriately begin and conclude the collection. Morton's opening essay provides a balanced examination of Soviet leadership and policy-making in broad terms. Especially useful are the comparisons he draws between decision-making in the Soviet and other major political leaderships. Here he points to similarities that are often overlooked as well as to the distinguishing characteristics. Slusser's study supplements Morton's by providing a wealth of concrete detail in an interpretive reconstruction of the leadership politics of the Khrushchev years. He traces the tortuous course of Soviet foreign policy during this period and seeks to uncover the factional tensions and conflicts which impinged on Khrushchev's leadership and were involved in this overthrow.

Marshall Goldman contributes an excellent article on economic policy and presents one of the clearest analyses of the Lieberman movement and its significance that I have seen. The article is especially valuable in view of the misconceptions concerning Libermanism which have widely circulated in the West.

Peter Viereck's article on the party's deep troubles with the writers is perhaps the most penetrating and thought provoking in the collection. The conflict in this sphere has been one of the most dramatic and portentous for the long-term future of Russia. However, Viereck tends to overlook one important point regarding Khrushchev's "pendulum" policy toward the writers. In his last years he promoted "thaw" when he was on the political offensive and "freeze" only when he was forced to take the defensive. A companion article by Maurice Friedberg shows how a kind of Libermanism in Soviet book publishing since 1956 has produced an unprecedented inflow of modern Western literature into the USSR. The Soviet publishers' increasing use of the "best-seller" criterion in publishing has seriously hampered the regime's effort to keep reading matter available to the public ideologically pure, to the obvious dismay of the ideologues.

The party's changing relationship with the community of scientists is illustrated in Loren Graham's revealing account of the debate in the late 'fifties and early 'sixties over reorganizing the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Graham shows how Khrushchev, despite his practical bent, opened the way in 1959 to giving the lead to the "pure" scientists rather than to the "applied" scientists in the Academy of Sciences—a departure from past policy involving adjustments in Marxist-Leninist doctrine and a recognition of the relative autonomy of science.

The two remaining essays cover aspects of social policy. Marianne Armstrong traces the "anti-parasite" campaign initiated by Khrushchev and shows how pressures from the legal community largely succeeded in assimilating, if not liquidating, this extra-judicial method of social control into the established structure of legal administration. The other editor of the collection, Peter H. Juviler contributes a useful and scholarly study of changing family policy since Stalin. Here again the study reveals the influential role played by the experts and their debates on policy. Family policy under Lenin and Stalin have received attention from scholars but developments since Stalin have suffered neglect. The Juviler study helps provide the missing pieces.

The very diversity of the writing styles and subject matters of the collection may be a bit jarring to some readers, but the editors help mitigate any such effect through their prefatory essays. These provide the collection with a unifying thread and also are up-to-date and informative. In sum, the collection is a useful and timely contribution to the deepening and broadening of our knowledge of contemporary trends in the Soviet political system.—CARL A. LINDEN, *St. John's College.*

Eastern Europe in Transition. ED. BY KURT LONDON. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. Pp. 364. $7.50.)

Eastern European Government and Politics. BY VACLAV BENES, ANDREW GYORGY, GEORGE STAMBUK. (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1966. Pp. 247. $2.50.)

Fortunately for the study of both comparative politics and Eastern Europe, social science literature focusing on Eastern Europe has increased dramatically in the past two years. The two books under review are indicative of that expansion.

There is little evidence that the major analytical problems confronting scholarship which focuses on fragmented political communities, undergoing political and social change, under the rubric of communism have been adequately confronted. Both of the studies under review would be considered "comparative" in subject matter. In reality, the first consists of a series of topical discussions, most of which are distinct contributions; the second consists of country by country surveys of the recent political history of Poland (Vaclav Benes), Czechoslovakia (Vaclav Benes), East Germany (Andrew Gyorgy), Hungary (Vaclav Benes), Yugoslavia (George Stambuk) and Rumania (Stephen Fischer-Galati). These country studies are introduced by a general essay placing "Eastern Europe in Historic Perspective" (Andrew Gyorgy).

Eastern Europe in Transition contains a series of papers delivered at the Fifth International Conference on World Politics, September 13–19, 1965, at Noordwijk, The Netherlands. Although the conference included thirty-three participants from North America, Europe, and Asia and a number of observers, no scholars from Eastern Europe were invited. The editor explains the absence of such participants by stating that "visitors from the 'socialist camp' could only have dispensed their party lines, which would have had no value for the conferees and might indeed have inhibited or even stymied the discussions" (p. x). This statement not only dramatizes the absence in this collection of essays of any analysis of the intellectual and cultural discourses, debates, and conflicts which are certainly a part of "transition" in Eastern Europe, but it also prejudges the situation to the detriment of both the conference and its publication. Certainly the experiences of scholars who have participated with Eastern European scholars in more open international meetings have had significant consequences including even joint research.

The essays in *Eastern Europe in Transition* include sweeping discussions of major social phenomena (nationalism, Andrew Gyorgy; polycentrism and splittism, Kurt London), case studies (East German, June 16–17, 1953, Wolfgang K. Kraus; the erosion of reformism in Poland, Adam Bromke; the Rumanian national deviation R.V. Burks; the East German economy, Karl G. Thalheim) topical studies related to the area (economic nationalism, John Michael Montias; the Warsaw Pact, Thomas W. Wolfe; national minorities, George A. Schiopflin) and international relations (bilateral relationships between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Boris Meissner;

Rumania and the Sino-Soviet conflict, Stephen Fischer-Galati; Eastern Europe and Asian communist countries, Ernst Kux; Eastern Europe and the West, Klaus Mehnert and Pierre Hassner). Each of these essays contributes to our knowledge but as in any collection of essays the weight of the contributions varies.

In this collection it is difficult to find threads which lead to cumulative knowledge about the cause or process of transition in Eastern Europe. Nowhere is there really a discussion of the character of transition or the transition process. The absence of integration points out the need for systematic analysis of transition in communist states. In this regard the essay by R. V. Burks should be signaled out for emphasis. Professor Burks in a remarkably candid essay raises the question of why Western regimes and Western experts were unable to see that Rumania was developing policies independent of the Soviet Union. Signals of the tension between Rumania and the Soviet Union were discernible as early as 1958, but not really recognized until the plenum of the Rumania Central Committee in March, 1963. Professor Burks suggests that the experts have been misguided because they have tended to "approach communism from an international standpoint, as a faith which absorbs and transforms particularisms" rather than studying as well, "how parochial groups seize upon the communist view of the universal because it is useful to them in their immediate situations" (p. 111).

We certainly need understandings and explanations of the universalistic and particularistic relationships of ideologically and internationally oriented political forces to power related and parochial forces. Certainly one concept that must be explored in this agenda is nationalism. Nationalism is a topic of discussion in one essay in *Eastern Europe in Transition* written by Andrew Gyorgy as well as a constant referent in *Eastern European Government and Politics.* But nationalism is useful when its conceptual characteristics are spelled out with care and when empirical components are related to these conceptual characteristics and to the event or series of events under discussion. This requires among other things rigorous discussion of the structural and behavioral relationships that compose nationalism as well as the norms and values which reinforce nations or cause them to disintegrate. Although the term is used throughout these studies it is never developed with conceptual clarity. It becomes a diffuse and inprecise rubric to reinforce what are essentially judgments about the course of Eastern European politics.

The judgmental rather than the analytical runs through *Eastern European Government Politics.* Characteristics of various types including emotions are attributed to leaders, regimes, and groups with a modicum of documentation and without empirical references. The book is designed as a text to introduce students to East Europe, but most students will feel the absence of conceptualization and hard information. Still it is a welcome volume as it reflects a concern that comparative politics include Eastern Europe, a part of the world that is generally excluded from traditional "comparative" texts. The reader will find that *Eastern Europe in Transition* despite its lack of integration will provide him more information and analysis, provided that the topics covered in the study are topics in which he is interested.—Carl Beck, *University of Pittsburgh.*

Soviet and East European Agriculture. Ed. by Jerzy F. Karcz. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967. Pp. xxv, 445. $10.00.)

The present reviewer is particularly subject to the charge of being unobjective because he is a contributor to the present volume and because it is the third of three volumes on Soviet and Eastern European Agriculture, that started with the first Conference on Soviet Agricultural and Peasant Affairs, which was held at the University of Kansas in 1962 and founded by the reviewer. Admitting the prejudices, I am most pleased by the way Professor Karcz has carried the work ahead. True, the book may well be charged with exhibiting some of the weaknesses that arise from an attempt to collect under one cover the contributions of many authors, presenting analyses from the point of view of several disciplines. Yet, here is surely the major strength of these volumes, and particularly the one edited by Professor Karcz which is a collection of the papers presented at the August 1965 conference at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Surely, few would disagree with the assertion that no other collection of research papers in the field of Soviet studies includes such a high percentage of authorities recognized as being leaders in a particular area of Soviet affairs. Indeed, in this volume can be found the valedictory work of two of the great pioneers in the field of Soviet Agricultural studies, Lazar Volin and Naum Jasny.

Dr. Volin's and Dr. Jasny's contributions, like several others, deal with the economic problems of agriculture in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, but in the volume also can be found contributions by anthropologists, geographers, historians, and political scientists as well as agricultural scientists. Here is original research on several aspects of Soviet agriculture ranging from problems of farm employment to the importance of the corn program and the role of women in the countryside. Moreover, highly informative papers also are included on Yugoslavian, Czechoslovakian, and Polish agriculture. True, some of the essays are more readable than others and some are more informative than others. Nevertheless, every one of the papers must be regarded as a worthy contribution to the growing literature on that most important of the domestic problems of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, agriculture.

The 1966 harvest in the Soviet Union produced a bumper crop of grain. Reflecting this success, recent reports from Moscow indicate a new optimism among the Soviet leaders that the greatly increased investment program in agriculture has at long last provided the solution to the agricultural problem. As recorded in this volume, specialists in Soviet agriculture and peasant affairs have long been in agreement that significant new levels of investment in the countryside have been absolutely necessary if the serious problems of agriculture were to be alleviated. Nevertheless, as important as the problem of investments has been, a careful reader of this volume will discover the shortcomings of Soviet and Eastern European agriculture have not been economic alone. Indeed, evidence offered by several of the contributors leaves the impression that in spite of new capital inputs, political and social factors are destined to block any forseeable solution to the problems of Soviet and Eastern European agricultural problems that would be regarded as satisfactory. Those who would understand the recent history of the Soviet Union, or hope to probe for future trends, will need the material presented in this volume.—ROY D. LAIRD, *Lawrence, Kansas.*

Soviet Mongolia. A Study of the Oldest Political Satellite. BY GEORGE G. S. MURPHY. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966. Pp. ix, 224. $5.95.)

Any scholarly work on the modern political history of Mongolia faces two serious difficulties. The first lies in the problem of proper documentation; the second involves the intelligent evaluation of the available information.

On the former count, Professor Murphy acquits himself well enough. He has dug diligently and gives evidence of having consulted most of the standard sources, as well as some of the more exotic bibliographical items which in the past have not been fully utilized. Even so, there are some strange gaps. For example, one looks in vain for any citation of the volume entitled *Revolyutsionnye meropriyatiya narodnogo pravitelstva, Mongolii v 1921–1924gg.*, compiled by Ts. Nasanbalzhir, edited by Ts. Puntsagnorov, Izd. vostochnoi literatury, Moscow, 1960, 211 pp., an indispensable collection of primary materials on the early years of the regime. The author has tried to piece together the contents of many of the laws and decrees promulgated during that crucial period from scattered references in Soviet literature, when the complete text of nearly all these measures is included in a single handy paperback edition.

As an interpretative analysis of the local political scene, however, the present study is a failure. The author's thesis is simple: everything that has transpired in this corner of the globe since 1921 was planned and supervised by Moscow, hence the very title, *Soviet* Mongolia. Proving it is another matter, of course, and although Professor Murphy tries mightily, he does not succeed. What he does manage to do is to picture the events throughout in the worst possible light for the Soviets and their Mongol allies, to indulge in fanciful speculation concerning the opposite side's motives and objectives (intentions are freely attributed—"they must have . . . ," "they ought to have . . ."—normally to get around embarrassing data), and to juggle the facts to fit his preconceptions.

Indeed, some of the tactics used literally to "score points off" the Bolsheviks, the Comintern and their native "stooges" are in extremely poor taste, to put it mildly. For instance, to show that the entry of Soviet units into Mongolia in 1921 was a purely Soviet move, the author quotes from a letter from Academician Maiskii where, in answer to the question as to who made the decision to commit these troops, the latter writes that the "chief decision-makers were the Soviet Government of the day headed by V. I. Lenin." The only trouble is that this proves nothing more than where the actual directive to initiate the operation emanated from (who else was competent to issue it?) and in no way shows that the Russians acted alone. Or were the Mongols supposed to be in a position to give the Red Army its marching orders? Similarly, in arguing that no revolution took place in Mongolia in 1921, Professor Murphy stresses the apathetic attitude of the average Mongol toward political issues, his stoic resignation to all manner of hardships and abuse, but, curious to note, carefully avoids mentioning the interesting brochure by Sh. Natsokdorzhi, *Iz istorii aratskogo dvizheniya vo Vneshnei Mongolii,* Moscow, Izd. Akademii nauk SSSR, 1958, which explores the depth of social awareness among the Mongolian masses and their attempts to improve their sorry lot prior to that time.

The whole book is slanted in this manner. The Mongols who were instrumental in bringing the Russians into the country are portrayed as dupes, fools, or knaves. The Comintern had a masterplan from the very outset for the Communization of Mongolia and the Kremlin immediately sought to convert it into a satellite. From the start, the Mongolian leadership was composed of people manipulable by Moscow. And so on. Several ingenious reasons are given to explain why the U.S.S.R. did not annex Mongolia, except the true one: it never wanted to, as far as anybody can tell. On p. 148, the Soviet economic concessions to Mongolia after 1954 are described as having been triggered, *inter alia*, by the emergence of a Mongolian elite eager to modernize the country (presumably on the Soviet model), but on p. 149 the statement appears that "apparently not until 1958 was the Soviet government able to bring sufficient pressure to bear to force the Mongols to do as was expected of them" in terms of nomadic collectivization. After having heard *ad nauseam* that for three decades Mongolia's rulers were pliable puppets of the Kremlin, one suddenly discovers that before 1958 the Soviets did not have the power to dictate their will to their local agents. And, why would these men have to be coerced into doing what they all agreed ultimately had to be done if they wished to build "socialism"—which they did? All this remains a tantalizing mystery, along with so much of the monograph.

Honest misapprehension? Genuine, but mistaken, conviction? Resolve to teach the Russians not to rewrite history and an urge to set the record straight that fell into the same trap? A desire to *èpater le borgeois?* Whichever, the results are distinctly disappointing.—GEORGE GINSBURGS, *New School for Social Research.*

Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province, 1911–1949. BY DONALD G. GILLIN. (Princeton: University Press, 1967. Pp. xiv, 334. $9.00.)

Although there has been a conspicuous burgeoning of interest in the study of China, one important aspect of its modern history—warlordism—remains much neglected. This is regrettable not only because warlordism itself makes a fascinating topic for research, but also because it provides important clues to understanding subsequent development in Chinese politics.

Mr. Gillin's book on Yen-Hsi-shan is a timely and valuable contribution toward remedying such a neglect in our academic inquiry. Although Yen was by no means the most powerful warlord, he reflected in many ways the lives of many other warlords of his time. His story becomes especially interesting because he was probably the only important warlord who had survived the many political crises in a stretch of four decades while his contemporaries had disappeared from the political scene one after another. His demise was brought about only after the whole political system of which he was an integral part had failed to persist in the face of the Communist challenge.

The main emphasis of Mr. Gillin's book is on the internal political process of the province of Shansi under Yen's rule. The author devotes well over half of the book to describing political reality in that province because it is his belief that the key to analyzing Chinese politics during the republican period lies not so much in the impotent central government as in the various regional governments in the hands of the warlords. This is certainly a sound view and the author has done a remarkable job in amassing a vast amount of data from numerous sources, many of which have never been used extensively by scholars before. He also has the benefit of interviewing Yen personally as well as some of his old associates, a feat which cannot be duplicated in studying other warlords. The result is a book which is meticulously written and which covers a wide range of subjects which will surely interest most students of Chinese politics. The weight of his evidence and the orderly manner of his presentation will not fail to convince most readers of the correctness of his conclusion that the story of Yen is also a story of "a conservative and, by contemporary standards, backward people struggling to adapt itself to the conditions of the modern world under the leadership of a man whose own limitations were among the most formidable obstacles in his path" (p. 293).

What the author has left undone is to fit Yen's personal story into the larger context of Chinese politics. It seems to this reviewer that the author has not given due emphasis to Yen's "external" policies vis-à-vis other warlords and thus has only told a partial story about him while the title of the book suggests a more comprehensive one. This is particularly important since it was in the inter-warlord-relations that we could detect some meaningful pattern of behavior with reference to the country as a whole. It is the author's omission to deal with this respect that causes his book to fall short of its objective of contributing to "a broader understanding of warlordism as a political phenomenon, illuminating further the whole subject of regional government in China during the first half of the twentieth century" (p. vii).

The available evidence seems to suggest that Yen's regime was rather atypical of the Chinese warlords in general, a fact which earned him the enviable title of "model governor." His internal policies undoubtedly shed invaluable light on the many problems most other regional governments would expect to face, but his eagerness to solve these problems was quite unique among his political peers. Therefore his story should never allow us to come to the conclusion that most warlords were just as dedicated to industrialization or universal education as he was. His unique performance in no small part explains why he managed to survive while others had long perished. Therefore, a more thorough picture of Chinese politics of this period will not emerge until more scholars become interested in the dynamics of regional and inter-regional politics. Mr. Gillin's book represents an important first step along a highly promising path that remains to be explored by others scholars. In this lies the main contribution of his book.—HSI-SHENG CHI, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.*

Nehru's Mantle: The Politics of Succession in India. BY MICHAEL BRECHER. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. 269, index. $6.50.)

Professor Brecher is one of the very few western scholars who has been engaged in the study of Indian politics at the central level. Well-known in India as Nehru's biographer (*Nehru: A Political Biography*, 1959), he has here given us a detailed and intimate account of the two successions following Nehru's death and an analysis of central decision-making in the post-Nehru period. The account is based partly on depth interviews with most of the leading actors involved in the two successions and partly on newspaper reports, including frequent—in fact, excessive—quotations from India's leading press pandits. Brecher succeeds in reconstructing in a fascinating manner, at times minute by minute, the unfolding of events following Nehru's death and those leading to the selection of a new leader. He brings out clearly the intricate interplay of personal, factional, and regional forces in Congress politics and how they interacted in the selection of both Lal Bahadur Shastri and Indira Gandhi. Little new is revealed from the account, but non-India specialists will find the book a useful introduction to some of the leading personalities and forces operating in all-India politics.

Brecher also uses the two successions and post-succession decision-making on the issues of language and food as case studies to evaluate the working of Indian democracy and its ability to solve India's social and economic problems. He is full of praise for the way in which the Congress elite handled the two successions, especially the first, which he describes as a "mature, sophisticated, and smooth internal transfer of power" (p. 6). However, Brecher's analysis of post-succession decision-making on the issues of language and food leads him to cast doubt upon the ability of the central government to formulate and implement effective national policies.

On the great issues in Indian politics, Brecher points out that it is often necessary to summon to Delhi the chief ministers of the seventeen states to meet with the central leadership in what he calls the "Grand Council of the Republic" to reach a consensus. What troubles Brecher is that the consensus is frequently a paper compromise (as on the language issue) or a complete failure (as on the problem of food). The inability of the center to formulate national policies on issues affecting the basic interests or constitutional prerogatives of the states leads Brecher to question whether the method of consensual democracy can solve India's social and economic problems, whether, in short, effective all-India government is possible and the future of Indian democracy is secure. Brecher was also concerned when he wrote about the effect upon the future of the Indian Union of the prospect—which has suddenly and unexpectedly materialized after the 1967 elections—of a situation in which opposition parties came to power in the states while the Congress remained in power at the center.

It seems to this reviewer that Indian democracy deserves neither undue praise for its maturity and sophistication nor dire forebodings about its future. The system of "bargaining federalism," as it has been called, has become and will undoubtedly continue to become more complex—especially when opposition parties come to power at the center. The system is both sustained and inhibited in its functioning by regional and intra-regional diversity of a multi-dimensional variety such as exists in no other single state in the world. Moreover, a flexibility derived from pervasive factionalism and the still limited effect of ideology upon Indian politics in practice makes seemingly impossible combinations and compromises ultimately possible.

On the language issue, compromise is the only possible and effective solution. Nor have the limits of compromise been reached. Moreover, it is questionable whether the issue of food is a valid test of central government effectiveness. In the first place, food is a state subject. Second, the very failure to formulate a national policy on food increases the dependence of the deficit states upon the center. Thus, the opposition government in Kerala may rail against the center as much as it likes, but it cannot effectively challenge central authority as long as it depends upon the center for food.

Professor Brecher's book is a useful chronicle of an important landmark in contemporary Indian political history. It is evaluative rather than theoretical in its analysis of the procedures of Indian democracy. It raises foreboding questions about the future of Indian democrary which cannot be adequately assessed until we have some case studies of center-state relations from the viewpoint of the provincial capitals.—PAUL R. BRASS, *University of Washington.*

L'Union pour la Nouvelle République: Etude du pouvoir au sein d'un parti politique. BY JEAN CHARLOT. (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1967. Pp. 362. $5.80.)

Although much has been published on the subject of de Gaulle and Gaullism, surprisingly little has been written, especially in an analytical way, about the Union for the New Republic. Charlot attempts to fill this gap. His book deserves praise, giving readers a competent introduction to the UNR and providing scholars with a base upon which further research can be done.

The book covers a broad range of topics. The first part of Charlot's study contains an essentially descriptive history of the UNR since 1958. More analytical are the other three sections. Examined in the second section are the voters and members of the UNR, the structure of the party outside Parliament, the Parliamentary Group structure, and the relationship between the Parliamentary Group and the UNR leadership. The third section includes an analysis of the leaders' backgrounds, an assessment of oligarchical tendencies within the UNR, and an examination of the peculiar relationship which obtains between de Gaulle and the UNR. A study of Gaullism within the UNR is the subject of the fourth section.

For many of the parliamentarians and leaders of the UNR, association with de Gaulle began at least as early as the resistance. As Charlot suggests, however, the resistance and its aftermath produced persons faithful to Gaullism for different reasons. Following Jacques Soustelle, Charlot examines Gaullism within the UNR in terms of three bases for belief. There are, first, the *gaullistes de foi:* persons who became Gaullists due to their depth of feeling for General de Gaulle. Policy matters little to them. The *empiristes* form a second category of UNR followers: policy is of central concern to them and their attachment to the UNR is based partly on policy considerations. Yet, *empiristes* tend to take a pragmatic approach to policy, viewing politics as the art of the possible. This is in contrast to a third category of Gaullists, the *doctrinaires.* They feel that Gaullism is a reasonsed economic and social doctrine which stems from de Gaulle's pronouncements and writings. Policy should coincide with doctrine in their view.

One senses that relations between the Government and those *gaullistes de foi* of the Parliamentary Group should be fairly smooth. But, it would seem that relations would be more difficult with the *empiristes* and even with the *doctrinaires,* who differ over what constitutes the full meaning of Gaullist doctrine or over what aspects of the doctrine should be given priority.

What, then, promotes amicable relations within the Group and between the Group and the Government? This is one of the questions Charlot focuses on throughout the book. Cohesion is explained partly in terms of the well-known oath taken by members of the Parliamentary Group, which is backed by sanctions (these sanctions have, on occasion, been used). Moreover, a common enemy exists for almost all members of the UNR Parliamentary Group, as well as the Government, in their fear of the return of the fourth Republic's chaotic party system. Finally, the Group's political committee, which controls its members' introduction of questions and legislation, serves as a vehicle for cooperation between the Government and the Group leadership. Periodic meetings between the Premier and the Group are also helpful in promoting smooth relations between the Government and the Group and in maintaining Group cohesion.

This system has not prevented the Group from exerting influence on the Government. While the preponderance of influence is in the hands of the Government or de Gaulle, the Group leaders and backbenchers have been able to initiate, to amend substantially, or to force the recall of several important pieces of legislation. This appears especially to be the case in those fields where the Group's specialized study committees, as described by Charlot, have been most active.

Charlot gives a balanced view of politics within the UNR. The difficulty with his book, as with all introductions, is that subjects have to be compressed in order to be included. We thus miss on occasion some of the depth and care which somewhat narrower research would have produced. Nevertheless, Charlot fulfills well the task he set out to accomplish. His book is excellent as a broad and sometimes extensive introduction to the UNR and opens its readers to a number of avenues for thought and research.—JOHN E. SCHWARZ, *University of Minnesota.*

La Vie Politique en France Depuis 1940. BY JACQUES CHAPSAL. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966. Pp. 592.)

Intended as a textbook in the Thémis series supervised by Maurice Duverger, this work by the Director of the Institut d'Etudes Politiques of Paris turns out to be a first-rate synthesis of much current research and a fascinating history, studded with apt and often pithy quotations, of the internal politics of postwar France.

An introduction, appropriately entitled *"Le Poids de l'Histoire,"* summarizes the legacy of the political culture of the Third Republic. More than half of the volume is devoted to the familiar story of the near stillbirth of the Fourth Republic, its senescence before adolescence, and its final agony. The rest is a history of de Gaulle's Fifth Republic through the presidential elections of December, 1965.

Interestingly enough, Chapsal's evaluation of the Fourth Republic is not far from the Gaullist indictment. Chapsal observes that the ministerial crisis of the summer of 1953 "well shows that the parliamentary regime was incapable of deciding or choosing." The active interlude of Mendes-France, who simply liquidated problems that had dragged on too long, was an exception that proved the rule, for the regime could not endure his dynamism. The *glissement* towards the condemned practices of the Third Republic is convincingly documented.

For many readers the value of the book will be found in its treatment of the Fifth Republic and the political forces now undergoing transformation. Chapsal sees two phases in the history of the Fifth: The Algerian phase during which many members of the political elite with apparent relief turned over to the General the intractable Algerian problem; and the more "normal" period since 1962. Both phases, however, have been characterized by the extension of presidential power at the expense of the Prime Minister, the Administration, and the Parliament. The constitutional struggle of 1962 strengthened this trend, as did the political rout suffered by the parties in the November elections, which Chapsal labels a "*règlement de comptes avec les partis politiques.*" Shocked from their traditions, the parties of the Left and Center attempted to regroup, first under Gaston Defferre, who admitted failure in June 1965, and then under François Mitterand, who led a coalition with the far Left into the run-off presidential election later the same year.

Looming large in this history is, of course, the *welthistorische* figure of Charles de Gaulle. What strikes the reader is the "great continuity in the views of the General" over the quarter of a century covered in this work. His identification of self and motherland ("Il y a moi et le peuple français"), his recourse to the referendum and his tours of the provinces (both expressions of his mystical connection with the people), his preference for a strong executive coupled with his contempt for political parties, all were apparent before the founding of the Fourth Republic.

Even more striking, however, is his resilience in the face of hard political realities. While Chapsal believes it is "impossible to interpret safely the position of Charles de Gaulle since 1958" on the Algerian War, his analysis suggests that the General tried to sort out the realities and then deal with them. When the African nations in the Community began to move quickly towards independence, he accepted it in good grace—and maintained French influence there. In spite of his distaste for campaigning and "the certitude of his historical dimensions," his slipping popularity in the 1965 presidential race forced him to descend into the arena and "play the game." In short, Chapsal says de Gaulle is "*un empirique*" and quotes the General's revealing declaration of 1960:

> Il est tout à fait naturel qu'on ressente la nostalgie de ce qui était l'Empire, tout comme on peut regretter la douceur des lampes à huile[,] la splendeur de la marine à voile, le charme du temps des équipages. Mais, quoi, il n'y a pas de politique qui vaille en dehors des réalités.

Excellent bibliographies at the end of each chapter include useful evaluative comments on the more significant works in French and on a few in English.—JAMES M. CLARK, *University of Maine.*

Berlin: The Wall is Not Forever. BY ELEANOR LANSING DULLES. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1967. Pp. 245. $6.00.)

It is fitting that Eleanor Lansing Dulles add a book to the growing literature on Berlin. Widely known and appreciated in West Berlin as the city's "patron saint," she headed the "Berlin Desk" in the State Department from 1952, when someone was needed "to be responsible for all of the major problems of Berlin" (p. 4) until 1959. She states: "For more than six years, I was fortunate to be able to act in every stage of this [aid] process, to know the people, the problems, and the technical as well as the political realities" (p. 13). On the basis of her experience and expertise, Eleanor Dulles is eminently qualified to write this book. She outlines the development of U. S. policy and aid programs affecting Berlin, traces the postwar history of the city, examines its vulnerabilities and strengths, and describes the "new mood" of criticality and impatience among (especially younger and intellectual) West Berliners and West Germans, as well as characterizing the post-Wall East German situation. The book is broad in scope and it is apparently designed to appeal to scholars, policy-makers, and citizens in both the U. S. and Germany. Her basic position is a defense of U. S. policy, and she is greatly concerned with a "threatened gap in understanding" between Americans and Germans and the dangers that policy-makers in both countries will either "take the present situation for granted" or, worse, fall victim to the "insidious danger of the present Communist 'soft-sell'" and make concessions that would undermine our established German policy. We should be continuously alert to Communist "salami tactics" which might "whittle away" Western rights. We should confront such with "determination, even stubbornness."

She is, however, against complacency, and is very much aware of the need to take the "new mood" of many West Berliners and West Germans into account. She devotes considerable attention to describing this increasingly impatient mood, as evidenced in Brandt's policy of "small steps" designed to increase contacts and trade with East Germany with the objective of a gradual improvement in relations and progress towards re-unification, as well as in more extreme demands and dissatisfaction with the status quo voiced by West Berlin students and intellectuals. She sees here a major dilemma for policy-makers in both countries: the West German policy of "small steps" has its counterpart in the "salami tactics" of the East German regime. The core problem from the Western viewpoint is how to gain something without giving up something essential in return (e.g., our policy of non-recognition of the "German Democratic Republic" or access rights). Professor Dulles offers no solution to this policy dilemma nor does she spell out just what implications for U.S. and German policy are to be drawn from the new mood among West Germans and developments in East Germany. She concedes that present Berlin and German policy may have to be altered, but does not say how. At the least, our present policy should be "shored up" and its "freshness restored." Beyond this, she merely suggests that the new German mood be carefully considered and that new studies and increased U. S.-West German contacts may be needed. Younger West Germans, in particular, need to be reminded of the nature of U. S. aid and support (and the reasons behind it), the accomplishments that have been made, our continued interest in and support of Berlin, and how the problems of Berlin and Germany, though a vital part of U. S. commitments, must be viewed within the broader context of our global involvement. Given her expertise, one might have expected more detailed analysis of specific policy implications for U. S. and German policy-makers, as well as more insight into how U. S. policy towards Germany was actually made. Although Professor Dulles provides insight into the extent of U. S. aid programs, the problems confronting Berlin, and the new mood in both Germanies, she has failed to give us the book she could have written. —William E. Wright, *University of Georgia*.

The British General Election of 1966. By D. E. Butler and Anthony King. (New York: St. Martins Press, 1966. Pp. xi, 338. $10.00.)

"To many politicians as well as to newspaper men the 1966 campaign was a great bore. It was a bore because there was so little doubt about the outcome; it was a bore because there had been an election only seventeen months before and electioneering of a sort had hardly stopped for four years; it was a bore because campaign techniques that were new in 1959 had become, on the third time out, established rituals."

The dullness of the campaign was relieved only in part by a few kicky independent candidates, like Screaming Lord Sutch, the pop singer, who gathered 585 votes in running against Prime Minister Wilson. Wilson got 66 per cent of the total, although Butler and King tell us that "press coverage at the local level was almost entirely devoted to Mr. Sutch's misadventures."

This is the seventh in the Nuffield studies of the British general elections since World War II. It is, like the others, descriptive, detailed, journalistic, impressionistic, necessary, useful, and unsatisfactory. These studies tell us a great deal about what happened—but obviously they cannot tell us all that happened, and there is no convincing justification why that which is told is told and that which is left out is left out. It is all reasonably good current history—and since we have as yet no descriptive political science that is better than (or more than) good current history, we are pleased to have that.

The authors know they cannot *explain* electoral behavior, and they make no such claim; but they do promise us soon ("late in 1967") more elaborate behavioral analysis based on three waves of interviewing in 80 constituencies.

Meanwhile, this study, like the ones before it, is especially helpful to American students because the flavor and texture of British politics is placed in the academic idiom so familiar to Americans—and so much in contrast with the characteristic pre-war British political essays from Bagehot to Laski. It is David Butler's lasting contribution to the Atlantic political science community that he (and his students) write so well about Britain in Americanese, as a generation before Denis Brogan wrote about America in Britishese.

Beyond this overriding contribution that runs through all the Nuffield election studies, the book at hand makes a number of especially relevant observations about the way the British handle their electoral business. Three may be mentioned. First, the local aspects of British general elections are seen as remarkably unpolitical. The constituency agents and the party workers have administrative tasks mainly. Because of the tidy separation of general (national) and local elections—unlike the United States—the workers and the voters can concentrate on a single set of issues and a single set of strategic and tactical decisions. Both major parties seem to have given up the objective of a party agent for every constituency—and why not, since the agent sent up from London for a two months campaign can serve as well as (perhaps better than) the year-round local?

More important probably is the second observation: the British general election is becoming increasingly and rapidly presidentialized. The ability to dramatize the party, in both the image-building and policy-position senses, is powerfully focused in the leaders. Presidentialization of campaigning is a consequence of "the gradual growth in the power of the Prime Minister and the dramatic ethos of television. . . . By now both the public and the parties expect the leaders to conduct campaigns of this type." The extent of presidentialization is shown in the disheartening lack of interest in the campaign speeches of secondary leaders, and in what the authors call the "most notable feature of the results, the uniformity of the swing." "Area by area the results varied little. The map showing regional swings which has been used in past Nuffield studies is omitted here because almost all the regions would have been shaded alike." [Compare the French election of 1967 for another example of the profound presidentializing effect of TV and electoral PR on non-presidential systems.]

Finally, Butler and King seem to be telling us that labor is losing the Labour Party. Working-class MPs are being replaced by middle-class MPs from the professions. But as the class differences narrow it may be that the formal ideological conflicts also diminish. The increasingly egg-head Labourites are not regarded as being more left than the trade-unionists (though the intellectuals of the 30s and 40s were more radical than working-class Members and candidates). The effect on ideology of the increasingly middle-class character of the Parliamentary Labour Party may be both minimal and unimportant in the post-ideology world of Britain (has Britain already followed the U. S. through the end of ideology?). "In the political circumstances of 1966," Butler and King say, "definition of what is meant by left (or right, for that matter) was unprecedentedly difficult." BERNARD HENNESSY, *Pennsylvania State University*.

Lawyers and the Courts: A Sociological Study of the English Legal System, 1750–1965. BY BRIAN ABEL-SMITH AND ROBERT STEVENS. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967. Pp. 468. $11.00.)

Despite the fact that the subtitle of this book is "A Sociological Study," it is also a work in history and literature. I am not competent to judge it in ways peculiar to the historian or to the literary critic; nevertheless, I feel that this book smacks strongly of excellence. Though heavily documented, it is not ponderous. Indeed, it is lively. Though bursting with instances of "the law" and bristling with a myriad of facts (names, dates and the like), there is an engaging framework of social, political, and humanistic analysis. Although this book is not a "hard" sociological treatise, it is a highly lucid and insightful exposition and it could become profoundly important in English legal and academic circles. Thus, what portended to be a laborious chore for the likes of me, was not. Of course, I *had* to read it. Such is the extent of my limitless dedication to the discipline and to the *American Political Science Review*. So the question remains for me to answer: of what practical use, if any, is this book to the modern, professional American political scientist?

Considering such factors as cost, length, and subject-matter, I doubt that *Lawyers and the Courts* will become a best-seller even on the college market. A few aficionados may peruse it for sheer literary delight or in order to become *the* American buff on the topic. But I can see little classroom use for it as a book. On the other hand, it promises to have tremendous research value for those political scientists studying judicial processes and behavior—and particularly for those who have an eye, heart, or stomach for comparative research and teaching. This is a superb case study in comparative developmental legal politics. There is much data and theory on the role and functioning of a legal system under various conditions.

The major theme of this book is that the English legal system is decrepit and that it may become even more so. Abel-Smith and Stevens examine the historical path of its rise and decline and the political factors that have led to the current situation. They view the legal system as being peculiarly inept, as an English societal structure, in adjusting itself to the many drastic changes that have rocked that nation in the mid-twentieth century. According to them, England's legal structure has lost much of its social and commercial and political importance and its image has suffered concomitantly. It would not be unfair to suggest that Abel-Smith and Stevens have described that system as being presently an anachronistic irrelevancy. The tone of the book is, however, neither one of quiet desperation nor of loud despair. Rather, the authors discern some grumbling and rumbling in the ruins. The natives are restless.

For instance, two very interesting chapters concern judges and legal education. In the former, some fascinating social background data is presented about English superior court judges (does it surprise you to learn that 76% of their number are graduates of Oxford and Cambridge?). Commenting upon the survey from which they quote these statistics, the authors wryly remark that "If this [the survey] showed that the judges were upper middle, rather than upper classes, it did nothing to show that they had a very broad view of life." The significance of this chapter is that it tends to demonstrate that the English judge has become, like his American counterpart, a focus of both academic and political scrutiny. If the myth of the robe received its comeuppance in the United States in the thirties, forties, and fifties, we learn now that the English variant of such folklore has begun to be exposed for what it is in the sixties.

All this critical analysis may be having some effect on the judges and their perceptions of judicial structure, judicial role, and the judicial function. Then again, it may not. The authors undoubtedly hope their book will be a prod in the correct place.

Similarly, Abel-Smith and Stevens detect and describe movement—yea, the very stirrings of life—within even the dankest halls of English legalism, i.e., the law schools. However, their hopes are not high for any substantial success for those modern legal academicians who have discovered social science. The mind of the English legal practitioner is a formidable fortress which is not easily scaled.

Will the English system be able to reform itself sufficiently to survive in recognizable form and, as such, perform functions necessary to an evolving English society? No answer could be forthcoming, and none is proferred. You see, dear reader, that's the rub.—THEODORE L. BECKER, *University of Hawaii and New York University.*

British Broadcasting and the Danish Resistance Movement, 1940–1945: A Study of the Wartime Broadcasts of the BBC Danish Service. BY JEREMY BENNETT. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1966. Pp. xvi, 266. $10.00.)

Jeremy Bennett, more lately a member of the staff of the British Broadcasting Corporation, undertook the writing of this book as a Churchill Fellow of the University of Copenhagen. The book itself is said to be the first detailed account of any part of the BBC European service in wartime. It will be of more interest to students of Danish affairs than to those interested in wartime propaganda.

This particular corner of the BBC European service was a small one: it began with a 5-minute broadcast in Danish on the day of the Nazi invasion of Denmark, for a time consisted of a single daily broadcast of 15 minutes, and for most of the war did not exceed an hour a day. Even within this small compass, however, there was a good deal of confusion. After the first broadcast, it was over a month before a chief was appointed to direct the Danish section; and it was a year or more before it was firmly established what upper echelons, both in BBC and in the British Government, were to give policy guidance to the section.

Some of the British documents dealing with the substantive issues which shaped propaganda policy, moreover, have not been made public. Mr. Bennett appears to have done most of his research in Denmark, and there is no indication that he talked to persons in Britain who might have been able to enlighten him. In the circumstances, it is not surprising that this book has its shortcomings as an account of the objectives and methods of the BBC's Danish service.

Mr. Bennett's narrative occasionally comes alive: it is interesting to learn how the V symbol (originally employed in the BBC's Belgian service) was adopted to the Danish service (*Ve vil vinde*—"We will win"); and he gives an interesting account of the competition between the BBC and the Swedish radio organization to capture the Danish audience. But the author has let himself get bogged down in minutiae largely of an administrative sort, and is not much interested in broadcast content; so that we learn little about the programming, themes, and appeals of the Danish service. The narrative is marred by repetition (the attitude of the British Special Operations Executive toward radio exhortation to sabotage, for example, is explained four times in one chapter), by much pointless language in the footnotes, and by several instances in which bad punctuation entirely changes the meaning of what the author doubtless intended to say. An editor could have greatly improved the text but the Cambridge University Press apparently did not provide one.—HAROLD GRAVES, *Chevy Chase, Md.*

Biographical Dictionary of Republican China. Volume 1. ED. BY HOWARD L. BOORMAN. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. Pp. xv, 483. $20.00.)

This is the first of a five-volume biographical dictionary of Chinese during the republican period (1911–1949) who distinguished themselves in the fields of politics, military, literature, or science. The articles are contributed by highly qualified scholars and are well written. It promises to be a major reference work to students of that period when it is completed. (HSC)

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION

Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy. ED. BY JAMES N. ROSENAU. (New York: The Free Press, 1967. Pp. xiii, 340. $7.50.)

The Center of International Studies at Princeton has produced some notable symposium books. This book is in that class but not at the top. Its individual chapters are mostly of high quality. But the adaptation to a common frame of reference has been minimal. The editor's attempt to integrate it was too modest in conception to be strong in performance. Rosenau has provided an excellent introduction, yet the book lacks focus. It is useful mainly as a collection and summary of the previous work of its authors. Since that work is neither inconsiderable nor undistinguished, the book should get the attention of informed readers of the foreign policy formulation process.

James N. Rosenau, in setting the frame of reference for the book, contrasts political behavior and processes in the foreign policy "issue-area" with behavior and processes in domestic policy issue-areas. Theodore J. Lowi, in his chapter, claims the contrary, that domestic and foreign policy behavior and process are more identical than distinguishable. Neither author, in my view, deals with this issue adequately for the purposes of this volume. Rosenau is overly concerned with research design. Lowi excludes *a priori* the distinction between domestic and foreign policy-making which Rosenau is at pains to describe. He does so by setting the latter equal to elitest policy-making and then finding other forms of policy-making in the foreign policy issue-area.

Kenneth N. Waltz also deals with public interest in foreign policy. His objective is to demonstrate that democratic governments do as well as and perhaps better than other forms of government in foreign relations. The grand proportions of this theme fit his own book, *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics* (1967), where he first developed it, but not this book. Rosenau sees Waltz focussing "mainly on governmental behavior as it is shaped by the anticipation of future elections and the memory of past elections." That is incorrect. Waltz describes the U. S. public as pliable with respect to foreign relations. Presumably he seeks to show that politicians need not be concerned about public opinion constraints in foreign relations. He is quite clear about the scope and purpose of his contribution; but in the setting of this book it is easy to see his paper the way Rosenau does, as a statement about the behavior of government officials.

I think Waltz exaggerates the interest of the public in foreign relations. Rosenau is better balanced on this point. But his description of public opinion in the domestic issue-areas goes uncomfortably beyond the available data, flagging the need for more systematic comparison of publics in equivalent terms.

Herbert McClosky has again written a carefully constructed research report, based on fresh survey data, on isolationism as a behavioral deviation. He marshalls skillfully the impressive data available on attitudes about foreign relations. But his categories are too inclusive and too rich in connotations to be comfortable empirical tools. He is never far from a good guys/bad guys dichotomy.

Milton J. Rosenberg has written casually though circumspectly about political attitude patterns and determinants in general. He does not attempt to demonstrate either their particular application to government officials, or the functional relationship between personal attitudes and behavior, on the one hand, and foreign policy as government output, on the other. His proposals for changing attitudes, therefore, stand as *ex cathedra* pronouncements about the Cold War.

Johan Galtung and Warren Miller have provided soundly conceived electoral behavior studies, with their inferences carefully drawn. Bernard C. Cohen has summarized and supplemented some of his excellent work on the press and foreign policy. Lester W. Milbrath has speculated about the methods and objectives of interest group representation with respect to foreign policy issues. He repeats some of the contrasts which Rosenau draws between domestic and foreign issue-area transactions. Scott Greer speculates about the quality of the performance in foreign relations from trends in domestic social, economic, and political conditions.

In sum, the book demonstrates at once that work of impressive quality has been done on the foreign relations function of government, the inadequacy of general theory on the subject, and some significant gaps in the field. Taking account of the fact that most of the items here do not address the central issues of the book, the gaps it makes evident are (1) verified propositions about the relationships between internal and external variables; (2) comparable frames of reference for comparing domestic and foreign policy issue-areas, particularly the variations in public attentiveness and activity; (3) findings about the processing of policy where the linkage between domestic sources and foreign policy behavior can be observed as a process.—PAUL Y. HAMMOND, *The RAND Corporation.*

Das amerikanische Sicherheitssystem 1945–1949—Studie zur Aussenpolitik der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft. BY ERNST-OTTO CZEMPIEL. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1966. Pp. xx, 442.)

In three ways this book constitutes a veritable *tour de force:* It is a book written by a German, in Germany, which deals with intimate and detailed phases of American foreign policy; American foreign policy is analyzed by using, almost exclusively, the proceedings and materials of Congress; finally, the author attempts to develop a more general theory of foreign relations out of the foreign policy of the most pragmatic nation extant, and out of its most untheoretical branch of government to boot.

As for the first *tour,* not much can and needs to be said, except that the author has succeeded splendidly. Czempiel (now one of two professors of political science at Marburg University) belongs to the still very small number of German specialists in international politics; as such he has proved extremely sensitive to things American, and in particular to the intricacies of U. S. politics in the area of the conduct of foreign affairs. His use of the respective materials is impeccable.

It is quite surprising how relatively clear and comprehensive a picture of U. S. foreign policy in the postwar years here covered emerges from the study of Congressional records (here comprising all the debates, hearings, votes, etc.). The author traces the emergence of what today would be called a broad "consensus" (in-between the dwindling pole of old-style, prewar isolationism and an equally insignificant new utopian, world-government-type of internationalism), first for U. S. cooperation in building up the UN system of international organization as "model of (genuine) collective security," and then, very soon, for a model of security still referred to as "collective security" that in reality was based upon the formation of alliances and the bloc-building that culminated in NATO. According to the author both policies, in contrast to prewar unilateralism, were conscious policies of "cooperation" and not of "domination" or coercion, aiming at security and not at territorial expansion or conquest. Befitting a "bourgeois republic" (*bürgerliche Republik*), the means of this foreign policy were primarily economic (aid, loans). Time and again the author documents the great reluctance of Congress to embrace means more appropriate to non-democratic societies, e.g., in regard to the maintenance, or resumption, of a non-voluntary military service system; or when it was a question of whether to follow totalitarian regimes into a propaganda war necessitating the setting up of governmental machinery for broadcasting etc., in the place of the traditional private management of these media.

In the foregoing there lies already a hint at the author's more general theory: The U. S. is the prototype of a bourgeois society. Such a society's foreign policy has for its prime objective peace and security for peaceful trade, especially in an age where industrial economy has become less dependent on foreign resources and thus is less interested in the acquisition of colonies or similar dependent areas, in conquest, and (with the exception of the defense sector) in war. More generally, the author asserts that a country's foreign policy is determined less by factors lying in the structure of the international system of which it is a part than by its internal social structure, its culture and tradition, and its style in conducting affairs. Somewhat in contrast to the older German approach we have here a doctrine of the "primacy of internal policy" (or, rather, of the internal system), and not of the "primacy of foreign policy" (*Primat der Aussenpolitik* in the Bismarck-Treitschke sense).

There are some rather obvious shortcomings of this interesting enterprise. One derives from its limitation to Congress as a primary source of documentation. To be sure, the U. S. remains the only major power where parliament not only enjoys comprehensive constitutional-legal powers but still exerts genuine actual influence in foreign policy; yet even here the shift toward the Executive is strong, and was already so in 1945. Moreover, there is the impact of public opinion and its periodic "Great Debates." There are initiatives like George Kennan's in this period on "containment." These are only dimly perceived in the author's presentation. Entire matters in which Congress happened to have no part are omitted (thus, of all things, American policy in and toward Germany, which at that time was still chiefly "occupation policy" outside the jurisdiction of Congress). The focus on Congress neglects great policy turns such as that away from striving for restoration of German unity toward the setting up of a separate German state integrated with the West.

Beyond this one might take issue with the author's underlying theory. This reviewer would charge disregard of the structural features of the international system and their impact on a nation's foreign policy, such as postwar bipolarity and its effect upon emergence and nature of the alliance, or bloc system of the superpowers, which compelled even peace- and cooperation-minded nations into what frequently amounted to hegemonial policies and client relationships. This is apart from the question whether the nature of the U. S. "style" in foreign affairs has been interpretated correctly. Major wars, including two world wars, in which America, in fifty years, participated in a crusading spirit (whether justified under "security" considerations, as in World War II, or not, as in Vietnam) make one doubt. Whether, in contrast to the author's theory but in accordance with the Lenin-Hilferding version of the Marxian interpretation of capitalist imperialism (and also with such non-Marxian interpretations of American foreign policy as Charles Beard's), such "bellicism" is in line with the economic interests of a "bourgeois society" or not, the question arises whether non-economic, e.g., ideological, factors are not overlooked this way. Thus the ideology of anticommunism which now so dominates U. S. policy (without much relation, so it seems, to economic interests) was certainly not absent in the immediate postwar era. It may yet drive this nation (and possibly the world) into a doom which Czempiel's interpretation of the American style would be at a loss to account for. But the book's merit as one of the few attempts to present a more fundamental interpretation of American foreign policy remains unaffected by this criticism.—JOHN H. HERZ, *City College of the City University of New York.*

Americans and the Soviet Experiment, 1917–1933: American Attitudes Toward Russia from the February Revolution Until Diplomatic Recognition. BY PETER G. FILENE. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967. Pp. viii, 389. $7.95.)

A significant paradox is that the greatest industrial nation in the world and what became the next greatest industrial nation did not recognize each other for sixteen years. On the American side there was considerable interest, nevertheless, in this new nation called Bolshevik Russia. Peter G. Filene has prepared a very valuable study on American attitudes towards Russia before our recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933. This book growing out of a Harvard doctoral dissertation reads unlike traditional theses in American history. It is vibrant, graphic, and illuminating. What impresses the reader of this book in addition to the intriguing nature of the subject is the thoroughness of the author in combing all possible bibliographical sources. Not only has he gone through the personal papers available in libraries of the principal Americans who molded our first attitudes on Bolshevik Russia like Borah, Gumberg, Harper, House, Norris, John Reed, Robins, Root, Norman Thomas, O. G. Villard, William Allen White, etc., but he has carefully sifted the attitudes represented by key American newspapers from coast to coast. Filene's appendices, bibliography and notes take in almost one hundred pages. Filene has read almost every conceivable American magazine published between 1917 and 1933 which said anything about Russia but has also gone through about a dozen American newspapers representing both geographic and political differentiation. It is apparent from reading Filene's work that though his problem was the attitude of various Americans towards the Soviet experiment, Filene soon became involved with a myriad of peripheral questions such as the American attitudes towards capitalism, socialism, democracy and American social institutions.

As all individuals are ambivalent in one way or another in regard to other individuals, Filene would argue that the American attitudes to the Soviets were also ambivalent. Some extreme worshippers at the Soviet scene like Lincoln Steffens said "We have seen the future and it works." Others saw the inability of the Soviets to accomplish anything. Hoover in 1923 called Russia an "economic vacuum." Others saw chaos unless the Russians changed their policies which they did under the NEP. John Dewey is quoted as saying in 1928 "Perhaps the most significant thing in Russia, after all, is not the effort at economic transformation, but the will to use an economic change as the means of developing a popular cultivation, especially an esthetic one, such as the world has never known." One merely can question the esthetic evaluation of Soviet culture today! Notwithstanding, the Soviet revolution is still being debated in its fiftieth anniversary not only by its adherents and devotees but also by many of its close students.

Every American who ever said in a public speech or wrote in a journal or newspaper anything on Russia in this period seems to be quoted by the author. Of especial interest in Filene's book are the case studies of four American journalists who lived in Russia during this period: Anna Louise Strong, Louis Fischer, William Henry Chamberlin and Eugene Lyons. Only Miss Strong has remained a devout believer, while the other three started out as ardent believers in the Soviet system but became disillusioned and have testified in many valuable books their strong anti-Communist positions and the reasons for their disillusionment. This part of the book is sort of anticlimatic. The main portion is a careful analysis of the first sixteen years of Bolshevik rule as seen through key groups in government, business, labor, education and journalism. This is a sound and revealing study. It is hoped that the author will continue his analytical techniques and extend them to successive periods of American-

Soviet relations.—William B. Ballis, *University of Michigan.*

Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influences. By Theodore A. Couloumbis. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966. Pp. 250. $7.50.)

In 1952 Americans and Greeks of a pro-Western state of mind viewed the emergence of a strong Greek government as an indispensable adjunct to Greece's accession to NATO, and NATO itself is a shield behind which Greece might safely become stronger through economic and social development. However, the strong government that emerged from the general elections of November 12, 1952 soon focused its attention not so much on economic development as on the Cyprus question, with fissiparous effects on NATO's southeastern flank. Mr. Couloumbis' book which deals with the public reactions of Greek politicians and the press to Greece's participation in NATO and its alignment with the West and the United States in particular clearly reveals these effects. Premier Constantine Karamanlis and members of his successive governments between 1955–1963 who attached primary importance to Greece's economic progress, hence to NATO security along lines consonant with U. S. and allied interests, did not remain unaffected by this factor of inter-allied friction which the predecessor government had bequeathed to them by raising the Cyprus issue in the United Nations in 1954. Signs of an independent foreign policy—leftward trends in the international arena—soon appeared, culminating in predictions in September 1958 that the position of Greece in NATO would become problematical if the British government insisted on implementing the Macmillan plan in Cyprus. At times, relations with the United States were close to becoming the only remaining link with NATO. The Opposition, naturally, sought to exploit the Cyprus issue to the hilt in order to undermine the government's position with the aim of replacing it in power or, at the least, of sharing power with it in a coalition government, ostensibly in order to deal more effectively with the issue. In public at least, the leaders of what became in 1961 the Center Union (EK) tended to assume attitudes more negative toward the West, NATO, and the United States than they did in 1963–1965 when a new Cyprus crisis occurred and their turn came to shoulder the burden of government and of responsibility for Greek policy as a whole. And the communist facade party, the United Democratic Left (EDA), was able to add new verbal weapons to its arsenal of anti-NATO, anti-American, and anti-Western slogans about a "golden occupation" of Greece and a supposedly colonial exploitation of the country—with ultra-nationalist press organs of the extreme Right wing chiming in.

These are some of the points, explicit and implicit, of Mr. Couloumbis' study, the excellence of which would have been enhanced by the treatment of certain matters which the reviewer now regards as omissions as well as by a somewhat greater verbal caution. The British, for instance, although doing all in their weakness to assist Greece in 1945–1947, can hardly be said to have given "massive" military aid to Greece during that period. And AMFOGE's function was not to "supervise" the Greek elections of March 31, 1946, but to "observe" them, as Byrnes tried to explain to the Soviet leaders at the Potsdam Conference. In the main body of his study, Mr. Couloumbis might have dealt at greater length with the reaction to Greece's accession to the "Eisenhower Doctrine," which a salient feature of American foreign policy in 1957. He might have also dwelt more on the matter of the reaction to the question of the immunities of American nondiplomatic personnel in Greece from the jurisdiction of Greek civil and military courts, especially since he publishes the relevant documents in his appendices. This reaction, incidentally, led to the revision of these agreements under the Karamanlis government. The author, too, should have been a little more careful in checking his UN facts. Thus, in 1954, the General Assembly did include the Cyprus item in its agenda. It did not do so the following year.

In connection with Mr. Couloumbis' remark on p. 211 that it would be fruitful to investigate and analyze Greece's United Nations voting pattern vis-à-vis the United States and other member nations, it should be noted that a study of U .S. influence in the General Assembly between 1946–1955 (R. Riggs, *Politics in the United Nations: a Study of U. S. Influence in the General Assembly*, Urbana, Ill.: Illinois University Press, 1958, pp. 167–168) reveals that this small noncaucusing UN member was more often in agreement with the United States on noncolonial rather than on colonial questions. In a table that indicates the scores of agreement of various UN members with the United States on fifty-six roll-call votes on noncolonial questions, Greece was ranked eighteenth, as compared with Turkey, which was fourteenth. On the other hand, in a total of eighty-six roll-call votes on questions that also included colonial issues, Greece's rank fell to twenty-ninth as compared with Turkey's, which was eighteenth. This provides a vivid measure of the impact of the Cyprus question on the relations between Greece and the United States, and this even before 1956–1958, when the Cyprus question led to greater divergences between the two countries.—STEPHEN G. XYDIS, *Hunter College of the City University of New York.*

A Working Peace System. BY DAVID MITRANY. Introduction by Hans J. Morgenthau. Published in Cooperation with the Society for World Service Federation. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966. Pp. 221. $5.95.)

It was in one of the William Dodge lectures at Yale in 1932 in discussing the "Communal Organization of World Affairs" that Mitrany first stated his functional conception of building peace. This volume is a collection of seven articles which provide the clearest articulation of his functional approach.

The first section, "A Working Peace System," consists of his essay of that title, which was originally published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs in 1943, to which a new introduction has been added. In essence, he argued in this seminal pamphlet that war and conflict spring "from the division of the world into detached and competing political units," and it will not be eliminated by federations, etc., which will change or reduce the lines of division.

> Any political reorganization into separate units must, sooner or later, produce the same effects; any international system that is to usher in a new world must produce the opposite effect of subduing political division. As far as one can see, there are two ways of achieving that end. One would be through a world state which would wipe out political divisions forcibly; the other . . . would rather overlay political divisions with a speading web of international activities and agencies, in which and through which the interests and life of all nations would be gradually integrated.

The functional approach, he argues, would make "frontier lines meaningless by overlaying them with a natural growth of common activities and common administrative agencies."

The second section on "Political Theory and International Political Development" contains three essays: "The Problem of Equality in Historical Perspective" (originally a paper before the 1955 IPSA Congress); "An Advance in Democratic Representation" (published in *International Associations* in 1954); and "Problems of International Administration" (a paper for the Institute of Public Administration and the Royal Institute of International Affairs in 1945). In these essays Mitrany considers: (1) the problem of the "transition from national to international control of political power and of material resources, on a general basis of equality—not equality of possession, but opportunity of use"; (2) the potential roles of international nongovernmental organizations in providing broader bases of opinion for national responses to international actions; and (3) the evolution of technical international agencies from a secretarial role to an executive role in dealing with common economic and social interests.

In the third section on the "Functional Approach and Federalism," there are also three essays: "The Functional Approach to World Organization" (from *International Affairs*, 1948); "Functional Federalism" (published in *Common Cause*, 1950); and "The Prospect of European Integration: Federal or Functional" (from the *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 1965). He argues here that it is a fallacy to seek political federations to create peaceful relations, if they leave social and economic activities in the hands of the national members. It is better to seek functional unions than to be hypnotized by dreams of political unification.

All of the last six essays are variations on the themes of the initial one—"A Working Peace System." The real significance of this volume is that it makes readily available this essay which has been out of print for over twenty years. The influence of this essay has been and still is very considerable. The original pamphlet was one of the few academic pieces that was distributed to all the delegates attending the U.N. Charter Conference in San Francisco in 1945, and had an impact on decisions to decentralize international approaches to economic and social activities, and to stress the separate development of the Specialized Agencies of the U.N. The polemics of Mitrany's arguments have been reflected in many treatises on international politics and hardly a text in international organization exists since 1943 that does not react to his functional approach. The late Linden A. Mander, in his *Foundations of Modern World Society* (Stanford, 1947) was materially influenced by the argument; and Ernst B. Haas's reaction to Mitrany in *Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and International Organization* (Stanford, 1964), has redefined functionalism to make a major contribution to theory and model building in the field of international organization—a field that has been too often characterized by an absence of theory. Most writers and many dissertations in the field since 1943 have reacted either for or against the Mitrany conception, probably more negatively than positively, but its stimulative impact has been impressive. It may be a paradox to some that Morgenthau should contribute an introduction to this volume, as his analysis of Mitrany in *Politics Among Nations* is quite critical, yet it is understandable. No review, in the face of this reaction, could adequately discuss the pros and cons of the Mitrany conception and do justice to the many writers who have reacted to it.

It is apparent therefore that it is useful to make Mitrany's "A Working Peace System" more readily available because it has been a generating essay. The essay has had a significant formative and creative effect on scholars and practitioners in the field that may be felt more today than when it was issued in 1943.—THOMAS HOVET JR., *University of Oregon.*

Competitive Interference and Twentieth Century Diplomacy. BY RICHARD W. COTTAM. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967. Pp. 151. $5.95.)

This excellent and thoughtful book is grounded on the author's belief that there is a strong trend away from the autonomous nation-state and that one of the major reasons for this development is the growth of what he calls "competitive interference" among nations. Professor Cottam defines "interference" so as to include all acts by a government and people designed to limit the freedom of action of the government and people of a target state. He rightly argues that this has led to a significant alteration in the way that foreign policy is conducted. The style of diplomacy that fitted the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is not appropriate to the twentieth century.

Interference in the affairs of other nations has become unavoidable for a powerful nation. Interference, the author points out, is neither good nor bad in itself. Economic aid, for example, is a form of interference.

> In re-evaluating the role of interference a basic first step is to erase the distinction between what is loosely called "normal diplomatic behavior" and interference. To search for a fine line dividing normal diplomatic behavior, interference, and intervention is not only futile but tends to obscure the important point that there is a continuum from slight to intense interference.

Professor Cottam notes that many Americans in the attentive public find interference repugnant. This can hardly fail to make it more difficult for the United States to learn to interfere effectively and to develop an appropriate set of canons concerning legitimate and illegitimate forms of interference. The author analyzes and catalogues various types of interference and discusses those that are likely to be acceptable to the nation interfered with. His use of examples and illustrations is imaginative.

Some of the points that this volume makes have been made elsewhere but these sources did not come to the author's attention. This is a small matter, for much of the author's material is original and, in any case, the points that he makes will need to be made again and again before they are incorporated into day-to-day thinking about the analysis of international politics and the conduct of foreign policy.

The book is oriented toward conflict and the author tends to overlook the extent to which the phenomena of interference are also found in non-conflict situations. His ideas on international politics appear to have taken shape primarily in a period of Cold War and he may not find it easy to think in other terms. In addition, he seems to give undue attention to covert forms of conflict and does not seem to be aware of the extent to which non-convert forms of interference (economic aid, cultural exchange programs, information programs, military aid, etc.) are susceptible to the same style of analysis. His discussion of CIA has already been dated by the exposure of some of its clandestine activities in the spring of 1967 and by the subsequent decisions of the President concerning the Agency's future role.

Professor Cottam goes on to try to analyze power in terms of "leverage" and he develops a typology of levers. This effort seems less successful to this reviewer than his analysis of competitive interference. The book as a whole is somewhat disjointed. These shortcomings, however, do not prevent it from being valuable. The author has a strong analytic mind and gravitates toward problems of significance. He has said new and useful things about an important subject.—ANDREW SCOTT, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.*

L'Europe au berceau: souvenirs d'un technocrate. BY ROBERT LEMAIGNEN. (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1964. Pp. 217. F 12.35.)

This brief volume, bringing together recollections of the institutional origins and development of the European Economic Community and reflections on its future, is based on the author's experience as one of the original members of the Community's nine-man Commission. Because this is the first view-from-within of the Commission, a perspective shaped by involvement rather than interview, it merits the attention of all those interested in European integration and careful reading by that rapidly expanding group of specialists in Community affairs.

Unlike the Commission's other French member, Robert Marjolin, whose appointment in 1957 was an expected consequence of his leading part in negotiating the Treaty of Rome, Lemaignen's selection was a complete surprise, ostensibly to himself as well as his future colleagues. The constituency represented by the author, implicit in his close relationship with Georges Villiers, President of the *Conseil national du Patronat Français,* appears to have been the principal determinant of the appointment. Significantly, Lemaignen was not a committed "European," forced to reconcile Resistance-bred and Monnet-inspired aspirations for the "new Europe" with the unfamiliar and often unglamorous routine of running the Community bureacracy. His faith in the Community enterprise, strongly articulated in this book, proceeded from practical knowledge gained within the structure of the Community institutions and thereby offers a persuasive example of the "demonstration effect" of European integration.

The author's account of the original Commission's early meetings, the method followed to implement a division of labor among its members, the process of recruiting the higher echelon of the bureacracy, and evolution of the Community's decision-making process (impressionistically described) furnishes an impressive image of administrative efficiency skillfully tempered with political prudence. A description of Lemaignen's *Direction Générale* is complemented by sympathetic sketches of the Commission's most influential members, Walter Hallstein, Sico Mansholt, Jean Rey, and Marjolin, in addition to intriguing glimpses of the elaborate network of formal and informal consultation constructed by the Commission and exploited in unprecedented fashion. An account of meetings among ministers, Commission members, functionaries, and journalists on the Trans-European Express, regularly travelling from Brussels to Paris in less than three hours and a mobile conference table which "rapidly became an annex to the institutions of the Community" (p. 43), provides suggestive material for interpretations of European integration, whether based on the premise of a conspiracy against governments or the imperatives of a technologically advanced society. Happily, considerable evidence is supplied to corroborate available models of Community decision-making.

Lemaignen's principal conclusions, the "irreversibility" of European integration, the folly of unrestrained national egoisms, and the need for France to assume the mantle of leadership for a united Europe of the Monnet-Hallstein variety, are unexceptional and not convincingly supported. The relevant passages of this book are those that further our understanding of the workings of the Commission, a successful example of collective leadership that the new and enlarged commission issuing from the 1967 merger will probably find difficult to emulate. Whether the leadership for the Europe of the Six (or some larger grouping) will be supplied by the technocrats, a sobriquet accepted and defended by the author, or be diffused among national leaders of a Gaullist persuasion, or remain precariously balanced between both groups, is not likely to be soon resolved. This volume, however, can be a useful source for political scientists seeking to explain how the balance has been achieved and sustained.—HOWARD BLISS, *Dartmouth College.*

Deutschlands Araberpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg. BY HEINZ TILLMANN. (Berlin: VEB Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1965. Pp. 473.)

The author of this study of German Middle Eastern policies on the eve of, and during, World War II (through July 1943) is a professor of history at the Martin-Luther University Halle Wittenberg, in East Germany.

The volume, though excellent in many specific aspects, as a whole is flawed beyond redemption by a persistent and at times ludicrous intrusion of Marxist stereotypes and by its ideologically determined hypothesis.

One must question the author's approach and treatment when the text is interlarded with such terms as "ruling circles," "the German-fascist foreign minister," "the reactionary West German school of history," "the German fascist radio," and when a well-known writer is referred to as "the renegade Arthur Koestler." Such terms occur on virtually every page, and the author's interpretation of events is closely linked to them. On the other hand, not a word of criticism relates to the Soviet Union. The author condemns the Nazi practice of selling manufactured goods at high prices to Near Eastern states while paying little for that region's agrarian products, but does not mention identical practices by the Soviet Union in relation to its European satellites and to China until a few years ago. He denounces German "liberation" plans for the Arab states even though these projects were couched in terms scarcely distinguishable from Communist projects for the stimulation of wars of national liberation. The Soviet social order is held to represent the highest stage of the organization of human society; the "war on the part of the powers comprising the anti-Hitler coalition had acquired the character of a just war [after the German attack on the USSR]" (p. 266). A list of such examples of rank pro-Soviet prejudice could be continued almost indefinitely.

The volume is based on a pervading thesis, mentioned briefly in the Preface and explicitly on page 446: German imperialism has risen again, with Western aid, and has begun a "neo-colonial" expansion into the Near East, and the "ruling circles" of West Germany, using a "legend" of German unselfish friendship toward the Near Eastern states, are again engaged in a struggle with their Western imperialist rivals. The work is to represent a "contribution" in the battle against the legend, termed a "reactionary and dangerous falsification of history."

Tillmann's volume is massively documented, with 1297 footnotes referring to 617 sources listed in a bibliography beginning with "31 Classics of Marxism-Leninism," followed by 6 "Theoretical Works of the International Labor Movement." Nevertheless, the omission of certain sources strikes one as peculiar: there is no mention of A. H. Hourani's *Syria and Lebanon—A Political Essay* (London, 1946), of S. H. Longrigg's *Syria and Lebanon under the French Mandate* (London, 1958), or of Enno von Rintelen's *Mussolini als Bundesgenosse* (Tübingen & Stuttgart, 1951). Also, certain allegations, asserted repeatedly, are not documented adequately: thus the author claims that German industry actively supported a penetration of the Near East, but no satisfactory evidence is supplied for the 1939–1943 period, and only fragmentary documentation is given for prewar years.

On the positive side, on the other hand, must be included a valuable discussion of German fifth-column activities in Iran; a fascinating account of the Byzantine intrigues among German agencies about their competence for propaganda in the Near East and of German propaganda techniques used in that area; a perceptive coverage of German-Italian relations from 1937 to 1943; the emphasis placed on organizational weakness of German intelligence agencies; the story of the convolutions of German foreign policy between November 1941 and May 1942 in the effort to avoid an overt commitment to Arab nationalists; the detailed history of the plans to create an Arab Legion; and the meticulous account of German schemes, some as late as the fall of 1942, for the invasion and exploitation of the Near East. Nevertheless, the flaws in approach and consequentially in interpretation outweigh the bulk of the contributions recorded.—GERHARD VON GLAHN, *University of Minnesota, Duluth.*

Canada and "Imperial Defense": A Study of the Origins of the British Commonwealth's Defense Organization, 1867–1919. BY RICHARD A. PRESTON. (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press for the Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center, 1967. Pp. xxi, 576. $12.50.)

Historians of the First and Second World Wars recognize the critical contributions of the British dominions to Allied victory. In 1914, constitutionally committed by Britain's declaration of war, they responded to the call to arms and stayed the long and bloody course. In 1940, Britain stood not entirely alone, and the support of the dominions may well have provided the margin of survival.

The history of the military relations between the United Kingdom and the old dominions which resulted in their close war-time collaboration is told in Dr. Richard A. Preston's *Canada and "Imperial Defense."* The author, who is W. K. Boyd Professor of History at Duke University, covers in detail the strategic thinking and military planning during the years 1867 to 1919, the period which opens with the achievement of colonial autonomy and the withdrawal of imperial garrisons and closes with the emergence of a Commonwealth of associated nations. Although he focuses on Canadian attitudes and actions, Professor Preston has included the contemporary relations of the other self-governing colonies with respect to imperial defense so that his subtitle correctly describes the contents of the book. Because almost all studies of the subject have been written from a British point of view and based upon British sources, the author's approach is the pioneering one of utilizing dominion archives to present problems and policies as they appeared to Canadians, Australians, and New Zealanders.

In the period of this study, and even until the opening of the Second World War, the term "imperial defense" was used ambiguously. To many military leaders, politicians, and publicists in Britain, and some colonials of the imperialist school, it meant a centrally planned defense of the Empire under British command, with dominion forces committed to an imperial strategy. They often wrote and spoke in the years before World War I as though this kind of defense system had been achieved, and the illusion was supported by such names as Committee of Imperial Defense and Commander of the Imperial General Staff. To most dominion leaders, however, imperial defense stood for the principle that the colonies had a vital stake in the existence of the British Empire and that they would help to resist a serious threat to it.

The obstacles to the achievement of the form of imperial defense promoted in official circles in London were insurmountable given the trend of constitutional development in the Empire. Dominion ministers and their electorates were jealous of their autonomy and were not disposed to make commitments of forces or money when they had no voice in British foreign or strategic policy. Some leaders in both Britain and the dominions believed that imperial federation would one day provide the Empire with central organs to deal with foreign affairs and defense, but before World War I the problems of representation, travel, and communications left federal institutions a vision for the future.

Central planning of imperial defense was also impeded by the dominions' varying estimates of the dangers they faced. Until late in the nineteenth century, the United States represented the chief threat to Canadian security, and only large land forces could meet invasion from the south. Such forces were beyond the resources of the dominion, and British help was unlikely to arrive in time to avert defeat. Consequently, Canadian governments did little to increase the size and effectiveness of their militia forces, showed little interest in sea power, and pointed to internal development, especially the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railroad, as their contribution to imperial defense. For the Australasian colonies, Russian and later German and Japanese imperialist ambitions in the Far East were the menaces they feared. After the Colonial Conference of 1887, they contributed to the construction of additional ships for the Australian station, although the Admiralty's insistence upon full control of naval dispositions led to continual bickering.

Despite the unwillingness of the dominions to participate in a centralized system of imperial defense, there developed, especially in the decade before 1914, many forms of military cooperation with Britain. Standardization in organization, tactics, and weapons, officer exchanges, and training in military and staff colleges facilitated cooperation and integration when war came. It is Professor Preston's opinion that "No one can say whether [a centralized system of] imperial defense, had it been attempted, would have been more effective." He does not believe, however, that the achievement of such a system would have been a deterrent to the outbreak of either of the World Wars or enhanced the contributions of the dominions. "The 'ifs' of history," he writes, "are always an unsatisfactory basis for argument, yet it is tempting to suggest that if the imperial defense planners had had their way, and if dominion contributions had been automatic, obligatory, or subject to a British direction that could not be questioned or criticized, the resulting dominion efforts would have been smaller and the two world wars might have taken very different turns." As it was, national sentiment and a common cause produced a maximum response from the Empire when the challenge came.

One would like to see the author's demonstrated skills in research, analysis, and exposition devoted to the subsequent Commonwealth period of military cooperation. In the present book he has laid an admirable foundation.—Hiram M. Stout, *The George Washington University.*

The Illusion of Permanence: British Imperialism in India. By Francis G. Hutchins. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967. Pp. xv, 217. $6.50.)

Professor Hutchins' thesis is that during the nineteenth century the British completely reversed their conception of their role in India. Until about the middle of the century they regarded India as a social laboratory, a pristine nation which through expert British rule could be transformed into a virtual utopia which might surpass even Britain in some ways. Subsequently, those who opposed the growth of democracy in Britain came to see India as a refuge where one still could enjoy the status and power of a stratified, closed society. As this view increasingly predominated, the British no longer conceived of their rule of India as a limited period of tutelage, but believed it would be permanent. Since this belief completely ignored rising Indian nationalism, it was illusory.

This major shift in perspective was not an adverse reaction to the major rebellion of 1857; Hutchins argues that the British simply used this event to rationalize a change in values which already was occurring. Instead the primary reasons were: first, that new theories about the factors productive of various character traits convinced the British that the Indian climate made the defects of the natives unremedial; second, that replacing the rule of the East India Company with that of a royally appointed Viceroy tied national prestige much more tightly to domination of India and made graceful withdrawal much more difficult to contemplate; third, that increasing international competition for colonial empires required that Britain retain all her colonies and even acquire more to prove that she was a great power; and, fourth, that although they might educate their children in England and even leave their families there for years, the British administrators in India did not desire very strongly to return home because the status which was theirs in India could not be transferred to England—their pretentions to an aristocratic style of life would be shattered upon their return home.

Corresponding to this shift in British imperial values was a change in the quality of British rule in India. Instead of trying to reform the Indians, the British tried to make their rule seem, at least superficially, more oriental. Being less foreign, it would be more acceptable to the Indians and would enable the British to control the country more effectively. Thus, instead of expanding opportunities for the average person to participate in government, as was occurring at home, the British increasingly were willing to govern despotically. Thus they propped up the traditional Indian rulers as puppets through which they controlled the country. The stirrings of Indian nationalism in protest to this rule were regarded by British administrators in India as needless trouble produced by radical democrats agitating in England about better treatment for the Indians. The "bleeding hearts" were provoking a movement which otherwise would never have existed.

While this argument is interesting, it is supported not by rigorous proof but rather by common-sense logic and selective illustration. Hutchins thinks "it was not surprising" that those Englishmen who opposed the growth of democracy should have regarded India as a refuge; so without further evidence he assumes that this was the case. He strongly emphasizes that British administrators were motivated to go to India by the opportunities to gain status and wealth, but presents little evidence beyond a quote or two to explain how he knows what was in these peoples' minds. He argues that life in India was sufficiently uncomfortable to convince a Victorian Englishman, who had enshrined duty as code of life, that he must be doing his duty and, therefore, building his character. India's unpleasantness was precisely what attracted Englishmen. The evidence for this is a one-sentence comment by a Lady S. contained in the diary of one William Blunt, neither of whom is further identified. Too frequently Hutchins fails to explain why the people he quotes should be considered either authoritative or representative. He devotes seven pages to summarizing a novel on British life in India by Matthew Arnold's brother, but he shows neither that this book had a widespread impact on British values nor was typical of British fiction of the time on this topic. Thus for all one can tell, Hutchins has presented whatever supported his argument and ignored everything else.

Even should Hutchins' account of British imperial values be representative, a further problem remains: he presents no evidence to link these values with actual British policy. He assumes that the ideas of British intellectuals were shared by administrators in India. True, John Stuart Mill, one of those he quotes, worked for the East India Company for 35 years, but is he to be taken as typical of the colonial administrator? And even if these ideas were part of the intellectual baggage which administrators took with them to India, did they try to implement them? Hutchins does not show that they did. His argument is flawed by an unexplored hiatus between ideas and policy.

As for the subject of the book, Hutchins suggests that it is important to study British imperial values because we can understand Indian nationalism only in terms of the Western values to which it was reacting. Such a study also is significant in providing further evidence about the development of prejudices and stereotypes. Unfortunately, Hutchins devotes little time to discussing the Indian reaction to British policy and does not relate his findings at all to existing social psychological theory on prejudice.

This book, then, is primarily a history of ideas and chiefly a descriptive history at that. Hutchins reports the change in ideas which he believes occurred, but does not really show why particular ideas developed as they did. For example, granted that Victorian Englishmen accepted the theory that climate produced character and, therefore, made the Indians unreformable, why did they come to believe this theory? Hutchins does not say.

Despite its shortcomings this book does offer on a significant topic some interesting ideas which deserve to be followed up. Perhaps it can serve to stimulate more rigorous research in this area.—JORGEN RASMUSSEN, *Vanderbilt University.*

The OAS and United States Foreign Policy. BY JEROME SLATER. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1967. Pp. viii, 289, bibliography, index. $6.00.)

In spite of the long history of the Pan American ideal and the special place of Latin America in the foreign policy of the United States, there has until recently been very little literature of value dealing with contemporary inter-American relations. With a few important exceptions, both United States and Latin American writings in this field have been either largely historical, highly polemical, or excessively legalistic in nature. Against this background, one is all the more grateful for the major contribution which Jerome Slater makes with his new book.

The OAS and United States Foreign Policy is both a study of the activities of the regional organization in several key functional areas and an analysis of its part in the evolving Latin American policy of the United States. More broadly, this volume focuses upon the organization as a dynamic instrument of *all* member governments, emphasizing its development through the interplay of policies which are themselves continually shifting in response to often-dramatic changes at the domestic political level. Slater stresses the period since the founding of the OAS in 1948, although perhaps regrettably—partly because of publication deadlines—he chooses not to deal with the 1965–66 Dominican crisis, the latest conflict between the U. S. and Panama over the future of the Canal, and the Alliance for Progress. In his work, he has drawn heavily upon his earlier writings (dissertation, monograph, and two articles), made good use of OAS documents and secondary sources, and added much significant information gleaned from interviews.

The Introduction offers a succinct review of U. S. post-war policies. Chapter 1 traces the development of the inter-American system from independence to the present and includes the best brief analysis of the principal OAS organs that this reviewer has seen.

Chapter 2 considers the OAS record in the collective security field from 1948–60. Slater stresses that "the primary function of the OAS has been to cloak and thereby legitimize the predominant role of the United States" in settling hemisphere conflicts, especially in the traditional Caribbean sphere of U. S. influence. He attributes "great significance" to OAS successes, although he points out that "the moral underpinning of collective security is often quite shaky" since it maximizes only the one value of interstate peace at the price of stabilizing the "unjust status quo" of dictatorship.

In Chapters 3–4 the author examines OAS actions as an "anti-Communist alliance" in response to the Korean War and the challenges of the Guatemalan and Cuban revolutions. His choice of terms rests upon his judgment that the organization has applied a double standard to hemisphere threats to the peace, as a rule mediating disputes arising from customary Caribbean intrigues while reacting much more forcefully to conflicts which involve the "imprecise and emotional" concepts of "Communism" and "subversion." Moreover, Slater charges that the OAS has betrayed the collective security ideal in its failure to offer Guatemala and Cuba protection against, or at least to condemn, U. S.-sponsored exile invasions. The results, he notes, have been a serious break in the OAS practice of unanimity, an outpouring of anti-American sentiment, and an exacerbation of militarism and endemic political instability in Latin America. On the positive side, the multilateral aspect of the Cuban problem has early and late provided the United States with an excuse to avoid drastic unilateral action against Castro.

Chapters 5–7 are devoted to the OAS operating as an "antidictatorial alliance." Slater emphasizes the contrast between the Dominican case, when vigorous joint OAS-U. S. efforts under the guise of collective security measures paved the way for the Bosch regime's "experiment in democracy," and the Haitian episode, when a majority of governments—despite the prodding of the United States and Latin American democrats—refused to use a diplomatic-military confrontation between Bosch and Duvalier as grounds for bringing strong pressure to bear on the Haitian tyrant. Subsequently, he demonstrates that the Haitian affair was much more in line with the usual OAS posture on the democracy issue.

Slater's most important observations emerge in the context of his concluding chapter discussion of integrative and disintegrative forces in the OAS. In view of "the wide political, ideological, and cultural differences in the hemisphere," he says, "one might argue that the really striking fact is that the OAS has worked as well as it has." It has done so, he feels, not only because of a genuine (though by no means blanket) commitment to Pan Americanism on the part of many political leaders, but, more significantly, because participation in the organization has held sufficient rewards for all member states. Apart from its value to the United States in pursuit of the central goals of stability and containment of Communism, the organization has been useful to the Latin American states in protecting them from external threats and as a lever over U. S. policies that they otherwise would not have had. Time and time again, the record reveals the United States scaling down its demands in the interest of unanimity.

Slater also effectively dispels the myth that the OAS has been the constant servant of a reactionary coalition of the "Colossus of the North" and venal Latin American dictators. Indeed he highlights the cautious encouragement which the Kennedy administration gave to pro-democracy initiatives and the attempts of both Herter and Rusk to moderate conservative regimes' hard-line stands on the subversion question.

It is Slater's principal criticism of the OAS and the Johnson administration that so little has really been done to support the cause of democracy in the Americas. His concluding pages constitute a reasoned plea for a more enlightened policy in this respect, one which would cast aside the shibboleth of absolute nonintervention and favor, not "indiscriminate intervention," but collective measures against *unprogressive* dictatorships. In his view, the Kennedy administration's assumption that the removal of dictators who oppose change has an anti-Communist utility is questionable at best; therefore, he would rest the case for pro-democracy intervention largely on its moral validity.

This review would not be complete without mention of a few deficiencies which only slightly dim the overall excellence of this book. Slater's Chapter 7 survey of the ongoing issue of institutionalizing a pro-democracy role for the OAS is too sketchy: much of the record simply is not here. For example, in his examination of the Bogotá Conference he makes no reference to haggling over the binding quality of key Article 5(d) and the matter of membership of non-democratic regimes. The former omission allows him to say that "the practice of democracy is not required of OAS members," which is contrary to the consensus that emerged from the meeting (requirement of democracy, yes—enforcement, no). From Bogotá he moves to the 1959 Meeting of Foreign Ministers, neglecting the Latin American response to Truman initiatives in the wake of post-war military coups and discussions of recognition norms within the framework of OAS juridical organs. In addition, he underestimates the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, as witness its active role in the 1965–66 Dominican situation and its success in wresting an expanded mandate from the Second Special Inter-American Conference.

The reviewer would also question Slater's assertion in the Introduction that by the fall of 1963 the Kennedy government had become so disillusioned with its pro-democracy policy that a retrenchment was underway. How is this judgment to be reconciled with the President's firm denial that Assistant Secretary Martin's October statement represented an "apologia for coups" and his own dramatic reaffirmation of the basic principles of his policy in Miami shortly before his death? Slater cites interviews as the source of some of his information in this section: Can it be that he talked to State Department hands whose reading of trends might well have been swayed by the hope that the White House was finally "coming to its senses"? The Kennedy period still needs further investigation.

Another shortcoming of the book is Slater's analysis of the nonintervention rule in Chapter 1. He states that Charter Article 15 "proscribed collective as well as unilateral intervention, thus excluding the OAS itself from involvement in the domestic or even the foreign policies of the member states, except in the case of aggression." Again, he should look more closely at the Bogotá debates, which indicate that the ambiguous phraseology of the article was a product of a difference of opinion as to the desirability of hamstringing the OAS. Slater is likewise remiss in his treatment of the OAS-UN relationship. For instance, he maintains in Chapter 3 that one outcome of the Guatemalan affair was the "exclusion" of UN jurisdiction from the Western Hemisphere. In fact, the "try the OAS first" issue which the Guatemalan case raised reappeared in connection with Cuba with far less definitive results.

One may also quarrel with the author's refusal to grant anti-Communist measures the legitimizing label of collective security. He admits that his decision not to do so is "arbitrary," but it seems excessively arbitrary to this reader. Have the proponents of anti-Communist action been insincere in maintaining that their security has been threatened? Should the label attached hinge upon the "objective" correctness of their assessment? Must a collective security system treat every threat to the peace and each party to a dispute equally, or is this a model which is seldom, if ever, approximated in practice?

A last complaint might be that Slater has failed to place his subject in the perspective of a growing body of relevant theory. For all his use of the terms "integrative" and "disintegrative," he does not allude to the work of Haas and others in the field of international integration. Neither does he draw insights from international legal theory in his examination of nonintervention and other Charter norms. Finally, if all or most dictatorships are relatively inept at modernizing, as some political development theorists would have it, a pro-democracy policy may assume a new urgency and an even broader application than Slater intends.—YALE H. FERGUSON, *Rutgers—The State University.*

Overtaken by Events: The Dominican Crisis from the Fall of Trujillo to the Civil War. BY JOHN BARTLOW MARTIN. (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1966. Pp xvi, 821. $7.95.)

This book, probably the finest as well as the frankest memoir ever written by an American diplomat, is a readable and often exciting account of the critical period before and during the Dominican civil war of 1965. In addition to describing, movingly and compassionately, the social and political chaos in the Dominican Republic, and the absurdity which so frequently prevails in Caribbean politics, it is an interesting first hand account of the inner workings of an embassy and its staff during a period of crisis in a small and turbulent country. The author's portrayal of the spent and disoriented Dominican society which emerged from the death throes of Trujillo's tyrannical order, although perhaps too long, detailed, and somewhat disjointed, is nevertheless fascinating. Mr. Martin, a member of Adlai Stevenson's circle, who later moved to Kennedy's camp, was sent on a fact-finding mission to the Dominican Republic in 1961, at the time when Trujillistas were using the Communist bogeyman to influence us. He later served as ambassador during 1963–64, and again as special envoy of President Johnson during the revolution of 1965. The book covers the Kennedy administration's efforts to help the Dominicans build a free society on the ruins of Trujillo's old order on shaky political foundations, the presidency of Juan Bosch in 1963, and the civil war which swept away the delicate political arrangement that had been so laboriously built.

Divided into four parts, the book, after a brief introductory chapter on Dominican history and an account of the Trujillo era, deals in detail with the events which finally led to the taking of office of a democratically elected Dominican President for the first time in thirty-two years. Martin then deals with the Bosch regime and categorically asserts that U. S. policy was aimed at maintaining President Bosch in office, never at overthrowing him, and rejects the idea that our deeds constituted intervention. He maintains that we acted as "a moderator among contending forces, as a helping hand in a difficult time," and that every U. S. diplomatic effort was aimed at promoting the freedom of the Dominican people. Part IV relates how the Civil War of 1965 broke out and what he personally was called upon to do as presidential envoy. The book ends with some conclusions concerning United States policy toward Latin America and with some useful appendices. His suggestions regarding our foreign policy provide nothing new, and consist essentially of a plea for a continuation of the Kennedy policy of alignment with the forces at work for change in Latin America. In pointing out past mistakes and failures, he makes several keen observations, as for example when he challenges the idea that a burgeoning middle class will automatically advance political freedom and progressive ideas.

Martin's version of the U. S. armed intervention in 1965 is generally favorable to the administration and certain aspects of his account will be controversial. He maintains that there was a real danger of a Communist takeover, but his evidence is not too convincing. He argues that it was a question of the "bloodbath that fuses men and women of all ideologies into a fanatic mass and erases the fine distinctions that are possible in ordinary times." He further maintains that President Johnson had no choice but to send the troops or in the end a Communist-dominated government would have been established. If the Communists were so poorly organized, divided, and by and large ineffective, as he admits, it is difficult to believe that a Communist takeover was imminent. But even when dealing with these controversial aspects, Ambassador Martin's testimony is always straightforward and honest. In his lively, lucid, and very moving manner, he manages to convey the notion that the Dominican case is infinitely more complex than the majority of the world's public opinion supposed. He reminds us that when Trujillo fell, many believed a bloodbath inevitable. If it did not occur, it was mainly due to the presence of the U. S. fleet, the OAS, and the complicated political arrangements that led the country to elections. Bosch's accession to power collected and focused again all the hopes and aspirations which had been let loose by Trujillo's fall, and his subsequent overthrow cut them loose again. Under the Reid administration that succeeded it, these subsurface currents continued to undermine the regime. Seen thus, the 1965 upheaval was the end result of a revolutionary process that had been stifled by Trujillo's regime of institutionalized terror and eventually directed into peaceful channels by Bosch's election. Its roots of discontent were held in check first by Trujillo, then the OAS and the United States but they are much alive.

All in all, it is a fine book and a most valuable contribution. Minor sins, likely to be criticized by both U. S. and Latin-American liberals, do not diminish the intrinsic first-rate quality of Martin's memoirs.—Federico G. Gil, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.*

Soviet and Chinese Communist Power in the World Today. Ed. by Rodger Swearingen. (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1966. Pp. xii, 126. $3.95.)

The Communist States and the West. Ed. by Adam Bromke and Philip E. Uren. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Pp. vii, 242. $6.50.)

Most of the essays in *Soviet and Chinese Communist Power in the World Today* insist that the USSR and CPR continue to strive for "world domination," and that temporary lapses into a policy of peaceful coexistence should not be interpreted as a deviation from the commitment to create a Communist world. Although the changing international environment with which the Communist states must contend is stressed by Professor Philip E. Mosely, one of the contributors, most of the essays portray Soviet and Chinese foreign policy as primarily determined by the nature of their internal political systems, i.e., the "dynamic of one party dictatorship admits no modification of political structure or objective; they can be restrained only by superior political and military forces" (p. 73).

Since these essays tend to regard Communist "ideology" as synonymous with the more messianic utterances of Lenin, Mao Tse-tung, and Lin Piao, these statements of principle are perceived as the source of immediate policy objectives rather than as pious hopes for the future of the world. Because of this crude conception of ideology, most of the essays analyze Communist policy in terms of the conventional and misleading dichotomy between "ideology" and "power politics." They thereby ignore (1) the statist nature of the ideologies evolved by the Communist leaderships which allows them to represent policies designed to foster their own security needs and objectives as by definition hastening the "revolution," and (2) the close relationship between the analytic statements made by Communist leaders at a particular time, the existing international situation, and actual Communist foreign policies.

Furthermore, most of the essays fail to differentiate between interstate or governmental relationships and the ruling parties' conception of correct strategy for Communists throughout the non-Communist world. As a result, the authors' distinction between "moderate" and "militant" policies is blurred, while their treatment of the Sino-Soviet dispute is extremely oversimplified, e.g., such assertions as the CPC and CPSU agree that the "major technique" for eroding Western influence is the "war of national liberation" (p. 76), or that "over the question of coexistence, the Soviets are for it, the Chinese Communists are not" (p. 111).

Nevertheless, both Max Frankel and Professor Marshall Shulman avoid these pitfalls. Frankel attempts to deal with the current complexities within the Communist world while Professor Shulman makes a sophisticated effort to define American-Soviet relations. As opposed to most of the companion essays which stress internal and messianic ideological factors, Shulman emphasizes the "condition of the environment of international politics" as the major determinant of Communist foreign policies.

The essays in *The Communist States and the West* present a broad spectrum of interpretations of Communist foreign policy. Two of the most interesting are those by Professors Bernard Morris and John Kautsky. Morris presents the view (which would have been considered heresy a decade ago) that much of Soviet foreign policy after World War II was defensive, statist, and more concerned with the construction of a reliable security sphere than with the extension of "world revolution." Probably most significant, Morris sees Soviet policy during Stalin's last years as localized rather than "global" (pp. 23–24).

Kautsky carefully differentiates between Soviet foreign policy and local Communist strategies, contending that the USSR has in actual fact abandoned the idea of Communist-led social revolution as a foreign policy goal and that the CPSU has actually urged the local Communists, particularly in underdeveloped countries, to follow suit. However, he contends that such a major shift in priorities can be perceived only on a policy level and cannot be determined directly from Soviet public pronouncements because the leadership's words "can indeed, not be trusted" (p. 216). Nevertheless, Soviet public discussions of the non-Communist world have made it clear that "revolution" is at best something for the distant future, a fact which has accelerated the disaffection with the CPSU among the local Communists.

Both volumes illustrate the shortcomings of a collection of articles as opposed to a monograph on a particular subject. All but a few of the essays in the volume edited by Professor Swearingen tend to reinforce one particular interpretation, in this case, the conventional cold war wisdom of the late 1950's. In contrast, the essays in the collection edited by Professors Bromke and Uren include such diverse interpretations (which, unfortunately, are not directed toward one another) and cover so many geographic areas, that it is impossible to come to a consensus on the distinctive attributes of Communist foreign policies.—Jonathan Harris, *University of Pittsburgh.*

The Two Faces of Co-Existence. By Alfred Berzins. (New York: Robert Speller and Sons, 1967. Pp. 335, index. $6.00.)

Peaceful Coexistence: International Law in the Building of Communism. By Bernard A. Ramundo. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967. Pp. 262, index. $6.95.)

These two books are entirely different in spite of the similarity in titles. The tone of Mr. A. Berzins' book can be gauged by this introductory statement: " . . . the communist leaders in Moscow are still at the centre of the world communist conspiracy" (p. XI). Anyone who is familiar with the difficulties encountered by Moscow in its relations with the Chinese, Albanian, Cuban, Rumanian and several other parties could hardly agree with this categorical opinion. If the Soviet leaders themselves could read that other statement: "Cuba has, in fact, become a colony of the Soviet Union . . . " (p. 71), they would probably melancholically remark: "If it only were true!"

While there is no doubt that the Polish party has disappointed the hopeful Polish expectations of October 1956, it is another overstatement to say: "Thus, by and large, the communist dictatorship in Poland was again brought up to Soviet standards" (p. 118). Or is it true that: " . . . in actuality the communists have not allowed even one crack to appear in their iron curtain" (p. 314)?

The author supports his thesis, among others, by recalling the history of Stalin's imperialism in Eastern Europe. Approximately one half of the book is taken up by this true story which had been told several times before in other books, most of them better documented. Not all of these earlier books have been listed in the bibliography, which frequently does not mention the publication dates for the listed books.

The political purpose of the book is frankly stated: "All armed conflicts in Asia, Europe, Africa, and Latin America since the end of the

Second World War, with the exception of the Suez incident, have been organized and guided mainly by the Soviet Communist party. These facts clearly indicate that the most dangerous adversary of the United States is still to be found in the Soviet Union . . ." (pp. 303–304). Does the author really believe that the Russian Communists masterminded the Chinese-Indian, the Indian-Pakistani, or the federal Nigerian-Biafran hostilities, to mention a few examples?

The conclusion is logically deduced: ". . . the building of bridges between the communist regimes of the Soviet Union and the satellite countries, on the one hand, and the Western democracies, on the other, is not only useless, but might actually be harmful to the latter" (p. 316).

Lt. Colonel Ramundo's book is of an entirely different nature. It is a scholarly and richly documented study of the current Soviet interpretation of international law. The limitation of space does not allow for the rendering of full justice to this fine book. It suffices to mention that all the aspects of Soviet doctrine are carefully analyzed: basic concepts, the sources and subjects of international law, socialist international law, sovereignty, peace and war, colonialism, collective security, international organization, peaceful settlement of international disputes, arms control, and peaceful change. Perhaps one of the author's main contributions is his analysis of the Soviet concept of a sort of "natural law." This *ius cogens*, founded on the Marxist-Leninist "laws" of historical development, holds, according to Soviet lawyers, a place higher than the positive international law. The United Nations Charter in the Soviet interpretation is considered the main source of that *ius cogens* which is used as the criterion of validity of the rules of positive international law. The invention of that *ius cogens* allows the Soviet lawyers to select inconvenient treaties or rules of the customary international law and declare them null and void as allegedly contrary to the superior Marxist-Leninist "natural law." This is an easy way for evading the principles of *pacta sunt servanda* and of respect for generally recognized customary law, which principles the same lawyers dutifully acknowledge as universally binding on states. The concept of *ius cogens* might be very convenient for the Soviet government. However, if other governments followed suit and picked up what they liked or disliked from the existing international law, this law would become meaningless. What the Soviet lawyers seem to forget is the reciprocity which is the surest guarantee of the observance of international law. While Lt. Colonel Ramundo wisely observes that: "All states attempt to utilize international law to cloak their foreign policies with the mantle of legality" (p. 1), the Soviet concept of *ius cogens* goes too far in this direction.

Is this the last word said by Soviet lawyers? The author points out ". . . the increasingly status quo orientation" (p. 1) of Soviet foreign policy, mindful of Russia's national interests and fearful of nuclear risks. He rightly observes that the Soviet policy-makers are caught between "the conflicting demands of their practical need to support the status quo and their ideological commitment to support the forces of world revolution" (p. 2). He might also be right in the expectation that: ". . . the underlying premise of peaceful coexistence, a bipolar world of two ideologically opposed camps, is rapidly disappearing and a reformulation of the Soviet approach to international law may become necessary" (p. 234). If it is true that ". . . the policy of peaceful coexistence contemplates détente between East and West and not a series of confrontations on the issues of national liberation" (p. 234), then one should hope that Soviet lawyers will eventually be instructed to forget their ingenious invention of *ius cogens* and to interpret the positive international law in the spirit of a reasonable reciprocity.

Lt. Colonel Ramundo has offered to lawyers and political scientists, interested in the Soviet ways of thinking, a valuable reference book.—W. W. KULSKI, *Duke University.*

The Changing Face of Southeast Asia. BY AMRY VANDENBOSCH AND RICHARD BUTWELL. (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1966. Pp. 419. index. $7.50.)

This book is an up-dating of *Southeast Asia Among the World Powers* written by the same authors in 1957. The current study is again useful for the layman and the area specialist. It is timely and well-written.

The book begins with a brief introduction covering the role of geography, pre-Western institutions, colonialism, and nationalism in the emerging political systems of the region. Each country is then discussed primarily in a historical context. The study ends with a discussion of the impact of international relations and American foreign policy on the politics of Southeast Asia.

To this reviewer the best parts of the book are the brief analyses interspersed among the vast historical material. Especially good are the assessment of the abortive Communist coup in Indonesia in October 1965, the confrontation of Malaysia, recent American-Philippine relations, and the U Nu and Ne Win governments in Burma. There are a few errors in these chapters. The figure of 1,000,000 Malays living in southern Thailand is too high (p. 75). The United States did not follow a policy of cultural assimilation in the Philippines during the colonial era (p. 114). It is doubtful that the Communist rule established by Ho Chi Minh in North Vietnam after 1954 is similar in theory and practice to the authoritarian rule imposed by Ne Win in Burma after 1962 (p. 128). It is equally doubtful that the Vietnamese people living in northeastern Thailand are "overwhelmingly Communist" (p. 308). And it is probably wrong to predict that neither the United States nor the United Nations can prevent the "ultimate dominance" of Southeast Asia by Communist China (p. 332).

The chapters dealing with international relations and American foreign policy in Southeast Asia are the most provocative and stimulating. They are primarily analytical and interpretative in content. In places they are also ambiguous and contradictory. The reader cannot tell, for example, whether the authors believe that Western influence is decreasing or increasing in the region. In one section they state: "All factors considered, there has been a sharp decline in Western influence in Southeast Asia since the Second World War, particularly in the half-decade, 1960–1966" (p. 321). Shortly thereafter the authors add: "Western influence, though it clearly declined in the first decade after independence, remained strong nonetheless. Particularly did the United States increase its influence in the area during this period. The general decline in Western influence, however, probably impressed many persons more than it should have" (p. 328). No empirical data are presented to measure or assess this important interaction between external influences and Southeast Asia politics. The discussion on Vietnam is likewise uncertain and confusing. This reviewer was not certain whether the authors feel the United States is justified in defending South Vietnam or if they believe the Hanoi government has a legitimate right to promote subversion and aggression against the southern half of the country.

In spite of these shortcomings the book is informative and interesting. It contains much useful statistical data that have not appeared elsewhere. It also has new information on moves toward regional cooperation that has not been published before. It does add to our limited knowledge of the important region of Southeast Asia.—Frank C. Darling, *DePauw University*.

The Trauma of Decolonization: The Dutch and West New Guinea. By Arend Lijphart. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966. Pp. xi, 303. $7.50.)

Self-assuredness is not the stuff of high drama. The Portuguese colonialism *à l'outrance* in Angola and Mozambique has that straightforward and brutish quality of stale melodrama. The British withdrawal from India or Nigeria, on the other hand, lacking even melodrama, suggests nothing so much as the prosaic, unsentimental businessman cutting his losses by liquidating an enterprise which is faring poorly. There is a twinge of regret perhaps, but a brief glance at the accounts ledger soon extinguishes that. The Dutch liason with West New Guinea—as that of France with Indo-China and Algeria—however, has all the makings of great drama. The Hamletesque colonizer is beginning to lose confidence in himself and therefore in his mission to raise others to his estate, but his confidence is not so far sapped as to pass into cynicism. Vacillating between righteous indignation and melancholy, as the difficulties of his position mount, the hero inevitably succumbs, a victim of his own confusion and the taunts of others.

Lijphart's sensitive and searching account of Dutch efforts to retain this last symbol of their once mighty empire in the East Indies does full justice to its dramatic potential. First, he disposes quickly and effectively of the *Realpolitik* explanations of why Holland might have wanted to keep West New Guinea. The economic potential of the Dutch half of the island was—to compare it with another half-island kingdom—almost as lackluster as that of Haiti. Initial dreams of black gold collapsed when two of the three known oil fields were quickly exhausted and production from the third fell precipitously. Hopes that the island could become a homeland for surplus labor from Holland and for "Indies Dutchmen" (Eurasians) experienced a similar fate as colonizing groups went bankrupt and erstwhile pioneers returned home. Limping along on deficits made good by the Dutch Treasury and with little prospect of private gain (Crocodile skins and U.S. military scrap metal left over from W.W. II were among its most prominent exports!), Dutch New Guinea's economic prospects were altogether dreary. The case for the strategic value of New Guinea was equally hollow as SEATO, Australia, and the U.S. all declined to offer even moral support for Holland's position. Far from gaining anything, then, the Dutch stood to sacrifice a great deal for their reluctance to surrender New Guinea especially since it jeopardized their far more valuable interests in Indonesia itself.

One is quite accustomed to discover baser motives lurking behind a veil of righteousness and platitudes. The whole point of Lijphart's argument, however, is that the baser motives were in this case an insubstantial screen behind which more symbolic—albeit misguided—goals were pursued. Ultimately, the forces in Holland intent on retaining West New Guinea were motivated by sentiments similar to this appeal by one party spokesman: "Let the Netherlands show that it is not a small forgotten country on the North Sea, which is being driven back inside its national boundaries, but that it still possesses that old, tough, and tenacious spirit to make New Guinea into a New Holland" (pp. 120–121). But since such visceral attachments cannot by themselves pass for policy goals in this, the twentieth century, politicians and pressure groups resorted to quite fanciful claims for the strategic and economic value of West New Guinea. The deception as to the objective worth of the island was not so much premeditated as it was the result of selective perception engendered by a strong emotional commitment. Determined to keep New Guinea as an amulet against becoming just another small European nation, Dutchmen convinced themselves for a time that the island was objectively worth keeping too.

While it is somewhat unsportsmanlike to fault an author for neglecting something he did not set out to accomplish, it is regrettable that the dynamics of the psychological attraction of colonialism was not examined more thoroughly. Mannoni's brilliant essay, *Prospero and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonization* offers a host of raw propositions about the psychic satisfactions available to the colonizers which might have been profitably examined in this case. Instead, Lijphart confines himself largely to making a case for subjective factors in colonialism by showing the absence of more objective interests.

One last question nags the reader. The author intends to explain the Dutch *refusal* to decolonize West New Guinea but, in fact, when the going got rough, the Dutch surrendered control quite readily. In Indonesia—where more concrete interests were at stake—sovereignty was only transferred after four years of armed struggle. In Dutch New Guinea, on the other hand—where few if any concrete interests were involved—control was retained as long as the costs were small, but once military and diplomatic pressures reached even modest levels, the territory was abandoned. This comparison suggests that concrete interests (e.g., Indonesia) will be defended against greater odds than symbolic interests (e.g., New Guinea) when all is said and done and thus appears to undermine Lijphart's implicit assertion to the contrary.

Neither of these objections should obscure the fact that this work represents a major achievement in the political analysis of decolonization.—James C. Scott, *University of Wisconsin.*

ANNOUNCEMENTS

The sixty-fourth Annual Meeting of the Association will be held September 3–7, 1968 at the Washington-Hilton Hotel, Washington, D.C.

ARTICLES ACCEPTED FOR FUTURE PUBLICATION

June, 1968

Charles R. Adrian and Charles Press, "Decision Costs in Coalition Formation"
Robert Alford, "Voting Turnout in American Cities"
Steven J. Brams, "Measuring the Concentration of Power in Political Systems"
S. E. Finer, "Pareto and Pluto-Democracy"
Carl J. Friedrich, "Some Thoughts on the Relation of Political Theory to Anthropology"
Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "Organization Theory and the Explanation of Important Characteristics of Congress"
Dean Jaros, Herbert Hirsch, and Fred Fleron, "The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Sub-culture"
Charles O. Jones, "The Minority Party and Policy-Making in the House of Representatives"
Fred Kort, "A Nonlinear Model for the Analysis of Judicial Decisions"
Lewis Lipsitz, "If, as Verba Says, the State Functions as a Religion, What Are We to Do to Save Our Souls?"
Richard M. Merelman, "On the Neo-Elitist Critique of Community Power"
Bruce M. Russett, "Commentary on Brams' Measuring the Concentration of Power in Political Systems"
Michael J. Shapiro, "The House and the Federal Role: A Computer Simulation of Roll-Call Voting"

September, 1968

Richard Ashcraft, "Locke's State of Nature: Historical Fact or Moral Fiction?"
Edward N. Beiser, "The Reapportionment Cases: A Comparative Analysis of State and Federal Judicial Behavior"
Moshe M. Czudnowski, "A Salience Dimension for the Study of Political Culture"
Jerome M. Gilison, "Soviet Elections as a Measure of Dissent: The Missing One Percent"
A. James Gregor, "Political Sciences and the Uses of Functional Analysis"
Kenneth P. Langton and M. Kent Jennings, "Political Socialization and the High School Civics Curriculum in the United States"
Michael Leiserson, "Factions and Coalitions in One-Party Japan: An Explanation Based on the Theory of Games"
Milton G. Lodge, "Soviet Elite Attitudes in the Post-Stalin Era"
Martin C. Needler, "Political Development and Socioeconomic Development: The Case of Latin America"
Robert A. Schoenberger, "Conservatism, Personality and Political Extremism"
Joel J. Schwartz and William R. Keech, "Group Influence on the Policy Process in the Soviet Union"
J. David Singer, Bruce M. Russett, and Melvin Small, "National Political Units in the Twentieth Century: A Standardized List"
Jack E. Vincent, "National Attributes as Predictors of Delegate Attitudes at the United Nations"
Raymond E. Wolfinger and Fred I. Greenstein, "The Repeal of Fair Housing in California: An Analysis of Referendum Voting"

December, 1968

Paul R. Brass, "Indian Party Systems: Coalition Politics and the Formation of Non-Congress Governments in North India"
M. Margaret Conway and Frank B. Feigert, "Motivation, Incentive Systems, and the Political Party Organization"
Ernest A. Duff and John F. McCamant, "Measuring Social and Political Requirements for System Stability"
H. D. Forbes and Edward R. Tufte, "A Note of Caution in Causal Modelling"
Michael P. Gehlen, "The Soviet Central Committee: An Elite Analysis"
Ted Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A

Comparative Analysis Using New Indices"
Allan Kornberg and Hal N. Winsborough, "The Recruitment of Candidates for the Canadian House of Commons"
Michael Lipsky, "Protest as a Political Resource"
Allan G. Pulsipher and James L. Weatherby, Jr., "Malapportionment, Party Competition, and the Functional Distribution of Governmental Expenditures"
Harry M. Scoble and Robert R. Alford, "Sources of Local Political Involvement"
Ira Sharkansky, "Agency Requests, Gubernatorial Support and Budget Success in State Legislation"
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

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

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

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
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

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